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**A STUDY OF THE
WISDOM CHAPTER
(PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ PARICCHEDA)
OF THE
BODHICARYĀVATĀRAPAÑJIKĀ
OF
PRAJÑĀKARAMATI**

A Thesis submitted for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
of the Australian National University

May 1994

by

Peter R. Oldmeadow



**This thesis is the result of my own research
carried out between 1986 to 1994
at the Australian National University.**

Peter R. Oldmeadow

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to sincerely thank all those who helped bring this study to fruition. Firstly, I would like to thank my principal supervisor Emeritus Professor J.W. de Jong who introduced me to Sanskrit commentarial literature when I was an undergraduate student and who suggested that I study Prajñākaramati's *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* for my Doctoral thesis. It was he who revealed to me the expertise and thoroughness that is involved in this kind of scholarship, and gave me the inspiration to pursue the lengthy path of Buddhist textual studies. Throughout my studies he has advised me on the translation of the text and has suggested many corrections without which this translation would have been the poorer. My thanks are also extended to my other Sanskrit teachers Dr Luise Hercus and Dr Tissa Rajapatirana for their splendid teaching of the language. Dr Rajapatirana also introduced me to the study of Tibetan which has been a great pleasure. As my co-supervisor Dr Rajapatirana has offered many useful suggestions particularly concerning reading the Tibetan.

I am indebted to Miss Betty Kat, the linchpin and Secretary of the South and West Asia Centre for her willing, cheerful assistance and her remarkable efficiency over the years. The Australian National University and the Faculty of Asian Studies have been my place of study and work for most of the last decade and I thank them for the facilities, resources, and comradeship that I have found there.

For her wonderful support and for her excellent editorial assistance I particularly want to thank Wendy, my partner. Without her encouragement this project may never have come to fruition. I also have appreciated the help given by friends Richard Stanley and Lydia Nelson, who helped in tracking down materials, typing and proof-reading. Richard has trodden the path before me and has been a friend and adviser throughout. My sister Pamela, as always, in the matter of the thesis has been on hand to support and encourage.

Peter R. Oldmeadow, May 1994

PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ PARICCHEDA OF THE
BODHICARYĀVATĀRAPAÑJIKĀ OF PRAJÑĀKARAMATI

ABSTRACT

This thesis is a study of the heart of Prajñākaramati's *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*: the only commentary preserved in Sanskrit on Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, one of the most popular and influential texts in Mahāyāna Buddhism. The primary purpose of the thesis is an annotated translation of the *Prajñāpāramitā Pariccheda* (Wisdom Chapter) of the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*. The translation is based on Louis de La Vallée Poussin's edition of the Sanskrit text with close reference to the Tibetan translation. The annotations present material necessary to understand Prajñākaramati's commentary both regarding the terminology he uses and the context in which he was writing. The annotations identify sources of quotations and parallel passages in other texts, and provide references to scholarly material on the subject matter treated by Prajñākaramati. While the reference point for the translation has been the Sanskrit text the Tibetan translation has been studied as an aid to the translation. Note has been made of where the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts diverge and some variant readings have been offered on this basis. There is an appendix containing an edited version of the Derge (sDe dge) and Peking editions of the Tibetan translation. A short introduction outlines the scope of the work, presents the known facts concerning Śāntideva and Prajñākaramati and their works, and discusses scholarly research done on Prajñākaramati's commentary.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AK	<i>Abhidharmakośa</i> of Vasubandhu
AKBh	<i>Abhidharmakośabhāṣya</i> of Vasubandhu
BCA	<i>Bodhicaryāvatāra</i> of Śāntideva
BCAP	<i>Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā</i> of Prajñākaramati
BHSD	F. Edgerton (1953) <i>Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary</i>
BHSG	F. Edgerton (1953) <i>Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar</i>
CS	<i>Catuḥstava</i> of Nāgārjuna
CSV	<i>Catuḥśatakavṛtti</i> - in T.J.F. Tillemans (1990) <i>Materials for the Study of Āryadeva, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti</i>
D.	Derge (sDe dge) edition of the relevant text. See Y. Ejima et al (1978)
LVP	L. de La Vallée Poussin's edition of the <i>Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā</i> (1901-1914)
LVP Kośa	L. de La Vallée Poussin (1923-1931) <i>L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu</i>
LVP Douze Causes	L. de La Vallée Poussin (1913) <i>Théorie des douze causes</i>
MA	<i>Madhyamakāvatāra</i> of Candrakīrti
MMK	<i>Mūlamadhyamakakārikās</i> of Nāgārjuna
MV	<i>Madhyamakavṛttiḥ</i> of Candrakīrti
MW	M. Monier-Williams (1899) <i>A Sanskrit-English Dictionary</i> .
P.	Peking edition of the relevant text.
RA	<i>Ratnāvalī</i> of Nāgārjuna
Skt.	Sanskrit
ŚS	<i>Śikṣāsamuccaya</i> of Śāntideva
T.	Tibetan edition of the relevant text.
TS	<i>Tattvasaṅgraha</i> of Śāntarakṣita
TSP	<i>Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā</i> of Kamalaśīla
Vaidya	P.L. Vaidya's edition of the <i>Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā</i> (1960a)

INTRODUCTION

Scope of the Thesis

The *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* (BCAP) written by Prajñākaramati is the only commentary preserved in Sanskrit on Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (BCA), one of the most popular and influential texts in Mahāyāna Buddhism. The *Pañjikā* comments on nine out of the ten chapters. The commentary to the ninth chapter on the perfection of wisdom (*prajñāpāramitā*) is undoubtedly the heart of Prajñākaramati's work and accounts for nearly a half of his text: 263 pages out of 605 in L. de La Vallée Poussin's edition. In it Prajñākaramati, following Śāntideva's lead, declares wisdom as the culmination of the Buddhist path and presents the correct understanding of reality from the Madhyamaka point of view.

Given the fact that the *Pañjikā* is the only surviving Sanskrit commentary on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and is the oldest known commentary it is surprising that up until now it has not been translated into a European language. The aim of this thesis is to at least partially rectify this situation.

I have aimed to provide a fairly literal translation of the root verses and commentary of chapter nine within the intelligibility of standard English (although this has been strained at times). It seems to me important to initially establish the content of what Prajñākaramati is saying even if at the cost of elegant expression. I have also focused on conveying the structure underlying his commentary, a structure which is to some extent determined by the nature of the Sanskrit language. For this reason I have tried to remain close to Prajñākaramati's mode of expression and to the structure of the commentary where words and phrases cited from the text are interspersed with glosses and comments. This does not always lend itself to easy rendition into English.

Although I kept closely to the Sanskrit I have rearranged some of the English translation of the commentary to reflect English word order. Because of the structure of Prajñākaramati's commentary it has not always been possible or appropriate for the English translation to do this.

I have based my translation on L. de La Vallée Poussin's edition. La Vallée Poussin brought out first a romanised edition of the ninth chapter of the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* (*Bouddhisme, Etudes et Matériaux*, 1898) followed by an edition in Devanāgarī script in *Bibliotheca Indica* (1901-1914) which included all of the commentary available in Sanskrit on the basis of two manuscripts: one in Nepalese characters and another, containing only commentary on the ninth chapter, in Maithili characters. The root text of Śāntideva's BCA based on Minaev's edition along with his critical apparatus is included in La Vallée Poussin's edition.

La Vallée Poussin had intended to publish appendices to his edition containing sources etc. for the works cited by Prajñākaramati but it never eventuated. To meet this need Aiyaswami Sastri prepared a pamphlet called "A Guide to Quotations in the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*." This guide was published in his *Ārya Śālistamba Sūtra* (1950). Many quotations not identified by La Vallée Poussin have been identified by Aiyaswami Sastri. I have indicated these in the footnotes unless they were identified by a scholar prior to Aiyaswami Sastri in which case I have given the earlier reference.

In 1960 Vaidya brought out another Sanskrit edition of the *Pañjikā* including appendices containing a verse index and a list of Buddhist sūtras from which extracts have been used by Prajñākaramati. Vaidya's edition adds little to that of La Vallée Poussin and yet is missing much that is in the earlier edition. None of La Vallée Poussin's extremely useful footnotes in which he draws attention to textual problems and compares certain passages to the Tibetan translation have been included. Vaidya

has amended La Vallée Poussin's readings at various places yet has not offered any justification for his changes. It is true that he has amended many trivial scribal or typographical errors, yet in other cases he has made changes that are justified by neither the context nor the Tibetan translation. I have identified several such cases in the footnotes to the translation. Hahn's comments about Vaidya's re-edition of the *Madhyamakaśāstra* appear to be apposite to his edition of the Bodhicaryāvatāra: "Apart from the corrections of some of the most obvious printing mistakes no original textual criticism was done by VAIDYA. For that reason his re-edition can be neglected entirely for any critical study of the basic text."¹

The translation has been made with the aid of the Tibetan translation which keeps closely to the original Sanskrit. The Tibetan is an invaluable aid to interpretation of the Sanskrit text (although not by any means infallible). To help me in this task I have made an edited version of the Tibetan translation on the basis of the Derge (sDe dge) and Peking editions. The texts are presented as I read them with no attempt to establish a preferred reading. This represents an aid to reading the text and makes no pretensions to being a "critical edition." The edited Tibetan translation is provided in a separate volume as an appendix to this study. In general I have found the Derge edition to be the more reliable. Such amendments as suggested themselves to me as I made my translation have been noted in the footnotes to the translation.

I have followed the Sanskrit text in my translation unless otherwise noted. I have based the translation on the Tibetan when the Sanskrit text is unintelligible or appears to be corrupt. Where the Tibetan translation deviates from the Sanskrit I have noted it in the footnotes to the translation.

¹ Hahn (1982) p. 3.

Annotations are provided to the translation which explain some of the key terms and concepts used by Prajñākaramati. I have sometimes explicated his argument briefly when the way in which it has been expressed is particularly obscure. As far as possible I have noted, both in the commentary and elsewhere, the sources of the quotations and parallel passages particularly those that may have directly influenced Prajñākaramti.

Śāntideva and the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*

It is generally accepted that Śāntideva lived in the latter part of the seventh century and first half of the eighth century C.E. There are three accounts of his life by Tibetan Buddhist historians: Bu-ston (1290-1364), Tāranātha (1575- ?) and Sum-pa mkan po (Yeshes dPal-'byor) (1704-1788). According to these histories, which are embellished with all manner of hagiographical detail and legendary material, Śāntideva was born in Surāṣṭra in South India, the son of a king, Kalyāṇavarman. As a youth he adopted the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī and goddess Tārā as his spiritual guides. He went to Nālandā University and became a monk. He was considered lazy in his studies by other monks who tried to expose him by examining him in a test of recitation of scriptures. When it was his turn to recite, he asked the assembled monks if they would like to hear something they had not heard before. It was agreed, and Śāntideva recited the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*. During his recitation of the section on wisdom Śāntideva is said to have disappeared from view as he elevated into the sky.

Śāntideva is the author of two works, the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and the *Śikṣāṃuccaya*, and also possibly of a third work, the *Sūtrasamuccaya*, which is no longer extant. The *Śikṣāṃuccaya* is primarily a collection of extracts from Mahāyāna sūtras, most of which are no longer extant in their complete versions. It has been utilised extensively

by Prajñākaramati in his commentary on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and likewise by other Indian and Tibetan commentators on this text.

The *Bodhicaryāvatāra* is undoubtedly Śāntideva's great work, ranging in style from intense religious fervour to philosophical subtlety. It presents the bodhisattva path as a union of religious practice and intellectual understanding and, as such, has had a significant influence both on the philosophical development of ^{the} Madhyamaka school and on the more general view of how the perfections (*pāramitās*) of the bodhisattva should best be practised.

Buddhism was flourishing in the great monastic institutions such as Nālandā in the eight century at the time of the transmission of Buddhism to Tibet and it is in that country that the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* came to be particularly revered. From the colophon of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* we know that the text was first translated by the Indian scholar Sarvajñādeva and the Tibetan translator dPal-brtsegs in the early period of transmission and again in the eleventh century by the Indian scholar Dharmasrībhadrā and the Tibetan translators Rin-chen-bzañ-po and Śākya-blo-gros. It was re-edited and translated a third time by the Indian scholar, Sumatikīrti and the Tibetan translator Blo-ldan śes-rab.¹

The text that has come down to us comprises 913 verses in ten chapters. The existence of another version in 600 verses has long been known and has been referred to by Bu-ston, Tāranātha and others.² Only recently has a systematic study been undertaken of a shorter version of the text preserved in the manuscripts from Tun-huang in order to establish the relationship of the two versions. A. Saito (1993) has argued persuasively that the version attributed to Akṣayamati preserved in 701.5

¹ For a translation of the colophon see Saito (1993) pp. 16-17.

² See Saito (1993) pp. 14-22.

verses is an authentic version of Śāntideva's great work and that it has kept a "more reliable and authentic form of the text"¹ than the longer version which is better known to us.

Prajñākaramati's commentary is on the longer and widely known version of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and it is that version that concerns us here. The *Bodhicaryāvatāra* in 913 verses comprises ten chapters as follows: 1) *Bodhicittānuśaṃsa*, praise of the thought of enlightenment; 2) *Pāpadeśanā*, confession of sins; 3) *Bodhicittaparigraha*, taking up the thought of enlightenment; 4) *Bodhicittāpramāda*, heedfulness of the thought of enlightenment; 5) *Samprajanyarākṣaṇa*, guarding of mindfulness; 6) *Kṣāntipāramitā*, perfection of patience; 7) *Vīryapāramitā*, perfection of vigour; 8) *Dhyānapāramitā*, perfection of contemplation; 9) *Prajñāparamitā*, perfection of wisdom; 10) *Pariṇāmanā*, dedication of merit.

Prajñākaramati and the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*.

If little is reliably known of Śāntideva and his life, even less is known about Prajñākaramati. He is reported to have lived at Vikramaśīla, one of the last great monastic universities of north-eastern India. Chattopadhyaya suggests he was one of the Six Door-keeper scholars, at Vikramaśīla, who probably lived in the early eleventh century.² Ruegg suggests Prajñākaramati lived c. 950-1000. Other contemporary scholars are reported to have been Ratnākaraśānti, Jñānaśrīmitra, Nāropā and Śāntipā.³ Maitrīpāda met him and 'Brog-'mi was one of his Tibetan disciples.⁴

¹ *ibid.* p. 24.

² A. Chattopadhyaya (1967) pp. 100-112.

³ D. Chattopadhyaya (1970) p. 294 ff p. s206, and Ruegg (1981) p116.

⁴ Ruegg (1981) Appendix II footnote 405.

Tāranātha records that he was a monk and "a scholar in all the branches of learning and had the direct vision of *Mañjuśrī*."¹ The *Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛttipiṇḍārtha*, a work on Prajñāpāramitā doctrine, *Śisyalekhavṛtti* and *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*² are works attributed to him.

Vaidya proposes that Prajñākaramati wrote the commentary to chapter nine of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* first of all, and composed that for the first eight chapters at a later date.³ La Vallée Poussin had suggested that the authenticity of chapter ten of *Bodhicaryāvatāra* was doubtful because Prajñākaramati wrote no commentary to it.⁴

Vaidya⁵ and Ruegg both reject this view. Ruegg refers to the fact that although P.^{Prajñākaramati} wrote no commentary to chapter ten, he refers to it in *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* 1:33.⁶

Prajñākaramati's *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* is the best known and only complete Sanskrit commentary on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* that is extant. Ruegg notes that the first commentaries on the BCA appeared in the late tenth century.⁷ Saito⁸ cites ten commentaries current in the Tibetan tripiṭaka that were probably officially incorporated in 1334 by Bu-ston. The Tibetans regarded Prajñākaramati's commentary to *Bodhicaryāvatāra* as authoritative.⁹ Tsoñ-kha-pa refers to Prajñākaramati's BCAP several times, as a "great commentary" and as a good interpretation.¹⁰

1 D. Chattopadhyaya (1970) p. 295.

2 D. Chattopadhyaya (1970) p. 295.

3 Vaidya (1960a) ix.

4 Vaidya (1960a) vii-ix.

5 ibid.

6 Ruegg (1981) p. 84.

7 Ruegg (1981) p. 84 fn. 85.

8 Saito (1993) pp. 22-23.

9 Sweet (1977) p. 38.

10 Tsoñ-kha-pa in Hopkins (1980) p. 155.

Although Prajñākaramati lived perhaps three or four centuries after Śāntideva, he belonged to the same North Indian monastic tradition¹ and wrote in Sanskrit, the language of the original work. He drew heavily on Śāntideva's own compilation of quotations from the Mahāyāna sūtras, the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*. This work has been characterised as a "companion anthology of scriptural readings"² and Prajñākaramati has used it extensively to illustrate and amplify points made in Śāntideva's verses. As one would expect, Prajñākaramati quotes extensively from the works of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, great luminaries of the Madhyamaka tradition and forerunners of what came to be known as the Prāsaṅgika School. Prajñākaramati, of course, quotes verses from the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* which are central to any presentation of the Madhyamaka philosophy, but he also quotes from the whole range of Nāgārjuna's writing. For example, he quotes liberally from Nāgārjuna's *Catuḥstava* and it is in fact in his commentary that we find the first known usage of the name *Catuḥstava* to describe this collection of hymns.³ Of Candrakīrti's works, he draws most substantially on the *Madhyamakāvatāra* and the *Prasannapadā*. He is also very clearly indebted to Vasubandhu and in particular to the *Abhidharmakośa*. At times his wording is almost identical to Vasubandhu's quite apart from the verses he acknowledges as quotes. He also quotes a few verses from Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavarttika*. He refers to Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti by the term *Ācāryapādāḥ*, "Venerable Teacher." Thus Prajñākaramati uses this term in a wider sense than does Candrakīrti who in the *Prasannapadā* appears to use it exclusively for Nāgārjuna.⁴ One other figure who deserves mention is Śāntarakṣita on whom Prajñākaramati relies for his presentation of non-Buddhist schools.

¹ Sweet (1977) p. 38.

² Sweet (1984) p. 3.

³ See Tucci (1956) p. 236.

⁴ For example, on pp. 503.6 and 389.8, he uses *ācāryapādāḥ* when referring to Vasubandhu. See comments of de Jong (1978) p. 136.

Previous Scholarly Study of the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*

As detailed above, Louis de La Vallée Poussin brought out two editions of the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* between 1898 and 1914.

The translation of BCA which La Vallée Poussin brought out in 1907 has remained a key work for those intent on understanding Śāntideva's work. It is unusual in that it incorporates a considerable amount of material, more or less directly, from the *Pañjikā*, especially in the ninth chapter, in order to draw out the meaning of the text. One result of this is that he has translated the BCA very much in line with the *Pañjikā*.

Many translations in European languages followed, most of them incomplete.¹ Notable among them is Finot's translation *La Marche à Lumière*, (Paris 1920).² Surprisingly, given the enormous amount of interest in Śāntideva there is still no entirely satisfactory English translation of the verses based on the Sanskrit text. Matic's translation (1970) is unreliable throughout and most interested readers, it would appear, rely on Batchelor's translation (1979) which is based primarily on the Tibetan.

For my own study I have found La Vallée Poussin and Steinkellner's (1981) translations of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* to be the most useful. Steinkellner's translation has obviously been made with reference to Prajñākaramati's commentary and offers an exceptionally clear and faithful rendition of Śāntideva's verses.

¹ For details of translations into European and Asian languages, ancient and modern, see Pezzali (1968) pp. 50-65.

² See Steinkellner (1981) p. 21 for comments on this translation.

Murti, in his *Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (1960), frequently refers to Prajñākaramati's commentary and has quoted it liberally in his footnotes but usually without translation. Clearly Murti understood the *Pañjikā* to be an important source for material on Madhyamaka thought. This is consistent with his claim that the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and *Śikṣāsamuccaya* are "the most popular works in the entire Mahāyāna literature," and that they are "our chief sources for the Mādhyamika path of realisation."¹

A study of the ninth chapter of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* was made by M. Sweet in the mid 1970s as part of his PhD. program but it has only appeared as a xeroxed microfilm (1984). This is the first study to have paid significant attention to Prajñākaramati's whole commentary. Despite his many references to the *Pañjikā* Sweet's thesis contains virtually no translated material from it and in general appears to owe far more to the Tibetan commentarial tradition. It contains a translation of rGyal-Tshab's commentary on the BCA *spyod 'jug mam bśad rgyal sras 'jug ñogs*. Sweet's thesis, as well as giving a general exegesis of Śāntideva's ninth chapter, has a special section devoted to the two truths as understood by Prajñākaramati and later commentators.² Prajñākaramati's treatment of conventional and absolute truth in his commentary on verse two is quite extensive and has significantly influenced later thinkers such as Atiśa. Lindtner has translated this part of Prajñākaramati's commentary in his article "Atiśa's Introduction to the Two Truths, and its Sources," (1981).

In 1990 Parmananda Sharma published an English translation of Śāntideva's verses with a commentary of his own with the title *Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra: Original*

¹ Murti (1960) p. 101.

² Sweet has reworked the material in his thesis on the two truths and published it under the title "*Bodhicaryāvatāra* 9:2 As A Focus For Tibetan Interpretations of the Two Truths In the Prāsangikā Mādhyamika." (1979).

Sanskrit text with English translation and exposition based on Prajñākaramati's (sic) Pañjikā. Unfortunately this well intentioned work is full of serious errors and cannot even be recommended to the most casual reader. A better example of the kind of work that Sharma was aiming at is Tripāṭhī's Hindi commentary (1989) which, while not translating Prajñākaramati's commentary, presents a selection of material and comment which is in keeping with it.

As well as Sweet's thesis with its translation of rGyal-tshab's commentary, some other material based on Tibetan commentaries is available in English. For example Batchelor's translation (1979) of the verses of chapter nine is embedded in a translation of a Tibetan commentary, and Geshe Kelsang Gyatso's *Meaningful to Behold* (1980) contains material from Tibetan commentaries. Williams brings together material from various commentaries including that of Prajñākaramati and several Tibetan commentaries on the topic of *prakṛtinirvāṇa* "natural nirvāṇa" in his article "On *Prakṛtinirvāṇa / Prakṛtinirvṛta* in the *Bodhicāryāvatāra*: A Study of the Indo-Tibetan Commentarial Tradition." The material from the various Tibetan traditions contained in all these works is, of course, interesting insofar as it offers insights into how the Tibetan tradition has understood the *Bodhicāryāvatāra*; however as aids to translating the verses from Sanskrit and, more particularly, for translating Prajñākaramati's work the Tibetan commentaries are of surprisingly little use.

PARTIAL LIST OF TOPICS IN PRAJÑĀKARAMATTI'S COMMENTARY

- 342.1 Invocation.
- 342.2 Introductory verses on the perfection of wisdom and the commentator's motivation.
- 343.7 The relationship of wisdom with the other perfections and the necessity to generate it in order to end suffering.
- 343.7 The other perfections devoid of wisdom do not procure buddhahood.
- 344.6 The assemblage of giving etc. has wisdom as its aim.
- 345.17 One should not think wisdom alone is the means of accomplishing buddhahood.
- 346.5 The significance of the designation "[Silent] Sage."
- 346.10 The *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras* on the relationship of wisdom and the other perfections.
- 348.4 The verse alternatively understood: mental calm has wisdom as its aim.
- 349.6 One should generate wisdom because it is the aim of the assemblage of giving etc.
- 349.9 Wisdom is twofold as cause and effect.
- 350.3 Explanation of suffering, cessation, and the desire for that cessation.
- 351.13 The two truths: conventional and absolute.
- 352.5 Conventional truth defined.
- 353.7 Two types of conventional truth: true conventional and false conventional.
- 354.3 Absolute truth defined.
- 354.9 No real essential nature is possible.
- 354.18 Impossibility of origination from a totality of causes.
- 355.15 Impossibility of origination in connection with a cause which is self, other, both self and other, or in connection with no cause.

- 357.15 Real essential nature does not withstand examination as "one" or "many."
- 358.3 Only absence of essential nature is the absolute and just that is the supreme aim.
- 358.6 One should not be conceptually attached to the absolute. Nothing should be considered the object of conceptual attachment.
- 359.15 The difference between conventional and absolute truth.
- 362.3 The four noble truths are included in the two truths.
- 362.9 Why conventional truth is called a "truth."
- 363.3 Reality is not the domain of intellect: the nature of absolute truth.
- 363.7 The absolute, not being an object of knowledge, is explained to some extent with the help of the conventional.
- 366.6 Intellect is concealing (relative): it is not possible that it apprehend absolute nature.
- 367.10 Absolute truth is personally realised by the saints.
- 367.16 Two types of people: yogins and ordinary people and their understanding in relation to the two truths.**
- 368.3 Yogins and ordinary people defined.
- 368.13 Ordinary people are refuted by yogins.
- 370.3 Yogins are refuted by yogins on a higher spiritual level.
- 371.1 How one understands that ordinary knowledge is in error.
- 372.5 How bodhisattvas engage in giving etc. for the sake of the goal despite knowing reality.
- 373.9 The disagreement between the world and yogins.
- 374.12 Answering the Sautrāntikas and other Realist opponents.**
- 375.7 [Opponent] How can the reality of form etc. which are directly perceived be denied?
- 374.16 From etc. are established by direct perception, a valid means of knowledge, by general acceptance. They are established conventionally, not absolutely.

- 375.7 General acceptance is wrong because it apprehends purity etc. in what is impure etc.
- 375.14 [Opponent] Doesn't scripture establish form etc. as real since the Blessed One teaches that the psycho-physical groups etc. are momentary?
- 376.3 The Blessed One, knowing the propensities etc. of beings, taught the psycho-physical groups etc. conventionally. He did not teach them absolutely.
- 376.17 [Opponent] But the psycho-physical groups etc. are not perceived as permanent. How can one say that their conventional nature is momentary?
- 377.12 Momentariness etc. are the objects of the conventional usage of yogins: compared to the world they see reality.
- 378.12 This must be assented to by the realist otherwise yogins would be refuted by the world in determining a woman's body as impure, and this the realist cannot accept.
- 379.4 All *dharmas* have the nature of an illusion. Yes, even the Buddhas have the nature of an illusion.
- 380.1 [Opponent] How can merit and sin arise from worship etc. of the Blessed One if he is similar to an illusion?
- 380.9 It makes no difference whether the Blessed One is real or an illusion: the principle of conditioned arising of merit and sin applies to both cases.
- 380.18 [Opponent] If a being is an illusion, once dead, why would he be born again?
- 381.13 As long as there is the assemblage of conditions illusion occurs.
- 382.3 Mere length of continuity does not establish that a being really exists.
- 382.12 [Opponent] There would be no destruction of life when slaying a person, illusory or otherwise, and hence no sin.
- 382.16 There is no sin in killing an illusory person because of the absence of mind in an illusory person.

- 383.6 When the person is endowed with an illusory mind there is the arising of sin and merit.
- 383.12 [Opponent] Illusions do not have an illusory mind because mantras etc. which produce them do not have the capacity to produce such a mind.
- 384.4 Illusion is of various sorts arising from various conditions.
- 384.14 A single condition does not have the capacity for every effect. One illusion arises through the power of mantras, another through the power of ignorance.
- 385.8 [Opponent] If one in nirvāṇa absolutely were to continue in saṃsāra conventionally then what would be the use of activity for awakening?
- 386.8 If the conditions are not extirpated illusion continues; when the conditions are destroyed there is no arising even conventionally.
- 386.14 Explanation of dependent origination from the *Śālistambasūtra*.
- 389.14 Refutation of the Yogācāra disagreements.
- 390.1 [Opponent] If everything is an illusion, how is anything perceived without there being a real apprehending mind?
- 390.7 When for the Yogācāra illusion itself does not exist, then what is perceived?
- 390.15 Even if what is perceived is an aspect of mind it is other than mind.
- 391.2 If it is accepted that illusion is not other, and mind itself is the illusion, what is seen by what?
- 391.8 [Opponent] There is no damage to our position because cognition is self-aware.
- 391.14 Mind does not see mind. The operation in regard to its own self is contradictory.
- 392.4 Just as a sword blade does not cut itself so mind does not see itself.
- 392.10 Searching for the mind according to the *Ratnacūḍasūtra*.

- 400.12 Even memory is not established through being a cognition.
- 401.4 Even cause and effect are in absolute terms without existence and cannot establish self-awareness absolutely. If self-awareness is accepted through conventional usage it belongs to the conceptual and the conventional.
- 401.10 How there is memory without self-awareness on account of the connection.
- 402.16 [Opponent] Just as another mind is seen by a mind endowed with certain conditions, so one's own mind is seen because of particular conditions.
- 403.11 What is seen because of something is not thing itself.
- 404.2 [Opponent] An object is evident because cognition makes evident what is not evident; without the perception of the cognition how is an object perceived? Everything described conventionally as "the seen" would not exist.
- 404.11 In absolute terms "the seen" etc. does not exist.
- 405.1 How it is seen etc. conventionally is not negated.
- 405.8 [Opponent] What then is negated?
- 405.11 Conceptualisation of them as real is rejected.
- 406.10 Rejection of the postulate that illusion is neither the same as nor different from mind which alone is real.
- 407.17 Just as illusion though unreal is able to be seen, so mind though unreal is the seer.
- 408.17 If the basis of saṃsāra were substantially real mind, saṃsāra would be either identical with mind and hence not to be abandoned, or different to mind and hence a complete non-entity like space.
- 409.2 A non-entity (saṃsāra) could not have causal efficacy by relying on a real entity (mind).
- 410.7 It turns out that mind is alone without an other.
- 410.15 If mind is free of the apprehensible object then all are Tathāgatas. Cultivating the noble path would be worthless.

NOTES TO THE SANSKRIT TRANSLATION

This translation is based on the original Sanskrit, following La Vallée Poussin's edition. The verses from the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* are in bold typeface, quoted immediately above the relevant *Pañjikā* commentary and then embedded within the translated commentary, as cited by Prajñākaramati.

Numbers given at the beginning of each paragraph of the commentary are from the La Vallée Poussin edition of the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*. Tibetan paragraph numbers for the text contained in the appendix also correspond to the La Vallée Poussin edition. Further notes to the Tibetan text are contained in the appendix.

My reference point for the translation is always the Sanskrit text. Wherever it provides an intelligible reading, I have followed it. Where the Tibetan differs from the Sanskrit text I have noted it as a variant reading in the footnotes. Where the Sanskrit text appears corrupt, the Tibetan text has been consulted to provide a possible amendment.

A few Sanskrit words have been retained in the translation. "Saṃsara" and "nirvāṇa" are not italicised in the translation and are treated as legitimate English words, as are various terms such as "tathāgata", "arhat" and "sugata". The word "Dharma" with uppercase "D" refers to the doctrine or teachings of the Buddha. When it is used in the sense of "constituent of reality", it is rendered as "*dharmā*" with a lower case "d."

Some explanatory material is contained in brackets, often clarifying pronominal referents. (It is characteristic of this commentarial style to use a pronoun wherever possible.)

The letters a, b, c, d, placed after the verse number, refer to the pāda of the verse. Where only a partial pāda has been quoted (following the textual break up used by La Vallée Poussin), the relevant letter has been underlined.

In the footnotes, where a dot point followed by a number is given after a reference this number refers to the line number. e.g. the digit 2 in p. 349.2 refers to line number two. If there is no attributed source for a page reference, the reference is to the La Vallée Poussin edition.

Om. Obeisance to the Protector of the World. Om. Obeisance to the Lord of the World.¹

That² which being stainless is the highest station³, which has abandoned all conceptual elaboration⁴, and is free of the sullyng influences⁵, is declared with obscured⁶ words: the perfection of wisdom⁷ etc.⁸ Having

¹ T. 'phags pa 'jam dpal g'zon nur gyur pa la phyag 'tshal lo = mañjuśrīye kumārabhūtāya namaḥ 'Homage to Mañjuśrī the Youth.'

² T. gañ dag. Read gañ zig. See LVP p. 342 fn. 3.

³ T. go 'phañ ldan 'possessed of highest station.' LVP, p. 342 fn. 4, suggests Skt. equivalent *niruttarapadavatī* but *go 'phañ ldan* may also translate *niruttarapadaṃ* understood as a bahuvrīhi (exocentric) compound qualifying *prajñāpāramitādi* T. śes rab la sogs pha rol phyin par. This would require reading Skt. *prajñāpāramitādi saṃvṛtipadair* in place of *prajñāpāramitādisaṃvṛtipadair*. (But see fn. 8 below.) On the use of *ldan* in translating bahuvrīhi compounds cf. Weller (1952) p. 271.

⁴ *prapañca*. *Prapañca* is closely associated with *vikalpa* (conceptual differentiation) and represents the proliferation or elaboration of names and things discriminated by *vikalpa*. May (1959), p. 175 fn. 562, explains: '*Prapañca*, littéralement "expansion", tib. *spros pa*, me paraît désigner non pas tant la fonction de pensée discursive, correspondant, sous divers aspects, à *vikalpa*, *vitarka*, *vicāra*, que l'opération de cette fonction ("expansion", différenciation du réel global en objets et en concepts distincts ...), et le résultat de cette opération, c'est-à-dire le monde constitué en objets et concepts distincts ..., avec les termes qui désignent ces concepts ...' It thus also reflects the fact that the 'subjective' and 'objective' worlds cannot be separated from each other. In the elaboration of duality 'things' and our naming of them are always given together. (On this point see Lindtner (1982) p. 271.) Schmithausen (1969), pp. 137 ff., shows that *prapañca* is closely associated with three groups of concepts: speech (*vāk*, *abhilāpa*); conceptual differentiation, imagination (*vikalpa*); and mental effort and disquiet (*abhisamskāra*).

⁵ *anāsrava*. *Āsravas* are evil influences that sully the *dharmas* (constituents of reality) and bind a person to *saṃsāra*. They are sensuality (*kāma*), becoming or attachment to continued existence (*bhava*) and ignorance (*avidyā*). Sometimes false views (*drṣṭi*) are included as a fourth. See Dayal (1932) pp. 109, 116 ff.

⁶ *saṃvṛti*. *Saṃvṛti* means both "obscured" or "concealed" and "conventional." The verse plays on the words *saṃvṛti*, *vivṛti* ("disclosure" or "explanation") and *nirvṛtti* ("cessation [of suffering]," i.e., *nirvāṇa*).

⁷ *prajñā*. No English word has the same connotations as *prajñā*. According to the Abhidharma systems *prajñā* is a *dharma* (constituent element) present in every

made obeisance to that, which those with stainless intelligence understand completely and attain the supreme cessation, I disclose it duly with lucid words.

Can I, my mind perplexed, explain the meaning of that about which the learned teacher Śāntideva, that repository of virtue who has reached the further shore of the ocean of explanation, is able to speak clearly? Nevertheless, since through the practice of wisdom there is unequalled merit, I am undertaking it.

My mind does not have any impression of a trace of virtue, I have not

moment of consciousness. On an ordinary level *prajñā* is synonymous with *mati* and simply means understanding. But, as Th. Stcherbatsky (1923), p. 50, points out, *prajñā* acquires a particular importance within the stream of becoming (*saṃtāna*) where it may develop and act as an antidote to the defilements (*kleśa*). In the Abhidharma systems, *prajñā* is understood to achieve this by discriminating the elements (*dharmapracaya*) whereby it is seen that there is no abiding self (*ātman, pudgala*) and the dharmas are gradually suppressed becoming *anupattidharmas*, constituent elements whose manifestation power has been suppressed forever. All the Abhidharma systems define *prajñā* as *dharmapracaya* However to translate *prajñā* as discrimination in the context of Madhyamaka thought would be misleading. Here *prajñā* does not merely discriminate *dharmas* leading to their suppression. From the Madhyamaka perspective ultimately there are no *dharmas* to suppress and nothing to discriminate! *Prajñā* as a perfection (*pāramitā*) is that faculty which allows us to move from the conventional (*saṃvṛti*) level to that of the absolute (*paramārtha*) level. By means of *prajñā* we see that all things (*dharmas* in the wider sense) are empty (*śūnya*) and without independent existence or essential nature (*niḥsvabhāva*). As such *prajñā* may be inadequately translated as 'wisdom.' It may also be translated, where appropriate, as 'insight' (= *vipaśyanā*) and 'discernment' (= *pravicaya*). The degrees of *prajñā* are also traditionally expressed by its division into three types (*trividhā*): *śruti*, *cintā* and *bhāvanā*, consisting of listening or understanding, of reflecting, and of direct experience in meditation. The three types are referred to below on p. 349.12.

⁸ T. *śes rab la sogs pha rol phyin par = prajñādīpāramitā*. See LVP p. 342 fn. 6.

acquired the quality of mental dexterity, nevertheless it is the result of attendance on a spiritual friend that speech of mine¹ streams forth towards such.

343.7 Now, any great being, inasmuch as they have attended on a spiritual friend because of [belonging to] a special spiritual family², suffers for the suffering of all living beings belonging to the triple world.³ They are indifferent to their own happiness and intend to eradicate the entire suffering of all animate beings. They believe that buddhahood alone⁴ is the means of stopping that suffering and with the desire to attain it generate the mind intent on awakening (*bodhicitta*).⁵ They engage duly in giving etc. for the sake of completing the two accumulations⁶ which are the means of bringing about the station of a Sugata.⁷ Although, being so engaged, they are fully endowed with mental calm⁸, their giving etc., devoid of wisdom, does not procure them buddhahood, the determining factor in accomplishing the aim of the

¹ T. *gañ phyir ... de ltar de lta bu la ñag* 'because [it is the result ...], in this way speech [streams forth] towards such. T. perhaps reads *yad evam etādr̥ṣī vāk* in place of *yad eva me tādr̥ṣī vāk*.

² T. *gañ žig rigs kyi khyad par 'ga' las = yaḥ kasmāc cid gotraviśeṣāt*. See LVP p. 343 fn. 5. There are five spiritual families (*gotra*): disciples (*śrāvaka*), solitary buddhas (*pratyekabuddha*), bodhisattvas, those of undetermined family (*aniyatagotra*), and those without a family (*agotra*). The *gotra* referred to here is, of course, that of a bodhisattva. For a detailed treatment of the question of the *gotras* and their relationship to the vehicles (*yāna*) and the spiritual element (*dhātu*) said to be present in all beings see Ruegg (1969), (1977b).

³ *trijagat*. i.e., *samsāra*. Equivalent to the triple states of existence (*trihava*) or the three realms (*tridhātu*), namely, the desire (*kāma*), form (*rūpa*), and formless (*arūpa*) realms.

⁴ *eva* T. '*di ltar = evaṃ* 'in this way.'

⁵ Chapter III deals specifically with the acceptance and generation of *bodhicitta*; chapter IV with heedfulness in developing and protecting it.

⁶ Accumulations (*sambhāra*) of merit (*puṇya*) and knowledge (*jñāna*). See p. 344.14.

⁷ i.e., buddhahood.

⁸ T. *ži gnas dan yañ dag par ldan par 'gyur pas*.

world. With this in view one seeking liberation from the suffering of samsāra should certainly strive to generate wisdom. As was said:

Insight well endowed with mental calm ...¹

Mental calm was explained there. Now, explaining insight, of which another name is wisdom², attained immediately after that³, he says:

1. **Since, the Sage has said, this entire assemblage has wisdom as its aim, therefore one should generate wisdom with the desire for the cessation of suffering.**

344.6 **This** is the giving etc. explained in terms of characteristics immediately preceding in this treatise. With the word "this" he indicates it as being present. **Assemblage** is a retinue, a party⁴, that is to say, a collection. **All**⁵ is what is of the said kind and more.⁶ It connects with **since, the Sage has said, [this] has wisdom as its aim**. Wisdom, characterised by the discernment of the reality of dependently arisen entities as they are is itself the aim. That assemblage characterised by giving etc. whose purpose it is inasmuch as it brings about the state of cause of complete awakening is called thus [i.e., one whose aim is wisdom]⁷ since wisdom

1 IIX 4. Alternative translations are possible: 'well endowed with insight on account of mental calm;' 'well endowed with insight together with mental calm.' *yadi vā hetvarthe tṛtīyā / śamathena hetunā vipaśyanāsuṣyuktaḥ / sahārthe vā / śamathena sārddhaṃ vipaśyanāsuṣyukta iti.* p. 287.

2 Cf. p. 287 *vipaśyanā yathābhūtatattvaparijñānasvabhāvā prajñā.*

3 T. *de'i rjes la thob pa'i lhag mthoñ gi miñ can śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa bstan pa'i phyir* 'to explain the perfection of wisdom, called "insight," attained immediately after that [mental calm].'

4 T. ris. Read *paricchadaṃ* in place of *paricchedaṃ*?

5 T. *brjod pa* 'said.' T. reads *uktaṃ* in place of *sarvaṃ*.

6 T. *brjod* (D. *rjod*) *pa'i mam pa dañ gzan yañ ste.*

7 The commentary here indicates that *parikaraṃ* is qualified by the *bahuvrīhi* (exocentric) compound *prajñārthaṃ*. *Parikaraṃ prajñārthaṃ* lit. 'assemblage

whose essential nature is the discernment of *dharmas* is primary among giving and the other perfections.

344.14 For so it is : Giving is the first cause for the attainment of the awakening of a complete buddha because it belongs to the accumulation of merit. And that, adorned with morality, procuring a succession of favourable states of existence¹ endowed with the means of enjoying happiness, is a cause for acquiring unexcelled knowledge. Patience too, protecting the accumulation consisting in the virtuous deeds of giving and morality inasmuch as it is a counteragent to anger which is adverse to them, acts towards the realisation of the Sugata state. And since the wholesome, arising from the three beginning with giving termed "the accumulation of merit" and that generated by meditative concentration etc. termed "the accumulation of knowledge" does not come about without strenuousness, that too, inasmuch as it is a cause of both accumulations, arises to dispel all the obscurations.² And since thorough knowledge of things as they are arises for one whose mind is concentrated, the perfection of meditative concentration also occurs as a cause of unexcelled knowledge.

345.6 Though, in this way, giving etc. be accumulated zealously, without wisdom they are not causes for the realisation of the station of a Sugata³ and hence do not receive the designation "perfections." However, partaking of the complete purity effected by wisdom, following conformably to that insofar as their activity is unimpeded and lofty, they acquire the state of cause for that and receive the name "perfections."

whose aim is wisdom.'

- 1 i.e., a propitious rebirth as a god or human being: *sugatiṃ śobhanāṃ devamanuṣyagatiṃ*. p. 595.8.
- 2 The obscurations (*āvaraṇa*) by the defilements (*kleśa*) and on account of the cognisable (*jñeya*). See verse 55 and commentary.
- 3 T. *bla na med pa'i go 'phan* = *anuttarapada* 'highest station.'

345.11 Completely purified thus by wisdom as a consequence of the non-perception of the triad of giver, gift and recipient¹ etc., practised assiduously and uninterruptedly for a long time, they reach the limit of excellence. They cause the attainment of the Dharma-body² of the Tathāgata which is free of the stain of³ the entire network of dichotomising conceptualisation proceeding from ignorance; which is free of the obscurations by the defilements and on account of the cognisable⁴; whose essential nature is the realisation of both kinds of non-self⁵; which is the basis of the accomplishment of all one's own and others' benefit; and whose true nature is the absolute. For this reason, as giving etc. have wisdom as their chief they are said to be secondary.⁶

345.17 But one should not say, "If, of giving etc., wisdom is the chief, that alone must be the means of bringing about complete awakening. What is the use of the others⁷, of giving etc.?" The purpose of those other than that [wisdom] has been described. By themselves, giving etc. are without an eye as it were.⁸ Only led by wisdom⁹ do they proceed to the spiritual level of a Sugata as intended. Therefore, they

¹ These are the three points (*koṭi*) or spheres (*maṇḍala*). See below p. 604.5.

² The Dharma-body (*dharmakāya*) is the absolute as an actual fact of experience or realisation. The 'objective' dimension of the absolute is the sphere of the real (*dharmadhātu*). See Takasaki (1966b).

³ T. does not translate *mala* 'stain.'

⁴ *kleśajñeyāvaraṇa*. Moral defilements (*kleśa*) always have an affective dimension and are an obscuration to the peace of nirvāṇa; the cognisable (*jñeya*) because they are falsely attributed (*samāropita*) are an intellectual obscuration to the omniscience (*sarvajñatā*) of the buddhas. See verse 55 and commentary.

⁵ Non-self of person (*pudgala*) and *dharmas*.

⁶ T. *śes rab ni gtso bo yin la / sbyin pa la sogs pa ni phal par brjod do* 'As wisdom is chief, giving etc. are said to be secondary.' See LVP p. 345 fn. 3.

⁷ T. does not translate *aparair* 'of the others.'

⁸ T. does not translate *iva* 'as it were.'

⁹ T. *śes rab kyī mig dan ldan pa ñid kyis* 'only endowed with the eye of wisdom.'

are said to lead to wisdom. However, wisdom alone is not the means of accomplishing perfect complete awakening. Therefore it is established that the assemblage of giving etc. has wisdom as its aim.

346.5 The [Silent] Sage (*muni*), the Buddha, the Blessed One, is so because he has abandoned all conceptualisation, because he is silent on the two extremes of attribution and denial¹, or because he is endowed with the three silences² characteristic of the actions of body, speech and mind of the one beyond learning. Firmly intent on the protection of all the worlds suffering from the threefold suffering³, he has said, has spoken, has stated, is the meaning. In the noble *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras* he has stated that the assemblage of giving etc. respectively have wisdom as their aim.

346.10 As is said in the noble *Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*⁴ : "Just as, Subhūti, the orb of the sun and the orb of the moon perform their function in the four

¹ Attribution (*samāropa*) attributes too much reality to things understanding them to have independent existence or essential nature (*svabhāva*) when in reality (*vastutas, paramārthatas*) they are without independent existence or essential nature (*niḥsvabhāva*); it leads to the extreme of *asti* 'it is.' Denial (*apavāda*) denies all reality to things thus ignoring that conventionally (*saṃvṛtitas*) they are dependently arisen (*pratītyasamutpanna*); it leads to the extreme of *nāsti* 'it is not.' By his 'silence' the Buddha refuses to affirm or deny and thus avoids either extreme. On the relationship between the Buddha's silence and the development of Madhyamaka thought see Murti (1960) pp. 36-54.

² T. *thub pa gsum* 'three capacities.'

³ *triduḥkhatā*. Suffering as suffering (*duḥkha*); suffering of conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*); and suffering of change (*vipariṇāma*). See AKBh VI 3. For a detailed discussion of *triduḥkhatā* see Schmithausen (1977) pp. 918-31.

⁴ The quoted passage corresponds to two passages in the Gilgit manuscript of the *Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā* ed. Conze (1962) pp. 111.23-112.10, 112.23-113.3. The second passage begins *tadyathāpi nāma subhūte yāḥ kāścana kunadyaḥ* 'Just as, Subhūti, whatsoever small rivers.' Conze notes, p. 111 fn. x, that these passages are quoted in the *Pañjikā* and has noted the variants. He observes, p. xiv, that this manuscript is very similar to the Cambridge manuscript (Add 1632) of the *Śatasāhasrikā*.

continents, go after the four continents, follow them, even so Subhūti, does the perfection of wisdom perform its function in the five perfections, goes after the five perfections, follows them. If they are separated from the perfection of wisdom the five perfections do not receive the name 'perfections'. Just as, Subhūti, a Cakravartin King separated from the seven jewels [of state]¹ does not receive the name 'Cakravartin' even so, Subhūti, if the five perfections are separated from the perfection of wisdom they do not receive the name 'perfections'. Just as, Subhūti, whatsoever small rivers there are, they all go wherever the Great River Ganges goes: together with the Great River Ganges they go to the ocean. Even so, Subhūti, the five perfections taken hold of by wisdom go wherever the knowledge of all aspects² goes," and so on.

347.8 And again, it is said: "This perfection of wisdom of the Bodhisattvas, the Great Beings, Kauśika, surpasses the perfection of giving, surpasses the perfection of

¹ T. *'khor los sgyur ba'i rgyal po dañ bral ba / rin po che sna bdun gyis 'khor los sgyur ba'i miñ mi 'thob* 'if separated from a Cakravartin King, the seven jewels do not receive the name "Cakravartin" ' AKBh III 96 p. 186 *sūtra uktaṃ rājñāś cakravartino loke prādurbhavāt saptānāṃ ratnānāṃ loke prādurbhavo bhavati / tadyathā cakraratnasya hastiratnasyāśvaratnasya maṇiratnasya strīratnasya gṛhapatiratnasya pariṇāyakaratnasyeti* 'In the sūtra it is said: "Because of the appearance in the world of a Cakravartin King seven jewels appear in the world: a precious wheel, a precious elephant, a precious horse, a precious treasure, a precious woman, a precious minister and a precious military adviser." '

² *sarvākārajñatā*. Aspect (*ākāra*) according to AKBh VII 13b p. 401 is the mode in which one apprehends an object of consciousness (*ālambanagrahaṇaprakāra*) as impermanent etc. Sixteen such aspects are taught (AKBh 13a p. 400) in association with the four noble truths. In the Mahāyāna *sarvākārajñatā* distinguishes the omniscience of a buddha from the other two kinds of omniscience (*sarvajñatā*): omniscience in regard to the path possessed by bodhisattvas, and omniscience in regard to the empirical world accessible to śrāvakas (disciples) and solitary buddhas (*pratyekabuddha*). Chapters I-IV of the *Abhisamayālamkāra* deals with this distinction in detail. Obermiller, (1932) p. 64, in his study of the *Abhisamayālamkāra* characterises *sarvākārajñatā* as 'knowledge of all the aspects of existence as being devoid of an independent separate reality and as not being liable to origination from the standpoint of the absolute.'

morality, surpasses the perfection of patience, [surpasses the perfection of strenuousness]¹, surpasses the perfection of meditative concentration. ²Just as, Kauśika, a hundred, or a thousand people blind from birth are unable, without a leader, to get onto a path, much less enter a city, even so, Kauśika, without the perfection of wisdom, eyeless, the five perfections are like one blind from birth; leaderless without the perfection of wisdom, they are unable to get onto³ the path to awakening, much less enter the city of knowledge of all aspects. However, Kauśika, when the five perfections are taken hold of by the perfection of wisdom, then these five perfections are possessed of an eye. And, taken hold of by the perfection of wisdom, these five perfections receive the name 'perfections,' and so on. In the same way elsewhere also one should understand according to the sūtra.⁴ And it is stated:

All the immaculate perfections, O Blameless One, ever follow you, like stars do the crescent moon.⁵

348.4 Alternatively, **this**, the continuity consisting of mental calm whose nature has been discussed immediately preceding, **assemblage**, the mass of causes of that and⁶ its basis inasmuch as it generates wisdom, **has wisdom as its aim**, the previously mentioned wisdom is itself the aim, the purpose, as it is that which is to be cultivated, since, like grain springing up in a well cleaned field, wisdom appears in the mental continuum completely purified by mental calm.

¹ T. includes *brtson 'grus kyi pha rol tu phyin pa dai*.

² See AS p. 87 (p. 172 Mitra's edition.) LVP p. 347 fn. 1. Cf. MA VI 2.

³ T. *skyed pa* 'to generate.'

⁴ T. *de bzin du gzan yan 'dir mdo gzan gyi rjes su 'brañs nas ji lta ba bzin du go bar bya'o* 'In the same way, moreover, one should understand here in accordance with another sūtra.'

⁵ AS prefatory stanza 8. LVP p. 348 fn. 1.

⁶ T. *vā* 'or.'

348.9 As is said in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*¹: "What is the excellence of this mental calm? The ability to engender the knowledge of things as they are. For:

'the Sage has stated that the concentrated one knows things as they are.' "

348.12 This is also said in the *Dharmasaṃgīti*²: "The one with concentrated mind sees things as they are. The bodhisattva who sees things as they are manifests great compassion for beings. [And he thinks thus:]³ 'I must accomplish this concentration method for all beings.'⁴ Driven on by this great compassion he completes the trainings: higher morality, higher thought, and higher wisdom; and fully awakens to unexcelled perfect complete awakening," and so on.

349.6 "Since" (*hi*) is to be construed thus: *Because*, the sage has said, the assemblage of giving etc, or the assemblage whose nature is mental calm, has wisdom as its aim, therefore one should generate wisdom. **One should generate** means one should give rise to⁵, should make evident, should cultivate, should devote oneself to, or should make abundant.

349.9 And that wisdom is twofold as cause and result. As cause it is also twofold: that of the one following the course of firm conviction⁶ and that of the bodhisattva

¹ ŚS p. 119.9. See LVP p. 348 fn. 6 for other occurrences of the quoted saying. The whole of verse 9 of ŚS, of which the first part is quoted here, is quoted by Prajñākaramati on p. 287.16.

² This quote immediately follows the preceding quote on ŚS p. 119.11.

³ ŚS includes *evaṃ cāsyā bhavati*.

⁴ T. *bdag gis* (P. *gi*) *sems can thams cad la tiñ nie 'dzin gyi sgo 'di bsgrub par bya'o*.

⁵ T. *bsgrub par bya'o zes pa* adds an *iti* after *niṣpādayet*.

⁶ On *adhimuktīcaryā*, a preliminary stage in the career of a bodhisattva, see Dayal (1932) pp. 53-4. According to Obermiller (1932), pp. 37,102, it is a synonym for the path of application (*prayogamārga*). A succinct and clear presentation of the paths and spiritual levels is given by sGam-po-pa in Guenther (1959) pp. 232-56. See also Obermiller (1932) pp. 14-57.

who has entered the spiritual levels.¹ But as result, on account of being signless, its essential nature is the realisation of the emptiness of all *dharmas* endowed with all the most excellent aspects. In regard to this, in the first place, as cause consisting of listening, reflecting, and meditative cultivation² respectively practised, it brings forth the wisdom of one who has entered the spiritual levels. And that, on account of the acquisition of the spiritual levels one after another, increases to a high degree, until free of both obscurations³, it gives rise to the wisdom whose essential nature is buddhahood⁴ free of the entire network of conceptualisation. For this very reason he says, with the desire for the cessation of suffering.

350.3 **Suffering**, is suffering which pertains to the multitude of sentient beings included in the five states of existence⁵ and to oneself; which belongs to *saṃsāra*⁶; whose essential nature is birth, sickness, old age and death; whose characteristic is separation from what is dear to one, meeting with what is not dear and failure to obtain what one seeks; and which, in short, consists in the five appropriated psycho-physical groups.⁷ **Cessation** is *nirvāṇa*, appeasement, meaning the complete cutting off [of

1 On entry of the path of seeing (*darśanamārga*) the bodhisattva has insight into emptiness (*śūnyatā*) and enters the first of ten spiritual levels (*bhūmi*).

2 *śrutacintābhāvanāmayī*. The three degrees or types (*trividhā*) of *prajñā*.

3 The obscurations (*āvaraṇa*) by the defilements (*kleśa*) and on account of the cognisable (*jñeya*). See verse 55 and commentary.

4 T. *sañs rgyas ñid kyī* (P. *kyis*) *śes rab kyī rañ bñin yoñs su rdzogs par byed de* 'it perfects the nature of wisdom which is buddhahood.'

5 The states of existence or places of rebirth (*gati*) are either enumerated as five: hells, animals, hungry ghosts, human, gods; or six with the addition of demi-gods. See BHSD p. 208.

6 T. *'khor ba'i 'gro ba'i ris lñas yañ dag par bsdus* (P. *sdus*) *pa'i sems can gyi phui por gtogs pa'i bdag ñid la yod pa* '[suffering whose essential nature is birth ...] existing in *saṃsāra* the nature of which pertains to the multitude of beings included in the five abodes (or groups) of the states of existence.' T. reads - *rāśigatātmakasya* in place of -*rāśigatasya svātmagatasya ca* ?

7 *pañcopādānaskandha*.

that suffering] insofar as its characteristic is to not arise again.¹ With the desire for that [cessation], that is to say, with the wish, with the appetite, for that.

350.9 For so it is: Because of the action of grasping self² and what belongs to self through the force of conceptual attachment to the attribution of reality to the non-existing³ on the part of one perceiving erroneously, attachment and the rest of the host of defilements born of incorrect mental activity, arise. From that, action, thence birth, and from that sickness, old age, death, grief, lamentation, suffering, mental unhappiness, and distress are born. Thus is the arising of this entire⁴ great mass of suffering.⁵ Thus then, for one examining dependent origination with perfect wisdom in the regular order⁶ and, furthermore, for one seeing the same [dependent origination] without self, without owner, as, in terms of the absolute, without essential nature insofar as it is like an illusion, a city of the gandharvas, a dream, a reflection etc., the ignorance member of the process of becoming, its essential nature delusion, ceases.⁷ This is on account of thorough knowledge of things as they are insofar as the nature [of thorough knowledge] is adverse to that [ignorance]. Because of the cessation of ignorance the mental formations dependent on that cease. In this way, one should know, the cessation of each later [member] as an effect is on account of the cessation

¹ T. *slar mi skye ba'i ñe bar źi ba'i chos ñid kyis śin tu rgyun chad pa* 'complete cutting off [of suffering] insofar as its characteristic is appeasement [which is] the non-arising again [of suffering].'

² T. does not translate *ātma* 'self.' Cf. LVP p. 351 fn. 4.

³ T. *mi bden* 'not true.'

⁴ T. *'di 'ba' źig las* 'from this alone.'

⁵ LVP, *Kośa* (III 27) vol. 2 p. 70, translates this saying: 'Ainsi a lieu la production de cette grande masse qui n'est que souffrance;' and comments (fn. 1): 'Les commentateurs disent: le mot *kevala* indique l'absence d'*ātman* et d'*ātmiya*; le mot *grand* indique l'absence de commencement et de fin; ... "masse de douleur", parce qu'accumulée par les *saṃskāras* impurs; *samudaya* parce que produite par le concours des conditions ...'

⁶ T. *lugs las bzlog pa'i mam pas = pratilomākāraṃ* 'in inverse order.'

⁷ *zlog par byed la* 'is stopped [by seeing absence of essential nature].'

of each former [member] as a cause, up to, old age, death, grief, lamentation, suffering, mental unhappiness and distress cease because of the cessation of birth. Thus is the cessation of this entire¹ great mass of suffering. ²Therein ignorance, craving and clinging is the section relating to the way of defilement; mental formations and becoming is the section relating to the way of action; the remaining members are the section relating to the way of suffering.³ The cessation of the extremes of former and latter is the portion belonging to the way of cessation. Just so, the triple way, without self⁴, devoid of self and what belongs to self, comes to be on account of coming to be and ceases to be on account of ceasing to be, in nature like a bundle⁵ of reeds [that rest on each other]. Later, this will be explained at length by reasoning and scripture.

351.9 Thus then, when one examines the conditioned, which has the essential nature of a dream, an illusion etc., with wisdom, one understands that all *dharmas* are without essential nature and realises the absolute. Because of that the multitude of faults with their latent impressions completely cease. Hence it is said that wisdom occurs as a cause allaying all suffering.

351.13 To show how discernment⁶ of the non-erroneous reality of things arises when one examines by reasoning and scripture, he declares the principle of the two truths with the words **conventional ...**⁷

¹ T. *gcig tu* 'as one.'

² Passage ending *duḥkhavartmano vyavacchedaḥ* 'section relating to the way of suffering' is from *Daśabhūmikasūtra* p. 50 quoted ŚS p. 227.11. See LVP p. 351 fn 1.

³ On the three ways (*trivartman*) see LVP *Kośa* (III 20) vol. 2 p. 60 fn. 1.

⁴ T. *bdag med pa ma yin te*. Delete *ma*. LVP p. 351 fn. 3 *bdag maṅ ba ma yin te?*

⁵ T. *tshigs* 'knot.' Elsewhere (pp. 473.3, 523.6) *kalāpa* is translated as *tshogs*.

⁶ T. does not translate *pravicaḥ* discernment.'

⁷ T. does not translate *satyadvayavyavasthām āha saṃvṛtir ityādi* 'he declares the principle of the two truths with the words "conventional ..."'

2. **Conventional and absolute: these are accepted as two truths. Reality is not the domain of intellect; intellect is said to be "concealing" (*saṃvṛti*).**

352.5 Thorough knowledge of things as they are is concealed, is obscured, because of the obscuration of essential nature and because the obscured is made manifest by this.¹ Therefore it is **concealing** (conventional). Ignorance, delusion and error are synonyms for it. Since ignorance attributes intrinsic nature to an unreal thing and exists as an obscuration to seeing essential nature it is concealing. Which is said in the noble *Śālistambasūtra*: "Furthermore, not understanding and wrong understanding of reality are unknowing, i.e., ignorance."² And it is said:

Having obscured the real, ignorance reveals the unreal thing, arising³ like the affliction of jaundice.⁴

And the dependently arisen entity shown by this is called "the conventional." The same is called "worldly conventional truth" with the understanding that it is truth by convention (*saṃvṛti*) of only the world. Which is stated:

¹ T. does not translate this sentence.

² See LVP *Douze causes* p. 82; Aiyaswami Sastri (1950) p. 11; Reat (1993) p. 54. The passage in the *Śālistambasūtra* from which this quote comes is cited below p. 479.6. It is also quoted ŚS p. 222. T. *gʒan yañ de kho na ñid ma rig pa dañ log par rtogs pa ni mi śes pa dañ ma rig pa yin no. Ajñāna* is a synonym for *avidyā*; not understanding and wrong understanding in regard to reality are what constitute them. Murti (1960), p. 238, comments: 'There are thus two functions of *avidyā*: one is obscurative (*āvaraṇa*), covering the real nature of things; the other constructive, as it throws up a false appearance (*asatkhyāpana*).' These observations are borne out by the quote immediately following in the commentary. May (1959), p. 270 (MV p. 564.7), offers an alternative translation: 'L'incompréhension, la fausse compréhension, l'ignorance à l'endroit de la réalité [constitue] la nescience.'

³ Read, with Vaidya, *jāyamānaiva* in place of LVP *jāyamāneva*. T. *skyes pa ñid* supports this.

⁴ Kambala's *Ālokaṃālā* 18. Identified by Lindtner (1981) p. 204 en. 65. Quoted by Vibhūticandra. See LVP p. 352 fn. 6.

Delusion is the conventional ("concealing") because it obscures essential nature. That which, being artificial, appears as true on account of it, the Sage has declared to be "conventional truth." Also the artificial object [he has declared] to be conventional [truth]¹.

353.7 In only worldly terms the conventional is twofold: true conventional and false conventional. For so it is: Whatever dependently born entity is perceived as blue etc. with faultless sense organs is true in worldly terms; and whatever dependently arisen entity is perceived with sense organs at fault in an illusion, a mirage, a reflection etc., or is imagined according to the tenets of the heretics themselves, is false in worldly terms only. This is stated:

The objects that the world perceives with all six sense organs without injury is true only in worldly terms; the rest, imagined, is false only in worldly terms.²

To the saints with perfect vision these two are both wrong since in regard to the absolute condition the conventional is mistaken. We will explain this with conclusive argument immediately following this. Therefore it is said that the essential nature of things does not appear to the ignorant.

354.3 The highest (*parama*), that is, the most elevated, thing (*artha*) is the absolute (*paramārtha*). It is the non-artificial entity, through the realisation of which the abandonment of all defilements in connection with the latent impressions of the obscurations comes about. Absence of essential nature, emptiness, suchness, real limit, sphere of the real etc. are synonyms. Indeed, the absence of essential nature of

¹ MA VI 28. See LVP *Le Muséon* vol. XI (1910), p. 303.

² MA VI 25. LVP *Le Muséon* vol. XI (1910), p. 301 translates: 'Ce que le monde considère comme perçu par le six organes exempts de trouble, cela est vrai du point de vue du monde; le reste, du point du vue du monde, est tenu pour faux.' For a discussion of the implications of this verse see Tillemans (1990) I pp. 46 ff.

every dependently arisen thing is its absolute nature for the conventional as it appears is not logically possible.

354.9 For so it is: In the first place, there is no entity with a real essential nature in the form that it is seen because it does not continue to exist at a later time; and because essential nature is of unchanging nature insofar as it is never adventitious. For how could that which has essential nature cease¹ at any time whatsoever? Otherwise, as a consequence of the loss of the essential nature of that there would be absence of essential nature! Nor, arising with a real essential nature, could that come from anywhere or, being destroyed, be stored² anywhere. Rather, like an illusion, it arises depending on³ the totality of causes and conditions and ceases because of a lack of those. How could that born depending on⁴ the totality of causes and conditions, obtaining its individuality in dependence on another like a reflection, have real essential nature?

354.18 Nor, in terms of the absolute, is the origination of anything from a totality of causes and conditions possible since that [totality] too, obtaining its individuality in dependence on another insofar as it is born of another totality, is without essential nature. In the same way, each other former [totality] is to be seen as without essential nature insofar as each is born of its own totality of causes. In this way, how can the origination of real essential nature from absence of essential nature be accepted by one holding⁵ that an effect is conformable to its cause. Which [Śāntideva] will state:

That which is created by illusion and that which is created by causes -
from where does that come and to where does it go? This should be

¹ T. *ldog pa ma yin* 'not cease.'

² T. does not translate *saṃnicayaṃ* 'store.'

³ T. *rañ bzin gyis* 'by the nature of.'

⁴ T. *tshañ ba las* 'through completeness of.'

⁵ T. *'dod pa mams kyis* 'by those holding.'

investigated.

What is seen with the presence of another [and] not [seen] because of the absence of that; in that artificial [entity] which is similar to a reflection, how can there be reality?¹

And it is stated:

That which is born of conditions is, in fact, not born; it has no origination in terms of essential nature.² That which is subject to conditions is said to be empty. He who knows emptiness is heedful.³

"Empty *dharmas* come forth from *dharmas* which are just empty."⁴

355.15 The birth of an entity in connection with a cause which is self, other or both or in connection with no cause is utterly impossible. For so it is: Were entities to have an individual intrinsic nature as causes of their own births it could be arisen or not arisen. Firstly, that which is arisen does not have causality in regard to its own self because it would have [already] arisen entirely by itself.⁵ Where then would be its function? Furthermore, this which is to be produced does not have another essential nature which has not arisen since, being one, it does not have parts.⁶ And it is not tenable that another arising afterward is the essential nature of that since when it has

¹ Verses 144, 145.

² i.e., essential nature and origination are contradictory. T. *skye ba'i ran bzin = utpādasvabhāva* 'essential nature of origination.' See May (1959) p. 220 fn. 770.

³ *Anavataptahradāpasamkramaṇasūtra* quoted MV pp. 239.10, 491.11, 504.1. See LVP MV p. 239 fn. 2. *Apramatta* 'heedful' also has the sense of absence of delusion. Cf. *Dhammapada II Appamādavagga*.

⁴ Nāgārjuna's *Pratītyasamutpādayakārikā* 4cd. Also quoted below p. 532.5. Identified by LVP Douze causes p. 123 fn. 1.

⁵ T. *skyes pa ni re zig ma yin te / ran gi bdag nid rgyu yin pa na de'i bdag nid thams cad ran nid kyis skyes pa'i phyir ro* 'First, it is not arisen because, if it were cause of its own nature, it would have [already] arisen entirely by itself.'

⁶ T. *gcig po 'di la cha śas dan ldan pa'i phyir* 'because this which is one would have parts.' ?

arisen the not-arisen is not its essential nature.¹ Therefore nothing originates from that which has arisen² from itself. Nor in regard to the postulate of origination from oneself is it possible for anything to have an essential nature arisen prior to it because the fault of each depending on the other would follow. Nor is that essential nature which has not arisen³, which is empty of all capacity like a sky-flower, able to serve as a cause⁴ in regard to its own arising. Otherwise there is the absurd consequence that a donkey's horn could generate its own essential nature!

356.10 Neither is the "from another" postulate [tenable] because it would follow that darkness could arise even from the sun or anything from anything for there would be no differentiation of what is generally accepted⁵ as the producer and the non-producer⁶ with regard to what is meant by "result."⁷ Also the determination of a single continuity⁸ for producer and produced, insofar as it is imaginary if the effect has not arisen is, in reality, not consistent. With regard to *dharmas* existing in future the conventional expression "result" etc. does not relate to a real entity⁹ for the real existence of essential nature of entities will be examined. Nor in regard to the sprout

¹ T. *de grub pa dañ ma grub pa ni de'i rañ bzin ma yin pa'i phyir ro* 'because that, arisen or not arisen, is not the essential nature of that.'

² T. does not translate *niṣpannāt* 'from [that which has] arisen.'

³ T. *de ma grub pa las kyañ ma yin te* 'nor from that which has not arisen.'

⁴ Alternatively 'nor should it be accepted as a cause,' but T. *rgyu'i dños por 'gro bar rigs pa ma yin no* Cf. MV 312.8 *hetubhāvam apy upagamyā*; MV 423.3 *hetubāvam upetya* T. *rgyur gyur nas* trans. de Jong (1949) p. 66 'qui a rempli sa fonction de cause.'

⁵ T. *mi 'dod pa* 'not accepted.'

⁶ T. *bskyed par bya ba dan skyed par byed = janyajanaka* 'produced and producer.'

⁷ T. *bskyed par bya ba dañ skyed par byed par mi 'dod pa dag mñon par 'dod pa'i 'bras bu la ltos pa ste gzan ñid du khyad par med pa'i phyir ro* 'for there would be no differentiation for what is not accepted as produced and producer in regard to the generally admitted effect.' ?

⁸ T. *rgyu*. Read *rgyun*.

⁹ *na vāstavaḥ* 'does not relate to a *vastu*.'

existing in the seed states is the otherness of the seed¹ not imaginary for the existence of an effect in a cause will be repudiated. When a thing which being perceived, on examination does not remain, what thought can there be of possible existence in the future etc?

357.1 Nor is the "from both" postulate [tenable] because there would be the consequence of the combined faults² described of each postulate. And when an effect has not arisen, there is, in absolute terms, no cause whose nature is both [self and other]. Or when [an effect] has arisen, since nothing is to be produced, what would be the function of a cause whose nature is both?

357.5 Nor is the "not from a cause" notion [tenable] because this "not from a cause" [notion] inasmuch as it has the nature of a non-implicative absolute negation³ is illogical. For if there were no cause there would be the consequence that things would not be determined as to place and time or the consequence that they would always exist or not exist. Nor would there be attending to a definite method for those seeking an end. And because if [it is accepted that] Primary Matter or God etc. is a cause the repudiation of this ["not from a cause" thesis] will be accepted.⁴ Therefore, things do not obtain essential nature from a non-cause (i.e., without a cause).

357.11 Therefore things with real essential nature do not originate from a cause which is self, other, both, or not a cause. This has been stated:

No things whatsoever exist anywhere, at any time, originated from

¹ T. *sa bon las* 'from the seed.'

² T. *gñi ga'i phyogs la skyon* 'faults in both postulate.'

³ *prasajyapratishedha*, i.e. not implying any affirmation. See Ruegg (1981) pp. 37-8, 65.

⁴ This passage is problematic. T. does not translate *iṣyamāṇatvāt* 'will be accepted.' Read perhaps *pratiṣetsyamāṇatvāt* and *kāraṇatvasya*: 'because [Primary Matter or God etc.] being a cause will be repudiated.'

themselves, from another, from both, or without a cause.¹

357.15 And there is no real essential nature, because, on examination of essential nature as one or many, all things are devoid of essential nature. The mere principle of conditionship² which is like a dream, an illusion, a reflection etc., may be attractive if there is no investigation. To what purpose is conceptual attachment to things, the cause of all suffering in this world?³ Hence this is the truth of the matter:

These entities declared by ourselves and others⁴ are, in reality, devoid of an essential nature which is one or many. Therefore they are without essential nature like a reflection.⁵

358.3 Thus, only absence of essential nature remains as the absolute nature innate to all things.⁶ Just that, being the principle goal of men, is called the absolute (*paramārtha*), the supreme aim.⁷

358.6 Nor should one be conceptually attached to this. Otherwise there is no difference in conceptual attachment to things or conceptual attachment to emptiness⁸

¹ MMK I 1. MV p. 12.13.

² *idaṃpratyayatāmātra*. Below p. 474.18 *yad asmin sati idaṃ bhavaty asyotpādād idam utpadyata iti / etena bhagavataivedaṃpratyayatāmātralakṣaṇaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvo 'pi darśita eva*. See also p. 182.12. For sources see LVP Douze causes pp. 110-1.

³ T. *ji ltar sdug bsñal thams cad kyi rgyur gyur pa mñon par zen pas ci žig bya ste / dgos pa yod pa ma yin no* 'What use is conceptual attachment, the cause of all suffering? There is no purpose.' T. *ji ltar*, read '*di la* (= *iha*) ?

⁴ T. *bdag dañ gžan smras dños 'di dag*.

⁵ *Madhyamakālamkāra* I 1. Identified by Aiyaswami Sastri (1950) p. 106.

⁶ T. *de ltar na rañ bžin med pa ñid dños po rñams kyi gñug ma yin te don dam pa'i rañ bžin gyis gñas pa ma yin no* 'Thus only absence of essential nature is innate to things; they do not abide with an absolute nature.'

⁷ T. *de ñid la skyes bu'i dgos pa'i mchog dañ khyad par du 'phags par brjod do* 'Just that is called the principal aim and supreme of man.'

⁸ T. does not translate *śūnyatābhiniveśaḥ* 'conceptual attachment to emptiness.'

since both, being conceptual, belong to the conventional.¹ Nor does a non-thing, inasmuch as its essential nature is notional, have any intrinsic nature. And nor does a non-thing have the nature of the cessation of a thing since cessation is without essential nature. If there were any essential nature of a thing then a non-thing, its nature the negation of that, would also exist.² But a thing does not have essential nature as has assuredly been explained. Hence there is no "non-thing" at all whose nature is the cessation of a thing. Nor, given that the non-existence of a thing and a non-thing has been explained in the way stated, is a nature combining both those or negating both possible. Since the conceptualisation of a thing is the causal basis of all conceptualisation, when that is repudiated all these are cast out at one blow. Therefore:

Not the existing, not the not-existing, not the existing-and-not-existing,
and also not not-consisting-in-either,³

should be considered an object of conceptual attachment. This is stated in the noble *Prajñāpāramitā*⁴: "Subhūti said, 'Here, O Venerable Son of Śāradvatī⁵ if a son or daughter of good family belonging to the bodhisattva vehicle, unskilled in method, knows that form is empty, it is an attachment. If he or she considers⁶ that feeling is empty, it is an attachment. If he or she considers that mental formations are empty, it is an attachment. If he or she considers that consciousness is empty it is an attachment. Likewise, if he or she considers that eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind, up to the emptiness of all *dharma*s is empty, it is an attachment", and so on.

¹ Or, 'are obscuring.' T. *bsgribs pa yin pa*.

² T. *gal te yañ dños po ma yin te / log pa ni rañ bzin ñid 'ga' zig gi rañ bzin yin na / de'i tshe bkag pa'i bdag ñid kyañ dños po med par 'gyur ro* 'And if a thing were not and cessation had the essential nature of some essential nature, then [cessation] also, having the nature of negation, would be a non-thing.'

³ See below p. 359.10.

⁴ Cf. AS 95 (p. 190 Mitra's edition). LVP p. 358 fn. 4.

⁵ = Śāriputra.

⁶ T. *yañ dag śes na* 'if [he or she] knows,' throughout the passage.

359.7 And it is stated:

To dispel all conceptions there is instruction with the ambrosia of emptiness. He who believes even in that is censured by you.¹

Not existing, not not-existing, not existing-and-not-existing, and also not not-consisting-in-either: the Mādhyamikas maintain that reality is free of the four extremes.²

359.12 Thus, we shall see the entire universe free of the four extremes, primordially at peace because it is beyond conceptual elaboration³ insofar as its essential nature is unarisen, not ceased, beyond annihilation and eternity etc, and like space with no place for attachments.

359.15 These are accepted as two truths. What are they? Conventional and absolute is to be construed afterward.⁴ The conventional is one non-erroneous truth and the absolute is the other truth. The word "and" collects them together with

¹ CS I 23 (*Lokāṭīstava*). Identified by Aiyaswami Sastri (1950) p. 108 as *Lokāṭīstava* 21 and incorrectly by Vaidya as *Nirupamastava* 21. This verse is also quoted below p. 415.3. Cf. MMK XIII 8 quoted below p. 414.11 and *Ghanavyūhasūtra* 54b8f cited in Tauscher (1981) p. 137. For other occurrences see Lindtner (1982) p. 137 fn. 23. Lindtner op. cit. translates the final pāda: 'You [have declared that] he is lost.'

² *Jñānasārasamuccaya* 28. Identified by Lindtner (1981) p. 205 en. 76. Quoted *Subhāṣitasamgraha* (fol. 17) from Saraha. LVP p. 359 fn. 5. On *catuṣkoṭi* 'the four extremes' or 'tetralemma' see Ruegg (1977a) pp. 1-71; Tillemans (1990) pp. 72-9.

³ *niḥprapañca*. See fn. to *prapañca* p. 342.2.

⁴ i.e. "these" (lit. "this") refers to conventional and absolute. The commentator then gives grammatical examples (not translated in this translation or T.) of a neuter predicate with a subject that is not neuter: just as 'this female brahmin is something existing', 'this fist is a vessel'. In the verse *satyadvayam idaṃ* is a predicate of *saṃvṛtiḥ* and *paramārthaḥ*.

equal force¹ merely as truths. The difference between them is that relative truth is the not untrue form [of truth] of the world while absolute truth is the non-deceiving truth of the saints. The word "and" is employed also for showing the difference in this way.²

360.8 This is said: Every one of those internal and external things arises bearing two natures, namely, conventional and absolute. Of those, one, insofar as it is the object of the wrong seeing of ordinary people who see the unreal thing³, the eye of their intellect⁴ obscured by the darkness of ignorance is self existence incorrectly seen⁵; the other, insofar as it is the object of the perfect seeing of the saints who know reality, their eye of perfect knowledge cleared of the veil of ignorance by the stick of the unguent of discernment, is intrinsic nature correctly determined.

360.15 All things then carry these two natures. Of these two natures, that which is the object of the spiritually immature who see wrongly is conventional truth while that which is the object of those of perfect seeing⁶, who have clearly understood reality, is absolute truth. Such is the determination of the knowers of the *Śāstra*.⁷ Which he [Candrakīrti]⁸ declares:

¹ T. *mtshuñs par* 'equally.' Read, with Vaidya, *tulyabalatām* in place of LVP *tulyabalatām*.

² T. *don gyi khyad par 'di lta bu mthoñ bas* 'because of seeing in this way the difference of meaning.'

³ T. *bdag ñid* 'nature.'

⁴ T. does not translate *buddhi* 'intellect.'

⁵ Reading *asamādarśitātmasattākam*. Text is probably corrupt. There is no verb *samādrś* according to the dictionaries. T. does not help *yañ dag par mthoñ bar žen to = samyagdarśanāsakta* ?

⁶ T. *gnas skabs*. 'condition.' Reading *daśām* in place of *drśām* ?

⁷ T. *bstan bcos rigs pas*. T. perhaps reads *śāstravidā* in place of *śāstravidām*.

⁸ Candrakīrti is the knower of Nāgārjuna's treatise (*śāstra*) on Madhyamaka (*Madhyamakaśāstra*) known as *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*. On the title see Ruegg (1981) p. 1 fn. 3.

All things carry two natures found by perfect and wrong seeing. That which is the object of those of perfect seeing is called "reality," that of those of wrong seeing,"conventional truth."¹

361.8 Thus it is appropriate that the collection of the two be referred to as "the two." Accepted means agreed upon², generally accepted. By whom [is it accepted]? By the buddhas, the blessed ones whose minds have abandoned the obscurations and the noble disciples, solitary buddhas and bodhisattvas who follow their path. These alone are the two truths; there are no other truths. Thus the word "and" is also employed for precise determination.³ This is stated:

The teaching of the Dharma of the buddhas relies on two truths: worldly conventional truth and truth in terms of the absolute.⁴

And it is stated in the *Pitāputrasamāgama*:

You yourself have seen these two truths of the knowers of the world without having heard them from others; which are, accordingly, conventional and absolute. No third truth is admissible.⁵

362.3 But, [it may be objected], weren't the four noble truths characterised by suffering, arising [of suffering], cessation and the path, related by the Blessed One in the *Abhidharma*? How then are the truths only two? True, but due to the disposition and propensities⁶ of the people to be trained these which are only two were related as

¹ MA VI 23 LVP p. 361 fn. 1.

² T. does not translate *saṃmatam* 'agreed upon.'

³ i.e., there are precisely two truths.

⁴ MMK XXIV 8. Quoted MA p. 70.11.

⁵ or, 'No third truth exists.' T. *bden pa gsum pa gañ yañ ma mchis so*.

⁶ *Āśaya*, 'propensities' or 'latent defilements' which according to AK V 1 p. 277 are the root of becoming. They are variously classified, but AK V 1-2a p. 277 lists six: attachment, hatred, pride, ignorance, false views and doubt; or seven by dividing attachment: *mūlaṃ bhavasyānuśayāḥ ṣaḍ rāgaḥ pratighas tathā / māno 'vidyā ca drṣṭiś ca vicikitsā ca te punaḥ // ṣaḍ rāgabhedāt saptoktāḥ*. *Āśaya* is

four since those are included in the two. For it is so: The truths of suffering, arising [of suffering] and the path insofar as their nature is conventional are included in conventional truth while the truth of cessation is absolute truth. Therefore there is no contradiction.

362.9 This may be so but why is the conventional called "truth" when it is vitiated in a hundred ways by examination because its essential nature is an unreal attribution insofar as its nature is shown by ignorance. This is also true, nevertheless, due to the grasping of the world it is called "conventional truth." Since the world itself accepts conventional truth here¹, the blessed ones in compliance with that, disregarding those whose object is the true reality, likewise² call it "conventional truth." For the same reason, in the *Śāstra*³ as well, the distinction is made by the Venerable Teacher [Nāgārjuna] with the words "and worldly conventional truth."⁴ However, in reality, the absolute alone is the one truth. Hence there is no damage at all [to our case]. As stated by the Blessed One: "Monks, supreme truth is one only⁵, that is to say, the non-deceptive *dharma* is nirvāṇa and all formative forces are false, deceptive *dharmas*."⁶

363.3 These [are accepted as] two truths is said. Of those "conventional truth" is known to those whose minds are afflicted by ignorance insofar as that is its nature, but absolute truth is not known to them, its kind, its nature or its characteristics.

often compounded with *anuśaya*, 'disposition' Edgerton, BHSD p. 35, notes that this compound 'usually refers to the person ripe for conversion.' This is the case in the present passage.

¹ T. *śes = iti* in place of *iha* "[conventional truth]."

² T. *bcom ldan 'das kyis kyañ de kho na'i don de ñid btañ sñoms su g'zag* (P. *b'zag nas* 'The Blessed One also, disregarding just that true object ...')

³ i.e., *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* (MMK).

⁴ MMK I 1 quoted above p. 361.14.

⁵ MV pp. 41.4, 237.11 reads *etad hi*, 'this indeed,' in place of *ekam eva*, 'one only.'

⁶ Quoted MV pp. 41.4. LVP p. 363 fn. 1. Also MV p. 237.11; MA p. 119.17. Cf. MMK XIII 1.

Hence the intrinsic nature of that should be declared and, accordingly, he says, **reality is not the domain of intellect.**

363.7 It is not the domain, not the object, of intellect, of any knowing, because it is beyond being the object of any knowing. That is to say, in no way can it be made the object of any intellect. Then how can its intrinsic nature be taught. For it is so: The reality of absolute truth¹ has a nature free of all conceptual elaboration, consequently, since it is empty of all particularity, how would it be perceived by way of any conceptualisation?² And its intrinsic nature, surpassing conceptualisation is not the object of words; words, born of a conceptual dichotomisation cannot function with regard to that which is not the object of conceptualising minds.³ Therefore, since it is devoid of all the expressions of conceptual dichotomisation how⁴ can absolute reality which is beyond attribution, which does not belong to the conventional, and which is inexpressible, possibly be taught? Although it is so, in order to assist people⁵ who listen and are worthy vessels [for the Dharma], with the help of imagination, by the use of examples a little is conveyed through the conventional.⁶

364.1 For example⁷, a partially blind person, on account of darkness [of vision]⁸,

¹ T. adds *de b'zin n'id = tathatā* 'suchness.'

² T. *ji ltar yan n'am par rtog pas mthon ba ma yin te* 'would in no way be perceived by conceptualisation.'

³ T. *sgra ni n'am par rtog pas bskyed pa yin la yul ma yin pa la n'am par rtog pa'i blo 'jug pa ma yin no?*

⁴ T. *ji ltar na 'di ltar* 'how in this way?'

⁵ T. adds *ji ltar yan* 'somehow.'

⁶ T. *kun rdzob ky'i bden pa dpe ñe bar bstan pas* 'by using conventional truth examples.'

⁷ MV p. 373 and MA p. 109 also use this example in regard to the absence of affirmation and negation. Cf. Candrakīrti's use of the example in CSV XII 13, in Tillemans (1990) I p. 8. For other occurrences see Tillemans (1990) II p. 275 en. 370.

⁸ On *timira*, 'darkness' or 'obscurity' of vision, see May (1959) p. 226 fn. 779.

despite looking in this direction and that, sees hair-like apparitions everywhere. Perceiving him acting thus a person of sound vision, wondering why he is doing that, approaches close to him; though his eyes are directed toward the hair perceived by the other he does not perceive its visible form. Nor does he imagine the distinctions of existent and non-existent based on that hair. Furthermore, when the partially blind person clarifies his intent explaining that he sees hair there¹, in order to remove that notion, he says to him in accord with the truth, "there is no hair here" accommodating what the partially blind person perceives yet he makes a statement containing a negation. But he² does not negate or affirm anything [as such] while teaching thus. The reality of the hair which the person of sound vision sees the partially blind person does not see.³

364.12 "In the same way, that intrinsic nature of the psycho-physical groups, constituent elements, domains of cognition⁴ etc. which the spiritually immature, who do not see reality⁵, perceive⁶ because of impairment on account of the darkness of ignorance, is their relative nature. The essential nature with which⁷ the buddhas, the blessed ones who have cast out all the latent impressions of ignorance see those same psycho-physical groups etc. after the manner of the hair perceived by the person of sound vision, is their absolute truth."⁸ Which the Knower of the *Śāstra* [Candrakīrti]

1 'di ni (P. na) skra yod do zes 'that there are hairs.'

2 T. de mams kyis 'those.'

3 Translated on the basis of T. skra śad kyī de kho na ñid de yañ rab rib can gyis mthoñ ba gañ yin pa de rab rib med pas mthoñ ba ni ma yin no. This reading is supported by MA p. 110. See LVP *Le Muséon* XI (1910) p. 306 fn. 4. Skt. 'The reality of the hair which the partially blind sees the person of sound vision does not see.'

4 On the *skandhas*, *dhātus* and *āyatanas* see BHSD pp. 607, 101, 282-3.

5 D. de kho na ñid ma mthoñ ba. P. om. ma. Cf. LVP p. 364 fn 5.

6 T. dmigs pa ma yin te. Delete ma. See LVP p. 364 fn 5.

7 D. [de mams] rañ bzin gañ gis, is correct. P. de bzin gañ gis. Cf. LVP p. 364 fn. 6.

8 MA p. 110.5. T. does not translate *iti*.

says:

Whatever form such as hair etc. is conceptualised on account of¹ darkness [of vision] is indeed false; the nature with which those of pure vision see that is reality. One should understand thus here also.²

365.6 Thus, though absolute reality is inexpressible in absolute terms, with the help of the conventional it is explained to some extent through examples.³ But that essential nature which is apart from all conventional expression of the relative cannot, in reality, be expressed. Which is stated:

How can the unutterable Dharma be heard or taught? The unutterable is heard and taught through attribution.⁴

365.11 Therefore only on the basis of the relative is the absolute taught. Through understanding the teaching of the absolute the absolute is realised since that⁵ [teaching] is the means for that [realisation]. Which is stated in the *Śāstra*:

Without recourse to conventional expression the absolute is not taught⁶; without understanding the absolute nirvāṇa is not realised.⁷

¹ T. *snai bas* 'through appearance.' T. perhaps reads *ābhāsāt* or *prabhāsāt* in place of *prabhāvāt*?

² MA VI 29. LVP p. 365 fn. 3.

³ T. *de ltar don dam brjod par bya ba ma yin yañ / don dam pa'i de kho na ñid gzigs* (Read *dpe*) *pa'i sgo nas ñe bar brtags pa bzun ste* 'Thus, although the absolute is inexpressible, with the help of conceptualisation (= *parikalpam upādāya*. Cf. 363.16) through examples of absolute reality.' Read *dpe* (= *drṣṭānta*) in place of *gzigs* (= *drṣṭa*).

⁴ Quoted MA p. 264.6. See LVP p. 365 fn. 4.

⁵ T. *de ñid* 'only that.'

⁶ T. does not translate *paramārtho na deśyate* 'the absolute is not taught.' Missing in T. *dam pa'i don ni bstan mi nus*. See May (1959) p. 434.

⁷ MMK XXIV 10. LVP p. 365 fn. 3. Widely quoted. See May (1959) p. 229 fn. 790.

365.16 Thus, teaching the absolute is the means and realising the absolute is the end.¹ Otherwise it would be impossible to teach that. But although it is like that why is it not the object of intellect of that kind absolutely? In response he says, **intellect is said to be concealing**. For every intellect, with or without an object², has conceptualisation as its essential nature and all³ conceptualisation has ignorance as its essential nature since it apprehends non-entities. Which he states:

This conceptualisation by itself has assumed the nature of ignorance.⁴

And ignorance is concealing (relative), so, ultimately, it is just not possible that any⁵ intellect apprehend absolute nature. Otherwise, being the apprehensible object of the conventional intellect, its absolute nature would be lost. For, in reality, the absolute is not the object of conventional knowledge.⁶

366.10 And in regard to this it is stated by the Blessed One in the noble *Satyadvayāvātāra*⁷: "If, Devaputra, ultimately absolute truth could become the object of body, speech and mind it would not be reckoned as absolute truth: it would be relative truth. But, Devaputra, absolute truth surpasses all conventional expression, is without distinction⁸, is not born, does not cease, is separate from naming and the named, knowing and the known, etc. up to, that absolute truth surpasses being the object of knowledge of the omniscient endowed with all the most excellent aspects," and so on.

¹ Cf. MA VI 80 *upāyabhūtaṃ vyavahārasatyam upeyabhūtaṃ paramārthasatyam*. Quoted below p. 372.15.

² T. *snañ ba dañ mi snañ ba ñid kyi* (Read *kyis*?) 'having a false appearance or not having a false appearance.' Cf. LVP p. 366 fn. 1.

³ T. *thams cad du* 'in every way.'

⁴ Also occurs in TSP (ed. Shastri) p. 633. Noted by Lindtner (1981) p. 205 en. 83.

⁵ T. *brgya la yañ* 'in any way,' 'at any time.'

⁶ T. *dños po la don dam pa ni kun rdzob kyi śes pa'i yul yin pa'i phyir ro* 'because, in reality, the absolute would be the object of conventional knowledge.'

⁷ Quoted MA p. 110. Noted by LVP *Le Muséon* XI (1910) p. 306 fn. 5.

⁸ T. does not translate *nirviśeṣaṃ* 'without distinction.'

366.17 For this very reason, that is not the object of any conceptualisation since the distinctions of existence and non-existence, own and other-being, truth and non-truth, everlasting and ceasing, permanent and impermanent, happiness and suffering, pure and impure, self and non-self¹, empty and not empty, characteristic², unity and difference, arising and cessation, etc. are not possible for reality because these qualities belong to the conventional.³

367.3 This is stated by the Blessed One in the *Pitāputrasamāgama*⁴: "5This much should be known, namely, the conventional and the absolute and that is thoroughly seen, thoroughly known, thoroughly realised by the Blessed One as empty. For this reason he is called 'Omniscient'. And in regard to this, the Tathāgata sees the conventional in terms of conventional usage. Furthermore, that same absolute is inexpressible, incomprehensible, unknowable, not taught, not explained, up to without action, without instrumentality, up to not gain, not non-gain, not happiness, not suffering, not fame, not disgrace, not form, not without form," etc.

367.10 Thus apart from all particularity, all the distinctions of conventional things vanished, the Blessed One, his inner being shining with the light of knowledge that penetrates the expanse of limitless things, has declared it "absolute truth." It is that which is to be personally realised by the saints insofar as its essential nature is personally realised. Therefore they alone are authoritative here.⁶ Conventional truth,

¹ Read, with Vaidya, *ātmānātma* in place of LVP *ātmāmānātma*.

² T. does not translate *lakṣaṇa* 'characteristic.' MA p. 111 includes *lakṣya*, 'characterised,' as does Vaidya.

³ Cf. MA p. 111.11. Noted by LVP *Le Muséon* XI (1910) p. 307 fn. 2.

⁴ Quoted in ŚS p. 256 and again by Prajñākaramati below p. 593.2.

⁵ T. begins '*di ltar de bzin gsegs pas kun rdzob dan / don dam pa gñis thugs su chud de* 'Thus the Tathāgata has realised both the conventional and the absolute.'

⁶ Reading *ta eva*. T. *de ñid* = *tad eva*. 'that alone' See LVP p. 367 fn. 3.

on the other hand, is taught through recourse to worldly usage. Therefore, in this way, through thorough knowledge of the two truths duly distinguished, non-erroneous discernment of *dharmas* comes about.

367.16 Having established in this way that truth is of two types¹ through the division of conventional and absolute, now showing that people relating to those are also of two types he says, in regard to those people ...

3. In regard to those, people are seen to be of two types: yogins and ordinary people. Of these ordinary people are refuted² by yogins.

368.3 In regard to those, those two, that is to say, relating to conventional and absolute truth, there are the perceivers of those truths. People, mankind, are seen, understood through reasoning and scripture, as of two types, of two kinds, knowing conventional and absolute truth [respectively]. "People" is a collective noun: because of that the meaning is two groups. As to how they are taken to be of two types he says, yogins and ordinary people. Yoga is concentration characterised by the non-perception of any *dharmas*. He who possesses that is a yogin, belonging to one kind of group referred to by the word "people." And nature (*prakṛti*) is ignorance and craving, the cause of the activity of saṃsāra. Born of that is the ordinary (*prākṛta*). Quite ordinary are the ordinary people (*prākṛtaka*) the second [group] referred to by the word "people." Of these the yogins see primary³ reality without error while ordinary people, since they err, see the reality of things erroneously.

¹ T. *bden pa gñis* 'the two truths.'

² Of course, arguments are refuted not people. Difficult to find a satisfactory word.

³ T. *rñal 'byor pa ñid ni gtso bo yin te* 'yogins indeed are primary, [they see reality without error].'

368.13 That is true but since both see reality in their own way, which of them is in error?¹ The one who is refuted by the other. Then, of the two who² is refuted by whom? In response he says, of these ... Of these indicates a collection by use [in Sanskrit] of the locative case and is a locative of specification. Of these, from among both yogins and ordinary people, the ordinary people are specified from the collection as a group with the generic quality of ordinariness. Having been specified, refutation is assigned them with the words are refuted. With regard to the question "by whom?", he says, by yogins.³ By saying they are refuted by them an erring mind is established. As to how, "by superior intelligence" is to be construed.⁴ But a yogin is not refuted by an ordinary person.

369.6 What is intended here is this: The knowledge of one whose vision is affected by partial blindness, and who seeing apparitions of non-existent hair etc. attributes, through erring, real existence to them, is refuted by the knowledge of one of sound vision who apprehends the reality of things as they are; but the knowledge of the one of sound vision is not so refuted by the knowledge of one partially blind. In the same way, the knowledge of ordinary people apprehending the erroneous essential nature of things, their intellectual vision sullied by the darkness of the dirt of ignorance, is refuted by the knowledge of yogins, knowers of the intrinsic reality of things, whose eye of knowledge is free of the sullyng influences, the dirt dispersed⁵ by the wash of the water of wisdom; but the knowledge of yogins is not [so refuted] by the

1 T. *ma 'khrul pa can = abhrāntimat*. Read *'khrul pa can*.

2 T. does not translate *kaḥ* 'who.'

3 The commentary here indicates that the compound *yogilokaḥ* ('yogins' lit. 'yogi folk') is made up of two substantives in apposition: *yogin* and *lokaḥ*.

4 See verse 4.

5 T. adds *mtshan nīd can* 'characterised by.' Possibly T. has misread *lakṣita* in *salilakṣāḷita* despite having translated *salila* and *kṣāḷita*?

knowledge of¹ the others. And thus it is stated:

Just as the perception of the partially blind does not refute the knowledge of those of sound vision, so, the immaculate intelligence is not refuted by the intelligence of those for whom immaculate knowledge is concealed.²

370.3 Therefore, certainly, ordinary knowledge is refuted since it is in error, but are only ordinary people refuted by yogins? Are yogins also refuted?³ In response he says **the yogins ...**

4ab. The yogins are also refuted by superior intelligence in succession.

370.6 Yogins are also refuted by yogins one after another. Not only ordinary people, is the meaning of the word "also." In what manner? **In succession.** The next and then the next, one after another by those [yogins]. By successively greater ones who have obtained the eminence of acquiring⁴ superior qualities existing in greater and greater degrees is the meaning. The successively lesser ones whose good qualities are meagre in comparison to those are refuted. They are surpassed by the excellence of knowledge etc.

370.11 How? **By superior intelligence.** By superior, eminent because it is free of the various obscurations, intelligence, knowledge, wisdom. And this is

¹ T. does not translate *jñāna* 'knowldge [of].'

² MA VI 27. LVP p. 369 fn. 6. T. *śes pa dri ma'i dbaṅ gyur pas* '[is not refuted] by those whose knowledge is under the power of contamination.' MA VI 27c *de b'zin dri med ye śes spaṅs pa'i blos*. See LVP p. 370 fn. 1.

³ Reading, with Vaidya, *atha kiṃ prākṛtatā eva bādhyante yogibhiḥ, uta yogino 'pīti*. *Uta* begins the second part of the double question. T. *'on te ci phal pa ṅid la mal 'byor pa mams kyis gnod dam / 'on te mal 'byor pa la gnod ce na*.

⁴ T. does not translate *pratīlambhotkarṣa* 'the eminence of acquiring.'

implied: by superior contemplative states, concentration, meditative attainments etc., as well. For so it is: The power of knowledge and other good qualities of the bodhisattva who has attained the higher second spiritual level named "the stainless" are superior with respect to qualities of knowledge etc. of the Bodhisattva who has attained the first spiritual level called "the joyful." And likewise, one should know, for the others who have attained the higher and higher spiritual levels.¹ In the same way the successive annulment of those who have attained the first contemplative state etc. is to be construed, up until those free of the sullyng influences² refute those with [remaining] sullyng influences.

371.1 This may be so but how, even given the superior intelligence of yogins, is it can one understand that ordinary knowledge is in error? In response, he says, by example accepted by both.

4cd. By example accepted by both for the sake of the goal since there is no investigating.

371.4 By example, by simile³, accepted, admitted, by both yogins and ordinary people. This very example, given by the Blessed One in the sūtras, of an illusion, a mirage, city of the gandharvas, reflection, etc. is well known by both as being absence of essential nature since the absence of essential nature of all *dharmas* is taught in conformity with that [example]. For so it is: In the first place, the forms etc. understood by all people to have intrinsic nature⁴ are known by yogins alone as

¹ T. *sa goñ ma goñ ma gzan thob pa nam*s 'those who have attained the other higher and higher spiritual levels.'

² *anāsrava*. See fn. to p. 342.3 'sullyng influences.'

³ T. *ñe bar sbyar ba = upanaya, upasaṃhāra*. Possibly meaning 'presentation' [of an example] (*dr̥ṣṭāntopasaṃhāra*). See *upasaṃhāra* BHSD p. 142.

⁴ T. does not translate *svarūpāḥ* '[that they have] intrinsic nature.'

without essential nature because of their realisation of absolute truth. Furthermore, these same [forms] which are perceived in dreams, illusions etc. are also [accepted¹ as without essential nature] by ordinary people. Hence, because of the absence of disagreement among them about that, the nature² of the example is not impaired. But the Mīmāṃsakas and others who are of the opinion that only a thing whose nature is otherwise in respect to place and time³ appears thus [in a dream] have been refuted elsewhere⁴; accordingly, their opinion is not disposed of here. But our co-religionists who believe that mind alone is substantially real and appears thus in dreams etc. will be refuted below at an appropriate opportunity through the refutation of self-cognition.⁵ What is established by reason is admitted by both and hence by that example it is established that ordinary knowledge is in error insofar as it apprehends an erroneous intrinsic nature of things. The [knowledge] of yogins respectively as well can be spoken of in the same way.⁶

372.1 But if the reality of things is that all things are without essential nature how can the bodhisattvas, despite knowing reality, then engage in giving etc. for the sake of completing the accumulations with the intention of extricating beings [from saṃsāra]

1 T. includes '*grub ste* 'accepted.'

2 T. *chos mams* = *dharmā* [*na*] 'qualities' in place of *dharmatā*.

3 Uttaramīmāṃsakas (Vedāntins) do not accept the conformity (*sādharmya*) of the dream and other examples to waking life: *Brahmasūtra* II 2 29 *vaidharmyāc ca na svapnādivat* . Also III 2 3 *māyāmātram tu kārtsnyenānabhivyaktasvarūpatvāt* 'But (the dream world) is mere appearance on account of its nature not being manifest with the totality (of attributes of the waking state). (Trans. Radhakrishnan (1960) p. 443). Radhakrishnan *ibid.* explains. 'Ś[ankara] argues that the dream world does not agree with the waking world in respect of time, place, cause and non-contradiction and so it is not real like the waking world ... Dream states are not bound by the rules of space time, cause and non-contradiction.' T. *yul dan dus gzan gyi bdag ñid* 'a nature consisting of a different place and time.' See LVP p. 371 fn. 1.

4 In another treatise. LVP p. 371 fn. 2.

5 See below verses 17-32.

6 i.e., as erroneous in respect to the knowledge of yogins on a higher spiritual level.

since they [giving etc.] are also without essential nature? In response, he says, for the sake of the goal since there is no investigating.¹

372.5 For the sake of, on account of, the goal, described as that which is to be accomplished, to be taken possession of, the result, since there is no investigating, since there is engagement in the cause of that without investigation. Though they [giving etc.] are so, since there is the certainty of the principle of conditionship in regard to them, there is no obstruction of cause and effect.

372.9 This is said: Even though giving etc. are without essential nature insofar as they are of the nature of an illusion etc.², nevertheless, practised assiduously with complete purity in regard to the three points³, though they be thus [without essential nature], they become causes for the realisation of the absolute since they are the means for that and because dependent origination is inconceivable.⁴ Such a result is realised from just such a cause since it is the means for that. This is stated:

Conventional truth is the means; absolute truth is the end.⁵

372.17 Certainly this is so. Otherwise how through the practice of the path⁶ would

¹ Cf. below verse 77cd.

² T. *sgyu ma la sogs pa ran bzin med pas* 'illusions etc. being without essential nature.' Read *sgyu ma la sogs pa'i ran bzin med pas*?

³ Below p. 604.5 *deyadāyakapratigrāhakāditritayānupalambhayogena trikoṭipariśuddhyeti yāvat* 'on account of non-perception of the triad of gift, giver and receiver etc., that is to say, with purity regarding the three points.' T. '*khorgsum* 'the three spheres' = *trimaṇḍala* Cf. ŚS 183.11 *dadato datvā ca trimaṇḍalapariśodhitam dānaprāmodyam*. Cited BHSD p. 258.

⁴ *acintya*. Maturation of *karma* and many other other things are also said to be inconceivable, e.g., CS XIII 311cd. Tillemans (1990), p. 280 en. 392, comments: 'The term should be taken in the sense of something being too subtle for us to understand, and not in the sense of something being impossible or inconsistent.'

⁵ MA VI 80. LVP 372 fn. 1.

⁶ T. *dri ma dan bcas pa'i gnas skabs na lam la sogs pa med na* 'if the path etc. did not

the stainless state¹ arise from the stained state, the non-conceptual state² from the conceptual state, since, in absolute terms, that [non-conceptual stainless state] is the essential nature of that [stained conceptual state]?³ And it is similar in other respects as well since, in absolute terms, all *dharmas* are without essential nature, and everywhere it is accepted that a result is conformable to its cause.⁴ Hence even from a conventional cause which is without essential nature realisation of absence of essential nature is the result. How else could unconditioned nirvāṇa be attained even from the conditioned path?⁵ Thus, although giving etc. are, in reality, without essential nature they are taken up by bodhisattvas feeling compassion for sentient beings in order to realise absolute reality, for, otherwise, they would not realise the absolute. Therefore engaging in giving etc. is not obstructed. Thus, those seeking to gain a desired result and to avoid an undesired result should be told to⁶ engage in the wholesome and desist from the unwholesome. This will again be made evident later.

373.9 That may be so but if the entity, having the nature of an illusion etc., that the yogins perceive is the very same one that ordinary people also perceive, where is the disagreement? In response, he says, **things are seen ...**

exist in the stained state.'

¹ T. *dri ma med pa la gnas pa* 'abiding in the stainless.'

² T. *rtog pa med pa* 'the non-conceptual.'

³ The stains of the passions etc. born of conceptualisation of self and other etc. are adventitious (*āgantuka*). See below p. 408.7-16.

⁴ T. *rgyu ñid dañ de'i rañ bzin* ?

⁵ T. *ji ltar 'dus byas pa'i lam las gzan* 'how apart from the conditioned path.'

⁶ T. *dge ba dañ mi dge ba dag la 'jug pa dañ ldog par bya ste* '[they] should engage in the wholesome and desist from the unwholesome.'

5. **Things are seen and also conceived by the world as real but not as like an illusion; herein is the dispute between yogins and the world.**

373.14 **Things** assume a nature of their own in dependence on causes and conditions; nevertheless they have no innate absolute nature.¹ By the word "thing" the designation "absence of essential nature" is understood. **Are not only seen** with a nature of their own² **they are also conceived by the world**, ordinary people, as **real**. They are grasped with an essential nature in absolute terms as conceived, that is to say, intellectually clung to because of accepting the idea, "this entity, the object I perceive, is certainly substantial." **But not like an illusion:** they are seen as absolute but are not seen empty of essential nature like an illusion, that is, similar to an illusion, as they are by yogins. **Thus herein, in this, is the dispute³, disagreement, between yogins and the world.** "Of the world with yogins" is the meaning because the world does not understand the reality of things understood by those [yogins]. Or, "of yogins with the world" because the yogins correctly negate what they [the world] have understood. This is the intent: All things have two natures belonging [respectively] to the relative and the absolute. Of those, it is said, only that belonging to the relative is understood by the world while that belonging to the absolute [is only understood] by yogins. For example, people their eye going astray⁴ on account of the power of mantras etc. see the form of an elephant etc. created by an illusion maker but the illusion maker sees its innate nature, its essential nature etc. It is similar, one should understand, in the case of the world and yogins respectively.

¹ T. does not translate *na punaḥ pāramārthikaṃ rūpaṃ nijam eṣāṃ asti* 'nevertheless they have no innate absolute nature.'

² T. does not translate *satsvarūpeṇa* 'with a nature of their own.'

³ T. *spyod pa ? Verse rtsod.*

⁴ T. *bslad pa* 'corrupted.'

374.12 That may be so but how can this entity common to all people, which is capable of causal efficacy, and is known by a valid means of knowledge¹, namely, direct perception, be denied? Supposing that the opponent thinks thus, he says, and directly perceived ...

6ab. Also form etc. is [established] as directly perceptible by general acceptance not by a valid means of knowledge.

374.16 Also whatever form etc. - by the word "etc." sound etc., feeling etc. is understood - is said to be directly perceptible is [established] by general acceptance, by current usage², by general talk of the world, not by a valid means of knowledge. The connection is that directly perceived form etc. is not being known by a valid means of knowledge.³ For direct perception etc. are valid means of knowledge in terms of conventional expression; only conventional form etc. is known by means of them. Real nature is not knowable through valid means of knowledge belonging to the world for there would be the absurd consequence of all people knowing reality! Which [Nāgārjuna] states:⁴

If whatever is perceived by the senses were reality, spiritually immature people would be born as knowers of reality; what then would be the purpose of knowledge of reality?⁵

¹ T. *skye bo ma lus pa la thun moñ du mñion sum gyi tshad mas mthoñ ba* 'seen by a valid means of knowledge, namely, direct perception, common to all people.'

² T. does not translate *rūḍhyā* 'by current usage.'

³ T. *tshad mas rtogs pa mñion sum gyi gzugs la sogs pa yod pa ma yin* 'directly perceptible form etc. known by a valid means of knowledge do not exist.' This translation overlooks the fact that *na pramāṇenādhigataṃ sat* has been added by way of explanation to *pratyakṣaṃ rūpādi*.

⁴ T. adds *gañ žig* 'what.' ?

⁵ CS III 19 (*Acintyastava*). Identified by Aiyaswami Sastri (1950) p. 103 as *Acintyastava* 18. Cf. *Lañkāvatāra* III 36, cited in Lindtner (1982) p. 147 fn. 19.

Therefore even the directly perceptible is not known by a valid means of knowledge.

375.7 If the reality of form etc. though directly perceived is not known by a valid means of knowledge, what is the manner of its general acceptance and if there is general acceptance how is it wrong? In response, he says, **like the general acceptance ...**

6cd. Like the general acceptance of purity etc. in regard to what is not pure etc., that is wrong

375.10 The idea of **purity in regard to a woman's body etc.** which is, in absolute terms, **impure** arises in a mind perverted by attachment to it.¹ Because of [the use of] the word "etc." the idea of permanence etc. in regard to what is impermanent etc. is understood.² And **that** because of apprehending that in what is not that **is wrong**. It apprehends falsely is the meaning. It is also the same in regard to form etc. Therefore³ there is no difference [between them].

375.14 [It may be claimed that] if they are not established through direct perception as a valid means of knowledge, then they will be through scripture. For so it is: In a sūtra the Blessed One teaches the existent insofar as its essential nature is the psycho-physical groups, elements, domains of cognition⁴ etc. and its own-nature is momentary etc. With regard to that the Blessed One says, "O Brahmins, when one speaks of 'all

¹ T. *phyin ci log tu zen pa'i sems kyis de la gtsaṅ ba'i blo skye bar 'gyur ro* 'the idea of purity arises in regard to that because of a mind pervertedly attached.'

² There the four perverted views or misapprehensions (*viparyāsa*) involving, respectively, misapprehension of self (*ātman*), permanence (*nitya*), happiness (*sukha*), and purity (*śuci*) in what is not self (*anātman*), impermanent (*anitya*), unsatisfactory (*duḥkha*) and impure (*aśuci, aśubha*). See AKBh V 9ab p. 283.

³ T. does not translate *iti* 'therefore.'

⁴ On the *skandhas*, *dhātus* and *āyatanas* see BHSD pp. 607, 101, 282-3.

all' it extends just so far: the five psycho-physical groups, the twelve domains of cognition, the eighteen elements."¹ Likewise:

All conditioned things are momentary; where is the action of the unstable
of which the existence is both its action and its agency?²

376.3 Nor is it appropriate to teach that the real nature³ of what has the nature of a illusion etc is momentary or not momentary since what is without essential nature has no nature of its own. Then how are they not absolutely real? In response to that he says, **and in order to introduce the world ...**

7. **And in order to introduce the world existents were taught by the Protector. In reality they are not momentary. If it is contradicted conventionally ...**

376.8 **And indicates the reason, because⁴, in order to introduce, to direct by very gentle small steps, the world, beings who are conceptually attached to existents and should be trained by teaching on the psycho-physical groups etc. but are not immediately qualified for teachings on emptiness, to emptiness, existents, characterised as the psycho-physical groups, the domains of cognition etc., despite all *dharmas* being in reality without essential nature⁵, were taught, explained, by the Protector, by the Buddha, the Blessed One who knowing the propensities etc. of**

¹ Quoted TSP p. 11.

² Regarding this verse see LVP p. 376 fn. 1 and LVP (1903) p. 112 fn. 1.

³ T. *chos* = *dharmā*, 'quality,' in place of *dharmatā*.

⁴ This connects with the 'therefore' at the end of the paragraph. Because of the arrangement of the English translation the two words are even further apart than in the Sanskrit.

⁵ T. *phuñ po dan kham la sogs pa'i mtshan ñid can gyi chos mams dños po la ran bzin med pa yin pa'i phyir ro* 'because *dharmas* characterised as the psycho-physical groups, the domains of cognition etc. are in reality without essential nature.'

beings protects them from the suffering of hell etc. and causes¹ them to attain temporal and ultimate happiness.² But [they were not taught] in absolute terms. Therefore there is no contradiction with the sūtra.³ This is stated:

Just as "my" and "I" have been spoken by the Conquerors for a practical purpose, so for a practical purpose the psycho-physical groups, domains of cognition and elements have been spoken of.⁴

376.17 If they were not taught in absolute terms, how are they momentary? In response he says, **in reality they are not momentary. In reality, in absolute terms, since they are without essential nature, they, these existents, are not even momentary.** Because of explaining the essential nature of those to those to be trained by the teaching of momentariness etc. [they are described as momentary]. If, in reality, they are not momentary, how are they spoken of even in the teaching?⁵ Bearing this in mind he says, **if conventionally.**⁶ Supposing the rejoinder, "if conventionally they are described as momentary," he poses the difficulty. There is then contradiction. To say, they are momentary conventionally, not in absolute terms, is contradictory. It is not consistent. It is contradicted by perception because they are perceived⁷ as permanent. Because they are perceived as permanent by those belonging to the domain of everyday practice. That is to say, the conventional nature is not

¹ T. *bde ba thob par 'dod pa la sogs pa'i bsam pa mkhyen* 'knowing the propensities of those desiring to obtain the happiness of ... etc.'

² *abhyudayaniḥśreyasasukha*. i.e., happiness in the world and the bliss of liberation. Cf. *Ratnāvalī* I 4 where *abhyudaya* is equated with happiness and *niḥśreyasa* with liberation (*mokṣa*).

³ i.e., the sūtra quoted above p. 375.16 and the sūtras in general.

⁴ *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* 33. LVP p. 376 fn. 3.

⁵ T. does not translate *deśanāyām api* 'even in the teaching.'

⁶ Translated on the basis of T. *yid la b'zag* (P. *b'zag*) *nas / kun rdzob ces smos te*. Skt. *paraḥ* 'opponent [bearing in mind].' See LVP p. 377 fn. 2.

⁷ T. does not translate *pratīteḥ* 'because they are perceived.'

momentary.¹ The follower of the definitive system² rejects that, saying, there is no fault ...

8. There is no fault by way of the conventional [truth] of the yogins: compared to the world they see reality. Otherwise there would be refutation by the world in determining a woman as impure.

377.12 There is not the fault characterised as being contrary to perception. Why? Because they are perceived as momentary by way of the conventional [truth], conventional usage, of the yogins who have obtained meditative concentration on the non-self of the person.³ This is the intent: Even if momentariness is not perceived by those seeing this side, nevertheless, it is the object of the conventional usage of yogins; and the conventional expression of yogins, on account of the statement "intellect is said to be concealing (conventional)"⁴, does not abandon conventional nature. Nor is what is refuted⁵ by perception necessarily refuted since such perception is not authoritative.

378.6 Why then, despite its belonging to the conventional, do only yogins see

¹ T. *tha sñad pa rnam kyis skad cig ma ma yin pa'i de kho na ñid du rtogs pa dañ / kun rdzob kyi rañ bñin zes pa ni 'gal lo zes pa'i don to* 'This is the meaning: The perception of them by those belonging to the domain of everyday practice as in reality permanent and the conventional nature [being impermanent] are contradictory.' For Skt. reconstruction see LVP p. 377 fn. 5.

² *siddhāntavādin*, i.e., a Mādhyamika. According to Renou (1942), p. 340: 'celui qui exprime (au terme de la discussion) la vue finale et définitive.'

³ *pudgalanairātmya*. One of the two kinds of non-self mentioned on p. 345.14. It does not negate the reality of the *dharmas* as impermanent etc. The other, non-self of *dharmas*, denies the individual existence of the constituents of reality. It denies *svabhāva* in the sense of *svalakṣaṇa* of *dharmas* as being ultimate.

⁴ Verse 2d.

⁵ T. *'gal ba* 'contradicted.'

momentariness etc. and not those seeing this side? In reply, he says, compared to the world they see reality. Compared to¹ the world which sees this side, those yogins see reality, see beyond the senses. This states the reason. Because they see reality they perceive the non-self² etc. of the momentary although it is not perceived by the world. For the same reason they are not refuted by the perception of the world.

378.12 Since this is certainly to be accepted, he says, otherwise ... Otherwise, if it were not thus assented to, then even in regard to what you accept there would be refutation by the world. In regard to what? In determining a woman as impure. At the time of meditation on impurity³, in determining, in ascertaining⁴, a woman, a desirable woman, as impure there would be refutation by the world. There would be contradiction by what is perceived⁵ by the world because the world is conceptually attached to a woman's body as by nature⁶ pure. Therefore the vision of yogins is not refuted by the perception of the world. Here an abundance of logical reasons may be supplied such as:

Just as the perception of the partially blind.⁷

Thus according to scripture as well, things are not established in absolute terms. Therefore it is certain that all *dharma*s have the nature of an illusion, a dream etc.

¹ *sakāśāt*. See Speyer (1886) p. 136 § 189 and BHSD p. 544. T. *mthoñ ba'i bdag ñid las = darśanātmakāt*, 'consisting of seeing,' in place of *darśanāt sakāśāt*.

² T. *bdag ñid* 'nature.'

³ See IIX 52-69.

⁴ T. *bsgom pa'i dus na*, has understood *vibhāvanāyām* (which glosses *nirūpaṇe* T. *ñes rtog* 'determination') as 'at the time of meditation.' The term *vibhāvanā* has connotations of analytic reduction ('undevelopment' as Conze (1967b), p. 359, puts it) and Harrison (1990), p. 28 fn. 7, has suggested 'meditational deconstruction' as a suitable translation in certain contexts. The term also has a more standard meaning of 'clear ascertainment' (given in MW p. 978). It seems likely that Prajnākaramati used the term to evoke this spectrum of meanings.

⁵ T. *grags pa* 'generally accepted.'

⁶ T. does not translate *svabhāvatayā* 'by nature.'

⁷ See above p. 369.15.

379.4 That may be so, but if essential nature similar to an illusion¹ is all pervasive, then the Buddha also would be similar to an illusion, similar to a dream. And it is stated in the illustrious [*Prajñāpāramitā*]² : "When this had been said, ³Subhūti said to those sons of the gods, 'O sons of the gods, similar to an illusion are those beings. O sons of the gods, similar to a dream are those beings. For an illusion and beings are not two, they do not form two groups. All *dharmas* as well, O sons of the gods, are similar to an illusion, similar to a dream. A stream-enterer as well is similar to an illusion, is similar to a dream. The fruit of stream-entry as well is similar to an illusion, is similar to a dream. Likewise a once-returner and the fruit of once-returning as well; a non-returner and the fruit of non-returning as well. An arhat and arhatship as well are similar to an illusion, similar to a dream. A solitary buddha as well is similar to an illusion, is similar to a dream. Solitary buddhahood as well is similar to an illusion, is similar to a dream. A perfect complete buddha as well is similar to an illusion, is similar to a dream. Perfect complete buddhahood as well is similar to an illusion, is similar to a dream. Up to, nirvāṇa as well is similar to an illusion, is similar to a dream. And if⁴ there were any *dharma*⁵ superior to nirvāṇa, that as well I would declare is similar to an illusion, similar to a dream.' "

380.1 In that case, how can merit and sin arise from doing good and harm [respectively]? Supposing the intent of the opponent he says, **how in any way ...**

9ab. How in any way can there be merit from the

¹ T. *sgyu ma'i rañ bzin* = *māyāsvabhāva* 'illusory essential nature.'

² AS p. 20 (p. 39 Mitra's edition) with minor variations. Quoted MV p. 449. Identified by LVP MV p. 449 fn. 4.

³ T. includes *tshē dañ ldan pa* 'venerable.' This agrees with AS.

⁴ T. does not translate *sacet* 'if.'

⁵ T. *'phags pa'i chos* 'noble dharma.'

**Victorious One similar to an illusion ? And if he
were real?**

380.4 If the Blessed One as well has a nature similar to an illusion, then you think **how in any way**, how possibly, by worship, veneration, respectful salutations etc, **can there be merit, virtue, from the Victorious One**, the Blessed One, who is **similar to an illusion**, who is without essential nature? And this is an elliptical expression. It is to be regarded as: Also if there is harm done to him, how possibly can there be sin? For the intent of the opponent is that it is not tenable that merit and sin issue from doing good¹ and harm to a man created by an illusion maker.

380.9 The answer to this has been given previously. Thus, here he asks the opponent in return, **and if he were real? And if he were real**, and if he existed in absolute terms, from the Blessed One how possibly could there be merit?² "How in any way?" is to be construed in both cases.

380.12 This is the intent: Just as for someone³, from the absolutely existing Victorious One absolutely existing merit arises, so, for somebody else, [from the Victorious One] similar to an illusion [merit arises] similar to an illusion. Between us there is no difference at all since the mere principle of conditionship is common to both cases. Thus the rejoinder of yours is no better⁴ than ours. That there is no absolutely existing substantial intrinsic nature established by reason has [already] been shown.

¹ T. *bkur sti byas pa* 'respect payed.' But cf. immediately above p. 380.1 where *satkāra* is translated by *phan pa*.

² T. does not translate *puṇyam* '[could there be] merit.'

³ T. '*ga' zig las* 'from some [absolutely existing Victorious One].'

⁴ T. *khyad par cuñ zad yod pa ma yin no* '[Our rejoinder is the same as yours:] there is no difference at all.'

380.18 Indeed there may be merit even from the Victorious One similar to an illusion. How does one reply to this? [The opponent] says in reply, **if a being is similar to an illusion ...**

9cd. If a being is similar to an illusion, once dead why would he be born again?

381.2 Or put another way: If even the Victorious One is similar to an illusion what can one say about samsāric beings? They too are the same, we say, in accordance with the statement, "Similar to an illusion, O sons of the gods, are those beings."¹ If this is so, a great fault follows. Hence he says, if...

381.6 **If a being, a living creature, is similar to an illusion, has qualities the same in nature as an illusion, then, once dead why would he be born again?** "Why" in the sense of a question or an impossibility. **Once dead, fallen from one's common class², why would he be born, arise, again?** One should either state a reason for this or it is not tenable, for an illusory man once destroyed does not arise again. Therefore one should accept that there are absolutely existing things. Since this is not to be accepted [Śāntideva] says, just as long ...

10ab. Just as long as there is the assemblage of conditions, for that long even an illusion occurs.

381.13 **Just as long a time as there is the assemblage, the collection, of conditions, of causes, [such as] mantras, drugs etc. - all the causes - for that long a time even an illusion occurs.** It does not cease before, nor does it occur

¹ Quoted above p. 379.6. T. *sems can de mams kyañ* 'those beings also.'

² *nikāyasabhāgatā*. See AKBh II 41a p. 67.

thereafter. In the same way as long as there is the assemblage whose nature is ignorance, action (*karma*) and craving, for that long even the illusion of the continuum of a being occurs because its activity depends on the principle of conditionship.¹ If a being does not exist in absolute terms, why does the continuum of beings continue as long as *samsāra* and not cease² after only a brief time as an illusion does? In relation to this it is said, **just as long as there is the assemblage of conditions, for that long [an illusion]³ occurs.** But that for which it is not so does not continue to exist.⁴

382.3 Moreover, that it endures for a long time is not an adequate basis for establishing its truth.⁵ Hence he says, **how, by mere long continuity ...**

10cd. How, by mere long continuity, could a being truly exist?

382.6 **How, in what way, he asks, by mere, by only, long, long enduring, continuity, unbroken succession, could a being truly, absolutely, exist, be found?** The extent of the difference is this: That which is distinguished by causes and conditions which endure for a long time continues to exist for a long time; but that for which it is not so does not continue to exist.⁶ But truth and falsity are not [established] by [a difference] of this extent. Therefore, even if it has the nature of an illusion, it is not possible for it not to be born again.

1 T. has misunderstood *āyatta: gai rkyen rnams gai yin pa ni 'jug pa'i phyir ro.*

2 *'byun ba* 'arise.' And not arise after a brief time, i.e., cease.

3 T. includes *sgyu ma* 'an illusion.'

4 T. does not translate this sentence which occurs again below on p. 382.10.

5 *samyaktva.* Lit. 'correctness.'

6 T. *de rjes su ldog pa yin te* 'that ceases.'

382.12 [Opponent] So then, just as in the slaying etc. of an illusory person there is no destruction of life, in the same way in the slaying of a person other than that [illusory person] there would be no [destruction of life] because their natures are not different? To this [Śāntideva] says, **there is no sin in ...**

11ab. There is no sin in killing an illusory person because of the absence of mind.

382.16 **In the killing etc., in the murder¹ etc., of an illusory person, - the word "etc." is used for taking what is not given etc.² - although [an illusory person] is the same [as an actual being] in being without essential nature, there is no sin, that is, the unwholesome destruction of life etc.³, does not arise, because of the absence of mind, because of the non-existence of consciousness, in the continuum of an illusory person. ⁴And in that case, from striking a blow with the intent to murder, there is the loathsome but not the destruction of life.**

383.3 [Opponent] How can there be destruction of life in a case other than an illusory person? In reply [Śāntideva] says, **but when ...**

11cd. But, when [the person] is endowed with illusory mind there is the arising of sin and merit .

383.6 **"But"** has the sense of distinction from the proceeding. **When [the**

1 T. *srog dan bral ba* 'loss of life.'

2 Translation on the basis of T. *ma byin par blaṅs pa la sogs pa yin la*. See LVP p. 382 fn. 4.

3 T. does not translate *prāṇātipātādi* 'destruction of life etc.'

4 Skt. here gives a grammatical explanation: 'Sin (*pāpaka*), because of the use [in Sanskrit] of the affix "ka" in the sense of the word itself (*svārthe*) is simply sin (*pāpa*)' T. does not translate. See Abhyankar (1977) p. 106.

person] is endowed with¹, possesses, an illusory mind, the very mind is an illusion - connected with a mind whose essential nature is illusory is the meaning - there is the arising, the origination, of sin and merit, of both sin and merit, that is, of both virtue and evil from helping and harming [respectively]. From a particular assemblage [of causes and conditions] there is a particular² result. Just as, even when two stalks born of cow dung and something else have the same form, their natures are different because they have different causes. In the same way, in this case [of an illusory and an "actual" person] also, their is not the consequence of the stated fault.

383.12 Undermining what has been said, namely, "but, when the person ... ," the opponent³ says, because mantras etc. ...

12ab. Because mantras etc. do not have the capacity an illusory mind does not arise.

383.15 Because mantras etc. - because of the word "etc." drugs etc. [are also meant] - do not have the capacity, the function, for producing mind, an illusory mind does not arise, a mind with the nature of an illusion does not arise. For example, the forms of elephants etc. come forth due to the power of mantras etc. employed by an illusion maker as a causal basis for deluding others but mind does not [come forth] in the same way. This is the way of thinking of the opponent. Countering this [Śāntideva] says, also that illusion is of various sorts ...

12cd. Also that illusion is of various sorts; its arising

¹ T. *mtshurñs* = *samāna*, 'the same,' in place of *samete*. Verse has *dañ ldan pa la*.

² T. does not translate *viśeṣaḥ* 'particular.'

³ T. *gzan gyi*. Read *gzan gyis*? Sweet (1977), p. 66, notes that Tsong-kha-pa and rGyal-tshab, following Bu-ston, interpret 12ab as Śāntideva's statement rather than an objection. Bu-ston also noted Prajñākaramati's opinion.

from various conditions.

384.4 The word "also" (*api*) has the sense of precise determination and¹ a different stage. That illusion is of various sorts, of various kinds, arising very much from various conditions. That [illusion] whose arising, production, is from various conditions, from many kinds of causes, is called thus.² This is the intent: If illusion is called "illusion" the word is the same, nevertheless it does not have an identical cause [in every case] since the result has various natures though the natures are [all] illusory. For, since a particular³ cause is seen for a single result, it is not logical to imagine that same [cause] in every case because the word "result" is the same. Rather, though the word is the same, a particular thing has capacity in a particular case because its nature is different. Showing just this he says a single condition ...

13ab. A single condition does not have the capacity for all in any circumstance.

384.14 A single condition, cause, causal basis⁴ of which the capacity has been observed in some instance, does not have, cannot have, the capacity for all, that is, the capacity, the power, for every effect. With the understanding of "seen in any circumstance" he says "in any circumstance" [meaning] seen or accepted in any circumstance of place or time. And therefore, one illusion has a nature acquired through the capacity of mantras etc. while another its active power come forth from

1 T. 'am 'or.'

2 The commentary indicates that *nānāpratyayasambhavā* is a bahuvrīhi (exocentric) compound qualifying *māyā*, i.e., '[illusion] whose arising is from various conditions.'

3 T. *gcig* 'single.'

4 T. glosses *rkyen* (*pratyaya*) with *rgyu*, not with both *kāraṇa* and *hetu* as does Skt. "Rgyu" would translate both.

beginningless saṃsāra is put into effect by the power¹ of ignorance. Therefore mantras etc. do not have the capacity for all.

385.4 All this, following worldly usage, has arisen relying on conventional substantial reality created by conceptualisation, but not absolutely, because of the absence of the conceptualisation of birth, death, origination, cessation, cause, effect, existence, non-existence etc. in the absolute state since all *dharmas* are naturally in nirvāṇa.²

385.8 The opponent not letting this pass, again drawing out a consequence in another way³, says, if one, in nirvāṇa absolutely ...

13cd. If one, in nirvāṇa absolutely, were to continue
in saṃsāra conventionally ...

385.11 If one, in nirvāṇa, devoid of origination and cessation⁴ because of emptiness of essential nature, absolutely, in terms of absolute truth because one is primordially quiescent being naturally in nirvāṇa, were to continue in saṃsāra, were to be yoked to birth, old age, death etc., conventionally, in terms of

1 'byuñ ba 'arising [from ignorance].

2 *prakṛtinirvṛtta*. T. *rañ bzin gyis ldog pa*. 'naturally ceased.' Since *dharmas* are without essential nature, neither arising nor ceasing, at peace from the beginning, they are naturally in a state of nirvāṇa. Ruegg (1969), p. 428, identifies *prakṛtinirvāṇa* with *cittaprabhāsvaratva*, the natural luminosity of mind essentially unaffected by adventitious defilements (*āgantukakleśa*). Cf. below p. 524.14. The realisation that all things are naturally in a state of nirvāṇa is concomitant with the knowledge that all things are unarisen (*anutpādayjñāna*) referred to below on p. 426.8. This realisation marks the entry into the eighth spiritual level (*bhūmi*). See Sakurabe (1966) p. 885 and Williams (1992).

3 T. *gzan yan slar yan = paro 'pi punar api* 'and the opponent yet again.'

4 T. *la sogs pa* 'etc.'

conventional truth, conceptually. Then, since there would be this great contradiction, he says, the Buddha would also continue in saṃsāra in the same way ...

14ab. The Buddha would also continue in saṃsāra in the same way. Then what would be the use of activity for awakening?

385.17 If such is accepted, the Buddha also, although in nirvāṇa because of dispelling all obscurations, would continue in saṃsāra, would partake of birth etc. Because it is [the Buddha would continue] in the same way, then, for that reason, what would be the use of activity for awakening? Activity characterised by many hundreds of difficulties¹ such as giving a hand, foot, head, etc., for awakening, for buddhahood. What would be the use of that? There would be no purpose because of the futility in the very way described.² For that [activity] is relied on for the cessation of all *dharma*s pertaining to saṃsāra³ and to attain buddhahood which is dependant on the collection of all good qualities.⁴ If, however, the *dharma*s pertaining to saṃsāra have not ceased, what is accomplished by relying on that [activity].⁵ This is the way of thinking [of the opponent]. That [objection] has already been answered⁶ with the words, "just as long as there is the assemblage of

¹ T. *stñon du 'gro ba'i sdug bsñal* 'preceding sufferings.'

² P. *brjod pa'i rim pas 'bras bu med pa'i phyir*. D. is wrong.

³ *Dharma*s perturbed (*aprasānta*) by the sullyng influences (*āsrava*) bind a person to saṃsāra. See Stcherbatsky (1923) p. 49 and fn. to p. 342.3 *āsrava* 'sullyng influences.'

⁴ T. *de yañ 'khor ba'i chos thams cad ldog pa'i ched du yon tan thams cad bsdus pa la brten te sañs rgyas thob par bya ba'i phyir yañ dag par brten la* 'And that, relied on for the accumulation of all good qualites for the cessation of all *dharma*s pertaining to saṃsāra, is completely relied in order to attain buddhahood.'

⁵ T. What is the use of practice?

⁶ T. *bsal ba* 'negated.'

conditions ..."¹ Clarifying it yet again, he says, **for, if there is no extirpation ...**

14cd. For, if there is no extirpation of the conditions, illusion too is not extirpated;

15ab.² But because of destruction of the conditions there is no arising even conventionally.

386.8 For, because, if there is no extirpation, no annihilation, of the conditions, the causes, illusion too, not only saṃsāra, is not extirpated, does not cease. The word "too" in a collective sense. But because of the destruction, the cessation, of the conditions, the causes, there is no arising, no continuing in saṃsāra, even conventionally, even by conceptual conventional usage. Moreover, the annihilation of the conditions is to be known by the respective cessation of ignorance etc.³ through the practise of reality.

386.14 As is stated in the noble *Śālistambasūtra*⁴: "When [Śāripūtra] had spoken thus, the Bodhisattva Maitreya, the Great Being, said this to the Venerable Śāripūtra, 'In regard to what was said by the Blessed One, the Omniscient Master of the Dharma: "Whoever, O monks, sees dependent origination, he sees the Dharma. Whoever sees the Dharma, he sees the Buddha," [you ask] what is dependent origination? ⁵It is this: mental formations dependent on ignorance, consciousness dependent on mental

¹ Verse 10ab.

² Both LVP and Vaidya have 15ab numbered as 14cd.

³ i.e., the members of dependent origination. See following passage.

⁴ See LVP *Douze causes* p. 70, Aiyaswami Sastri (1950) p. 2, Reat (1993) p. 28.

⁵ The Tibetan translation of the *Śālistambasūtra* in the Kanjur adds '*di lta ste 'di yod pas 'di 'byuñ la 'di skyes pa'i phyir 'di skye ba ste = yad uta asminn satīdam bhavati, asyotpādād idam utpadyate* 'It is: this being that occurs; from the arising of this, that arises.' See LVP *Douze causes* p. 71; also fn. 2 for parallel passages. The saying is quoted by Prajñākaramati on pp. 182.12, 474.18. The occurrence on p. 182 is noted by Aiyaswami Sastri (1950) p. 2 fn. 5.

formations, name and form dependent on consciousness, the six domains of cognition dependent on name and form, contact dependent on the six bases of cognition, feeling dependent on contact, craving dependent on feeling, clinging dependent on craving, becoming dependent on clinging, birth dependent on becoming, old age, death, grief, lamentation, suffering, mental unhappiness and distress dependent on birth. Thus is the arising of this entire great mass of suffering. Therein, because of the cessation of ignorance mental formations cease ... Thus is the cessation of this entire great mass of suffering. This is called conditioned origination ... ¹Whoever sees this conditioned origination as incessant², impersonal, as it is, non-erroneous, unborn, unarisen³, unconditioned, unobstructed, without support, quiescent, fearless, immoveable, of unceasing nature, he sees the Dharma. But whoever sees the Dharma thus, as incessant up to of unceasing nature, he sees the Buddha, the highest body of the Dharma ... ⁴Therein what is ignorance? The perception of these six constituent elements as single, the perception of them as a whole, the perception of them as permanent, the perception of them as fixed, the perception of them as everlasting, the perception of them as happy, the perception of them as a self, the perception of them as a being, the perception of them as a life, the perception of them as a creature, the perception of them as a human, the perception of them as belonging to the human race, the perception of them as forming an 'I' or forming a 'mine'; this and other similar kinds of unknowing is called ignorance. While such ignorance exists attachment, hatred and delusion are active in regard to sense objects. In regard to that [conditioned origination], attachment, hatred and delusion in regard to sense objects: these are called mental formations dependent on ignorance. The mental representation of a thing is

¹ Passage beginning here and ending *so 'nuttaraṃ dharmaśariraṃ buddhaṃ paśyati* 'he sees the Buddha, the highest body of the Dharma,' is quoted with minor differences below p. 576.14.

² T. adds *srog med pa = ajīvaṃ* 'non-personal.'

³ T. adds *ma byas pa = akṛtaṃ* 'not made.'

⁴ For following passage see LVP *Douze causes* p. 79, Aiyaswami Sastri (1950) p. 9, Reat (1993) p. 49. See also ŚS p. 221, MV p. 562.14.

called consciousness. The four great elements and matter dependent on¹ them is one² form.³ The four formless appropriated psycho-physical groups which arise together with consciousness are name. Those [together]⁴ are name and form. The senses dependent on name and form are the six domains of cognition. The coming together of three *dharmas*⁵ is contact. The experience of contact is feeling. Attachment to feeling is craving. The expansion of craving is clinging. The action springing from clinging which gives rise to rebirth is becoming. The manifestation of the psycho-physical groups caused by becoming⁶ is birth. The maturation of the psycho-physical groups proceeding from birth is old age. The destruction of the psycho-physical groups⁷ is death. The inner burning when one dies, bewildered and with intense attachment⁸, is grief. The utterance arising from grief is lamentation. The unpleasant experience associated with the five [classes of] consciousness⁹ is suffering. The

¹ Reading *upādāya* on the basis of T. *bzui* (P. *gzui*) *nas*.

² *aikadhya* seems out of place here.

³ MV 563.4 gives a more comprehensible reading: *rūpaṃ catvāri mahābhūtāni tāni copādāya rūpaṃ* 'Form is the four great elements and the matter dependent on those.' T. *byuñ ba chen po bzī pa ñe bar bzui nas / gzugs gcig po ni gzugs so* 'The single matter dependent on the four great elements is form.'

⁴ T. *de dan de ni*. 'that [form] and that [name].' LVP *Douze causes*, p. 79 fn. 6, clarifies: 'Pour le sens: "Les quatre *upādānaskandhas* immatériels et nés avec le *viññāna*, c'est le *nāman*; le *rūpa*, c'est les quatre *mahābhūtas* et le *rūpa* qui en dépend; ce *rūpa* et ce *nāman* ensemble, c'est le *nāmarūpa*."'

⁵ i.e., the coming together of object, sense organ and consciousness, as made clear by the *Madhyamakaśālistambasūtra* which adds *viṣayendriyaviññānasamnipāta ity arthaḥ*. See Reat (1993) p. 52 n. 19.

⁶ T. *rgyu de las* = *taddhetukaḥ* 'caused by that.' T. agrees with ŚS p. 222.

⁷ T. adds *rgas nas* 'from old age.'

⁸ Read, with Vaidya, *sābhiṣvaṅgasya*, in place of LVP *svābhiṣvaṅgasya*. This reading is supported by ŚS p. 222 and T. *mñon par chags pa dan bcas pa'i*. Correct reading noted by LVP p. 388 fn. 5.

⁹ T. *mam par śes pa lña'i tshogs* = *pañcaviññānakāya*. i.e., associated with the five types of bodily consciousness; mental unhappiness (*daurmanasya*) is associated with mental consciousness.

mental suffering associated with the mental attention to suffering¹ is mental unhappiness. And other like² afflictions are called distress.

388.17 ³"Therein ignorance on account of great darkness.⁴ Mental formations on account of operations of volition. Consciousness on account of mental representation⁵. Name and form on account of vain imagining.⁶ Six domains of cognition on account of [their being an] entrance door.⁷ Contact on account of contact. Feeling on account of experience. Craving on account of thirst for. Clinging on account of clinging. Becoming on account of generating rebirth. Birth on account of manifestation of the psycho-physical groups. Old age on account of maturation of the psycho-physical groups. Death on account of destruction. Grief on account of grieving. Lamentation on account of vocal lamentation. Suffering on account of bodily torment. Mental unhappiness on account of mental torment. Distress on account of affliction." And so on.

389.6 If there is no extirpation of the conditions, thus shown, saṃsāra⁸, unimpaired, comes forth because of the formativeness of the conditioned origination of

¹ T. does not translate *duḥkha*. This agrees with ŚS p. 222. MV p. 563.10 reads *manasā samyuktaṃ* 'associated with the mind.'

² Read *ādaya* in place of LVP *ādāya*. T. '*di lta bu la sogs pa = evamādayaḥ* and ŚS p. 222 support this reading.

³ The following passage is omitted in ŚS and only abbreviated by *peyālaṃ* 'etc.' It is quoted MV p. 564.1.

⁴ MV p. 564.1 *mohāndhakāra* 'darkness of delusion.'

⁵ Reading *vijñāpana* on the basis of T. *mam par rig pa* and MV 564.1.

⁶ *mananārthena*. T. *rlom pa'i phyir*. Perhaps because *nāmarūpa* constitutes the individual. MV p. 564.2 reads *anyo 'nyopastambhanārthena* 'on account of mutual support.'

⁷ Reading *āyadvāra*. Cf. AKBh I 20 p. 13 *cittacaittāyadvārārtha āyatanārthaḥ*. T. *skye ba'i sgo* 'door of birth.'

⁸ T. '*du byed = saṃskāra* 'formative forces' and what is conditioned by them, i.e., in the sense of *saṃkārasamūha* and *saṃskṛtadharmas*. See Stcherbatsky (1923) pp. 5, 22.

the twelve members. Which the Venerable Master¹ states:

Matured gradually in accordance with the projective cause, the continuum, on account of defilement and actions, goes again to the other world.² This is the beginningless wheel of becoming. That conditioned origination has twelve members in three parts.³

389.12 However, if the conditions are extirpated⁴, there would be no continuing in saṃsāra in any way at all because of a lack of causes. Therefore it does not follow that "the Buddha would also continue in saṃsāra in the same way."⁵

389.14 Thus, first having dealt with the objections of the Sautrāntikas etc., in order to refute the disagreements of the Yogācārinś, explaining a fault by means of their opinion, he says, and when errancy ...

15cd. And when errancy does not exist by what is illusion perceived?

390.1 When the whole world, insofar as it consists of illusion, is accepted by [you] Mādhyamikas as empty of essential nature, and [errancy]⁶, the intellect,

¹ i.e., Vasubandhu. Prajñākaramati uses the term *ācāryapādāḥ* in a wider sense than does Candrakīrti who, in the MV, appears to use the term to exclusively refer to Nāgārjuna. See the comments of de Jong (1978) p. 136. Also see fn. to *ācāryapāda*, 'Venerable Master,' below p. 491.17.

² T. *'jig rten pha rol dag tu 'gro* 'goes to other worlds.'

³ AKBh III 19-20 p. 129. The 'three parts' (*kāṇḍa*) are equivalent to the three ways (*vartman*), i.e., *karma-*, *kleśa-*, *duḥkha-*. See above p 351.2.

⁴ *pratyayānāṃ punar ucchede*. Verse *pratyayānāṃ tu vicchedāt*.

⁵ Verse 14a.

⁶ *māyāsvabhāvasaṃvṛtigrahīṇī buddhir api* 'the intellect, apprehending the conventional which has the nature of an illusion' explains *bhrāntir api* 'and errancy.'

apprehending the conventional which has the nature of an illusion, to you, like the external, **does not exist**, then, **by what is illusion perceived?** By what is it known without a substantially real knowing as apprehender (*grāhaka*) of that.¹ By nothing at all is the meaning. But he [who accepts] that his own mind, alone absolutely real², erringly appears thus as external form, does not have this³ fault. Thus is the way of thinking [of the Yogācārins].

390.7 In order to refute them in the same way, he says, **when, for you, illusion itself ...**

16ab. **When, for you, illusion itself does not exist, then what is perceived?**

390.9 **When, for you⁴**, a Vijñānavādin who accepts that the world is mind-only because of the non-existence of the external object, **illusion itself** coming forth as an apprehensible object (*grāhya*) in the form of elephants etc. **does not exist, then what is perceived?** Then what appears here? Because of the non-existence of the external object, appearance is not logically possible as delimited by place etc, is the meaning. Supposing the intent of the opponent here, he says, **even if that is a form ...**

16cd. **Even if that is a form of mind itself it is in reality other.**

390.15 It is stated in regard to this that one's mind alone, erringly, appears externally

1 T. does not translate *tad* '[of] that.'

2 D. *yod pa ma yin*. Delete *ma*.

3 T. does not translate *ayaṃ* 'this.'

4 *tava*. Verse *te*. T. *khyod de ... khyed cag la* ?

in the form (*ākāra*) of elephants etc. It is just stated. But even if that is a form, an appearance, of mind itself, of knowing itself, appearing as an apprehensible object as delimited by place etc., it is, it exists, in reality, in actuality, other, different from the form of mind which is the internal apprehending subject. Even if what is stated is to be accepted, it is, nevertheless not consistent. Hence he says, when mind itself ...

17ab. When mind itself is the illusion, then what is seen by what?

391.2 When mind itself, consciousness itself, accepted as the knower, is the illusion, is not other because there is nothing at all called "illusion" separate from the knowing mind on account of the acceptance that that [illusion] appears thus insofar as it consists of that [mind], then what is seen by what? What is perceived by what? For there is only seeing itself, not the seen. Without the seen there would be no seeing either since that has reference to the seen. Hence nothing is seen by nothing! The blindness of the entire world is arrived at! This is the way of thinking.

391.8 But [the Yogācārin objects] it would only be so if cognition were not self-aware. While aware of its intrinsic nature as self-aware it would know the appearance of¹ illusion etc. as not different to that. And that being so there is no damage [to our case]. Supposing the intent of the Vijñānavādin to be thus, he says, and it has been stated ...

¹ T. does not translate *pratibhāsa* 'appearance [of].'

17cd. And it has been stated by the Protector of the world that mind does not see mind.

391.13 When it has been shown through reasoning that the whole world is quite empty of essential nature, then what possesses what essential nature in reality? By what, of what, would there be knowing? And the Blessed One has stated: "All *dharmas* are empty. Mind has the characteristic of emptiness. All *dharmas* are isolated. Mind has the characteristic of isolatedness."¹ Moreover, and it has been stated, and it has been related², by the Protector of the world: by the Protector, the Refuge, i.e., the Buddha, the Blessed One, of the world, of all beings. What has been stated? That mind does not see mind.³ Mind does not know its⁴ own self because even if it exists in reality the operation in regard to its own self is contradictory. How possibly? Just as a sword-blade does not cut itself ...

18ab. Just as a sword-blade does not cut itself so mind [does not see itself].

392.4 Just as a very sharp sword-blade, cutting blade, does not cut, rend, itself, its own body like something other than that⁵, because of the contradiction of action in respect to its own self, so the mind⁶ [does not see itself]. "Like a sword-blade,

¹ References to the emptiness and isolatedness of *dharmas* occur throughout the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature. For some glosses from the commentaries on the meaning of 'isolated' (*vivikta*) see Conze (1967b) pp. 363-4.

² T. does not translate *uktaṃ ca kathitaṃ ca* 'and it has been stated, and it has been related.'

³ Cf. quote below from the *Ratnacūḍasūtra* p. 393.2 *na hi cittam cittam samanupaśyati*.

⁴ T. *sems kyi* 'mind's.'

⁵ T. does not translate *tad* '[than] that.'

⁶ T. adds *kyan* 'too.'

mind too¹ does not see itself," is to be construed. For so it is: It is not tenable that one and the same knowing² have the three self-natures of the known, the knower and the knowing because it is impossible for what is one without parts to have three natures.

392.10 In regard to this, this is said in the noble *Ratnacūḍāsūtra*³: "Searching for the mind he does not observe it as internal, he does not observe mind outside, he does not observe mind in the psycho-physical groups, he does not observe mind in the constituent elements, he does not observe mind in the domains of cognition. Not observing mind, he thoroughly investigates the flow of mind, thinking⁴, 'Whence does mind arise?' When there is an object mind arises.⁵ Then⁶ is mind one thing and the object another? But whatever the object mind is just that. If then the object is one thing and mind another, that mind will be double. But whatever the object, mind is just that. Then how does mind see mind? Indeed, mind does not observe⁷ mind. Just as the same sword-blade is not able to be cut by the same sword-blade, nor is the same fingertip able to be touched by the same fingertip, in the very same way, the same mind is not able to be seen by the same mind." And so on.

393.6 Here the Cittamātrin, to undermine the contradiction of the action in regard to its own self, explaining an example to establish his own thesis, says, it is just as ...

18cd. It is just as a lamp illuminates its own being. If

¹ T. *bdag ñid kyis* (D. *kyi*) *sems kyī* (D. *kyis*) *bdag ñid mi mthoñ ño* 'its own self does not see mind's own self.'

² T. *śes pa gcig po* (P. *pu*) *de la* '[for] one knowing[to have]' See LVP p. 392 fn. 2.

³ Quoted ŚS p. 235, MV p. 62.4. LVP p. 392 fn. 4.

⁴ T. *'di sñam du sems te = tasyaivaṃ bhavati* 'it occurs to him thus,' 'he thinks.' T. agrees with ŚS p. 235.

⁵ T. adds *sñam mo* 'thinking.'

⁶ T. adds *'di sñam du sems* 'he thinks.'

⁷ *sems kyis sems mthoñ bar mi ruñ ño* 'it is not right that mind sees mind.'

one thinks thus ...

393.10 It is just as a lamp, a lantern, illuminates, makes visible, its own being, its own nature. For, assuredly, it is just as a lantern is employed¹ to discern a pitcher or some other thing obscured by darkness but not so another lantern to illuminate a lantern. Rather, illuminating a pitcher etc. it illuminates itself as well. One should understand likewise in regard to the self-awareness under discussion. "And there is no contradiction seen at all," is to be construed in every case. Therefore, like a lantern it is quite without contradiction. **If one thinks thus**, if you think in this way, then you should not speak thus. Why? In response, he says, **a lamp is certainly not ...**

19ab. A lamp is certainly not illuminated since it has not been obscured by darkness.

394.2 A lamp is certainly not illuminated, certainly not lit up, like a pitcher etc. is, since it has not been obscured by darkness, has not been covered by the dark. Illumination is the removal of an existing obscuration. Therefore the illumination of pitchers etc. is tenable² because they exist beforehand. It is not so for a lamp because it does not exist beforehand and the illumination of the not-existing is not tenable because it is non-existent. Therefore a lamp is certainly³ not illuminated. Thus, because of dissimilarity⁴ the point to be established is not established through the example of a lantern.

¹ T. '*degs par byed la* 'is held up.'

² T. does not translate *yukta* 'tenable.'

³ T. '*di ltar* 'in this way.' T. reads *evam* in place of *eva*.

⁴ This clause is construed with the previous sentence in T.

394.8 [Opponent] That may be so but the words "it is just as a lamp ..."1 do not convey that a lamp illuminates itself obscured by darkness as [it does] a pitcher.2 Rather, they convey merely its lack of dependence on another in regard to its essential nature. Showing just this [the opponent] says, because a blue [thing] ...

19cd-20ab. Because a blue [thing] does not depend on another for blueness as a crystal does, so one thing is seen depending on another and [another] not depending.

394.14 **Because, since, a thing which is itself blue does not depend on another attribute for blueness [as a crystal does]3, in the same way as a crystal stone not being itself blue depends on another attribute, such as the presence of a blue leaf etc., for blueness, as a cause for the arising4 of the quality blue, so, in that way, one thing, such as a pitcher etc., depending on another, depending on a lantern etc., is seen clearly but another, such as a lantern etc., not depending [on another] is seen, is perceived, having itself a luminous nature. Only so much was intended to be said.**

395.1 The distinction having been shown thus by the Vijñānavādin, the follower of the definitive system negating what is shown by the example, first, that something blue is without dependence on another for blueness, says, **when there is ...**

20cd. When there is no blueness, that would not make

1 Verse 18cd.

2 T. does not translate *ghaṭavat* 'like a pitcher.'

3 *yathā sphaṭikopalaḥ* 'in the same way as a crystal stone' glosses *sphaṭikavat* 'as a crystal [does].'

4 T. *skyed* 'production.'

itself blue by itself.

395.5 Even this example is not fitting because, like a crystal, even something blue is not without dependence for blueness because it would depend on its own causes and conditions for being that. And when would it be without dependence?¹ If that arose as not blue from its own cause it would then make itself blue quite by itself without depending on another for being that. But this is not [the case] because when there is no blueness, when the quality blue is wanting, that, an entity accepted as blue², would not make itself, its own-nature, blue, endowed with the quality blue, by itself, quite by itself. "Not" negates it. It cannot be done because of the contradiction of action in regard to itself as before.³ Therefore, like a crystal, even something blue is not without dependence on another for blueness.

395.14 For so it is: Even a crystal stone its nature existing substantially does not experience a blue colouring⁴ in the presence of an⁵ attribute. Rather quite another crystal stone coloured with the quality blue arises because everything's own material support⁶ is momentary⁷ and because of the cessation of its own former character⁸ through the cooperating condition of a blue attribute.⁹ Thus is the definitive system.

¹ T. *di yan nam gyi tshe gzan la ltos pa yod par gyur ze na* 'And when would it be dependent on another?'

² T. adds *de* 'that.'

³ Above p. 392.5.

⁴ T. *sñon por bsgyur bar gyur pa yin te* 'has turned blue.' Read *ma yin te*.

⁵ T. *khyad par gzan* 'another attribute.'

⁶ *upādāna* in the sense of material support or cause. See LVP *Douze causes*, p. 27, on the two senses of *upādāna*.

⁷ Reading *sarvasvopādānakṣaṇāt*. T. *thams cad rañ gi ñe bar len pa'i skad cig ma*.

⁸ T. *sña ma rañ ñid* 'former nature.'

⁹ T. '*on kyañ thams cad rañ gi ñe bar len pa'i skad cig ma dañ sñon po'i khyad par lhan cig byed pa'i rkyen las kyañ sña ma rañ ñid kyis 'gags nas* 'Rather, because of the cessation of the former nature because the material support is momentary and because of the cooperating condition of a blue attribute.' See LVP 396 fn. 1 for the

Therefore subjection to causes and conditions in regard to that quality is common to both those. And thus there is no distinction also in regard to the thing to be established which is under discussion.

396.4 [Opponent] But what [you] wish is willingly accomplished. The very origination of knowledge from its own causes and conditions insofar as its nature is the opposite to a senseless essential nature, i.e., the self-luminosity of what is without dependence on other lumination, is called "self-awareness." And this is exactly what is determined by you¹ indicating the intrinsic nature of something blue. And only to such an extent was the lantern made an example. But we do not maintain² the self-illumination of knowledge as distinguished by act, actor and action because it is not tenable for a single existent to have the three natures of act etc. Despite the fault by way of the distinction of action etc. that would not become any fault³ for us because of not damaging the self-lumination of what is produced from its own causes and conditions. Thus the fault set forth in regard to self-awareness does not follow. This is stated:

Consciousness arises the opposite to senseless natures: this, its non-senseless nature, is precisely its self-knowing. But its self-knowing is not differentiated⁴ by action and actor because it is not logical that what is single, without parts, have three natures.⁵

397.1 [Commentator] To this we say⁶: The fault has been stated having understood

Skt. equivalent of the Tibetan.

1 T. *kho bos* 'by me.'

2 T. does not translate *iṣyate* 'is maintained.'

3 T. *sun phyun ba* 'refutation.'

4 T. *bya dañ byed po'i dños por = kriyākāra karūpeṇa* 'with the nature of action and actor.'

5 *Tattvasaṃgraha* 2000-1. Identified by Aiyaswami Sastri (1950) pp. 104, 107.

6 *ucyate*. Lit. 'it is said.'

the word in the sense established by conventional usage as differentiated by action and actor because the word "self-awareness" conveys that meaning. If however, through fear of fault, the meaning of the word is totally rejected though admitted by the world then you will be refuted in worldly terms.

397.5 And, neither in this way is self-awareness established in absolute terms. For so it is: What is generated by causes and conditions is said to be without essential nature like a reflection, even more so self-awareness of cognition since it is without intrinsic essential nature in reality. And, given that it does not have essential nature, it is not appropriate that a "sky-flower"¹ have self-awareness. And neither does a senseless essential nature of anything exist² for a Mādhyamika³ in absolute terms⁴ whereby a non-senseless self-awareness could be opposed to the senseless. Therefore it is appropriate to say this only to others who are substantialists. Hence, being without essential nature, self-awareness is in no way whatsoever established. We will show this again in detail later on the occasion of showing the applications of mindfulness.⁵

397.14 Now, teaching that self-awareness of intellect is untenable [even] after accepting the self-illumination of a lantern, he says, **one says ...**

1 i.e., something completely non-existent.

2 T. does not translate *siddha* 'exist.'

3 T. *dbu mar smra ba po mams* 'Mādhyamikas.'

4 T. does not translate *paramārthatas* 'in absolute terms.'

5 Below verse 24.

22. One says "a lamp illuminates" having known it by cognition; having known it by what, does one say "intellect illuminates?"

397.18 The overall meaning is: Even granted the luminous nature of a lantern the example is, nonetheless, not suitable for establishing [self-]awareness¹ of intellect. One says, makes known, "a lamp illuminates," lights up itself without depending on another light, having known it, having perceived it, by cognition, with the intellect, because a lantern is an object of cognition. One says "intellect", cognition, "illuminates" but having known it² by what cognition, does one say that? He asks the opponent this.

398.6 And, [the fact] that there is no³ adequate basis at all for discerning the intellect explains the impossibility. First, it is not discerned by a prior cognition because of the non-existence of that because of its non-arising at that time. Nor [is it discerned] by [that cognition] coming to be at a later time since at that time the apprehensible object, being momentary, has passed away. Nor by that occurring at the same time as it because that [self-awareness] is not instrumental and the non-instrumental is not an object of knowledge in accordance with the statement, "a non-cause is not an object." Nor [is it perceived] by itself because of the contradiction in regard to that. Thus we do not know how that is perceived.

398.13 Since the awareness of that [cognition] is extremely untenable given the non-discerning of intellect in any way thus, he says **when, either ...**

1 T. *rañ rig pa* = *svasaṃvedana* 'self-awareness.'

2 T. adds *go bar byas nas* = *pratītya* 'having perceived it.'

3 *ma yin no źes pa'i sgra ni* 'There is no ... The word "iti" ...' Cf. LVP p. 398 fn 2.

23. **When, either illuminating or not illuminating, it is not seen by anything, even talking about that is senseless like talking about the charms of a barren woman's daughter.**

398.17 **When intellect, either illuminating, having the nature of illumination like a lamp, or not illuminating, having the nature of non-illumination¹ like a pitcher etc., is not seen by anything, is not perceived by anything, nor is it a perceiver of itself.² The words "either or" in the sense of a reciprocal collection. The word "when" attracts the word "then." Then, even talking about that, even explaining that, i.e., the intellect, is senseless, is fruitless, like talking about the charms, the coquetry, the dalliance, of a barren woman's daughter, the child of a woman having the characteristic of not giving birth. Since, being non-existent, a barren woman's daughter is not perceived, even less are her charms perceived, is the intent.**

399.7 **Alternatively, insofar as its essential nature is unarisen and not ceased, intellect represents³ the barren woman's daughter; self-awareness, insofar as its essential nature is unperceived, is like her charms. Because of the non-perception of one the other is also not perceived.⁴ Thus even talking about that, self-awareness, with mere talk devoid of reason, is senseless, is purposeless because it cannot be taken hold of. [Opponent] It may be so but this is [not]⁵ mere talk empty of reason because in regard to this there is this [following] reason. Thinking thus, he says, if**

¹ T. *mi gsal ba* (D. incorrectly inserts *ma*) *yin*. 'is non-illuminating.'

² T. *rtogs pa po 'ga' yañ med la rtogs pa cuñ zad kyañ med de rañ dañ gzan gñi gas kyañ ma yin no* 'given that there is no perceiver there is no perception either, nor is there both self and other.' See LVP p. 399 fn. 1.

³ T. *Ita bu* 'is like.'

⁴ T. *rañ rig pa des ma rtogs pa'i phyir de'i rtogs pa yañ med do* 'because of its non-perception by that self-awareness that is not perceived either.'

⁵ T. *tshig tsam ma yin te*. Cf. LVP p. 399 fn. 2.

self-awareness ...

24ab. If self-awareness does not exist how is
consciousness remembered?

399.14 If self-awareness of consciousness does not exist, is not found, then how is consciousness remembered since without self-awareness of consciousness there would be no remembering at a later time?¹ For remembering the unexperienced is untenable² because of the extreme consequences. Therefore it is inferred that self-awareness of cognition exists because of perceiving memory, the result of experience, at a later time.

400.3 This proof is not better³ because if memory were certain insofar as it is the result of self-awareness, memory would be the proof of self-awareness as smoke is of fire. And when self-awareness is not established by a valid means of knowledge there is no apprehending of memory as the result of that for there is [only] discernment of cause and effect on account of a necessary connection⁴ with the discernment of both [cause and effect] completely. And it will not establish memory as its result like

¹ The same argument is put and answered in MA VI 73-76 p. 166-171. For a discussion of the refutation of self awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) in MA see Fenner (1990) pp. 80-82. Fenner (p. 81) says: 'Without such an apperceptive faculty, the Phenomenalists [Vijñānavādins] reason (MABh: 167) that memory or recall would be impossible, for consciousness must be non-referentially aware of itself - in other words, aware of itself independently of referents - in order to have memories when the referents are past and finished.'

² T. *ñams su ma myoñ ba ni dran par mi nus te* 'the unexperienced cannot be remembered.' i.e., as consciousness occurs there is an experience (*anubhava*) of it and that experience is self-awareness. Cf. Rgyal tshab's commentary on this verse in Sweet (1984) p. 193.

³ T. *bsgrub par bya ba = sādhyā* 'thing to be proved.' See LVP p. 400 fn. 1.

⁴ *nāntarīyaka*. T. *med par (D. pa) ma yin*. Equivalent to *avinābhūta*. See Renou (1942) p. 170.

consciousness [is established as the result of] of the eye etc. even when there is not seeing [the eye etc.]. For that result is inferred through negative concomitance¹ because of the invariable absence² of consciousness of blue etc. when the eye is absent; but we will show that remembering occurs even without the [self-]awareness of cognition. Thus without the certainty that [memory] is the result of self-awareness, since memory occurs without that³, [self-]awareness is not established.

400.12 Hence you should tell how even memory is established through being a cognition.⁴ An invariable mark⁵ that is itself not established does not make known⁶ something else. Nor is memory, insofar as self-awareness is directly perceived, the apprehender because it is other than that [self-awareness]. Nor is cognition the object of another cognition because of the consequence of the fault of not establishing a connection etc. as [is possible] with an external object. Because it is the same in regard to being other⁷ there would be the apprehension of that⁸ even by memory occurring in another continuum. But, [one may object], it is not remembered because

1 *vyatireka*. T. *ldog pa*.

2 *vyatireka*. T. *med pa*.

3 T. *dran pa ni de med pa yañ byuñ bas* 'since memory occurs even without that.'

4 T. *rnam par śes pa = vijñāna* 'consciousness.'

5 *liñga*. The invariable mark serves as the middle term or logical reason (*hetu*, *vyāpya*) in inferential knowledge. There must be prior knowledge of pervasion (*vyāpti*) or positive and negative concomitance (*anvayavyatireka*) between what is to be proved (*sādhya*, *vyāpaka*, the major term) and the invariable mark or logical reason which is present in the subject of the inference (*pakṣa*, the minor term). The invariable mark then serves as an indicator or makes known (*jñāpaka*) what is to be inferred. For a full treatment of inference, see, for example, Athalye's edition of *Tarkasaṃgraha*.

6 *jñāpaka*. See previous footnote.

7 i.e., there is no distinction insofar as memory in two continua are both other than self-awareness and no connection has been established between a particular continuum and self-awareness.

8 T. *rgyud* (D. *rgyu*) *gžan gyi dños po de yañ dran pas 'dzin par 'gyur ro* 'that existent in another continuum would be apprehended by memory.'

it was not experienced previously by that. The consequence is the same: it is not experienced previously even by that occurring in a single continuum.

401.4 Even the existence of cause and effect is not tenable as making that [self-awareness] certain because in absolute terms cause and effect are without existence; and because even if it exists it is impossible to apprehend that [self-awareness] insofar as self-perception is the ultimate basis of all cognitions.¹ If it is accepted in accordance with conventional usage it belongs to the conceptual, and if it belongs to the conceptual it belongs to the conventional because all conventional usages are created by conceptual construction. Thus we have established the point to be established.² Thus self-awareness is not established through memory.

401.10 How then for you can there be memory in the absence of self-awareness? In response, [Śāntideva] says, **there is remembering when ...**

24cd. There is remembering when something else is experienced because of the connection as with rat's poison.

401.13 **There is remembering, memory of a cognition arises, when something else³, an apprehensible entity, an object, other than the cognition, is experienced.** But wouldn't experiencing one thing and remembering another result in an extreme consequence?⁴ In reply, he says, **because of the connection.** When an object is

¹ T. *śes pa thams cad la de yod kyañ raiñ ñid rtogs pa la mthar thug pa yin pa'i phyir dañ / de 'dzin par mi nus pa'i phyir ro* 'because though it exists in all cognitions that is the ultimate basis of self-perception and because it cannot be apprehended.'

² T. *kun rdzob bsgrub bya yin pas don dam pa ma bsgrubs par 'gyur ro* 'because it is to be established conventionally it will not be established absolutely.'

³ T. adds 'dir 'here.'

⁴ T. *rigs pa ma yin te / śin tu thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro že na* 'is untenable because it

experienced remembering the consciousness of that occurs¹ because of the connection, for consciousness, being the apprehender of that, is connected to that. Hence consciousness is remembered not the other. [Opponent] Even if there is a connection, if one thing is experienced and there is remembering of another the remembering would be disordered. [Commentator] No [it would not]. An object formerly experienced being remembered at a later time is itself remembered distinguished by the experience because of the apprehension of that [object] distinguished by that [experience]. And only cognition is the experience of an object, not something else. Thus, one speaks of remembering a cognition because of remembering an experience of an object insofar as it is connected to that; but cognition is not remembered by itself separated from its object. Thus there is not a fault.

402.8 But how possibly would there be memory at a later time without the seed of a latent impression of a memory implanted by [self-]awareness of cognition? In response, he says, **as with rat's poison. Rat's poison: mouse's poison.** Just as because of the connection it arises at a later time so too does memory, is the meaning. For so it is: At one moment a mouse's poison is transferred to the body but later meeting with² the sound of thunder³, without there being the seed of a latent impression implanted by self-awareness⁴, because its operation is dependent on the mere principle of conditionship⁵ at another moment it becomes a deleterious substance. Thus even in regard to the point under discussion there is no fault. This is the way of

results in an extreme consequence?'

¹ T. *yul dran pa na 'brel pa las śes pa dran par 'gyur ro* 'when one remembers the object remembering the cognition occurs because of the connection.'

² T. *rkyen dan phrad* 'meeting with the condition.

³ The thunder activates the poison. Cf. the interpretation offered by Geshe Kelsang Gyatso (1980) p. 273.

⁴ Rgyal tshab's commentary in Sweet (1984), p. 194, suggests at this point the bite is remembered. Cf. Batchelor (1979) p. 137.

⁵ T. *rkyen dan phrad ñid kyi phyir* 'because of meeting with conditions.'

thinking.

402.16 Yet again to show another way to establish the [self-]awareness of cognition the Vijñānavādin says, because of the appearance ...

25ab. Because of the appearance [of another mind] to one endowed with different conditions, [with particular conditions] it illuminates itself.

403.2 Because of the appearance, manifestation, [of another mind] to a mind endowed with different conditions, different causes¹, i.e., to one in relation with an assemblage of knowledge of looking into the future etc. and supersensible cognition of other minds etc.², [it is logical that] consciousness illuminates itself, manifests its own-nature, that is to say, that [self-]awareness exists. For if [mind] were always³ invisible how would it ever be perceived through a particular assemblage [of conditions.] Therefore, just as the mind of another is perceived through a particular assemblage so one's own mind is perceived through the contiguous⁴, object and other conditions.⁵ Thus is the sense.

403.9 Since even this is not a means of establishing [self-]awareness of cognition [Śāntideva] says, a pitcher seen ...

25cd. A pitcher seen because of the use of a magical

¹ T. *dus g'zan* 'different time.'

² T. *Ita ba'i rig pa la sogs pa dañ g'zan gyi sems śes pa la sogs pa'i mñon par śes pa dag*. Cf. LVP p. 403 fn. 2. (D. and P. both *gyi*. LVP *gyis*).

³ T. *thams cad du* 'in every way.'

⁴ Read, with Vaidya, *samanantara* in place of LVP *samantara*.

⁵ On these conditions (*pratyaya*) see Murti (1960) pp. 170-2.

ointment is certainly not the ointment.

403.11 A pitcher or [buried] treasure etc. **seen, perceived¹, because of the use,** the application, the employment, **of a magical ointment** or the ointment of an accomplished one (*siddha*)² **is certainly not the ointment.** And the pitcher etc. would not be the ointment itself. What is perceived because of something is not that thing itself. Thus, supposing that the mind of another is seen because of cognition with knowledge of looking into the future etc. as co-operating causes in the way a pitcher is, this is not enough to establish the [self-]awareness of that [cognition]. Therefore even this is not suitable as a means of establishing what is to be established.

404.2 [Opponent] But if cognition's intrinsic nature was not known there would be no perception of the object either. An object is evident then³ because cognition makes evident what is not evident; without the perception of that [cognition] how is an object perceived? For so it is: In no way whatsoever is there perception of the object if⁴ self-awareness is negated; because of the impossibility of one [cognition] apprehending another; and because, if one accepts that apprehension [of one cognition by another], a regression would follow as a consequence of another cognition for perceiving the unperceived [cognition] in succession.⁵ For this reason the statement "when something else is experienced ..." ⁶ is inconsistent. Because of the absence of the experience of the object all this whose conventional expression is "the seen" etc. would not exist in the world. In response he says, **how it is seen ...**

1 T. does not translate *pratīta*.

2 The commentary offers two resolutions to the compound *siddhāñjana*.

3 Reading *tarhi* 'then,' 'in that case,' in place of *na hi*. See LVP p. 404 fn. 2.

4 Lit. 'because.'

5 T. reads *uttarottarasya* with *tadgrahaṇābhyupagame: phyi ma phyi mas 'dzin par khas blaṅs pa na* 'if one accepts that apprehension successively.'

6 Verse 24cd.

404.11 [Commentator] When it is said, "[all this] whose conventional expression is 'the seen' etc. would not exist," would it not exist in absolute terms or conventionally? Of those [alternatives] if one says that it would not exist in absolute terms then this is agreeable¹ to us, for what belongs to the conventional does not enter into consideration of the absolute, but if it is in terms accepted by the world then:

26ab. How it is seen, heard, known is certainly not negated here.

405.1 **How it is seen**, directly perceived by eye-consciousness etc, **heard** from another person and scripture, **known**, ascertained because of inference born of the logical mark in its three aspects.² That, based on all conventional usage, **is certainly not negated here**, is not excluded. Whatever is perceived in a worldly way is in like manner, its intrinsic nature unexamined, accepted in terms admitted by the world, but not in absolute terms.³ For this reason the faults of not clearly realising the object etc. because of the non-existence of [self-]awareness of cognition do not impinge here on one who espouses the side of the absolute.

405.8 [Opponent] If that is accepted in exactly the same way, what then is negated? In response [Śāntideva] says **but the conceptualisation ...**

¹ T. 'dod pa ma yin 'not agreeable.' Read 'dod pa yin.

² *trirūpaliṅga*. The logical mark (*rūpa*) or indicator (equivalent to *hetu* 'reason') must be present in the subject or locus of the inference (*pakṣa*, *anumeya*) and what is similar to it (*sapakṣa*) and absent in what is not similar to it (*vipakṣa*, *asapakṣa*). What is known is ascertained as a result of the inference but, interestingly, the logical mark must be ascertained or certain in its three aspects for there to be an inference: *trairūpyaṃ punar liṅgasyānumeye sattvam eva sapakṣa eva sattvam asapakṣe cāsattvam eva niścitam* (Nyāyabindu II 5). See Steinkellner (1988) pp. 1427-1443. Nyāyabindu is quoted by Steinkellner p. 1437.

³ T. *don dam pa ma yin no* 'it is not absolute.'

26cd. But the conceptualisation [of them] as real, the cause of suffering, here is rejected.

405.11 The word "but" in the sense of "however." Conceptualisation, attribution [of them] as real, as absolute, here, on examination or in the definitive system, is rejected, is negated. Why? His saying "the cause of suffering" states the reason. Because it is the cause of, the reason for, suffering therefore [it is rejected], is the meaning. And saṃsāra the essential nature of which is suffering is caused by activity effected by conceptualisation of the appropriated psycho-physical groups as real, unreal etc.

406.1 Thus, in accordance with the statement, "and those are suffering, its arising, the world, place of views¹, becoming²,"³ the conceptualisation [of them] as real is the cause of suffering. Therefore only the negating of attachment to the conceptualisation of unreal attribution is intended here. But nothing substantial is negated. Thus in this way the self-awareness of cognition is not tenable in any way at all. This is stated:

Mind in the aspect of the known⁴ or a knower⁵ is not seen by the Tathāgatas. Where there is a known or a knower there is no awakening.⁶

Wherever anything is declared by the Blessed One to have existence as mind-only, that will, like the psycho-physical groups, domains of cognition etc., be explained as being of indirect meaning.⁷

¹ Read *dṛṣṭisthānam*. See LVP p. 406 fn. 1.

² T. *sred pa* = *ṭṣṇā*. Read *srid pa*.

³ AK I 8. LVP p. 406 fn. 1.

⁴ *bodhya*. T. *rtogs bya*.

⁵ *bodhaka*. T. *rtogs byed*.

⁶ *bodhi*. T. *byañ chub sems = bodhicitta*.. Verse is from *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* 45. See Lindtner (1982) p. 199. Identified by Lindtner loc. cit. fn. 45.

⁷ Mādhyamikas class scriptures belonging to the "third turning of the wheel of

406.10 Now having completed the associated matter applying himself to the point under discussion he says, **if it is conceived ...**

27. **If it is conceived that illusion is not other than mind nor is it identical, [that is untenable]. If it is an entity how can it not be different? If it is identical it does not exist in reality.**

406.14 These then are the four alternatives: illusion may be other than mind or it may be identical or its nature both or its nature neither. Of those, to begin with, it is not the first postulate. If it is accepted as other than mind there would be contradiction for the system of one maintaining that the world is mind-only. The fault in the second postulate¹ has been shown with the words, "when, for you, illusion itself does not exist ..."2 The third way is not consistent because of the non-existence in one place of the mutually contradictory. As to the fourth conception, that is not consistent either. [The verse] is spoken with that [fourth conception that it is neither the same nor different] in mind. **If, in case, it is conceived, is determined³, that (*iti*), the postulate of both cases negated⁴ [as follows]: "Illusion is not other than mind" negates otherness. Then is it identical? "Nor is it identical" negates its identity. [If that double negation is conceived then] that is not tenable either, because the**

Dharma" (*dharmacakrapravartana*) which teach mind-only (*cittamātra*), *ālayavijñāna*, three natures (*trisvabhāva*) etc. as being of indirect meaning (*neyārtha*) and requiring interpretation to be understood definitively as do the scriptures of the "first turning" which teach the psycho-physical groups, four noble truths etc. See Obermiller (1932) pp. 91-100.

¹ T. *mam par rtog pa = vikalpa* 'alternative.'

² Verse 16ab.

³ T. *mam pa gzan byed na*. Read *mam par gzag byed na* ?

⁴ T. *gñi ga'i bkag pa'i phyogs*. Perhaps *pāta* in the sense of 'fault.'

negation of one of the two, which are mutually exclusive, is necessarily concomitant with the affirmation of the other. Since the two do not occur in one place the fourth conception does not hold either.

407.8 Furthermore, if it is an entity, if that illusion exists as a real entity, how does it not become different, not separate from mind? But if it is identical, if mind itself is illusion, then it does not exist in reality, does not exist in absolute terms because that [illusion] would have the essential nature of that [mind]. There would only be mind itself. This is exactly what has already been said:

When for you illusion itself does not exist, then what is perceived?¹

Now, having established the point under discussion, summing up, he says, just as illusion ...

28ab. Just as illusion though unreal is able to be seen, so mind [although unreal] is the seer.

407.17 Just as illusion though unreal - illusion being perceived as elephants etc. has, in reality, an unreal essential nature.² [Though illusion] is like that it is able to be seen, is an object of seeing, so mind is the seer. That same unreal illusion is able to be seen so mind is the seer.³ Though its essential nature is unreal in absolute terms, [mind] will have the capacity of seeing. Therefore, having established that which the opponent asked: "When there is no errancy [by what is illusion perceived]?"⁴ it is shown in conclusion.

¹ Verse 16ab.

² T. *dños po med pa 'am med pa'i rañ b'zin yin pa ste* 'is not an entity or has an essential nature that is unreal.

³ T. Reading *draṣṭṛ tathā manaḥ* in place of *drṣṭāntaḥ / tathā manaḥ*. T. *med pa'i sgyu ma de ñid blta bar bya ba dañ / lta ba* (Read *byed*) *de b'zin du yid yin te*.

⁴ Verse 15cd.

408.4 Moreover, having in view the opponent's endeavour to establish a consciousness real in absolute terms in another way, he says, if *saṃsāra* ...

28cd. If *saṃsāra* had a real entity as its base [*saṃsāra*] would be otherwise, [i.e., a non-entity] like space.

408.7 [Opponent] For so it is: Inasmuch as defilement¹ is to be abandoned and purification², is to be accepted these two should be discerned accordingly.³ In regard to those, mind obscured by the impurity of attachment etc. is called "defiled." Those adventitious [defilements] based on the mind are active because they are produced on account of attribution of the unreal. *Saṃsāra* comes forth depending on⁴ a succession of action and births arising from those.⁵ That same mind, in absolute terms naturally luminous⁶, unadventitious, empty of the latent impression of attachment to the attribution of dualities such as apprehensible object and apprehending subject arising from imagination of the unreal⁷, its essential nature non-dual, free of adventitious

¹ *saṃkleśa*.

² *vyavadāna*.

³ According to Abhidharma teachings (which are more evident in Yogācāra thought than Madhyamaka) Buddhist doctrine is a teaching about defilement and purification: *saṃkleśavyavadānikam idaṃ śāstraṃ*. See Stcherbatsky (1923) p. 35.

⁴ T. *byuñ ba* 'arising [from].'

⁵ Defilements (*kleśa*), action (*karma*) and birth (*janma*) refer collectively to the processes of *saṃsāra*. The term "*saṃkleśa*", defilement in general, embraces all three and thus may be regarded as a synonym for *saṃsāra*. See *Madhyāntavibhaṅga* I 11 on this threefold division and its relationship to the twelve links of dependent origination.

⁶ *prakṛtiprabhāsvara*. See fn. to *prakṛtinirvṛtta* 'naturally in nirvāṇa' p. 385.4.

⁷ *abhūtaparikalpa*. The term imagination (*parikalpa*) indicates the creative or constructive functioning of the mind (*citta*) with its mental concomitants (*caitta*) which makes discriminations of things (i.e., 'constructs' things) which have no independent existent or are 'unreal' (*abhūta*). Foremost among the false

faults, because of the turning about of the basis¹ is called "purified." Therefore in this way,² they [the Yogācārins] think that the determination of defilement and purification does not hold without a substantially real mind because saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are qualities of mind in accordance with the statement "mind alone is defiled, mind alone is purified."

408.17 That then defines the opponent's opinion. If, in the case that, it is established that saṃsāra had a real entity as its base, that is, the base of it were an entity, namely, substantially real mind, then saṃsāra would be otherwise, would be other than mind - being other than an entity it would be a non-entity because only mind is an entity. In what way [would it be a non-entity]? Like space, like the sky.

409.2 This saṃsāra which is described as having mind as its base, is it an entity or is it a non-entity? And if it is an entity is it mind or other than that? Of those, if only mind is an entity then saṃsāra which has that as its base is not other than mind. It is mind itself and mind is not to be abandoned because, being naturally luminous, its nature is purity. But if it is other than mind there is damage to [your] system because of accepting an other separate from mind. But if it is a non-entity nothing at all called "saṃsāra" exists, like a donkey's horn. For that very reason he says, "like space." Just as space, a mere nominal reality, unreal, has no capacity at all for causal efficacy

discriminations is that of subject and object (*grāhakagrāhya*) which establishes the very possibility of experience and is the mode of all appearance. The distinction of subject and object, according to *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XI 40, is the distinguishing characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of imagination of the unreal.

¹ *āśrayaparāvṛtti*. Turning about of the basis involves overcoming the imagined duality of apprehending subject and apprehended object and the elimination of the obscuration of the defilements and on account of the cognisable (*kleśajñeyāvaraṇa*) which spring from that false imagination. It simultaneously involves endowment with the most excellent qualities of the buddhas. See *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IX 12.

² Reading *tad evaṃ* in place of *tad eva*. T. *de'i phyir de ltar na*.

so would *saṃsāra* be for you. Alternatively, saying "like space" fits into our system because it is without own-being.

409.12 [Opponent] That may be so but even if it is a non-entity¹ it will, nevertheless, have the capacity for causal efficacy because of its reliance on substantially real mind. In response [Śāntideva] says, **how would a non-existent ...**

29ab. How would a non-existent have activity by means of a basis which is a real entity?

409.16 There can be no basis at all for what is without real nature because the basis and existent based on it have the nature of cause and effect and because a non-existent is not the result of anything because of the sameness of the not producible² Granted, nevertheless **by means of a basis which is a real entity**, by relying on substantially real mind, **a non-existent with an unreal nature has activity**, i.e., its operation is causally effective. **How would it have that?** Never at any time is it tenable, is the meaning. Otherwise it would have the nature of an existent for capacity is the characteristic of existents in accordance with the statement, "lack of all capacity is the characteristic of non-existents."³

410.4 Asking, "what now on examination results for you?", he says, **for you ...**

¹ T. *dños po yin*. Read *dños po ma yin*.

² Reading *anirvartyāviśeṣatvāt* in place of *anirvartyaviśeṣatvāt*. T. *bskyed par bya ba ma yin par khyad par med pa'i phyir*.

³ See Stcherbatsky (1930) pp. 124-5.

29cd. For you it turns out that mind is, in fact, alone with an unreal companion.

410.7 For you who espouses mind alone as absolute it turns out that mind is in fact, in an emphatic sense, alone, without a second,¹ with an unreal companion: it has an unreal, a non-existent companion. [Opponent] But mind has the characteristic of non-duality free of the aspects of apprehensible object and apprehending subject etc.; to show the singularity of mind is not the least disadvantageous to us. [Commentator] This is untenable. You have said that defilement insofar as it is to be abandoned is something actual. Then how is mind the sole entity? Even granted it is [the sole entity], nevertheless it is not free from invalidation. Therefore [Śāntideva] says, if mind is free ...

30ab. If mind is free of the apprehensible object then all are Tathāgatas.

410.15 Apprehensible object is an elliptical expression: one should understand free of apprehending subject etc. as well. Alternatively, because the state of subject depends on the apprehensible object, because of the non-existence of that the apprehending subject is also non-existent. And since, if the apprehending subject is non-existent the expressible² fashioned by that [apprehending subject] is non-existent, in order to show the non-existence of what is expressed³, "free of the apprehensible object" is said. If mind [is free of the apprehensible object], separate from the aspects of apprehensible object and apprehending subject, [and is] the non-dual essential nature of the whole world then, because that mind is

¹ *ekam advitīyam eva*. Perhaps an allusion to the monism of the Advaitans which should not be confused with the *advaya* (non-dual) of the Buddhists.

² T. *mñon par brjod pa* 'what is expressed.'

³ T. *brjod par bya ba* 'the expressible.'

included in the continuum of all being, all beings, those in saṃsāra, are, would become, Tathāgatas, buddhas, blessed ones. No one would be an ordinary person. From that would follow the worthlessness of the cultivation of the noble path¹ for dispelling defilements. And it is not so. Therefore, having in view the claim that even if there is absence of apprehensible object and apprehending subject, because of that persistence of attachment to existents, defilements are not completely² dispelled, he says, and if it is so ...

30cd. And if it so, what merit is obtained even when mind-only is supposed?

411.8 And if it so (*evaṃ ca*) [in Sanskrit] is a collection of indeclinable particles in the sense of "if it is so." The word "and" in the sense of "even." Even if it is accepted as so what merit is obtained? None at all [is attained] even when mind-only, even when mental representation³ only is supposed, is attributed by conceptualisation, because of the pervasiveness⁴ of attachment etc. in the continuum of all beings even when there is connection with thorough knowledge of non-dual reality.

411.13 But it is the same for you who declare absence of own-being. Hence, demonstrating the same faultiness, he says:

¹ T. *g'zan lam*. T. has misread *ārya* as *anya*.

² T. does not translate *sarvathā* 'completely.'

³ *vijñaptimātratā*. Equivalent to *cittamātra* but emphasising the ideational aspect of mind. Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikāvṛtti* begins by declaring *citta* and *vijñapti* synonyms.

⁴ *paryavasthāna*. *Paryavasthāna* also has the sense of 'possession,' 'ensnarement' etc. See BHSD p. 334.

31ab. Even if [the world] is known to resemble an illusion how does defilement cease?

411.16 Even if the world¹ is known to resemble an illusion, to have the nature of an illusion, how does defilement cease? How is attachment and the rest of the host² dispelled? he asks. Thinking, "What you ask is: 'what is the reason for the illogicality of dispelling [them] in this case?' " he says, **when passion ...**

31cd. When passion for an illusory woman is born even in her maker.

412.2 Here the source of the illogicality of dispelling³ [them] in this case is seen: **When passion**, that is, an enamoured state of mind, **is born**, arises, **toward an illusory woman**, a member of the tender sex created by an illusion maker. Born in whom?⁴ **Even in her maker**. The significance of the word "even" is this: It is not born just in those for whose delusion she was made but *even* in her maker. For when for the sake of leading astray the minds of others some illusion maker exceedingly skilled in creating such a form⁵ causes a woman, a beauty of the country⁶, created by the efficacy of mantras and drugs, a woman complete with the characteristics of the parts of all the major and minor bodily members, endowed with the perfection of beauty of fresh youth, her complexion clear and attractive, [and] abounding in exceeding loveliness, to appear, then, having seen her, not only do minds other than his, become internally troubled⁷ by the blow of the arrow of the god of love, but even

1 T. 'gro bas '[known] by the world.'

2 T. does not translate *gaṇa* 'host.'

3 T. *mi spon ba'i 'thad pa* 'logicality of not dispelling.'

4 T. does not translate *kasya jāyate* 'born in whom?'

5 T. *de'i mam par 'khrul pa = tatvibhrama* 'that erring.' Read *mam par sprul pa* ?

6 *janapadakalyāṇī*. See BHSD p. 237.

7 T. 'dod pa'i lha'i mdaṅs (Read *mdas*) *bsnun pa'i sems kyi sdug bsñal* 'mental

he who created that form longed for by those experienced in the art of love and rich in desirable attractiveness, he who is familiar with her nature thinking, "I fashioned this illusion myself," even he, finding the ultimate state with the art of love, is unable in any way at all to check his mind. Then how, even if [he world] has been ascertained to be like an illusion, would the continuity of birth-and-death be cut? Desiring to remove this [difficulty, Śāntideva] says, **since the latency...**

32. **Since the latency of defilements on account of the cognisable has not been dispelled by her maker, therefore at the time of seeing that his latency of the empty is weak.**

412.20 **Since** in the sense of "because."¹ This fault does not follow for us because that has not been dispelled, have not been turned away, by her maker, by the creator of the illusory woman. What has not been dispelled? **The latency of defilements on account of the cognisable.**² Defilement on account the cognisable is attachment etc. because of the attribution of having an essential nature or the attribution of being an entity, that is to say, it is obscuration on account of the cognisable. **The latency of that**³ [defilements on account of the cognisable] is the penetration by formative forces⁴ by the mental continuum which are generated by wrong conceptualisation practised in a succession of births in beginningless saṃsāra and which are the seed of that. Because that [latency] has not been dispelled.

suffering of the blow by the arrow of the god of love [arises].'

¹ T. does not translate this sentence.

² T. *śes bya dan / ñon moñs bag chags* 'the latency on account of the cognisable and because of the moral defilements.' Reflecting the fact that there are two kinds of obscuration. See verse 55 and commentary.

³ T. *de'i dbaṅ gis = tadvaśāt* 'by force of that.'

⁴ T. *'dus byas pa* '[defilement] conditioned.' T. reads *saṃskṛtaḥ* in place of *saṃskārādhānaḥ*.

413.5 [Opponent] But is not the counter of the Vijñānavādin also the same as this? For him too despite the existence of non-dual reality, since the latency of adventitious defilement has not been dispelled all beings do not become Tathāgatas. [Commentator] No, it is not the same because the impurities, by nature non-existent, deficient in the result portion are not able to become an obscuration. This has already been said. But for us the produced and the producer are indeed [both] without own-being. Thus it is not the same.

413.10 Because that [latency] has not been dispelled **therefore**, for this reason, **at the time of that seeing**, seeing, perceiving that cognisable object with an own-being, at the time of that [seeing] or **at the time of seeing**, the time of perceiving **that illusory woman**¹, his, the seer whose latency of defilements has not been dispelled, **latency of the empty is weak**. The empty is resolved as empty objective reality² or empty state (*śūnyatā*, emptiness). The teaching says "empty" having made an elision of the suffix "state"³ [i.e., "-ness"] (*tā*) in compliance with the metre. **Latency** is the penetration by formative forces. That is **weak**, wanting in capacity, because of seeing what is attributed.⁴ Hence at that time the latency of existence is strong. How then is that turned away? In reply he says, **because of ...**

¹ i.e., there are two alternative resolutions of the compound *tadḍṛṣṭikāle*: 'at the time of that seeing' or 'at the time of seeing that.'

² *tattva* is here understood in the sense of *dravya*. See '*dravya*' in Renou (1942) pp. 162-3. T. *dhos po'i de kho na nīd* = *vastutattva* 'reality of things.'

³ *bhāvapratyaya*. See Renou (1942) pp. 243-4. i.e., because of the metre, 'empty' is to be understood as 'emptiness.'

⁴ T. *brtags pa'i űo bo* = *āropitarūpa* 'attributed nature.'

33ab. Because of penetration¹ by the latency of emptiness the latency of existence is dispelled.

414.2 The latency of emptiness, of the lack of essential nature of an illusory nature. Penetration, the penetrative power, of that, that is to say, the making firm² through practice. Because of that contrary condition³ it is dispelled, it is turned away like the sensation of cold through the presence of fire. What [is dispelled]? The latency of existence⁴, the latency of attachment, the grasping as substantially real, practised in saṃsāra without beginning or end.⁵ [It is dispelled] because that [emptiness] is the true reality and because it is the intrinsic⁶ nature of things and because the other [i.e., the latency of existence] is adventitious because it is false.⁷

414.8 But [it is objected], whether there is attachment to existence or attachment to emptiness, as regards attachment there is no difference at all⁸ because even that does not go beyond the nature of⁹ conceptualisation. Which [Nāgārjuna] states:

Emptiness, the Victorious Ones have declared, is the remedy to all views; however those who have the view of emptiness are incurable, they have said.¹⁰

To remove this [difficulty] he says, and through practising ...

33cd. And through practising "nothing at all exists,"

¹ T. *goms pas* 'because of practice.'

² T. *brten par 'gyur*. Read *brtan par 'gyur*.

³ T. *des na 'gal bai rkyen gyis* 'therefore, because of the contrary condition.'

⁴ Insert a *daṅḍa* after *kiṃ*. T. *ci žig ce na / dños po'i bag chags*.

⁵ T. *thog ma med pa'i 'khor ba* 'beginningless saṃsāra.'

⁶ T. does not translate *nija* 'intrinsic.'

⁷ T. *gžan ni brdzun pa yin pas glo bur ba yin pa'i phyir*.

⁸ See above p. 358.6.

⁹ T. does not translate *svabhāva* 'the nature[of].'

¹⁰ MMK XIII 8. Identified by Aiyaswami Sastri (1950) p. 108.

afterwards even that is dispelled.

414.15 The word "and" in the sense of a conjunction in regard to the former part [of the verse]. Through practising in this way: "nothing at all," neither an existent nor emptiness, "exists," is found, afterwards, [after] dispelling the latency of existence¹, even that latency of emptiness is dispelled, is turned away. This is the intent: The penetration² of emptiness because it is the counteragent to attachment to existence is the means of dispelling that. And the end being realised, afterwards the dispelling of the means is carried out as well because it is like a raft [abandoned when the further shore is reached].³ This is precisely what [Nāgārjuna] says:

To dispel all conceptions there is instruction with the ambrosia of emptiness. He who⁴ is believes even in that is censured⁵ by you.⁶

415.5 [Opponent] This may be so but even if through practising the mental act, "nothing at all exists," the latency of emptiness is abandoned nevertheless through that practice the conceptualisation of non-existence which is active cannot be turned away. Thus your weakness remains in the same condition just as protrusion of the eyeball occurs on interfering with a goitre.⁷ To this⁸ [Śāntideva] says, when the

¹ T. *bags chags de* 'that latency.'

² T. *rtogs* 'realisation.'

³ Cf. 'In the same manner, O bhikkhus, I have taught a doctrine similar to a raft - it is for crossing over, and not for carrying (lit. getting hold of). You, O bhikkhus, who understand that the teaching is similar to a raft, should give up even good things (*dhamma*); how much more then should you give up evil things (*adhamma*).' *Majjhima-nikāya* I (PTS ed.) pp. 134-135. Cited in Rahula (1974) p. 12.

⁴ Read *yasya*. Cf. Lindtner (1982) p. 137 and LVP p. 415 fn. 2.

⁵ T. *spāis pa lags* 'is abandoned.' Cf. LVP p. 415 fn. 2.

⁶ CS I 23 (*Lokātitastava*). Identified by Aiyaswami Sastri (1950) p. 108 as *Lokātitastava* 21. See above p. 359.8 where this verse is also quoted.

⁷ i.e., one evil is replaced by another.

⁸ T. does not translate *atra* 'to this.'

existent ...

34. When the existent of which one conceives "it does not exist," is not met with¹, then how would a non-existent without basis remain before the mind?

415.12 Not even this [conceptualisation of non-existence] persists on investigation.² [When], if³, that, existent of which one conceives "it does not exist," of which a negation is made, on being investigated, insofar as it is without essential nature, is not met with, is not found, like the tuft of hair perceived by a partially blind person⁴ then, how would a non-existent, a form made to appear by conceptualisation, without basis, without support because that of which existence is thoroughly imagined has nothing connected to it, remain before the mind? How would that on investigation⁵ appear before the intellect? In the absence of the essential nature of existents it ceases naturally.

416.3 Alternatively, put another way: [Opponent] Granted the latency of existence comes to an end because of penetration by the force of emptiness, nevertheless, since that is not negated, by what is attachment to non-existence turned away? [Commentator] Hence [Śāntideva] says, when the existent ... All the rest is as before.

416.7 This is the overall meaning here: The emptiness of all *dharmas* is spoken of

¹ or 'perceived'. T. *dmigs pa*.

² T. adds *zes ston par byed de* 'He shows that [not even ...]'.
³ *Yadi* ('if') either glosses *yadā* ('when'), or is read by the commentator in place of it, or is a wrong reading for *yadā*. T. *gañ gi tshe = yadā*.

⁴ Cf. above 364.1.

⁵ T. *brtags pas*.

to dispel attachment to existence. Because it causes one to turn toward emptiness that emptiness is also dispelled afterwards. Whatever conceptualisation of existence arises in any way is also turned away by the immediately succeeding investigation. For this very reason in order to turn away the whole network of conceptualisation the eighteen emptinesses starting with emptiness of the internal have been declared at length in the illustrious *Prajñāpāramitā*.¹ Nor is emptiness separate from existence since it is the essential nature of existence itself. Otherwise if emptiness were separate from existence² there would not be absence of essential nature of *dharmas*. That the lack of essential nature is their essential nature has been established above.

416.16 This is also said in the *Prajñāpāramitā*: "Furthermore, Subhūti, a bodhisattva, a great being, coursing in the perfection of wisdom with mental acts endowed with knowledge of all aspects investigates thus: form is not empty of emptiness of form, form itself is empty, emptiness itself is form. Feeling is not empty of emptiness of feeling; feeling itself is empty, emptiness itself is feeling. Perception is not empty of emptiness of perception; perception itself is empty, emptiness itself is perception. Mental formations are not empty of emptiness of mental formations; mental formations themselves are empty, emptiness itself is mental formations. Consciousness is not empty of emptiness of consciousness; consciousness itself is empty, emptiness itself is consciousness." Thus in detail.

417.6 And it is said:

Dependent origination is exactly that which you consider as emptiness.

That there is no independent existence is your incomparable lion's roar.³

¹ The different kinds of emptiness are variously listed as sixteen, eighteen, or twenty in the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature. See Murti (1960) pp. 351-6, Tauscher (1981) p. 124 fn. 122.

² T. *chos* = *dharma*.

³ CS I 22 (Lokāṭīstava). Identified by Aiyaswami Sastri (1950) p. 107.

Thus emptiness is not separated from *dharmas*; therefore one should not form attachment even to emptiness.

417.11 In this way, because all dichotomising conceptualisation has vanished liberation from the obscurations in their entirety comes about. Showing this he says, **when neither existence ...**

35. When neither existence nor non-existence remains before the mind then, there being no other mode, without support, it is pacified.

417.15 **When neither existence, an absolutely real own-being, remains before the mind, in front of the intellect, nor non-existence, nor when non-existence, characterised as devoid of existence, remains before the mind, then, there being no other mode, because there is no mode¹ other than affirmation and negation. Since the postulates of both or neither have the nature of the pair affirmation and negation, insofar as they are not separate from those two, they also are included in the collection of the two. Thus, without support² because it is not joined to either a real or an unreal support, the intellect is pacified, becomes quiet because of the quieting of all dichotomising conceptualisation, like a fire without fuel. Attains to nirvāṇa is the meaning.³**

418.6 How then can the Blessed One, who has attained Buddhahood, which was sought after for many innumerable kalpas and which is the means of fulfilment of the aim of others, because of separation from all conceptualisation, accomplish the aim of

¹ T. does not translate *gati* 'mode.'

² *nirāśraya*. Verse *nirālambā*.

³ T. *me bzin du 'das pa ni ma yin no zes pa'i don to?*

others? In response, he says, just as a wish-granting ...

36. Just as a wish-granting gem [or] a wishing tree, completely fulfils wishes, so the miraculous body¹ of the Victorious One is seen because of the trainees and the resolutions.

418.11 Just as even without conceptualisation a wish-granting gem, a special jewel which bestows a wished for result, [or] a wishing tree, a special tree which bestows an imagined result, completely fulfils wishes of people according to suitability, i.e., it is an accomplisher of what is sought after, so the miraculous of the Victorious One is seen. This is the connection.

418.15 So, in that way, the miraculous body, the body glorious with the thirty-two characteristic marks of a Great Person², of the Victorious One [so called] because of his victory over the four Māras³ or because of his victory over evil *dharmas*, i.e., [the miraculous body] of the Buddha, the Blessed One, is seen, is perceived, as capable of accomplishing the benefit and happiness of others despite the absence of all conceptualisation.

419.1 But how will this come to be by merely being desired? In response, he says, because of the trainees and the resolutions. By force of the trainees, those who are to be trained by the Buddha, the Blessed One; because of the complete

¹ *jinabimba*. See LVP Introduction p. 119 fn. 1.

² *mahāpuruṣalakṣaṇa*. See BHSD pp. 458-60.

³ Personifications of deadening influences. The four are: the Māra of the defilements (*kleśamāra*), Māra son of the gods, i.e., the Evil One (*devapūtramāra*), the Māra of the psycho-physical constituents (*skandhamāra*), and the Māra of Death (*mṛtyumāra*). For references see BHSD p. 430.

ripening of the wholesome actions which are a cause for the obtaining of the particular result of an appearance¹ by them. By force of that, and by force of **resolutions**, by force of the projective power of that which accomplishes the aim of beings [the accomplishment of which was] resolved on by the Blessed One in many ways formerly in the Bodhisattva state. The accomplishment of the benefit and happiness of all beings is possible because it is put into effect effortlessly in the way spinning is imparted² to a potter's wheel.³

419.8 Which is stated: "In the interval between the night on which the Tathāgata completely awakened and the night on which he entered final nirvāṇa the Tathāgata uttered not even a syllable. What is the reason for that? The Blessed One is always deeply concentrated. Those beings who are to be trained⁴ by letters, vowels and sounds hear the sound issuing from the Tathāgata's face, hair-curl and top-knot ..."⁵

And it is said:

When he dwells in the attainment of meditative concentration, like a wishing-jewel instructions issue even from the walls etc. according to desire. By means of those, people understand everything they desire to know and they quickly meet with benefits according to suitability.⁶

Also in the *Catuḥstava* it is said:

Not even a single syllable was uttered by you O Lord, yet all trainees are satisfied by the rain of Dharma.⁷

¹ T. does not translate *upādhi* 'appearance.' *Upādhi* also has the sense of a 'limiting condition' or 'particularity.'

² T. does not translate *ākṣepa* 'imparting.'

³ Once the motion is imparted to it the wheel keeps spinning by itself.

⁴ T. does not translate *vaineya* 'to be trained.'

⁵ *Tathāgataguhyasūtra* quoted MV p. 366.1. Identified by LVP p. 419 fn. 4. Cf. *Lankāvatārasūtra* pp. 142-3.

⁶ *Tattvasaṃgraha* 3241-3. Identified by Aiyaswami Sastri (1950) p. 105.

⁷ CS II 7 (*Nirupamyastava*). Identified by Tucci (1932) p. 314.

420.4 Having explained the particular reason thus, again, in another way, he shows with a pair of verses that from that same causal state¹ there is such a special abundance of power² that effortlessly the result, the capacity of accomplishing the aim of others, arises. He says, **just as a snake charmer ...**

37. **Just as a snake charmer, having empowered a post, perishes and, although he has long since perished, that [post] would quell poisons etc.**

420.10 **Just as a snake charmer, one who knows the essence of poisons, one who has acquired the capacity of mantras, having empowered, having consecrated, a post consisting of a piece of wood, consisting of stone or something else, with a mantra thinking, "after my demise this itself will be efficacious in removing every poison," perishes, himself ceases to function, although he, the snake charmer, has long since perished, although he deceased a long time ago, that post consecrated by him with mantras, would quell poisons etc.** By the word "etc." one understands that it would remove evil spirits and other deleterious things.³ Having thus presented the example applying it to the thing to be explained, he says, **empowered by his conformity ...**

38. **Empowered by his conformity with activity conducive to awakening the "pole" of the**

¹ i.e., the Bodhisattva state which acts as a cause for the accomplishment of the aim of others.

² T. does not translate *sa tādṛśaḥ prabhāvātīśayaviśeṣaḥ* 'there is such a special abundance of power.'

³ At this point the commentary notes that for metrical reasons the rule of Pāṇinian grammar (VI 4 92) whereby *upaśāmayet* should read *upaśamayet* is not followed. Not translated in T.

**Victorious One also performs all deeds although
the bodhisattva has passed into nirvāṇa.**

421.3 The words "just as" attracts "so." So, [empowered by his conformity with] activity conducive to awakening, activity for awakening, aimed at awakening, its purpose buddhahood, [performs all deeds] although the bodhisattva has passed into nirvāṇa. Bodhi¹ (awakening) is described as buddhahood which is devoid of an own-being which is one or many, is not arisen, not ceased, not annihilated, not everlasting, is free of all conceptual elaboration, is similar to space, named the Dharma-body [and] is absolute reality. The same, making use of the relative², is called by words such as perfection of wisdom, emptiness, suchness, limit of reality, sphere of the real etc. With just this in view it is stated:

The buddhas are to be seen as the Dharma³ for the guides are the Dharma-body; and real nature is not to be known dualistically (*avijñeya*), that is not able to be known dualistically.⁴

And it is said:

And without characteristics, not arising, not conditioned, not relating to speech, [like] space, is the mind conducive to awakening; awakening has the characteristic of the non-dual.

421.15 A Bodhisattva is a being whose intent is on that [awakening].⁵

¹ This is the beginning of the commentary on 'bodhisattva.'

² *kun rdzob kyi bden* 'relative truth.'

³ T. *chos űid* = *dharmatā* 'as real nature.'

⁴ *Vajracchedikā* 26. LVP p. 421 fn. 2. Quoted MV 448.14. Note previous verse: *ye mām rūpeṇa adrākṣur ye mām ghoṣeṇa anvayuh / mithyāprahāṇaprasṛtā na mām drakṣyanti te janāḥ* // Whoever has seen me as form, whoever has been led by my voice, these people, set out on false practices, will not see me.

⁵ 'Bodhisattva' is understood as a bahuvrīhi compound literally as follows: 'A Bodhisattva is one who has *sattva* ("resolution"), i.e., *abhiprāya* ("intent"), towards that [*bodhi* "awakening"].'

Although¹ that one has passed into nirvāṇa, although he has gone to supreme peace by a non-abiding nirvāṇa.² The meaning is that the causal state has ceased and the result state has been obtained. Thus in both cases even in the complete absence of conceptualisation the accomplishing of the aim of beings³ without deficiency is shown.

422.1 That may be so, but if for the Blessed One, insofar as the entire support of dichotomous conceptualisation has stopped, all functioning of mind and mental concomitants has ceased, then how is it that worship of the Tathāgata is described as having a great result? Supposing this, he says, **how would worship ...**

**39ab. How would worship rendered to one without mind
be fruitful?**

422.5 **How would worship, a special act of worship⁴, rendered, performed, to the Blessed who is [without mind]⁵, devoid of a conventional mind, be fruitful, be profitable? When the one who enjoys [the gift] is non-existent how can there be merit for the munificent people and givers. To this he gives the answer, because it is taught ...**

¹ The commentary explains that the word '*apī*' is to be construed in a different place in the text, i.e., after *nirvṛte* (not before it).

² *apraṭiṣṭhitanirvāṇa*. Not abiding in the peace of a static nirvāṇa nor abiding in saṃsāra. Bodhisattvas on the sixth level and beyond realise that ultimately there is no difference between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa and abide in neither. Both are equally empty.

³ T. *g'zan* 'others.'

⁴ *kārā*. P. *že sa byed pa*. D. *śes par byed pa* is wrong.

⁵ *Samvṛticittavivikte* which follows is a gloss on *acittake*.

39cd. Because it is taught that [the worship] of the living and the one passed into nirvāṇa is exactly equal.

422.10 Because it is taught, made known in scripture, that [the worship] of the living and the one passed into nirvāṇa is exactly equal, precisely the same. "Therefore it would be fruitful," is to be construed. There is no difference in the worship of the living, the one not passed into final nirvāṇa, and the one passed into nirvāṇa, the one gone to nirvāṇa without remaining substratum.¹

422.14 This is the intent: Merit is of two types: that associated with giving away which arises from giving away and that associated with enjoying which arises from the enjoyment of a meritorious gift. Concerning those, even if there will be no merit associated with enjoying because of the absence of a receiver when the Blessed One has passed into nirvāṇa, how is the merit associated with giving away excluded?

423.1 [Opponent] How can there be even merit associated with giving away when no one is receiving? [Commentator] But why should there be merit when there is a receiver and not when there is not? [Opponent] Because of the absence of anyone experiencing.² [Commentator] This is not a reason at all because if there were merit only with the assistance of another there would not be [any merit] in the cultivation of benevolence and the other immeasurable states and perfect vision. Therefore one should see that merit arises³ from one's own mind even without the assistance of another. Thus even if the Virtuous One has passed away there would be merit from one's own mind created through devotion to him. It is not contradicted. Moreover scripture is everyone's witness to the real existence of all merit and sin. Hence he

¹ *Nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa* means the total end of suffering and its substratum, the five psycho-physical groups.

² *len pa po 'ga' yan med pa'i phyir* 'because of the absence of any receiver.'

³ *T. mthus* 'on account of.' *T.* reads *prabhāvāt* in place of *prabhavaṃ*.

says, according to scripture ...

40ab. According to scripture there is a result in regard to that either conventionally or in reality.

423.10 What need is there for other reasoning? **According to scripture,** according to the words of the Blessed One, **there is a result** effected by worship of the Blessed One, understood to be characterised by great enjoyment etc. **In regard to that,** in regard to the Blessed One whether he has or has not passed into nirvāṇa, the difference in worship is this: by one the result is considered conventional, by another absolute. In this way, without regard to a following¹ investigation, it is described differently. **Either conventionally or in reality,** the result of a meritorious or sinful act is recognised according to the scripture of the Blessed One. In regard to that there is no dispute between us two.

424.1 In regard to this, the Blessed One in the *Puṣpakūṭadhāraṇī* said this:
²"Every one of those, Siṃhavikrīḍita, who will perform the worship of a Tathāgata, either living or passed into final nirvāṇa, will attain final nirvāṇa by one of the three vehicles. And indeed, whoever, Siṃhavikrīḍita, having seen a Tathāgata, an arhat, a perfect complete buddha, would arouse faith in his mind, with a faithful mind would pay honour, would show reverence, would show esteem, would worship, would wait upon, would serve him with goods, with all that is needful for all happiness, namely, the necessaries of robes, bowl, bed and seat, and medicine to cure illness and whoever

¹ T. does not translate *anantara* 'following.'

² T. begins: *señ ge nram par rtse ba 'ga' žig gis de bžin gšegs pa dgra bcom pa yañ dag par rdzogs pa'i sañs rgyas yon tan gyi tshogs dpag tu med pa dañ ldan pa de'i phyir de la mchod pa'i nram par smin pa de yañ dpag tu med par bya'o* 'Siṃhavikrīḍita, because a Tathāgata, an arhat, a perfect complete buddha, possesses an innumerable collection of virtues the result of worshipping him also may be made immeasurable by anyone.'

worships the body of the Tathāgata passed into final nirvāṇa in the form of bodily relics as small as a mustard seed, should expect a similar result. Thus for worship¹ there is no difference and no distinction." And it is said:

For whoever would worship one living and for whoever would worship one passed into nirvāṇa with equal faith of mind, there is no difference in regard to merit.²

424.13 Further this is said: ³"And further indeed, Siṃhavikrīḍita, whoever would serve a Tathāgata with all that is needful for happiness for a hundred years or a thousand years and whoever, taken hold of by the mind intent on awakening, would place a single flower at a reliquary of a Tathāgata who has passed into final nirvāṇa, and whoever would offer water in cupped hands for the worship of a Tathāgata, and who would sprinkle with water⁴ or would present a sign-post [at the reliquary of a Tathāgata]⁵, or would remove the remains of an offering⁶, or would make the gift of ointment or the gift of a light, or with mind transported advancing a single footstep would say the words⁷, 'Homage to that Buddha, the Blessed One,' in regard this, Siṃhavikrīḍita, have no doubt or uncertainty or dubiety that that one would go into the misery of an evil state of existence for a kalpa, a hundred kalpas or a thousand kalpas⁸: the case does not occur."

¹ T *de bzin gsegs pa'i mchod pa la* 'for the worship of the Tathāgata.' T. reads *tathāgatapūjayai* in place of *tathā pūjayai*.

² *Divyāvadāna* p. 469.3. LVP p. 424 fn. 3.

³ This passage occurs ŚS p. 173.13. LVP p. 424 fn. 4.

⁴ T. does not translate *jalena upasiñcet* 'would sprinkle with water.'

⁵ *iṣikāpada*. See BHSD p. 115. Bendall and Rouse (1922) p. 169 'offer a brush.' T. *byug pa'i thig le 'dri* (Read 'bri) 'make a stroke of a brush.'

⁶ T. *me tog gi ñal ñil* (Read *ñal ñol*?) 'phyag 'sweep away exhausted [remains] of flower offerings.' ?

⁷ T. *zes smra ba tsam* 'only says the words'. This agrees with ŚS 173.18 *itimātre*.

⁸ T. adds *bskal ba 'bum du 'am* 'or a hundred thousand kalpas.'

425.6 This is certainly to be accepted, [otherwise] how would it be possible ...

40cd. How would it be possible that worship rendered to a real Buddha be fruitful?

425.8 How would even this be possible, how possibly would it be that worship rendered to a real Buddha, to the absolutely real Blessed One, be fruitful, be efficacious? Thus he gives an example. The example is from nowhere else but scripture, is the sense.¹ Therefore it is understood from scripture that worship of the Blessed One² in every way has a real result.

425.12 In regard to the statement "because of penetration by the latency of emptiness ..." ³ the Vaibhāṣikas and others who do not allow the dispelling of all obscurations through the emptiness of all dharmas and who accept the cultivation and seeing of the four noble truths as the means for that, say, liberation is from seeing ...

41ab. Liberation is through seeing the truths; what is the use of seeing emptiness?

425.16 Through seeing, from perceiving, from realising, the four noble truths characterised by suffering, arising, cessation and the path. The elliptical expression "through seeing" should be understood to include "through cultivation" as well. This is stated:

The dispelling of moral defilements is explained to be through seeing and

1 T. does not translate *iti bhāvaḥ* 'thus is the sense.'

2 T. *bcom ldan 'das kyis*. Read *kyi*.

3 Verse 33ab.

cultivating the truths.¹

426.2 ²In regard to that, abiding in morality³ and endowed with listening and reflecting one engaged in meditative cultivation⁴, by the respective generation of meditative cultivation on the impure⁵, mindfulness of in-and-out breathing⁶ and applications of mindfulness⁷, sees the truths of suffering etc. with these sixteen aspects. [That one sees each truth] as impermanent, suffering, empty and non-self.⁸ By way of the four⁹ aids to penetration, i.e., the state of warmth etc.¹⁰, that one attains the path of seeing characterised by the fifteen moments¹¹ of acceptance of the knowledge of dharmas etc. in regard to suffering.¹² After that, through realising the path of cultivation, because of dispelling the multitude of major and minor defilements which pertain to the three realms, which can be dispelled by seeing and cultivation, that one has the arising of the knowledge of the destruction and non-arising [again of sullyng influences].¹³ This is, in brief, the order of comprehension in regard to the four noble truths. In this way, "Liberation is through seeing the noble truths" is

¹ AK VI 1.

² A useful discussion of the Vaibhāṣika conception of the path, here given in outline, as presented in AKBh can be found in Guenther (1976) pp. 215-32.

³ T. *žugs pas* = *vṛttasya*. 'involved.' See LVP p. 426 fn. 1. LVP *Kośa* vol. 4 p. 142 translates *vṛttastha*. (T. *tshul gnas*) 'fixé dans son devoir professionnel.' See loc. cit. fn. 4.

⁴ Cf. AK VI 5ab: *vṛttasthaḥ śrutacintāvān bhāvanāyāṃ prayujyate*. The three degrees of wisdom (*prajñā*) are referred to here: *śruti*, *cintā* and *bhāvanā*, consisting of listening or understanding, of reflecting, and of direct experience in meditation.

⁵ See AKBh. VI 9-11.

⁶ See AKBh VI 12-13.

⁷ See AKBh VI 14-15.

⁸ See AKBh VI 16-17, VII 13a.

⁹ T. does not translate *catur* 'four.'

¹⁰ See AKBh VI 17a-c, 20ab.

¹¹ See AKBh VI 28cd.

¹² See AKBh VI 25cd-26ab.

¹³ See AKBh VI 50.

spoken of.

426.10 Therefore, given that liberation is through this alone, **what is the use of seeing emptiness?** That is to say, **of seeing**, of understanding clearly, of realising, **emptiness**, the absence of own-being of all dharmas, **what is the use?** There is no purpose at all because the means of liberation are other than that. In reply to this, he says, **because scripture says...**

41cd. **Because scripture says that without this path there is no awakening.**

427.1 Because there is no other means, therefore [it has a use] is the meaning. This is the reality of the great aim.¹ For so it is: Every single thing bears two natures called "attributed" and "not attributed." Of those, the nature which is attributed, given impetus by ignorance, is common to all people. Dispelling the defilements is not possible for one perceiving that, otherwise all spiritually immature people would be Tathāgatas, the absurd consequence [explained]² previously.³ Thus, only the non-attributed reality, being realised in conjunction with non-perception, is perceived to have the capacity to destroy unknowing and the sullyng influences. And that, being discerned by wisdom, is ascertained to be characterised by the non-perception of any *dharma*. Thus only the emptiness of all *dharmas* is understood to have the capability to dispel the erring from all the obscurations.⁴

427.10 Thus it has been explained through reasoning above and will be explained later. Furthermore, to make this matter known here through scripture, he has said:

¹ T. '*di ñid don gyi de kho na ste* 'Just this is the reality of the aim.'

² T. includes *bstan* 'explained.'

³ See above p. 411.3.

⁴ T. '*khrol pa'i sgrib pa thams cad* 'all the obscurations that are erring.'

Because scripture says that without this path there is no awakening.

427.13 Which is said in the *Prajñāpāramitā*: "The Blessed One said, 'Here, Subhūti, a bodhisattva, a Great Being, coursing in the perfection of wisdom does not cherish the thought that form is an existent; does not cherish the thought that feeling is an existent; does not cherish the thought that perception is an existent; [does not cherish the thought that consciousness is an existent]¹; does not cherish the thought that mental formations are an existent; up to, does not cherish the thought that knowledge of the aspects of the path is an existent; up to, does not cherish the thought that knowledge in regard to all aspects is an existent; does not cherish the thought that dispelling all² the moral defilements associated with the latencies is an existent. What is the reason for that? [Subhūti]³, for one with the conception of existence there is no cultivation of the perfection of wisdom, up to, for one with the conception of existence there is no cultivation of the perfection of giving. For one with the conception of existence there is no cultivation of emptiness of the internal, up to, for one with the conception of existence there is no cultivation of the emptiness of own-being of non-existence. For one with the conception of existence there is no cultivation of the six supersensible cognitions, up to, there is no cultivation of every concentration, every mystic formula method, the Tathāgata's strengths, intrepidities, special knowledge, great benevolence, great compassion and special buddha qualities, [up to, there is no dispelling the moral defilements associated with the latencies.]⁴ What is the reason for that? For so it is: Attached to the two extremes, he thinks, 'It is I in the existent'; attached to the two extremes, he thinks, 'It is I in giving, morality, in patience, in strenuousness, in meditative concentration, in wisdom;' attached to the two extremes,

¹ T. includes *rnam par śes pa dños po yod ces bya bar mi sgom mo*.

² T. does not translate *sarva* 'all.'

³ T. includes *rab 'byor*.

⁴ T. adds *śes pa nas bag chags kyī mtshams sbyor ba'i ñon moñs pa'i spon ba med do*.

he thinks, 'it is I in emptiness of the internal, up to, in emptiness of own-being of the non-existent, in the six supersensible cognitions, up to, in the dispelling of all¹ the moral defilements connected to the latencies. And for he who is attached to the two extremes there is no liberation. What is the reason for that? Subhūti, for one with the conception of existence there is no giving, up to, there is no wisdom. There is no path, there is no knowledge, there is no attainment, there is no comprehension, there is no patient acceptance² conformable [to the continuation of religious development], there is no thorough knowledge of form, there is no thorough knowledge of feeling, up to, there is no thorough knowledge of conditioned origination . There is no thorough knowledge of the conception of a self, a being, a life, a creature, a human being, a man, a person, one born of man, one belonging to the human race, an agent, an experiencer, a knower, a seer, up to, there is no thorough knowledge of the dispelling of all moral defilements connected with the latencies. How much less will there be liberation for him!

429.1 Further, for that very reason, in the same place it is said: "The Blessed One said, 'So it is, Kauśika, so it is. Whatever tathāgatas, arhats, perfect complete buddhas there were in the past period of time they too fully awakened to unexcelled complete perfect awakening relying on this same perfection of wisdom. And whatever tathāgatas, arhats, perfect complete buddhas there will be in the future period of time they too will fully awaken to unexcelled complete perfect awakening relying on this same perfection of wisdom. And whatever tathāgatas, arhats, perfect complete buddhas there are now who reside, remain³, pass time, teach the Dharma in the immeasurable, innumerable world systems in the ten directions, they too have fully awakened to unexcelled complete perfect awakening relying on this same perfection of

1 T. does not translate *sarva* 'all.'

2 or, 'intellectual receptivity.' See *kṣānti* BHSD p. 199.

3 T. does not translate *dhriyante* 'remain.'

wisdom. And whatever śrāvakas (disciples) of past tathāgatas, arhats, perfect complete buddhas there were, whatever śrāvakas of future tathāgatas, arhats, perfect complete buddhas there will be and whatever śrāvakas of presently existing tathāgatas, arhats, perfect complete buddhas there are, they too have attained, will attain and are attaining the fruit of stream-entry relying on this same perfection of wisdom.¹ And whatever solitary buddhas there were in the past period of time, and so on, up to, they too have attained, will attain and are attaining the awakening of the solitary ones (*pratyeka*) relying on this same perfection of wisdom. What is the reason for that? In this perfection of wisdom all three vehicles are taught extensively. Furthermore, they [are taught] by means of the signless, by means of non-perception², by means of non-arising³, by means of non-defilement, by means of non-purification, up to, further in accordance with conventional expression of the world but not by means of the absolute," and so on.

And it is said:

Adhered to by buddhas, solitary buddhas and śrāvakas, you [perfection of wisdom] are the sole path of liberation; there is no other. This is certain.⁴

Intolerant of this statement of the Mahāyāna he says, **but the Mahāyāna ...**

42a. But the Mahāyāna is not established.

430.6 But, proponent of emptiness, for me **the Mahāyāna is not established,** is not admitted, as scripture, therefore citing it is not good as proof.

¹ T. adds *zés pa nas dgra bcom pa ñid thob po // 'thob po // 'thob par 'gyur ro* 'up to have attained, will attain and are attaining arhatship.'

² T. does not translate *anupalambhayogena*.

³ T. adds *'gag pa med pa'i tshul = aniruddhayoga* 'by non-cessation.'

⁴ *Prajñāpāramitāstuti* 17. LVP p. 430 fn. 1.

Here, putting the same fault as a counter to the opponent, he says, **how ...**

42b. How is your scripture established?

430.10 If the Mahāyāna is not established, **how**, in what way, is it **established** that **your scripture**¹ is the word of the Blessed One? For that we do not behold any authority² which establishes it as scripture. The opponent says as a counter, **because ...**

42c. Because that is established for both.

430.14 **Because**, for the reason that, **that**, my scripture, is **established for**, ascertained as scripture by, **both** you and me. For, even you, a follower of the Mahāyāna, do not dispute that my scripture is the word of the Buddha. Therefore that [scripture] is established. On the other hand, I do not concur in regard to the Mahāyāna in such a way that you too might give this same answer. The follower of the definitive system says:

42d That was not established for you from the beginning.

431.2 Even if being established for both is a reason for your scripture to be established as scripture, still this should not be said since it was not established. **Because even for you that scripture of yours was not established. When? From the beginning, in the beginning before your acceptance of it. For, before acceptance, that was in no way established for you. Thus since it was not established**

¹ *tvadīyāgama. Verse tvadāgama.*

² *T. tshad ma lhag pa 'greater authority.'*

being established for both is not proof.

431.7 And if the being established for both is not established, then this must be the proof: That which comes from tradition through a succession of gurus and disciples as the word of the Buddha and what is put down in a sūtra, appears in the rules of discipline, and is not contrary to reality, that and nothing else is the word of the Buddha.¹ Thus he says, **whatever ground ...**

43ab. Whatever ground there is for confidence in that apply that also to the Mahāyāna.²

431.12 **Whatever ground, basis, there is for confidence.³ Whatever ground, whatever basis, there is for confidence, acceptability, reverence, in that, your own scripture, apply, assign, that ground for confidence here also to the Mahāyāna because the cause for confidence spoken of is also found in regard to the Mahāyāna.**

431.16 Furthermore, the unerring characteristic common to all the declarations [of the Buddha]⁴ which is stated in the *Adhyāśayasamcodanasūtra*⁵: "Moreover,

¹ See LVP *Kośa* Vol. 5 p. 252 fn. 2. T. *gañ yañ mdo sde la 'jug / 'dul ba la snañ ba'i rgyu mtshan blañ bar bya žiñ gus par bya bar brjod pa yin no // der žes pa ni rañ gi luñ la yin la chos ñid dañ mi 'gal ba de sañs rgyas kyi bka' yin te / gžan ni ma yin no že na* 'And what enters the sūtras, what is characterised as appearing in the rules of discipline which is acceptable and respectfully spoken. What is in that is in our own scriptures and is not contrary to reality, that is the word of the Buddha, nothing else.

² T. *theg chen la yañ mtshuñs*: 'is the same also for the Mahāyāna'.

³ The commentary here indicates that *āsthā* 'confidence' is qualified by the bahuvrīhi compound *yatpratayā*. Lit. 'confidence whose grounds are whatever.'

⁴ T. includes *sañs rgyas kyi*.

⁵ Quoted ŚS p. 15.13. LVP 431 fn 3.

Maitreya, every eloquent word¹ should be known as spoken by Buddha in accordance with four reasons. Which four? Here, Maitreya, the eloquent word is concerned with sense, not concerned with nonsense. It is concerned with the Dharma, not concerned with non-Dharma. It dispels defilements, does not increase defilements. It shows the good qualities and benefits of nirvāṇa, does not show the good qualities and benefits of saṃsāra.² By these four," and so on down to "Of anyone³ who speaks or will speak [eloquent words]⁴ with these four [reasons]⁵ faithful sons of good family or daughters of good family should generate the notion of the Buddha. Having formed the notion of a teacher, they should listen to the Dharma.⁶ What is the reason for that? Whatever, Maitreya, is well spoken, all that is spoken by the Buddha. In that case, Maitreya, whoever would reject these eloquent words, whoever, saying, 'these are not spoken by the Buddha,' would generate disrespect toward them, that one, with aversion toward the person⁷ rejects every eloquent word spoken by the Buddha. Having rejected the Dharma, he is destined for an evil state because of an act⁸ conducive to an injury to the Dharma.⁹ Thus only non-contrariety to reality is said to

¹ Read *pratibhāṇaṃ sarvaṃ*. T. *spobs pa thams cad*. Cf. p. 432.10.

² T. here reads: *byams pa rgyu bzi po 'di dag dan ldan na snar bzin du rig par bya'o // byams pa dge sloṅ nam / dge sloṅ ma 'am / dge bsñen nam / dge bsñen ma gaṅ su yaṅ ruṅ ste* 'Maitreya, if it is endowed with these four reasons it should be known as before [i.e., as the word of the Buddha]. Whatever monk or nun or male lay-disciple or female lay-disciple there is ...'

³ T. 'any monk, nun, layman or laywoman.' See previous fn.

⁴ T. includes *spobs pa = pratibhāṇa*. ŚS p. 15 supports this reading.

⁵ T. includes *rgyu*. ŚS p. 15 supports this reading.

⁶ T. *dam pa'i chos* 'true Dharma.' T. reads *saddharmaḥ* in place of *sa dharmaḥ*. ŚS p. 15 *sa dharmaḥ*.

⁷ T. *gaṅ zag la dan ba'i phyir*. Read *gaṅ zag la sdaṅ ba'i phyir*.

⁸ T. *las mñion par 'du byed pas* 'because of performing an act.'

⁹ T. adds *byams pa de lta bas na rigs kyi bu 'am / rigs kyi bu mo dzad pa can gaṅ chos kyis (P. kyi) phoṅs par 'gyur ba'i las las yoṅs su grol bar 'dod pas / gaṅ zag la sdaṅ ba'i phyir chos la sdaṅ bar mi bya'o //* 'Therefore, Maitreya, any faithful son or daughter of a good family desiring liberation from a deed conducive to an injury to the Dharma because of aversion toward the person should not show aversion toward the Dharma.'

be the correct characteristic here."

And it is said:

That speech which is concerned with the meaningful words of the Dharma, which removes defilement pertaining to the three worlds and which shows the benefit of peace is said to belong to the sage. Otherwise it is the opposite.¹

Since all this exists in the Mahāyāna how would it not be acceptable?

433.2 In regard to the statement, "That was not established for you from the beginning,"² the opponent sets forth a qualification: I do not say that which is established for two is established for us both, but rather that since my scripture is established for two, other than us two, it is to be accepted³, while the Mahāyāna is not [established] because it is contrary to this. For this reason it is not to be accepted. In response, he says, **if it is true ...**

43cd. If it is true because it is accepted by two others, the Veda etc. also is true.

433.8 If, because we two are involved in a dispute, it is accepted that that is true, correct, which is accepted, that is, well accepted, agreed upon, by some unknown pairs⁴ other than us, **the Veda etc. is also true**, the statements of the Veda

¹ *Ratnagotravibhāga* V 18. Identified by de Jong (1975) p. 178. This verse is quoted in Vibhūticandra's legend of Śāntideva section XIII. See comments of de Jong loc. cit.

² Verse 42cd.

³ T. *gañ gi tshē khyod dañ kho bo cag gñi ga la grub pa zes mi smra'o // 'on kyañ u bu cag las gzan pa gñi ga la grub pa'i bdag ñid luñ ni blañ bar bya ba yin la / theg pa chen po ni ma yin te* 'It was not said [it is established] when it is established for both you and me, but rather scripture whose nature is established for two, other than us two, is to be accepted.'

⁴ Text may be corrupt here. See LVP p. 433 fn. 2.

characterised as precepts. Because of the word "etc." [one understands that] the words of Kaṇāda and others would also be true, not false. In that case too, since agreement between two other than the disputant and counter-disputant occurs, that too¹ should be accepted by you. Therefore there is not this difference either.

433.15 That may be so but there is no dispute about my scripture being the word of the Buddha but there is about the Mahāyāna. For this reason one is to be accepted not the other. Supposing this, he says, if the Mahāyāna ...

44. If the Mahāyāna is [not acceptable] because it is disputed you should abandon your scriptures because they are disputed by heretics [and yourselves], and other scriptures [because they are disputed by] yourselves and others.

434.3 If, in the case that, the Mahāyāna is not acceptable because (*itī*), for the reason that, it is disputed, disagreed about - some accept it as a condition for activity since it is the word of the Buddha, others, because they attribute what is contrary to it do not accept it² - then you should abandon your scripture, you should reject your own scripture as well. That too would not be a condition for activity. For what reason? Because it is disputed, because of the occurrence of disagreement on the part of heretics such as the Mīmāṃsakas etc., it deserves to be totally abandoned. Since [it is disputed] not only by heretics but also by coreligionists, he says, by yourselves. The teaching of the Blessed One is the four schools divided into eighteen divisions. Because of the occurrence of many divisions in just one of the

¹ T. does not translate *api*.

² T. *phyin ci log gi sgro btags pa ñid du 'dod de* 'accept it as an erroneous attribution.'

schools therein, dispute of one with another occurs even among coreligionists.

434.12 **By yourselves:** by those located in another division included within ones own school. **By others:** by those located in other schools. The word "and" has the sense of addition with regard to the former.¹ "Because they are disputed you should abandon other scriptures," is the connection. **Other scriptures**² are scriptures other than those accepted by you. They too, because they are disputed do not merit acknowledgment. And since your scriptures are equally disputed as the others, the argument is of equal weight for their complete abandonment.

434.18 **Alternatively:** The sūtras, Abhidharma and rules of discipline (*vinaya*) merit total abandonment because they are disputed **by yourselves**, by Sautrāntikas, Ābhidharmikas and Adherents of the rules of discipline (*Vainayika*) located in a single division each [disputing] with the other. For there is dispute with each other among the Sautrāntikas etc. located in a single division. **By others:** by those in a different division based on one school. Because of this the statement, "the word of the Buddha comes from tradition by way of a succession of gurus ..." ³ should be seen as rejected by this. For, it is not tenable that those who have not forgotten their traditional doctrine dispute one with another; the words of the Omniscient One do not conflict with each other; and, for you, uniformity of tenets with each other does not occur among the sūtras, Abhidharma and rules of discipline. Then how can agreement with the sūtras etc. be stated as a reason for being the word of the Buddha? ⁴ Therefore this is worthless.

435.11 Having put the same fault for the counter thus, showing the fault again by a

1 T. *sīa ma dañ phyi ma = pūrvāpara* 'of former and latter'.

2 T. *luñ gi khyad par* 'different scriptures.'

3 Cf. 431.7.

4 Cf. 431.7.

qualification in what is accepted by the opponent, he says:

45ab. The teaching has its root in monkhood and monkhood is scarcely possible.

435.12 He begins with the words, **the teaching ...** The teaching is characterised by instruction by the Blessed One on acceptance of the beneficial and rejection of the harmful and that is rooted in monkhood.

435.13 Alternatively, having dealt with the continuing disagreement about scripture, wishing to refute the statement, "liberation is from seeing the truths; what is the use of emptiness?"¹ he says, **the teaching ...**

435.17 **The teaching conveys the precepts:** "This should be done. This should not be done." That is rooted in monkhood. That [teaching], of which **monkhood**, the state of a monk, is itself **the root**, the fundament, is spoken of thus² because it is based on that. Just as, assuredly, a tree with a firm root, experiencing long enduring, [by means of its] trunk, branches, subsidiary branches, leaves, flowers, fruit, is capable of removing torment etc. by providing shade, so too, the wishing tree of the teaching of the Blessed One, putting down the root of monkhood, endowed with³: the applications of mindfulness, complete abandonments, supersensible powers, powers, strengths, adjuncts of awakening, meditative attainment of formless concentration⁴ and

¹ Verse 41ab.

² The commentary here indicates that *śāsanam* 'teaching' is qualified by the bahuvrīhi compound *bhikṣutāmūlam*. Lit. 'teaching whose root is monkhood.'

³ The commentator here lists the thirty-seven factors conducive to awakening. See Dayal (1932) pp. 80-2.

⁴ T. *gzugs med pa'i tiñ ne 'dzin la sñoms par 'jug pa*. But on the relation of *samādhi* and *samāpatti* see Tillemans (1990) vol. I p. 232 en. 134.

meditative absorption¹, and factors conducive to awakening, noble eight-fold path and the fruit of mendicancy, has the capacity of removing the torment of the heat of defilements by miracles of supersensible powers etc. Thus does monkhood have the same qualities as a root.

436.8 In regard to that [monkhood], a monk in name only, a monk by his own declaration, a monk who is used to collect alms, a monk ordained by a motion and a resolution put three times² and a monk whose defilements have been destroyed are the five types of monk. Of those, the two foremost are the fourth and fifth since the others should be merely designated by the same name. And neither of those is incompatible³ with being determined by abiding in the teaching. And, of those, the monk who has destroyed the defilements is primary. Only that one is understood here. His state is monkhood.

436.14 And since it is not consistent that that [monkhood] is from seeing the noble truths, he says, **and monkhood is ...**⁴

436.16 **Monkhood** is the state of having destroyed the defilements, that is to say, the dispelling of the defilements. "And" adding another statement, is used in the sense of a reason⁵: because that **monkhood is scarcely possible**, not right, without seeing emptiness, it is not tenable through only seeing the truths. Therefore one should not say, "liberation is from seeing the truths," is the intent. For whom⁶ is that scarcely possible? For those whose minds have an object. [The mind]

¹ T. does not translate *dhyāna*.

² *jñāpticaturthakarma*. See *jñāpti* (3) BHSD p. 244.

³ T. '*gal ba yin no* 'is incompatible.' Read '*gal ba ma yin no* ?

⁴ T. does not translate *bhikṣutaiva cetyādi* 'and monkhood is ...'

⁵ T. *thar pa ñid du 'jug la* ?? in place of *hetau vartate* 'is used in the sense of a reason.'

⁶ T. *ji ltar = katham* 'how?'

which **has an object**: functioning with an object, it has attachment to an entity. Those yogins whose minds are like that are spoken of thus.¹ Because, you accept, they hold onto the truths of suffering etc. and separation from defilements as entities, thus for them with views involving perception [of entities monkhood] **is scarcely possible**. But not for those whose minds are free of objects.

437.8 Furthermore, the statement, "liberation is from seeing the truths" may be differently conceived because seeing the truths is possible in two ways: absolutely and conventionally. If it is the first postulate we have no disagreement because of the primacy of our position through our acceptance of seeing all *dharmas* absolutely. But the second, that we do not allow because it is contrary to reason. For liberation does not arise² from seeing conventional truth because the liberation of all beings would follow as a consequence. For so it is: Because of the discernment of reality and non-reality by reason and scripture, of these only absolute truth and not conventional truth is ascertained to dispel defilements and that is characterised by the non-perception of any *dharmas*. For without that the cessation of the defilements is not tenable. As long as there is attachment to existents conceptualisation does not cease; as long as there is conceptualisation defilements, their might unimpaired, dwell in the mental continuum; as long as there are defilements there is the bringing forth of a succession of births created by actions. And *samsāra*, its progress unimpeded, continues³ still more. Therefore only the emptiness of all *dharmas*, since it is the counteragent of ignorance, is ascertained to be the cause of cutting the continuum of *samsāra*, not seeing the truths alone. Precisely this has been stated by the Venerable Teacher⁴:

1 The commentary here indicates that *sāvalambanacittānām* is a bahuvrīhi compound qualifying *yoginām* 'yogins whose minds have an object.' 'Yogins' is understood in the verse.

2 T. *rīgs pa ma yin te* 'is not tenable.' Perhaps T. reads *upapadyate* in place of *utpadyate*?

3 T. adds *mtha' yas par* 'endlessly.'

4 i.e., Dharmakīrti .

Liberation is from seeing emptiness; cultivation of the rest has that as its aim.¹

How the noble truths are included in the two truths has already been shown above.²

Thus, enough of excessive elaboration.³ Moreover:

45cd. For those whose minds have an object nirvāṇa is also scarcely possible.

438.6 The significance of "also" is: not only monkhood but *also nirvāṇa*. Nirvāṇa without remaining substratum because of separation from the defilements is scarcely possible, is very difficult to accomplish. He first explains the inconsistency of monkhood in regard to this.

46ab. If liberation is from dispelling the defilements it must be immediately after that.

438.10 If defilements are dispelled through seeing the noble truths and through that, liberation occurs, then it, liberation, must be, must occur, immediately after that, immediately following the dispelling of the defilements. [Opponent] Granted it is so.⁴ Indeed, who says otherwise? [Commentator] It is not [so]. Why? In response, he says:

¹ *Pramāṇavārttika Pramāṇapariccheda* 255. Identified by Tripathi (1989) p. 405 fn.

1. Quoted *Subhāṣitasamgraha*. LVP p. 438 fn. 1.

² See above p. 362.

³ T. *śin tu spros pas chog go*.

⁴ T. does not translate *bhavatv evaṃ* 'Granted it is so.'

46cd. And in them is seen a capacity for action even though free of defilements.

438.15 "And" in the sense of reason.¹ Because in them who have dispelled the defilements, i.e., in noble Maudgalyāyana, noble Aṅgulīmāla etc., is seen, known from scripture, a capacity, a power to give a result, therefore liberation is not immediately after that. A capacity for what is seen? For action characterised as wholesome or unwholesome. Is it [only] when possessed of defilements formerly in the non-noble state? No. He says, "even though free of cooperating defilements" [the capacity is seen] "for action."³ [Opponent] But through seeing the truths ignorance etc. is dispelled. By way of dispelling of mental formations etc., because of dispelling that [ignorance], craving too is dispelled. Craving and [ignorance] possessing misapprehension are causes for the arising of re-birth. Therefore, even if action exists, on account of the non-existence of those two, it is [without capacity] like grain devoid of its husk, and nothing [of our case] is destroyed. This is stated:

Having abandoned birth in an inferior state by force of thinking with incorrect knowledge and craving generated by that, this does not arise.⁴

¹ T. does not translate this sentence. ('And' does not appear in the Tibetan translation.)

³ T. *gañ yin źe na / śāra 'phags pa ma yin pa'i gnas skabs na ñon moñs pa dañ bcas pa'o // ñon moñs pa med kyañ yin no źes bstan pa'i phyir / ñon moñs med kyañ źes gsuñs te / lhan cig byed pa'i ñon moñs pa dañ bral na yañ las kyi nus pa mthoñ ba yin no* 'What [action has capacity]? That possessed of defilements when formerly in the non-noble state. In order to show that even [activity] free of defilement [has capacity] he says, "even that free of defilements," i.e., the capacity is seen of action even when free of cooperating defilements.'

⁴ *Pramāṇavārttika Pramāṇapariccheda* 262cd-3ab (in Pandeya's edition). Identified by Tripathi (1989) p. 407 fn. 1.

439.10 Alternatively, craving alone is the cause of re-birth because it is the cause¹ of arising. For it is said by the Blessed One: "Therein what is the noble truth of arising? [It is] this craving which pertains to re-birth, which is associated with passion for joys and which takes delight in this and that, that is to say, craving for pleasure, craving for existence, and craving for annihilation."² Thus then, for him who has no craving, for whom arising is destroyed, there is no possibility of re-birth because of the absence of a cause. Setting up the intent of the opponent thus, he says:

**47ab. If now it is determined that craving, the cause,
does not exist ...**

440.1 If, in the case that, now it is determined, ascertained, that because of the dispelling of ignorance craving, the cause, the reason for re-birth, does not exist, is not found, then this should not be said. For the dispelling of ignorance is impossible for those with views involving perception because there is no dispelling of craving as long as that exists. Or granted [that determination], nevertheless, it is explained:

**47cd. Is there not craving, though being undefiled, in
them, like delusion?**

440.6 Is there not craving, does craving not occur, though being undefiled, though not possessed of defilements, in them, your yogins? How possibly? Like

¹ Translated on the basis of T. *kun 'byuñ ba rgyu yin pa'i phyir*. Skt. 'it is the form (*ākāra*) of arising.'

² This is a well known definition of the truth of the arising of suffering found in many texts. See Rahula (1974) p. 29 fn. 1. T. *loñs spyod* has understood *vibhava* in the sense of 'wealth.'

delusion, like undefiled unknowing¹ Even in this way craving² cannot be repudiated. Thus he says:

48ab. Craving is conditioned by feeling and feeling is found in them.

440.10 Feeling is conditioned by contact and craving is conditioned by feeling. That feeling, the cause of craving, exists in them.³ How then can one say that craving⁴ the result of that does not exist despite the cause being unimpaired. But if [it is objected] though the irreproachable⁵ have feeling, there is no craving. It is said [in reply] that⁶ the irreproachability⁷ of those attached to existents is not established. Therefore, even if craving which is like undefiled unknowing is not accepted⁸, nevertheless, without [seeing] emptiness, by force of logic it occurs.

441.1 This is the overall meaning here: When, even in one whose continuum is liberated, the capacity of action to give a result is perceived; and craving occurs when feeling exists, then, even the dispelling of defilement being doubtful, how can one be

¹ T. *ñon moñs pa can ma yin pa'i śes pa* 'undefiled knowing'. Read *ñon moñs pa can ma yin pa'i mi śes pa*. According to AKBh I 1 śrāvakas and solitary buddhas are free of defiled unknowing but, unlike the buddhas, they still have undefiled unknowing. Thus they have not destroyed blindness in an absolute manner.

² T. *srid pa* 'existence.' Read *sred pa*.

³ T. *sred pa'i rgyu tshor ba de yañ yod pa yin (D. min) pas* 'and because that feeling, the cause of craving exists.'

⁴ T. does not translate *tṛṣṇā* 'craving.'

⁵ Read *niravadya*. T. *kha na ma tho ba med pa*.

⁶ T. adds *kyañ = api* 'even.'

⁷ Read *niravadya*. See LVP p. 440 fn. 1.

⁸ T. *ñon moñs pa can ma yin pa'i mi śes pa yod kyañ sred pa khas mi len pa de lta na yañ* 'Even if, despite the existence of unknowing which does not have defilements, craving is not accepted, nevertheless ...'

certain about liberation? Therefore it does not appear¹ that monkhood is easily possible without seeing emptiness. Which is stated:

For those whose minds have an object nirvāṇa is also scarcely possible.²

Justifying that, he says:

48cd. A mind with an object must abide somewhere.

441.9 A mind with an object, with perception, must abide, must affix itself, somewhere, on some place of fixation, on the noble truths etc. or on the fruits of cultivating them. When there is the possibility of fixation³ there is no cessation of rebirth. So how would nirvāṇa also not be in doubt when rebirth is possible? Therefore only the spoken of emptiness is said to be the cause of nirvāṇa. Hence he says:

49. Without emptiness the mind, bound, arises again just as in the case of the attainment of non-perception. For this reason one should cultivate emptiness.

441.16 Without emptiness, excluding emptiness, the mind, consciousness with an object, bound, held fast by the noose of fixation on an object arises again, becomes possessed of further arising though brought to cessation for a short while by the power of concentration. But where is this seen? Just as in the case of the attainment of non-perception. Just as, despite their cessation for as long as the attainment of non-perception is attained, mind and mental concomitants would arise

¹ T. *snañ bar 'gyur zes pa'o* 'does appear.'

² Verse 45cd.

³ T. *žen pa srid pas* 'because of the possibility of attachment.'

again. So it is in other cases as well, is the meaning. And this is an elliptical expression. One should also understand, "as in the case of the attainment of cessation." Alternatively: Just as, although the mind and mental concomitants of one who attains the attainment of non-perception and is born among the non-perceiving gods, cease for many hundred kalpas, nevertheless, on the complete ripening of the fruit of the maturation of that attainment they arise again. So [it is in other cases as well].

442.7 Because without emptiness neither monkhood nor nirvāṇa is possible, those seeking either should cultivate just emptiness. Hence he says, **one should cultivate emptiness ...** The seeker of nirvāṇa etc. should cultivate just emptiness **for this reason:** without emptiness, the mind, bound, arises again. For the cultivation of that causes one to realise the dispelling of defilements and nirvāṇa. That is to say, the cultivation of the truths etc. alone does not [cause that] because it has an object.

442.13 Which is stated in the *Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā*¹ : " 'What then do you think Subhūti, does it thus occur to a stream-winner, "by me the fruit of stream-winning has been gained?" ' Subhūti said, 'Indeed, Blessed One, it does not.' What is the reason for that? Because nothing has been won. For this reason he is called a stream-winner. No form has been won, no sounds, no smells, no tastes, no touchables, no objects of mind have been won. If, Blessed One, it would occur to the stream-winner thus, 'by me the fruit of stream-winning has been gained,' that would be a grasping of a self, would be a grasping of a being, a grasping of a life, a grasping of a person for him ... 'What then do you think Subhūti, does it occur to an arhat thus, 'by me arhatship has been attained?' Subhūti said, 'Indeed, Blessed One, it does not.' What is the reason for that? There is no *dharma* called 'arhat.' If, Blessed One, it

¹ p. 25.9. LVP p. 442 fn. 1.

would occur to an arhat thus, "by me arhatship has been attained," that would be a grasping of a self for him'¹ ... The Blessed One said, "Therefore Subhūti, the bodhisattva, the great being should bring forth the non-fixed mind, should bring forth the mind not fixed anywhere, should bring forth the mind not fixed on form, should bring forth the mind not fixed on sounds, smells, tastes, touchables."² Therefore it is settled: only emptiness is the path of awakening.

443.11 The three anuṣṭubh verses which begin "if words which would enter" appear to be interpolated by someone because their entry is out of order.³

444.1 The topic of this investigation⁴ [in the verses] is disagreement about scripture. Because the point [presently] under discussion beginning with the words 'the teaching is rooted in monkhood ...'⁵ is different to a dispute about the scriptures it would be appropriate [for these verses] to have been spoken earlier. Beginning a past dispute again by means of this [investigation] would be unskillful in regard to the [present] topic on the part of the author and [it would be appropriate earlier] because the matter was conveyed by the two preceding verses beginning with the words

1 T. includes *sems can du 'dzin pa dañ / srog tu 'dzin pa dañ / gañ zag tu 'dzin par gyur ba lags so* 'a grasping of a being, a grasping of a life, a grasping of a person.'

2 T. includes *chos* 'objects of mind.'

3 The verses which are found in the manuscripts and in the Tibetan translation read:

50. If words which would enter into a sūtra are accepted as spoken by the Buddha why is the Mahāyāna generally not considered equal to your scriptures?

51. If because one is not understood all are faulty, why are not all spoken by the Victorious One because one is equal to the scriptures?

52. Who would not accept the words which are not fathomed [even] by Mahākāśyapa and others because they have not been understood by you?

4 T. *spyad pa*. More correctly *dpyad pa*? Cf. comments on '*caraka*' BHSD p. 225.

5 Verse 45ab.

"whatever ground there is ..."1 Because the words beginning "by Mahākāśyapa and others" do not fit the context, it is certain that the verses were not supplied by the author. Therefore this is just an interpolation.

444.8 [Opponent] That may be so but just as there would be no liberation because of the occurrence of attachment in a mind with an object, so fear of emptiness as well arises. Therefore it is better to remain in saṃsāra on account of rejecting both is logical.

53. But, because of non-liberation of the sufferers on account of clinging and dread, remaining in saṃsāra is effected by delusion about the object. This is the fruit of emptiness.

[Alternate Reading:]

53. But, because of liberation from the extremes of clinging and dread, remaining in saṃsāra is effected by delusion for the sake of the sufferers. This is the fruit of emptiness.

444.13 The word "but," however², is for the sake of removing a fault: *but* there would be this fault in accepting emptiness, that is to say, the fault is common [to both of us].³ Why? **Because of non-liberation.** [In Sanskrit] the instrumental of reason. Because of the absence of liberation etc. is the meaning. [Non-liberation] of whom? **Of the sufferers**, those existing, afflicted by the suffering of birth etc., in saṃsāra, the five forms of existence. [**Because of**] **clinging, attachment, and**

1 Verses 43-4.

2 T. does not translate *punar* 'however.'

3 T. *thun moñ ma yin no* 'is not common.'

dread, fear because of hearing the word "emptiness" because of not thoroughly knowing the meaning of it.¹ Because of that, rejecting both positions, **remaining**, continuing to abide², in **saṃsāra** whose nature pertaining to the three realms is **effected**, occurs. How? By **delusion**, ignorance, about the object, the domain of the object, that is to say, by attachment to an objective support. Hence this is the fruit of emptiness that having ceased yet again one continues to exist in **saṃsāra**.

445.8 This is the intent: Just as there would not be liberation through views involving perception apart from emptiness, so the spiritually immature person³ with a mind happy in attachment to objects, shrinking in fear of the emptiness of all *dharmas* thinking "it is better to continue to exist in **saṃsāra**," having ceased⁴, turning away from the happiness of cessation, experiencing the suffering of **saṃsāra** again continues to abide therein. What is established by this [emptiness]?

445.13 Others, on the other hand, believing the reading to be, "because of liberation from the extremes of clinging and dread," explain it thus: Because it is a cause of **clinging**⁵ - clinging is a state of attachment; because it is a cause of **dread**, dread is a state of fear. The meaning is that those same two extremes, the extremes of clinging and dread⁶, are the extremes of eternalism and annihilationism. For so it is: Because of the view of eternalism, attachment arises; because of the view of annihilationism, dread. **Because of liberation from:** because of the total

1 The commentary explains that *saktitrāsa* 'clinging and dread' is a co-ordinative compound.

2 T. *gnas pa'i gnas skabs* 'the condition of remaining.' T. reads *avasthā* in place of *avasthāna*.

3 T. *sar ba'i byis pa* ?

4 T. does not translate *vinivṛtya* 'having ceased.'

5 T. *žen pa* = *āsaṅga* in place of *sakti* .

6 T. *chags pa dan' jigs pa'i gnas yin la* 'states of clinging and dread'.

dispelling¹ of those two. The instrumental [of reason] as before. Because by investigating the absolute the extreme of eternalism is avoided; because of accepting conventional truth the extreme of annihilationism is completely dispelled. Because it thus rejects the extremes of attribution and denial, this, the middle view, is shown. And what is achieved in this way? In reply he says, **remaining in saṃsāra is effected**. Because one unstained on account of wisdom by the faults of saṃsāra is subject to compassion, **remaining, continuing to exist, in saṃsāra is effected**, brought about.² For what purpose? **For the sake of the sufferers, for the sake of those suffering in saṃsāra insofar as one suffers with the suffering of others.**³ Because of a desire to remove their suffering.

446.8 But surely those in saṃsāra, in absolute terms, simply do not exist. How then can they continue to exist? To this he says, **by delusion, erroneously, because of the perception of a being conventionally. And he will make this evident later in the statement, "but for the sake of allaying suffering delusion for the goal is not to be excluded."**⁴

446.12 Therefore **this is the fruit of emptiness** that, despite remaining in saṃsāra on account of compassion, because of seeing emptiness one is not stained with the faults of saṃsāra. This, the non-abiding nirvāṇa, is the fruit of emptiness because it does not exist without emptiness. Therefore just emptiness should be cultivated by those desiring to remain for the duration of saṃsāra for the sake of beings.

446.16 Showing all this by way of summary, he says:

1 T. does not translate *parityāga* 'total dispelling.'

2 T. does not translate *niṣpadyate* 'is brought about.'

3 T. does not translate *para* 'others.'

4 Verse 77. Verse reads *vāryate* 'is not excluded.'

54ab. That fault put thus in regard to the thesis of emptiness is not logical.

446.18 That, this, fault put, declared, thus, in the way declared, in regard to the thesis of emptiness, [a difficulty] characterised as remaining in saṃsāra because of dread of emptiness, is not logical, is not consistent¹ because of the reply about to be given. Thus it is construed in reference to the first thesis.² Because it is so:

54cd. Therefore emptiness should indeed be cultivated without uncertainty.

447.2 Without uncertainty, free of uncertainty, without doubt. With that being so, emptiness, the absence of own-being of all dharmas, should be cultivated, should be practised by means non-perception.³

447.5 By this the statement "not without the path"⁴ is summed up. Furthermore in regard to the statement "what is the use of seeing emptiness?"⁵ he declares the distinctive character of emptiness⁶:

55. Since emptiness is the counteragent to the darkness

¹ T. does not translate *na samgacchate* 'is not consistent.'

² i.e., the first reading of the verse which postulated that dread of emptiness causes people to remain in saṃsāra.

³ T. *rañ b'zin gyis mi dmigs pa'i sbyor bas* 'by means of non-perception of essential nature.'

⁴ Verse IX 42.

⁵ Verse IX 41.

⁶ T. adds *ñon moñis śes bya'i*.

of the obscurations by defilements and on account of the cognisable, how would one whose wish is for omniscience not cultivate that immediately?

447.10 Defilements are attachment etc. The cognisable is fivefold. The word "obscurations" is connected with both. Defilements are themselves an obscuration and the cognisable, analysed as "obscuring," is to be construed as an obscuration. The cognisable itself [is an obscuration] because its nature is [falsely] attributed. That same obscuration, like darkness, is darkness because it obscures the reality of things. Since, because, emptiness is the counteragent to that [darkness], the cause for dispelling¹, therefore how would one whose wish, whose desire, is for omniscience, for buddhahood, - or, because one wishes for omniscience, [how would] one wishing for omniscience² - not cultivate that, not practise that emptiness immediately, speedily? Rather, he would cultivate it with great exertion.

448.5 And since the claim that there would be no entry into emptiness because of dread is also untenable, he says, dread of that thing ... Furthermore, one may put it in this way in regard to the second thesis³: there is indeed in emptiness this benefit: only at the beginning because of dread of it would there be no entry into emptiness. Hence he says:

¹ T. *spoñ ba'i gñen po* 'dispelling counteragent'.

² The commentary resolves the compound "*sarvjñatākāmaḥ*" in two ways: either as a bahuvrīhi: 'one whose wish is omniscience;' or as a tatpuruṣa: 'wishing for omniscience,' with *kāma* having the sense of an active participle.

³ i.e, the second reading of verse 54.

56. Dread of that thing which generates suffering may arise. Emptiness allays suffering. Why does fear of that arise?

448.11 Dread, fear, of that thing, towards that, which generates suffering, which creates affliction, may arise, of course. Emptiness however, on the contrary, allays suffering, removes the¹ suffering of all those subject to saṃsāra. Why, why indeed, does fear of that, of that emptiness arise in a person shrinking from what is not an occasion for fear. This the sense: Since it is the determining factor² in all good qualities only a friendly disposition is appropriate in regard to that. For fear, issuing from egoism generated by grasping self arises for those who do not know reality. And since that self has a form attributed by conceptualisation³ egoism is also groundless because of the non-existence of that⁴ [self]. Showing that, he says:

57. There may be fear of this or that if "I" is something; [but when] "I" is nothing at all whose will be the fear?

449.3 There may be, might be, fear of this or that occasion for fear or not for fear.⁵ When? If "I" is something, an "I" described as an object of the "I"-notion. If anything named "I" knowable by the "I"-notion were an entity then fear would be quite tenable. The neuter gender [is used in Sanskrit] because of showing what is not manifest. But when "I" existing as an entity on investigation is nothing at all

¹ T. *de 'that.'*

² T. *'byuñ gnas 'source'.*

³ T. *de yañ bdag tu brtags pas sgro btags pa'i ño bo zes 'and since that has a nature attributed by the conceptualisation of a self.' T. reads *ātmakalpanā-* in place of *ātmā kalpanā-*.*

⁴ T. *de la med pa '[its] non-existence in that.'*

⁵ T. *'jigs pa'i gnas las 'occasion for fear.'*

other than a word and a mere conception, then **whose will be the fear**, for whom will it arise, since that called "I" does not exist. And¹ from investigating in this way dread ceases, is the sense. This is stated:

"There is no² 'I' nor will I come to be; there is no 'mine' nor will there be,"³ thinking thus, there is dread for the spiritually immature and destruction of fear for the wise.⁴

Just as he explains the non-existence of the object of the notion "I" by showing it to be mere conceptualisation, in the same way, he says,

58. I am not teeth, not hair of the head, not nails. I am not bones nor am I blood. Not nasal mucus, not phlegm, not pus nor even suppuration.

450.1 **I am not teeth, not hair of the head, not nails.** Individually these are not the object of the notion "I". **I am not bones nor am I blood.** Bones are osteoid matter; **blood** is hematoid substance.⁵ And I am not either of these two. **Not nasal mucus, not phlegm, not pus.** Nasal mucus is discharge which issues from the nasal openings. **Phlegm** comes out of the oral cavity.⁶ **Pus** is the ripe blood⁷ in a wound. These are not "I" either. Nor even **suppuration**, discharge from a wound. Nor am I that.

59. I am not grease, nor sweat, nor lymph, neither am I

¹ T. adds *skye bar 'gyur na* 'if it arises.'

² Vaidya *nāsti*. in place of LVP *nāsmi*.

³ This line is quoted in CSV XII 281. See Tillemans (1990) Volume II p. 24. Occurrence in *Pañjikā* noted by Tillemans (1990) Volume I p. 238 en. 166.

⁴ *Ratnāvalī* I 26. Identified by Hahn (1982) p. 10.

⁵ T. does not give synonyms; they are difficult to find in English!

⁶ T. does not translate *siṅghāṇaṃ na ca ... mukhavivaravinirgata* 'Nasal mucus ...'

⁷ T. does not translate *rudhira* 'blood.'

entrails, nor am I the bowels, neither am I
excrement or urine.¹

450.9 I am not grease, nor sweat, nor lymph.² Grease is oil of the body, sweat perspiration, lymph the fourth bodily element. Neither am I these. Neither am I entrails. The entrails are well known. Nor am I those. Nor am I the bowels.³ The bowels are well known⁴. Nor am I those. Neither am I excrement or urine. Excrement is faeces. Neither am I these two.⁵

60. I am not flesh or sinew, or bodily heat. Nor am I wind. Nor am I the bodily openings and in no way the six sense consciousnesses.

451.1 I am not flesh or sinew, or bodily heat. Sinew is tendon. Bodily heat is the fiery element of the body. Nor am I these.⁶ Nor am I wind. Wind is characterised by exhalation and inhalation. Nor am I that. Nor am I the bodily openings, the eyes etc. Nor am I those. And in no way the six sense consciousnesses, the six consciousnesses of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind. Nor am I those. In no way, in no manner either individually or collectively. For so

1 T. *bdag ni źag dañ riul min te //*
glo mchin dag kyañ bdag ma yin //
nañ khrol gźan yañ bdag min te //
bdag ni phyi sa gcin ma yin //

'I am not fat or sweat, nor am I lungs and liver, moreover I am not the internal organs. I am not excrement or urine.'

2 T. does not translate *meda* 'lymph.'

3 T. *źag* = *vasā* 'fat.'

4 Reading *suprasiddha*. T. does not translate *sūkṣmātmikā*. f. LVP 450. fn. 2.

5 T. reads *yoñs su grags pa de ñid kyañ bdag ma yin no* "And that [i.e., those] is very well known; I am not that.'

6 T. '*di*' 'this.'

it is¹: On investigation² the body is perceived as simply consisting of the collection of teeth etc. And individually they are not knowable by the notion "I" because in each of them the "I"-notion is non-existent.³ Even for others [i.e., non-buddhists] hairs etc. are not singly knowable by the notion "I" and collected there are only the same [parts] as before. And nothing single occurs if those are collected because that will be disallowed. Nor can many, though collected, be the object of the notion "one". And it is not tenable that the notion of "one" in many is not in error and the determination of reality is not through errancy. Therefore it is apparent⁴ that this so-called "I" is mere conceptualisation, empty of substance.⁵ This is certain.

451.16 And in regard to the topic of meditation on the loathsome [parts of the body] this is stated in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*⁶: "7In this body there are hair of the head, hair of the body, nails, teeth, dirt, impurity, skin, flesh, bones, sinew, nerves, kidneys, heart, spleen, lungs, entrails, bowels, upper and lower stomach, intestines, liver, excrement, tears, sweat, mucus, nasal mucus, fat, suppuration, marrow, lard, bile, phlegm, pus, blood, membrane of the brain⁸, urine. And to these things a Bodhisattva, by nature, gives consideration." We will show this again later at the end of the application of mindfulness of the body. Thus the notion of "I" is quite without object.

452.7 That may be so but even if hair etc. cannot be known⁹ by the notion "I",

1 T. does not translate *tathā hi* 'for so it is.'

2 T. does not translate *vicāryamāṇa* 'on investigation.'

3 T. *so sor bdag tu 'dzin pa'i śes pa'i yul du de rnams med pa'i phyir* 'because, individually, they don't exist as the object of the 'I'-notion.'

4 T. does not translate *ābhāti* 'it is apparent.'

5 T. *ston' zin dños po med pa yin* 'being empty, an entity does not exist'.

6 ŚS p. 209.7. LVP p. 451 fn. 3.

7 T. begins *'di lta ste = tadyathā* 'namely.'

8 T. includes *glad pa = mastaka* 'head.' ŚS p. 209 supports this reading.

9 T. *rig par bya* 'are to be known'.

nevertheless it is not established¹ that this [notion] is without object since the follower of Nyāya and others say that they consider the notion "I" to have as its domain the person in its inner functioning.² This is also not tenable because the notion "I" appears to consist of judgements of the form, "I am white, lean, tall, I am going," etc. And opponents do not accept this as the nature of the self.³ Nor is it possible to apprehend a thing with cognition of a different type because of the extreme consequences. For so it is: When one possesses these, others describe him as having this and that characteristic. Now, in regard to that the Nyāyas consider the self to be eternal, all pervading, different in each living creature, unconscious yet conscious through connection with mind, a substratum for the qualities of happiness etc., the doer of wholesome and unwholesome deeds, the one who enjoys the results of them, the one who goes to the other world.⁴ The Vaiśeṣikas also [think] like the Nyāyas. Which is stated:

Others, again, here⁵ consider the self the base of desires etc., unconscious of itself, eternal and all-pervading, the doer of wholesome and unwholesome actions and the one who enjoys the result of them, conscious through connection with mind not through its own-nature.⁶

453.8 Followers of Jaimini⁷ however consider the self to consist of opposition and continuity, as transforming into the form of intellect and to have the nature of consciousness. And that consciousness is the essential nature of intellect while the

1 T. *'mi gyur te* 'does not occur'.

2 T.: *nan gi byed pa ldan pa'i skyes bu nar 'dzin pa'i spyod yul ñid du kho bo cag gis 'dod do* 'We [they] accept the person possessed of inner functioning as the domain of egoism.'

3 *'di dag la bdag tu 'dod pa ma yin la* 'do not consider these as self.'

4 T. *gtugs par bdag 'dod de ?*

5 T. *'di ltar* 'in this way.'

6 TS 171-2. Identified Aiyaswami Sastri (1950) pp.103, 108.

7 i.e., Mimāṃsakas.

activity and cessation of that are not because that [consciousness] nature continues in both just as that snakesness continues in both the inactivity of the snake in its coiled state and in its activity in its "straight" state. As is said:

Others, again, consider the self to consist of opposition and continuity, to have the nature of consciousness and consciousness to be the characteristic of intellect. Just as immediately after the coiled state of a snake comes undone the straight state occurs yet snakesness does not cease, so for the self, its essential nature eternal and conscious, there is, at the same time, no disappearance of its entire form nor continuity of all.¹

This is the distinctive character. Everything else as before.

453.19 But the Jains, like the followers of Jaimini, consider the self consciousness consisting of opposition and continuity in the form of substance and successive factors respectively. As is stated²:

Like the followers of Jaimini, the Jains declare the inner being³ to be characterised by consciousness, to consist of opposition and conformity in the form of substance and successive factors.

454.5 But the followers of Kapila⁴ consider the self eternal, pervading, without qualities, of itself consciousness, not [conscious] through connection with intellect since intellect is itself of unconscious nature⁵ according to the saying, "consciousness is the own-nature of the person."⁶ Nor is that by itself the creator of any action or the

¹ TS 222-4. Identified by Aiyaswami Sastri pp. 107, 105.

² T. does not translate *uktam* 'is stated.'

³ *antara*. TS 311 reads *-lakṣaṇam naraṃ* 'the person (= *ātman*) characterised.' T. *mtshan ñid rgyu* ?

⁴ i.e., followers of the Sāṃkhya system.

⁵ T. does not translate *svabhāva* 'nature.'

⁶ T. *rañ gi ño bo ni sems pa dañ ldan pa'i ño bo yin no* '(Its) own-nature has the nature of consciousness'.

enjoyer of its result because [the person] is without activity. Only nature is the doer of that [action] and makes over the result of that to that [self].¹ By force of misapprehension that [person] attributes that to its own self. For so it is: When for the person the desire in the form of enjoying an object such as sound etc. arises, nature, thoroughly knowing the desire of the person, joins with the person and thence effects the creation of sound etc. The intellect creates grasping at the objects, the sounds etc. taken hold of by the activity of hearing etc. superintended² by the mental faculty. Then the person becomes conscious of the object grasped by intellect. Thus absence of qualities (*nirguṇa*) because its own-nature is consciousness and absence of activity because it is pervading is the distinctive character of the person of the Sāṃkhya.

And it is stated:

Others think consciousness different to the nature of intellect; they conceive consciousness to be the innate nature of the self; that alone enjoys the result made over by primary nature. It does not have agency at all; that is thought to belong only to nature.³

Consciousness misapprehending these qualities proceeding from nature because it is covered by darkness, unwise, thinks "I am acting," powerless to bend even a blade of grass.⁴

455.7 But the followers of the Upaniṣads consider that awareness is within the continuum of every living creature, is single, pervading and eternal. That, by means of development, appears as this whole⁵ world of earth, water, wind, fire etc. Indeed the essential nature of that is the self. Nothing apprehensible, external, possessing parts

¹ T.: *bdag de la 'bras bu stobs par byed pa* 'empowers the result to that self'.

² T. *byin gyis brlabs pa* 'empowered.'

³ TS 285-6. Identified by Aiyaswami Sastri (1950) p. 104, 106.

⁴ *Sāṃkhyakramadīpikā* 43. See LVP p. 455 fn. 1.

⁵ T. *ma lus par*. Read *ma lus pa'i*?

such as atoms is established authoritatively. Thus he says:

Furthermore, others assert that this earth, fire, water, etc. is the eternal transformation of awareness¹ and the nature of that is the self. Nothing endowed with the characteristic of the apprehensible exists here² Therefore everything is properly perceived³ as this transformation of consciousness.⁴

455.16 But the proponents of a person (*puḍgalavādin*), heretics moving within [our own ranks], consider the self called⁵ "the person," to be inexpressible as identical to and different from the psycho-physical groups. Otherwise there would be a view conceptually attached to the systems of the heretics. And in regard to this he says,

And some others declare themselves to be sons of the Sugata.⁶

456.2 How would the self be the object of the notion "I" since it does not appear there in its own-nature. How then does the self appear as the notion "I"?⁷ it is asked.⁸ Therefore it is settled: this is a mere conception⁹; it arises without an object.

456.5 Now, the Sāṃkhyas and others, proponents of a self whose essential nature is consciousness, not allowing the repudiation of the six consciousnesses as the self declare, "The self is described by us as the awareness of sound etc. whose nature is consciousness. How then can one speak of the negation of this [awareness] as the

1 TS 328 reads *nityajñāna* 'eternal awareness.' T. *rtaḡ dañ śes pa* ?

2 T. *'dod na* 'if one accepts'.

3 TS 329 reads *samīkṣyate* glossed as *vyavasīyante* 'ascertained.'

4 TS 328-9. Identified by Aiyaswami Sastri (1950) pp. 106, 104.

5 T. does not translate *-nāmānaḡ* 'called.'

6 TS 336. Identified by Aiyaswami Sastri (1950) p. 104.

7 T. *ñar 'dzin pa'i śes pa'i yul du* 'as the object of the notion "I".'

8 T. does not translate *ity ucyate* 'it is asked.'

9 T. *snan̄ bar rtog pa tsam* 'mere conception in regard to appearance' ?

self?"¹ The follower of the definitive system having taken into consideration the intent of the opponent, drawing out the consequences, says:

61ab. If it were awareness of sound² then sound would be apprehended at all times.

456.10 But if the nature of the self were awareness of sound, since that [self] is eternal, awareness of sound would be eternal. Then sound also at all times, eternally, both at the time of its presence and its absence, would be apprehended since that whose essential nature is the apprehension of sound would continue to exist at all times, [both] at the time of the existence and non-existence of that. Otherwise its being eternal would be vitiated. It is thus. [To this objection] he says:

61cd. But without a cognisable object what does it know on account of which it is spoken of as awareness?

456.16 Only awareness is determined as eternal.³ But because sound is intermittent its existence⁴ is not always manifest. And therefore, at the time of the non-existence of that, without a cognisable object, without an object, what does it, that awareness, know, cognise. The word "but"⁵ occurs in sense characteristic of a question concerning the time of non-existence. On account of which cognisable object, though empty, awareness is spoken of⁶, is named? It is called "awareness" because it knows a cognisable object. This is the intent: Since that is absent in what

¹ T. *'di'i 'dod pas 'gegs* 'negation by accepting this'.

² T. *gal te sgra ye śes rtag na* 'if awareness of sound were eternal'.

³ T. *śes bya ñid ni bdag tu ñe bar gnas pa yin* 'only the cognizable object is determined as the self' (?).

⁴ T. does not translate *sattā*.

⁵ T. *gañ gi sgras ni* 'the word "what".'

⁶ T. adds *ji ltar* 'in what way'.

way is there awareness? He says just that:

**62ab. If the unaware is awareness it follows that a stick¹
is awareness.**

457.7 If even that which does not know an object is spoken of as **awareness** then it follows that a stick whose essential nature is unaware is **awareness** for nothing is transgressed by that whereby it would not be consciousness. And it is not so. Therefore just as a stick² because of the absence of thorough knowledge of an object is not awareness neither is anything else. Thus he says:

**62cd. Therefore it is certain that there is no awareness
without a proximate cognisable object.**

457.13 **Therefore**, because there is no awareness without an object, it is absolutely **certain**, that there is no awareness, awareness is not found, without a **proximate cognisable object** because of dependence on it. Without a proximate, located in a congruent position, **cognisable object**, apprehensible object.³

457.17 That may be so but awareness of sound is not without a proximate cognisable object because sound is not always existent but rather it is not apprehended at times because of its intermittent manifestation. Therefore the difficulty spoken of does not follow. [Commentator] This is not the case because, insofar as what one

1 T. *śinī yañ* 'even a stick.'

2 T. does not translate *kāṣṭha*; perhaps *cinī* should read *śinī*.

3 The commentary here indicates that *jñānaṃ* 'awareness' is qualified by the bahuvrīhi compound *asamnihitajñeyaṃ* 'awareness without a proximate cognisable object.'

calls the manifest form, determinable by this awareness, is not always a proximate object its non-apprehender¹ is described as unawareness.² But [we] do not wish to say that sound is always existent or non-existent. Rather, to the very extent that awareness is sometimes not the apprehender, the thing to be established [by us] is established. Therefore, it is established that awareness is not an apprehender inasmuch as it is without a proximate cognisable object. Given the understanding that an apprehensible object of awareness, whatever its form, is not present at all times how can the difficulty spoken of not follow? We do not say that sound does not exist at all times through fear of the going into details³ of that.

458.9 Moreover, if knowing sound itself is the self, since its nature is the apprehension of that it would not apprehend form. This is not the case because the same [awareness] is considered the apprehender of form. To this he says, if the same knows form ...

63ab. If the same knows form why does it not also hear at that time?

458.13 If it is accepted that the same, the awareness of sound, knows form, why does it not also hear at that time? At that time, the time it apprehends form, why does it not also⁴ hear? Why does it not apprehend sound as well since

¹ See LVP p. 458 fn. 3.

² T. *gañ gi phyir śes pa gañ gis yoñs su gcad par bya ba'i nio bo gsal ba źes brjod la der rtag tu ñe ba ma yin pa'i yul yin pas 'dzin par byed pa śes pa ma yin brjod par bya'o* 'Because, insofar as the object of that awareness which determines an entity described as manifest is not always proximate, the apprehender is described as unawareness.'

³ T. *gzun mañs pa'i jigs pas* 'through fear of an extensive treatise.'

⁴ T. does not translate *api* 'also.'

it is awareness of sound. ¹But it would only apprehend it if it were proximate. [It does not apprehend it] only because of non-proximity. There is no difficulty. Supposing the answer of the opponent, he says, if (one says) because ...

63cd. If [one says] because of the non-proximity of sound, then that awareness is also non-existent.

459.2 If one explains thus that there would be no apprehending because of the non-proximity, non-congruence of location, of sound which has become an object, then that awareness, then, therefore² in that case, because of the non-proximity of sound that awareness, awareness of sound, is also non-existent, is not found. There is then not that same awareness of sound, is the meaning.

459.6 Moreover if there is awareness of sound, then that whose nature is the apprehension of form is not tenable. Hence³ he says, how does ...

64ab. How does that whose nature is apprehending sound apprehend form?

459.9 How does that whose nature is apprehending sound, whose essential nature is the apprehension of sound, that is to say, the apprehender of sound, apprehend form? That awareness which apprehends form is [awareness] whose nature is apprehending form. In no way whatever would it [apprehend form] because it is impossible for what is single without parts to have two natures. [Opponent] But in the same way that someone may be father in regard to one and son in regard to

¹ Lacuna in T. T. resumes p. 459.4

² T. lacuna ends.

³ T. *bstan pa'i phyir* 'to explain this'.

another, so too in regard to the point under discussion what is single will have two natures. Hence he says, **one is imagined ...**

64cd. **One [person] is imagined as father and son but not according to reality.**

459.16 **One [person] is imagined as father, the producer, and son. the produced.** But he is so determined by conceptualisation, **but not according to reality**, not however in terms of the absolute. Only one essential nature [is said to have] both natures on account of a designation¹ attributed by conceptualisation, however what is only one in that way is not given various names because it has separate forms.² Two substantial natures belonging to both³ may be applied to one but that is in no way consistent because of the consequent twoness of an entity insofar as it has two separate natures. Therefore that does not have the characteristics of an example of something single with two substantial natures. And what is conceptual is inappropriate to the topic under discussion. Thus [your objection] is worthless.

460.9 And hence this designation⁴ is not absolute. Hence⁵ he says, **because *sattva*, *rajas* ...**

¹ T. does not translate *vyapadeśāt* 'on account of a designation.'

² T. *gzugs* i.e. father and son are one in bodily form; the distinction is purely conceptual.

³ T. does not translate *ubhaya*. 'both.'

⁴ T. does not translate *vyapadeśa* 'designation.'

⁵ T. *žes bstan pa'i phyir* 'to show this'.

65ab. Because *sattva*, *rajas* and also *tamas* are neither father nor son.

460.12 Certainly¹ this must be accepted by you. For in Sāṃkhya doctrine the one² universe has three primary qualities. As a consequence the combination *sattva*, *rajas* and also *tamas*³ has the sense of a collection. **Because**, on account of the fact that, these primary qualities are fixed in their own essential natures individually or collectively, they are neither father nor son in absolute terms. Always it is only the primary qualities that exist. This is the meaning: Whatever primary qualities characterised as *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are in the son state it is just those that attain existence as the producer [i.e., the father]. Because of that their essential natures are not different at a former and later time. Therefore having regard to those [times] they are called father and son but there is no difference between them. Therefore this is simply conceptual conventional expression.

461.1 And if, even at the time of apprehending form, that single awareness had the nature of apprehending sound then the essential nature of that [sound] would be perceived. But it is not perceived. Therefore it does not have the nature of apprehending that. Thus he says, **but the essential nature ...**

65cd. **But the essential nature endowed with apprehension of sound is not seen by that.**

461.6 The word "but" in the sense of describing a distinction. **The essential nature**

¹ T. does not translate *avaśyaṃ*. 'certainly.'

² T does not translate *eka* 'one.'

³ *sattva* 'purity,' *rajas* 'activity,' *tamas* 'darkness.'

endowed, connected, with apprehension of sound is not seen, is not perceived, by that awareness that apprehends form. Hence it is ascertained that at that time it does not have the nature of apprehending sound.

461.9 This may be so but even if it is not perceived it is, nevertheless, just that. To the question, "How then does it apprehend form?", he says, the same ...

66ab. The same [awareness] in another form¹ like a dancer.
He too is not eternal.

461.12 The same awareness of sound in another form, nature, consisting of apprehension of form. "Apprehends form" is the rest. In what way does it conform?² Like a dancer. Just as a dancer on the stage at the time of dancing is one yet assumes various forms so it is in regard to the topic under discussion. Thus there is no difficulty. To this he says, "He too is not eternal." Impermanent, he enters another form by abandoning his former nature. And a dancer, because of connection³ with various forms, does not have one and the same nature at a former and later time. Otherwise one would say⁴ that that [dancer] has two forms at once. Thus the example⁵ is deficient as regards the thing to be established.

462.3 That may be so but, it is the same being (*bhāva*), but its nature (*svabhāva*) arises and ceases in succession. Therefore this is without fault. To this he says, if the same ...

1 T. *tshul* 'manner.'

2 T. *chos mthun pas chos mthun pa* ?

3 T. does not translate *sambandha* 'connection.'

4 T. *sems la snañ bar 'gyur ro* 'would appear in the mind.' Perhaps T. reads *citi* or *cet(as)i bhāseta* in place of *ceti bhāseta*.

5 T. *dpe ltar snañ ba = dṛṣṭāntābhāsa* 'false example.'

66cd. If the same has a different nature it is an unprecedented singularity for that.

462.7 If, in case that, the same self or dancer has a different nature, another nature, then it is an unprecedented singularity for that. An unprecedented singularity for that, such as has not been seen before. A singularity of that being, a not different self identity despite the arising of another nature. For so it is: "The same" proclaims identity but "has a different nature" [proclaims] the otherness of that very [thing]. This possession of two mutually contradictory qualities by one thing is not tenable. For being is not other than nature such that being would not have the two [i.e., arising and perishing] although there are arising and cessation of that [nature]. Nor is it tenable for a being to remain in the same condition on the arising and perishing of a nature not different to it because of the consequence of the non-existence of non-difference (*abheda*) Or if there is difference there is no establishing the connection [between being and nature]. This is the sense.

462.16 This may be so. Indeed there may be this consequence if the two natures of this self were real, but having excluded its own nature, the other nature is unreal. Therefore there is not the spoken of fault. Supposing this intent, he says, **if the other nature ...**

67ab. If the other nature is unreal, please tell us its own nature.

463.4 If, in case that, the other nature¹ is unreal, lacking essential nature², like a crystal stone possessing the attribute of its object then please tell us its own nature.

¹ T. *gzugs* 'form.'

² T. *'di gcig pa yin* 'is single.'

Please tell us its own, pertaining to essential nature, nature, reality, of that self. Indeed that has another nature. What is it? If it is awareness ...

67cd. If it is awareness then it follows that all men are identical.

463.9 Indeed the selfhood of awareness continues to exist in former and later time of that.¹ Of what other innate nature can one speak? ²If it is said it is single despite the connection of other natures with that nature at former and later times as in the case of a crystal it thus follows that all men are identical because that [self] has a common nature with awareness. All beings [are identical] in the same way that awareness of sound and form at former and later times is identical [as awareness] despite the difference because of the different modes. The single selfhood of the family of living creatures follows³, results, because of the absence of distinction despite difference as entities (*vastutas*).

463.11 And, moreover, because in this way this extreme consequence follows, he says, and consciousness ...

68ab. And consciousness and unconsciousness would be identical because their existence is the same.

464.2 The word "and" in the sense of adding another difficulty. Or if, differently, having rejected distinction whose basis is difference one speaks of identity based on some mode then consciousness, the quality of men, and unconsciousness, the quality of

¹ T. adds *ni de'i gñug ma'i ran b'zin can* (P. om. *can*) '[continuing to exist in former and later time of that] is the innate nature of that.'

² Lacuna begins in Sanskrit text.

³ End of lacuna in Sanskrit text.

Primary Nature etc., even they would be one undifferentiated entity¹. How? Because, the reason being, **their, consciousness' and unconsciousness', existence is the same.** And that [existence] is the innate nature² of existents³. **The same: equal for both.**

464.7 But identity whose basis is similarity is accepted even in regard to this, even if there is difference as an entity. Therefore because of establishing what is desired this is without difficulty. In response he says, **and when distinction...**

68cd. **And when distinction is false what then is the basis of similarity?**

464.10 The word "and" in the sense of bringing another difficulty to light. **When,** because all existents are not determined [as having different natures], **distinction, difference, is false, unreal - only innate nature is real - what then would be the basis of similarity?** On what basis is similarity determined? For if distinction exists there would be similarity on account of the merest sharing of qualities and if distinction does not exist there would not be that same similarity. For without experiencing the distinction of a cow and Gayal ox there would not be the similarity of a cow and Gayal ox, but rather there would only be a cow. Hence distinction is the basis of similarity. And when that is not absolute **what then would be the basis, causal basis, of similarity,** sameness of form of men or anything else. Nothing at all, is the meaning. Hence identity occurs only as entities; for you it is not created by similarity. Then how can it be said that [your thesis] is without fault because of establishing an established point [because you have to

¹ T. *gcig ciñ tha dad pa med pa'i dños por 'gyur ro* 'being one, would be an undifferentiated entity.'

² T. *gzugs* 'form.'

³ T. *de dag ... yod pa ste /bdog pa de yañ dños po rnams kyi gñug ma'i gzugs su mtshuñs* '...both those exist. And that existence is the same as the innate nature of existents.'

admit that there is no real distinction].

465.6 Thus the non-establishment of the self whose essential nature is consciousness imagined by the followers of Kapila and Jaiminī. Also this is the fault which is to be stated in regard to what is imagined by the followers of the Upaniṣads and others.

465.6 Now, to negate the conventionally real self imagined by the Nyāyas and others, he says, **and unconsciousness is...**

69ab. And unconsciousness is not "I" because it is insentient like a piece of cloth etc.

465.12 To begin with, it is not tenable that the self is consciousness in the way declared. And neither is it tenable that unconsciousness is "I", is the meaning of the word "and". Why? **Because it is insentient**, because of the absence of sentience. It is **unconsciousness** because it does not have consciousness. Its state (*bhāva*) is insentience.¹ Because of that, because of its unconsciousness, is the meaning. In what way? **Like a piece of cloth etc.** Just as a piece of cloth, tree, mountain etc. because it is devoid of consciousness is not the self so neither is what is accepted [as by "I"] because of the acceptance [of the self] as action, actor etc. Otherwise that has no purpose at all. Nor is that tenable of unconsciousness as in the case of a piece of cloth etc.²

466.3 Even if that is itself unconscious nevertheless it is conscious through the consciousness of intellect³. Therefore this is without fault. Suggesting this to be

¹ The commentary explains that the abstract noun corresponding to *acetana* is *ācāitanya*. It is explained that the vṛddhi form applies to both 'a' and 'e' of '*acetana*' resulting in '*ācāitanya*' as in the word '*pāralaukika*' etc. This is not translated in T.

² T. *sems med pa yan der rigs pa ma yin te* 'Nor is unconsciousness tenable of that.'

³ T. *blo'i sems kyis sems dan ldan par byed de* 'made conscious by the consciousness of intellect.'

intention of the opponent, he says, but if it is aware...

69cd. **But is it aware because of union with consciousness?**¹

It follows that [when] unaware it is destroyed.

466.7 "But" in the sense of a question. **But is this self aware despite itself being unconscious because of union with intellect, because of conjunction with consciousness? Because it knows it is "aware." It follows, when one accepts that to be such, that [when] unaware it is destroyed.** Whenever consciousness has ceased in a drunken or stupefied² condition this self, unaware, knows nothing at all. At that time because of giving up the nature connected with the previous consciousness **it follows that it is destroyed, utterly destroyed.**

466.13 There is not this fault because it has one nature both at the time of connection with consciousness and non-connection. Supposing this thought of the opponent, he says, **but if ...**

70ab. **But if the self is quite unchanged what is done to it by consciousness?**

466.16 **But if the self is quite unchanged** on the arising and cessation of consciousness, that is, the self's essential nature has not arisen or ceased, then, if it so, **what is done to it by consciousness? What is done by consciousness,** by conjunction with intellect, to it, the self, which unconscious exists unchanged at all times? What surplus is accomplished? None. The self is simply unconscious³ because its former nature remains unchanged and just the same despite conjunction with intellect.

¹ T. *sems dan ldan pa'i phyir* 'because of possessing consciousness.'

² T. *brgyal ba la sogs pa* 'stupefied etc.'

³ T. *sems dan bcas pa ñid yin no* 'simply conscious.'

467.5 If it so, what have you accomplished? In response, he says, **unaware and without ...**

70cd. **Unaware and without activity thus, space is accepted as the self.**

467.7 **Unaware:** unable to know anything beneficial or disadvantageous; **without activity:** being free of, outside of, activity, it is without activity. That is devoid of any reaction, untransformed insofar as another extra is added to it.¹ Alternatively, because space, deficient in capacity for any action² or void of the activity of going etc., is inappropriate to the topic under discussion, it is like space. Being thus, the determination is caused to be made, [of space] as selfhood, as having the essential nature of the self. And this is the application according to our doctrine: Just as space, void of all activity insofar as it is without essential nature, has mere nominal existence, so too does the self. This is the meaning. Or according to the doctrine of the opponent: Just as space does not have³ the nature of action, act etc. because it is unconscious and without activity neither does the self. This is the sense.⁴

467.16 Now again raising^zan impediment which negates the self in another way by means of the opponent's doctrine, he says, **if without self ...**

¹ T. *bya rgyu thams cad la khyad par mi byed pa* 'does not make a difference in any endeavour' ?

² T. *lus*. Read *las*.

³ T. 'does have.'

⁴ T. does not translate *tathātmāpīti bhāva*. 'likewise also the self.'

71ab. If without self connection of action and result is not tenable.

467.19 If there were no one belonging to the other world then, **without**, in the absence of that **self** which goes to the other world **connection of action and result is untenable**. Action is wholesome and unwholesome; and the **result** of that is characterised as wanted and unwanted¹. The **connection** of those two or the **connection** of action done with its result. [You say,] "Only the one who has done the action partakes of the result, no one else."² It is **not tenable**, does not hold yet the connection of cause and result in the other world is accepted. And even the sugatas do not dispute that.

468.6 And so the sūtra³: "Who else but the one who has done the action will experience in return [the result]? For, monks, actions done and accumulated will not mature in the earth element, nor in the water element, nor in the fire element, nor in the air element, only in the appropriated psycho-physical constituents, elements, domains of cognition" and so on. And it is said:

Actions do not perish even in hundreds of kotis of kalpas; assuredly, having reached the assemblage [of conditions] and time, they bear fruit for beings.⁴

Therefore the connection of action and result is not rejected even by you. Therefore a self is certainly to be assented to. Otherwise all this would be inconsistent.

468.15 How does the connection of action and result hold if the self does not exist? Asking this, he says, **for when ...**

¹ T. *'bras bu ni de ñid 'dod pa dañ mi 'dod pa yin no* 'The result is the same, as wanted and unwanted.'

² T. adds *de cis 'thad pa yin* 'by what is that possible'.

³ *Divyāvadāna* p. 54 and elsewhere. LVP p. 468 fn. 2.

⁴ *Divyāvadāna* p. 504 etc. See LVP p. 468 fn. 5.

71cd. For when, having performed action, one has perished, whose will be the result?

469.2 **For when, because, having performed action, having generated action characterised as wholesome and unwholesome one, the doer of the action, has perished, has ceased, whose will be the fruit because of the non-existence of anyone going to the other world if the self is non-existent? Since, being momentary the moment of consciousness which has performed the action ceases at the time of doing that action, whose will be the performed action's result consisting of happiness or suffering in a good form of existence or in an evil form of existence? [For whom] will it arise? It would be no one's. Because of the arising in the other world of someone else endowed with the result of the very action done there would be the destruction of what has been done and obtainment of what has not been done. And this is the implication: Nor would there be memory, recognition, uncertainty, ascertainment, reclamation of that which one has oneself entrusted [to somebody], cessation of curiosity about a seen object, state of result and cause, means of knowledge for understanding that, bondage, liberation etc. If¹, in the case, it is accepted, that is not tenable. To this he says, **when for both ...****

72ab. When for both of us it is established that action and result have different supports ...

469.14 **When for both of us, for you espousing a self and for me espousing non-self, it is established, ascertained. As to what is established, he says, that action and result have different supports. Action is activity in this existence; its result is in the other world. They have different supports: it is established that they have various**

¹ Referring to Verse 71a.

foundations. For so it is: It is not with the same body¹ that one performs an action in this birth and, having passed on [to the next world] experiences its result. Hence the performer of the action is one and the experiencer of the result is other than that one. Hence action and result have different supports. About this we have no disagreement.

470.4 This² may be so but without the function of the self there would not be those same states of actor and experiencer. To this he says,

72cd. And since [you say] the self is functionless in regard to those, isn't controversy about it pointless?

470.7 The self is functionless, devoid of function, in regard to those, in regard to performing action and experiencing a result because it is without activity and unconscious. Because it is eternal it has no capability for action anywhere.³ Which is stated:

One speaks of the state of actor of him who is in connection with mere awareness etc.; the coming together of knowing with happiness and suffering etc. is the state of experiencer.⁴

470.12 Nor, in the way spoken of, is that consistent with an essential nature unchanged at a former and later time. For this reason **controversy**, dispute, **about it**, a functionless self, is **pointless**, fruitless, since what is accepted is inappropriate in regard to this. "Isn't" in a vocative sense in regard to the opponent.

¹ T. *lus dag gis* Read *lus gañ gis*.

² T. reads *etad* with *ātma-* 'without the function of this self.'

³ T. *bdag byed pa ñid ni sems pa med pa'i phyir dan / rtag pa'i phyir gañ la yañ byed pa la nus pa yod pa ma yin no* 'The self without action, because it is unconscious and because it is eternal has no capability for action anywhere.'

⁴ TS 176. Identified by Aiyaswami Sastri (1950) p. 104.

470.16 But if there were no self how then would there not be the fault of the destruction of what has been done etc? Therefore that controversy is not pointless. To this he says, **the possessor of ...**

**73ab. The possessor of the cause connected to the result:
this possibility is not seen.**

471.1 **The possessor of the cause, the one who is endowed with action, the same one connected to the result, bound to the result: this possibility, [a possibility] such as this, is not seen, is not perceived because one dies in the world, another is born. Therefore the possessor of the cause is not seen to have connection with the result.**

471.5 How then is the statement, "Who else but the one who has done the action will experience in return [the result]"¹ ascertained? To this he says, **on the basis ...**

**73cd. On the basis of singleness of continuum "actor" and
"experiencer" have been taught.**

471.8 **On the basis of singleness of continuum** characterised by a series of many successive moments functioning as the state of effect and cause; on account of a unity attributed by force of attachment of the world to what is many, **"actor" and "experiencer" have been taught.** And although it is taught, "he alone who does an action experiences its result," it is explained by the Blessed One by force of a provisional intention lest people suppose the annihilation of action and result. But, to that extent, the existence² of one continuing to exist both worlds is not taught. And hence on this very point it is said, "Only in the appropriated psycho-physical constituents, elements, domains

¹ Above p. 486.6.

² T. *sems can* 'a being [entering both worlds]'.

of cognition do [actions] mature." And likewise in accordance with the statement, "Intention (*cetanā*) is action; having intended is action."¹ This is said:

The variety of the world is born of action; that is intention and what is done by that. Intention is action belonging to the mind, actions of body and speech born of that.²

And elsewhere it is said,

The world of beings and the container-like world in their extreme variety are fashioned by mind alone. For the entire universe is said to be born of action and, disregarding mind, there is no action.³

472.8 Therefore there is not another action, free of mind. And that ceasing, having generated a wholesome or unwholesome attitude, deposits a latent impression, a particular formative force which is wholesome, unwholesome etc., at the moment of mind appropriated by [the act] itself. And that [act] becoming a particular transformation in which latency is deposited by that [act] functioning in a continuum through the uninterrupted succession of moments conditioned by that [latency] one after another, produces a result consisting of mind in the other world, its nature happy etc., of such a kind that is conformable to the particular action.⁴ Just as earth, seed etc. occur in the first moment because of the extra effect obtained on account of special conditions meeting each other; arise to greater extent successively to that through generating qualities corresponding to the generation of a result in the second mass of moments appropriated by [the act] itself; bring about the culminating point characterised as the final moment, through a specific transformation in the continuum; and generate a "nigellica indica" or

¹ MMK 17 2.

² AKBh IV 1. LVP p. 472 fn. 1. Quoted by Prajñākaramati on p. 99.

³ MA VI 89. Identified by LVP *le Muséon* (1911) p. 245. For other occurrences see *ibid.*

⁴ T. *žes brjod do.*

grain sprout conforming to the seed. And in the way a sown seed such as sweet lime, pervaded by the juice of lac, produces the red colours in its flowers etc. through the manifestation of the series of its formative forces. And in that there is not a single one continuing to exist in both former and later time. And because the determination of that as equal to wholesome and unwholesome is by conceptualisation its mention is not logical. That is said:

Only in that continuum in which the latent impression was implanted does the result take effect, like red colour in cotton.

473.12 Therefore just as, even despite the absence of self, in the case of seeds etc. a result strictly determined and the arising of that in turn occurs, so also in regard to the topic under discussion, even without an individual going to the other world, because the existence of cause and effect is fixed, the result is strictly determined. Receiving the result in the other world is spoken of because of the uninterrupted functioning of the continuum conditioned by defilement and action. Thus neither meeting with an unperformed [action] nor destruction of a not performed [action] is an obstacle. Therefore the connection of action and result without a self is not illogical.

474.3 It would be prolix to talk elaborately about how, if a self exists, that [connection of cause and result] does not hold, so it is not proceeded with here.

474.5 And he says:

There is no self, only the psycho-physical groups conditioned by defilement and action. In continuity from the intermediate state one enters the womb like [a flame] does a lamp.¹

474.8 Entityness in itself is negated by those proponents of a person because they

¹ AK III 18. Identified by Aiyaswami Sastri (1950) p. 106.

accept a postulate [concerning the person] that repudiates identity with and difference from [the psycho-physical constituents]. For an entity does not go beyond the mode of identity and difference because if one alternative is rejected the other is necessarily affirmed in the case of two mutually exclusive [alternatives]. Also the *Bhārahāra* and other sūtras are clear on this matter: "Therefore it is imagined by those not knowing the intended teaching of the Blessed One but it does not exist as an entity. If it is accepted as an entity there is no otherness. Thus by the negation of the self [the person] is [also] negated." Therefore it is not specially negated.

474.15 And this is said by the Blessed One: "For there is, monks, action, there is result but an actor is not perceived who casts off these psycho-physical groups and appropriates other psycho-physical groups apart from the conventional terms of the Dharma. In regard to this, this is the conventional terms of the Doctrine: 'When this occurs that arises; from the arising of this that arises.'"¹

475.1 By this the existence of effect and cause is also shown by the Blessed One to be characterised by the mere principle of conditionship. By the words, "And this continuum is single," it is indicated that its nature is not further defined in accord with conventional expression because by the expression "continuum" the mere principle of conditionship is accepted. Otherwise there would be no continuum! Therefore the faults inherent in a substantially existent effect and cause do not apply. And just this is said by the Venerable Teacher²:

Everything is powerless [it is objected]. But if the power seen in sprouts etc. from seeds etc. is accepted conventionally: let it be so anyhow.³

¹ Quoted TSP p. 11.

² i.e., Dharmakīrti.

³ *Pramāṇavārttika Pratyakṣapariccheda* 4. Identified by Tripathi (1989) p. 440.

475.9 And the non-existence of memory is negated through the strict determining of the relation of cause and effect. Because of the non-existence of a self, a continuing individual no one remembering exists in this world, but there is¹ only remembering alone by force of attribution and its object which is being remembered. And in this there is no inconsistency despite the non-existence of one remembering: A seed of memory is deposited in the continuum of consciousness when a thing is experienced. Because of that, at another time, the effect called "remembering" arises on account of maturing in the continuum². Recognition etc. should be looked at in the same way. ³Out of fear of excessive length they are not individually discussed here. The justification of that must be considered at length elsewhere.⁴

476.1 All this is established by means of conventional truth. But in the absolute, because all *dharmas* are without essential nature and all dichotomising conceptualisation ceases, nothing arises or ceases,⁵ or has self or is without self. Nor, on investigation, is there any action or result of that⁶, neither this world or other world, because [they are] created by conceptualisation. Therefore all this, resembling a reflection, arises and ceases without essential nature and is described as cause and effect, with self and without self, permanent and impermanent. And like a dream, there is action and actor, experiencing the result of that, this world, the other world and going to good and evil forms of existence, because of not dispelling conceptualisation. Thus all is well established. Which will be explained⁷:

¹ T. 'there is not.'

² T. does not translate *saṃtati* 'continuum.'

³ T. starts *de ltar na* 'thus.'

⁴ T. *de bsgrubs pa ni gžan du rgyas par bśad pas der go bar bya'o* 'The accomplishment of that having been taught elsewhere, is to be understood there.'

⁵ T. adds *rgyu dan 'bras bu* 'cause and effect'. Cf. 486.6.

⁶ T. does not translate *tat* 'that.'

⁷ Verses 150-1.

Thus there is no cessation and there is no existence in reality¹. And therefore this whole universe is unborn and not ceased. Forms of existence, on examination, are similar to a dream, same as a plantain ...

And it is said:

Independent actor and action are declared by you in terms of conventional expression but their existence in mutual dependence is maintained by you. No actor is there, no experiencer is there, merit and demerit are born dependently. O Lord of Speech you have declared that whatever is dependent is not born.²

477.1 How all *dharmas* are without self and the non-contradiction with the connection between action and result, and absence of essential nature and how there is no contradiction of all³ seen *dharmas* is taught in the *Pitāputrasamāgama*⁴: This is said: "The Blessed One said, 'Just so, Great King, the spiritually immature, untutored ordinary person having seen forms with the eye believes them to represent happiness; believing in them he becomes attached; attached he feels passion; feeling passion he performs action born of passion⁵ - three kinds by body, four types by speech, [three types by mind]⁶. And that action performed is from the very beginning injured, obstructed, separated, changed, does not abide relying on the eastern direction, nor on the southern, nor on the western, nor on the northern, nor up, nor down, nor the semi-cardinal points, is not here, not going across, not in between both. But at another time when the time of death is near, when the vital power ceases because of the complete exhaustion of the span of life because the action [karma] corresponding to that is exhausted, when the final consciousness is

¹ IX 150 *sarvadā* and T. *rtaḡ tu* 'always.'

² *Catuḡstava* II (*Lokāṡitastava*) 8-9. Identified by Aiyaswami Sastri (1950) p. 104.

³ T. does not translate *sarva*.

⁴ ŚS p. 252.10. Identified as ŚS p. 250.10 by LVP p. 477 fn. 2.

⁵ T. *gti mug* 'delusion.'

⁶ T. *yid kyis mam pa gsum*. ŚS includes. Cf. LVP p. 477 fn. 4.

ceasing that [action] becomes the object of mind ceasing with its final consciousness just as a beautiful woman of the country does to one awakening from sleep. For so it is¹, Great King, the initial consciousness relating to birth arises having two conditions: the final consciousness as dominant and action as its objective support whether [it is born]² in the hells, or in the womb of an animal, or in the world of the lord of death, in the body of a demi-god, or among men, or among gods. And immediately the initial consciousness belonging to birth has ceased as the immediately preceding [condition], the corresponding continuum of mind arises where the experience of maturation is known. Therein, for the cessation of final consciousness, there is the designation 'fall'; for the manifestation of initial consciousness [the designation] 'arising'. Thus, Great King, no dharma at all goes from this world to the other world. Fall and arising are known. And that final consciousness arising does not come from anywhere; ceasing it does not go anywhere. Action too, arising does not come from anywhere; ceasing does not go anywhere. Initial consciousness too, arising does not come from anywhere; ceasing does not go anywhere. What is the reason for that? Because [they are] devoid of essential nature: final consciousness is empty of final consciousness; action is empty of action, initial consciousness is empty of initial consciousness; fall is empty of fall; arising is empty of arising. Yet the fruitfulness of actions is known and there is the experience of maturation. Therein there is neither actor nor experiencer apart from the conventional name," and so on. And in the same way one may speak of the conditioning of action by hatred and delusion respectively.

479.6 Also it is said in the *Śālistambasūtra*: "Furthermore, not understanding and wrong understanding of reality are unknowing, i.e., ignorance. When ignorance exists in this way three kinds of formative forces result: conducive to merit; conducive to demerit;

¹ T. *de la*.

² T. *skye bar 'gyur*.

conducive to immovability. These are called formative forces conditioned by ignorance. From formative forces conducive to merit only consciousness conducive to merit arises; from formative forces conducive to demerit only consciousness conducive to demerit arises; from formative forces conducive to immovability only consciousness conducive to immovability arises. This is called consciousness conditioned by formative forces. The same for name-and-form conditioned by consciousness. By the development of name-and-form, through the six domains of consciousness actions to accomplish function. This is called the six domains of consciousness conditioned by name-and-form. From the six domains of consciousness the six contact groups come forth. This is called contact conditioned by the six domains of consciousness. Whatever group contact belongs to, sensation comes forth belonging to that group. This is called sensation conditioned by contact. When one feels these, relishes them especially¹, delights in them, grasps at them and stays therein², that is called craving conditioned by sensation. Relishing, delighting, settlement after careful deliberation, earnestly desiring more and more for their non abandonment thinking³, 'May there be no separation from forms dear and pleasurable to me.' That is called appropriation conditioned by craving. Earnestly desiring thus, one sets up by body, speech and mind actions that generate rebirth. That is called becoming conditioned by clinging. The actualisation⁴ of the five psycho-physical groups issuing from these acts is what is called birth conditioned by becoming. The destruction which occurs because of accumulation and maturation of the psycho-physical groups actualised by birth, that is called decay and death conditioned by birth ... Therein consciousness, having the nature of a seed, is a cause; action, having the nature of a field, is a cause;

¹ T. *tshor ba'i bye brag de dag myoñ ba* 'relishes the various sensations' *tān vedanāviśeṣān āsvādayati* MV 565.4 *tān vedanān viśeṣenāsvādayati*. T. *tshor ba'i bye brag de dag myoñ ba*.

² T. *lhag par žen nas 'dug pa adhyavasāya tiṣṭhati* = MV p. 565.4 'having grasped remains.'

³ T. *sñam du yoñs su mi gtoñ bar phyir žiñ smon pa*.

⁴ T. does not translate *abhinirvṛtti* 'actualisation.'

ignorance and craving, having the nature of defilement, is a cause. ¹ Action and defilements generate the seed, consciousness. Of those, action does the cultivation of the field of the consciousness seed, thirst moistens the consciousness seed, ignorance sows the consciousness seed. Without these conditions the consciousness seed is not actualised. Therein it does not occur to action, 'I do the cultivation of the field of the consciousness seed.' Nor does it occur to thirst, 'I moisten the consciousness field.' Nor does it occur to ignorance, 'I sow the consciousness seed.' Nor does it occur to the consciousness seed, 'I am generated by these conditions.' Nevertheless, the consciousness seed located in the field of action, damp with the moisture of thirst, sown by ignorance grows up. The actualisation of the sprout of name-and-form occurs. And this sprout of name-and-form is not self-made, not made by another, not made by both, not created by God, not transformed by time, does not depend on a single cause, nor is it arisen without a cause. But because of union of mother and father, the concurrence of the mother's time and the concurrence of other conditions, the seed consciousness possessed of relishing² actualises the sprout of name-and-form in such and such a mother's womb by birth.³ This is because causes and conditions are not lacking even when *dharmas* are without master, 'mine', possession or claimant, are like space, their nature characterised by illusion Therein no *dharma* at all passes over from this world to the other world yet there is the result of action and there is recognition because causes and conditions are not lacking Just as a fire does not ignite because of lack of fuel and ignites because fuel is not lacking, so the seed of consciousness generated by action and defilement actualises the sprout of name-and-form in such and such a mother's womb on reconstitution in a domain of birth. This is because causes and conditions are not lacking even when *dharmas* are without master, 'mine', possession or claimant, are like space, their nature having illusion as its

¹ T. *de la* 'therein.'

² T. *myoñ ba dañ ldan pa*, ŚS *anupraviddha*, MV *anuviddha*.

³ T. *skye ba'i gnas ñiñ mtshams sbyor ba* = *upapattiyātanapratisaṃdhi* See below 482.3.

character. One should see thus the linking of conditions of internal conditioned arising.

482.8 "Therein, internal conditioned arising should be seen with five aspects. What are those five? Non-permanence, non-annihilation, not passing over, arising of a great result from a small cause, and a continuation similar to that [cause]. In what way non-permanence? Because some psycho-physical constituents become manifest which end in death, others which take part in birth. However those psycho-physical constituents which become manifest which end in death are not the same as those which take part in birth. Hence non-permanence. How non-annihilation? The psycho-physical constituents which take part in birth do not become manifest when the psycho-physical constituents which end in death have already ceased nor when they have not ceased. Rather, the psycho-physical constituents which end in death cease and at that very time the psycho-physical constituents which take part in birth become manifest. It is like the rise and fall of the arm of a balance scale. How not passing over? Because the class of beings [among whom one can be born] is dissimilar, non-corresponding psycho-physical constituents arise in different births. Hence not passing over. How the arising of a great result from a small cause? A small act is done; the maturation of a great result is experienced. Hence from a small cause a great result arises. How continuation similar to that? The act done and the maturation experienced are to be experienced in the same way. Hence continuation similar to that. Thus is the internal conditioned arising to be seen with five [aspects]" and so on.

483.12 Thus in this way¹ it has been shown that the Blessed One himself in the sūtras taught that despite the absence of self etc., the connection of action and result is unimpaired. Thus, despite the absence of a single [self] continuing to exist² in regard to both [action and result], nothing is contradicted.

483.15 [Opponent] If there is no self in any way then why is it said:

Self is lord of the self. What other lord would there be? For with a well disciplined self the wise person wins heaven.

in the verse? [Commentator] In this [verse] it is only mind, insofar as it is the basis of egoism, which is spoken of by the word "self." Elsewhere in the sūtra on account of the statement about training the mind [it is said]:

Disciplining the mind is good; a disciplined mind brings happiness.

And that mind is taught conventionally with indirect meaning as the self in order to eliminate the imagination which grasps at a self elsewhere [than the mind] on the part of those conceptually attached to the false view of self. But it is not [taught] absolutely. And what is said by him in the *Laṅkāvatāra*³:

Person, continuum, psycho-physical groups, conditions, and atoms⁴,

Primary Matter, God, the creator are, I declare, only mind.

is explained⁵ because that⁶ too is a statement to refute conceptual attachment to a person elsewhere [than the mind], but, at the the same time⁷, the absolute existence of mind is not spoken of. And, in the same way, the teaching of the self elsewhere⁸, in

¹ T. *de lta bas na* 'therefore.'

² *anuyāyin* T. 'gro ba. Vaidya *anuvartin*.

³ II 139, X 133. Identified by Vaidya.

⁴ T *rgyu* 'causes.' *Laṅkāvatāra* supports Skt.

⁵ T. *bsgrub* (P. *bsgrubs*) *pa* 'established.'

⁶ T. des. Read *de*?

⁷ T. *kho nar*?

⁸ T. does not translate *anyatra* 'elsewhere.'

the psycho-physical constituents etc., is of indirect meaning. Hence even mind is not substantially an object of the "I"-notion.

484.14 Or, granted that mind exists absolutely, nevertheless that is in reality not the object of egoism. Showing this, he says, **the past and future mind ...**

74ab. The past and future mind is not the "I" for it does not exist.

484.17 Relying on imagination mind of three kinds is possible: past, future and present. Of those, **the past and future, the destroyed and not [yet] arisen, mind is not "I", is not the object seen as the "I". Why? For (hi), because, it, that past or future mind, does not exist, does not exist at present¹, because it is destroyed or not [yet] arisen. That which is past is destroyed, ceased, gone away, transformed. And that which is future has not arrived. Then [one may say] the present mind must be the "I." Hence, he says, but if the present ...**

74cd. But if the present mind is the "I" when it is destroyed the "I" again does not exist.

485.7 Even the way the **present², occurring, mind is the "I" is not tenable because when it is destroyed the "I" again does not exist. When it, the present mind, is destroyed, when in the second moment it is past, the "I" again does not exist. Afterwards, the object³ of the "I"-notion⁴ would be destroyed.⁵** The enduring of the present is not perceived. Then how could mind be perceived so

¹ T. *de ltar* 'like that.' Read *da ltar*?

² Possibly the text is corrupt and should read, in keeping with the verse, *athotpannaṃ* in place of *yathotpannaṃ*. T. reads *yathā ... tad api as ji ltar ... de ltar yaṇi*.

³ T. *sems* 'mind.'

⁴ T. *sñar 'dzin pa*. Read *ñar 'dzin pa*.

⁵ Read *naṣṭaḥ* in place of *neṣṭaḥ*. T. *zig par 'gyur te*.

that it would be an objective. Hence, since there is not even a mind [as] object the "I"-notion arises quite without object. Likewise it is not the self (*ātman*) because of the non-existence of the self, for [only] the mind¹ occurring in the three times is the object of that. Having established that mind also is not the object of egoism, summing up, he says, just as a plaintain trunk ...

75. Just as a plaintain trunk reduced to its parts is nothing, so too the "I," when sought through investigation, is not a real existent.

485.17 Just as a plaintain trunk, the stem section of a banana tree, reduced to its parts, shaken down into individual portions, is nothing, no existing thing is found, so too the "I" is not a real existent, like a plaintain trunk. So too the "I", the object of the "I"-notion also², is not a real existent, is not a substantial existent, like the offspring a barren woman.³ It has no object⁴ at all in the sense. How? When sought through investigation, through examination.

486.4 Again drawing out the consequence of another impediment in negating the self, he says, if a being does not exist ...

76ab. If a being does not exist towards whom is the compassion?

¹ T. *sems nīd*.

² T. does not translate *api* 'also.'

³ T. *yod pa ma yin pa'i mo gśam gyi bu dan 'dra'o* 'like the offspring of a non-existent woman.' T. has construed *avastubhūtaḥ* as qualifying *vandhyātanyavat*.

⁴ T. *khyad par* = *viśeṣa* 'difference.' T. reads *viśeṣaḥ* in place of *viśayaḥ*. That is to say, there is no difference between the 'I'-notion and the child of a barren woman.

486.6 [Opponent] If on being investigated a being, a self or person, does not exist, would not be, in any way at all, then towards whom is, would be¹, the compassion, the love, of bodhisattvas. Without a being, taking what as its object would it be active? And compassion is the means of bringing about perfect complete awakening because preceded by that there is activity with regard to giving etc. which are the determining factors in the accumulations [of merit and knowledge] preceded by that. Hence all buddha qualities² act preceded by compassion.

486.11 And likewise it is said in the noble *Dharmsaṃgīti*³: "Now⁴ the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara, the Great Being, said this to the Blessed One, 'Blessed One, a bodhisattva should not be trained in too many things⁵, for only one thing is to be thoroughly accomplished⁶, thoroughly realised; all buddha qualities are encompassed by that.⁷ Just as wherever the precious wheel of the Cakravartin King⁸ goes the whole army goes, in the same way, Blessed One, wherever the great compassion of the bodhisattva goes all the buddha qualities go. Just as, Blessed One, when the vital

¹ T. *bsgom par bya* 'would be cultivated.'

² T. *sañs rgyas dañ chos*. Read *sañs rgyas kyī chos*. The eighteen buddha qualities are: ten powers (*daśabala*), four assurances (*vaiśāradya*), three applications of awareness (*smṛtyupasthāna*), and great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*). See AKBh VII 28.

³ ŚS p. 286.7. LVP p. 486 fn. 1.

⁴ T. *des na yañ* 'and therefore.'

⁵ T. repeats *bcom ldan 'das byañ chub sems dpas chos mañ po mams la bslab par mi bgyi'o* 'Blessed One, a bodhisattva should not be trained in too many things.'

⁶ T. *rab tu gzun = sughīta* 'well apprehended.' See LVP p. 486 fn. 3.

⁷ T. adds *chos gcig po gañ ze na / 'di lta ste sñiñ rje chen po'o // bcom ldan 'das sñiñ rje chen pos ni sañs rgyas kyī chos thams cad byañ chub sems dpa'i mams kyī lag mthil du mchis pa lags so* This is in accord with ŚS p. 286 *katama ekadharamaḥ? yad uta mahākuraṇā / mahākuraṇayā bhagavan bodhisattvānām sarvabuddhadharmāḥ karalagatā bhavanti* 'What is the one thing? It is great compassion. Blessed One, all buddha qualities of the bodhisattvas are comprehended by great compassion.'

⁸ i.e., a universal monarch.

power¹ exists the other organs are active², in the same way, Blessed One, when great compassion exists the qualities³ that produce awakening are active."⁴

487.6 And in the noble *Gayāśīrṣa* it is said: " 'What is the beginning, Manjuśrī, of the bodhisattvas' conduct? What is its basis?' Manjuśrī said, 'Great compassion, Devaputra, is the beginning of the bodhisattvas' conduct; its basis is beings.'" Thus at length.

487.9 Therefore, certainly, first, compassion with beings as its object must be accepted for it arises with suffering beings as its basis. Without beings it would not exist. If you think that way you should not speak thus. [In response] he [Śāntideva] says, [compassion is towards] the one who ...

**76cd. The one who is imagined by bewilderment accepted
for the sake of the goal.**

487.14 Towards the being who is imagined, falsely attributed, by bewilderment, the conventional, accepted, assented too, for the sake of that⁵, the generally admitted goal⁶ to be accomplished called "the aim of man." Thus is the meaning. For so it is: The thing to be cultivated here insofar as it is the goal of man is buddhahood which is devoid of the entire network of conceptualisation [and] free of all obscuration. And that is not realised without non-perception of every *dharma*. And that is achieved through reaching the culminating point of wisdom. And that arises through practising assiduously and uninterruptedly for a long time.

¹ *jīvitendriya*. See AK II 45.

² T. 'byuñ bar 'gyur ro 'arise.'

³ T. *chos gzan nams* 'other qualities.'

⁴ T. *byuñ bar 'gyur ro 'arise.'*

⁵ T. adds *des na* 'because of that' explaining *de'i don du*.

⁶ *kārya*. Cf. p. 372.5 *kāryam sādhyam / upādeyam / phalam ucyaṭe*.

Undertaking that arises on account of compassion and that [compassion], active firstly towards suffering beings, becomes the determining factor in undertaking the accumulations.¹ Thus the acceptance of bewilderment with the nature of conventional truth for the sake of the goal. Therefore, firstly, compassion with its only object beings; after that with its object *dharmas*²; and [finally] without object. This is the intent: A being is not³ in every way non-existent for the psycho-physical groups etc. are conventionally described by the word "self." As has been said by the Blessed One: "Whoever O monks⁴, be they mendicants or brahmins, sees⁵ 'the self' they see these same five appropriated psycho-physical groups."⁶ Therefore, even if through investigation by wisdom there is non-perception of a being absolutely, nevertheless conventionally [a being] is not negated. That is said:

Because it is held that wisdom partakes of reality and compassion of the conventional, when considering according to truth for you the world is without reality; and when filled with compassion that generates⁷ the ten powers⁸, then you have, like a father for an afflicted child, love for the world.⁹

Also in the *Catuḥstava*¹⁰:

O Lord, the notion of a being in no way occurs to you yet you are exceedingly compassionate to beings afflicted by suffering.

¹ T. *tshogs kyī rgyu* (D. om. *rgyu*) *rtsom pa* 'undertaking the determining factor of the accumulations.'

² T. *don la dmigs pa* 'its object things.'

³ T. is missing the negation.

⁴ T. does not translate *bhikṣavaḥ* 'O monks'.

⁵ T. *yañ dag par mthoñ ba* 'correctly sees.'

⁶ Quoted AKBh IX p. 467, MA 126cd p. 244. Cf. Saṃyutta III 46. See LVP Kośa vol. 5 p. 253 fn. 2.

⁷ T. *bskyed* (D. *skyed*) *par mdzad ma*. Read *bskyed par mdzad pa?*

⁸ The ten powers (*daśabala*) are variously enumerated. They comprise ten of the eighteen buddha qualities (*buddhadharma*). See, for example, AKBh VIII 28-9. For a list commonly cited in the Mahāyāna see *Dasabhūmikaśūtra* pp. 70-71.

⁹ Vaidya identifies this verse as *Guṇaparyantastotra* 33 of Ratnadāsa.

¹⁰ *Catuḥstava* II 9 (*Nirupamastava*). Identified by Aiyaswami Sastri (1950) p. 108.

489.3 Therefore, since just these [psycho-physical groups] beginning with form are conventionally described by the words "a being"¹ compassion is not without an object.

489.5 [Opponent] But given the non-existence of a being absolutely who has that goal? Therefore how is anyone active to accomplish that?² With this mind, he says, who has the goal if ...

77ab. Who has the goal if there is not a being? True, but the endeavour³ is through bewilderment.

489.8 If there is not a being, if a being does not exist, then, because of the non-existence of a continuing individual on account of the arising and perishing of form and the other [psycho-physical groups], who has the goal? No one would, is the meaning. [Commentator] True in the sense of "assent."⁴ Yes, this is precisely what we maintain.⁵ No one one at all has the goal absolutely because all *dharmas* are without owner. [Opponent] If it is so how then is there activity at first to accomplish that? [Commentator] But there is endeavour through bewilderment. But⁶

¹ T. *'di ltar kun rdzob kyi bden pa'i sgras brjod de* 'are spoken of in this way by the word of conventional truth.' Probably T. read *evaṃ samvṛtisatyasabdenocyante* in place of *eva samvṛtyā sattvasabdenocyante*.

² T. *des na bsgrub pa'i don du 'ga' žig 'jug par 'gyur* 'therefore who is active to accomplish that?'

³ T. *'dod* 'desire.' Some Tibetan commnetator have interpreted *'dod* as accepted. See, for example, Batchelor (1979) p. 148, Sweet (1984) p. 234.

⁴ Vaidya *abhyupagame* in place of *abhyupagama*.

⁵ T. *'di de ltar yin no // 'dod ces pa ni 'di ltar kho bo cag 'dod pa ñid de* 'This is so. "Maintained" in this way is precisely what we maintain.'? There seems to be some confusion here as *'dod* also occurs at the end of the Tibetan translation of 77b. Also *ihā* is not translated correctly in line 13 of the Skt., being interpreted as *'dir* (= *ihā*). See fn. 3 above.

⁶ *punar*. Verse *tu*.

there is endeavour¹, exertion², action insofar it is for the sake of that goal, through bewilderment.³ Because of attachment to individuality thus: "That goal will be mine alone," conventionally despite the non-existence of a being; for apart from dependent origination all *dharmas* are, in reality, without endeavour insofar as they have an illusory self. That is said:

Without endeavour, dependent⁴ arising from conditions like an illusion;
all *dharmas* have been explained by you, O Lord, to be without essential nature.⁵

Therefore action for the sake of the goal only conventionally.

490.1 But isn't bewilderment totally unacceptable insofar it as has the nature of ignorance? How then can one assent to that? Because of this [question], he says, **but for the sake ...**

77cd. **But for the sake of allaying suffering bewilderment for the goal is not excluded.**

490.4 For delusion is of two kinds: the cause for the activity of *samsāra*; and the cause for stopping that. Of those, that which is the determining factor of *samsāra* is simply to be eliminated; but the other which⁶ is **bewilderment for the goal**, bewilderment for realising the goal characterised by absolute truth, **for the sake of allaying suffering successively⁷**, for the purpose of the cessation of of birth and

¹ T. '*dir ni zes te*. Perhaps reading *iheti* in place of *ihā tu*.

² T. '*di lta bu'i spyod pa ni 'bras bu de don du gñer bas rmoñs pas bya ba dañ ldan pa yin no*. 'there is such behaviour, active through bewilderment insofar as it is seeking for that goal.'

³ *mohāt*. Verse *mohatas*.

⁴ T. does not translate *vaśika*. Concerning *vaśika* see BHSD p. 473.

⁵ *Catuhstava* I 24 (*Lokātīstava*). Identified as *Lokātīstava* 22 by Aiyaswami Sastri (1950) p. 206.

⁶ T. does not translate *yaḥ* 'which.'

⁷ T. *sdug bsñal brgyud* 'the succession of suffering.'

the other adversities of all beings, however **is not excluded**, is not negated. Indeed it is accepted because it is suitable for the absolute. This is what is intended¹ to: That goal is not accepted² by the great ones with the desire for their own happiness but rather for the sake of ultimate allaying of all suffering of all beings. And for that realisation of the absolute is indeed the means³ and the means of that is relative truth for without the relative there is no realisation of the absolute. Thus delusion about the goal has the purpose of stopping suffering.⁴ In regard to this topic this was taught previously [with the words] "for the sake of the goal since there is no investigating."⁵ It has been said [here] to elaborate further.

490.17 [Opponent] This may be so but, just as because it is the cause of allaying suffering bewilderment for the goal is accepted although it has the nature of ignorance, so too bewilderment concerning the self must be because it is the cause of that [bewilderment for the goal]. Why then is the self strenuously negated? Even⁶ if that exists there will be the cessation of saṃsāra because of the destruction of egoism through meditative cultivation of the self. Therefore what is the use of meditative cultivation of non-self? To this he says, **egoism, the cause of suffering ...**

78ab. But egoism, the cause of suffering, increases because of bewilderment concerning the self.

¹ Reading *ihābhipretaṃ* since *ihādhikṛta* is an improbable reading.

² T. *legs pa ma yin* 'is not good.' ?

³ *upāyabhūtaḥ*. T. *thabs su gyur pa*. Vaidya *upeyabhūtaḥ*. 'is the end.' Vaidya offers no justification for his reading but perhaps has in mind p. 365.16 *upāyabhūtaḥ saṃvṛtiḥ paramāṛthādhigamaś ca upeyabhūta iti*, and MA VI 80 quoted on p. 372.15.

⁴ *P de ltar na sdug bsñal ñe bar źi ba'i don ni rmoñs pa'i bras bu yin no* 'thus the aim of stopping suffering is the goal of bewilderment.'

⁵ IX 4 p. 371.

⁶ T. does not translate *api* 'even.'

491.4 The latter, bewilderment concerning the self is not a cause for allaying suffering in the way that bewilderment for the goal is because when that [bewilderment concerning the self] exists egoism is not destroyed. But egoism increases further, becomes stronger, because of bewilderment concerning the self, because of the erroneous seeing of self¹ in what is not self. How? It is the cause of suffering, the cause, the reason for the suffering belonging to saṃsāra characterised by the threefold suffering.² And it is maintained that the allaying of suffering is through the destruction of egoism but if the view of self exists how could that cease? For it is not tenable that a result cease when the capacity of its cause is not wanting. Therefore nor does suffering cease. For so it is: For one seeing self, attachment to the conditioned psycho-physical groups, elements and domains³ as "I" arises more strongly. Thence, with the desire for a remedy to that suffering, concealing the faults of desiring happiness⁴, because of falsely attributing good qualities [of desiring happiness] insofar as one's aim is that⁵ [happiness] one engages in the means of accomplishing that. The idea of "us" arises to our benefactor. Because of seeing "I" and "mine" there is aversion for an adversary. Because of that, all the major and secondary defilements, the determining factor for every suffering, arriving in profusion, become active. Thus egoism, the cause of suffering activated by bewilderment concerning the self occurs. That is said by the Venerable Teacher⁶:

¹ *ātmaviparyāśadarśana*. *Ātmaviparyāya* is the most serious of the four erroneous views or misapprehensions (*viparyāsa*); the others concern permanence (*nitya*), happiness (*sukha*) and purity (*śuci*). See, for example, Nāgārjuna's *Suhṛllekha* 48, ŚS 198.11.

² *triduḥkhatā*. See fn. to p. 346.7.

³ *āyatana*. The six internal and six external domains corresponding to the six sense organs and their objects. On the *skandhas*, *dhātus* and *āyatanas* see BHSD pp. 607, 101, 282-3.

⁴ Translated on the basis of T. *bde ba 'dod pa'i ñes pa* (D. om. *pa*) *rnams bsgribs nas*. Skt.: 'the one desiring happiness, concealing faults.'

⁵ Read, with Vaidya, *tadarthitayā* in place of LVP *tathitayā*. T. *de don du gñer bas*.

⁶ LVP p. 491 fn 6 notes that Nāgārjuna is the "Venerable Teacher," but the verses are from Dharmakīrti *Pramānavārttika*, *Pramāṇasiddhipariccheda* vv. 119-21.

Whoever sees the self has perpetual attachment to that saying "I". Because of attachment he craves for pleasures, he hides the faults of craving; seeing good qualities, anxiously thirsting saying "mine" he appropriates¹ the means of accomplishing that. Therefore as long as there is conceptual attachment to a self there is saṃsāra. If there is a self there is perception of an other; because of distinguishing self and other there is grasping and aversion. Completely bound to these two all faults come forth.

In this way egoism is unable to be stopped through attachment to self.²

78c. And if it is not stoppable through that

492.9 **And if, in the case that, it, egoism, is not stoppable, unable to be stopped, through that, through seeing self, then³:**

78d. Meditative cultivation of non-self is best.

Identified by Tripaṭhi (1989) p. 452 fn 1. Prajñākaramati uses the term *ācāryapādāḥ* in a wider sense than does Candrakīrti in MV. For example, on pp. 503.6 and 389.8, he uses *ācāryapādāḥ* when referring to Vasubandhu. See the comments of de Jong (1978) p. 136. Aiyaswami Sastri (1950) pp. 103, 107 notes that two of the three verses quoted are attributed in the *Yaśastilaka* II p. 252 to Sugatikīrti. See also comments of Vaidya p. 230 fn 1.

- ¹ *upādatte*. Referring to the *pañcopādānaskhandas*, the five psycho-physical groups appropriated as the self.
- ² T. *bdag la chags pa'i nar 'dzin pa* 'egoism of attachment to self [is unable to be stopped].'
- ³ T. *gal te bdag tu 'dzin pa yin na / de'i tshe bdag med du bsgoms pas* (Read *pa?*) *mchog yin no*, tends to suggest, probably unintentionally, that meditative cultivation of non-self is best if there is egoism rather than it is best if egoism if not stoppable through seeing self.

492.12 **Meditative cultivation, practice, of non-self, absence of the person etc. is best, is supreme, because it the cause of the cessation of egoism which is active through the view of self.**¹ For some time there must be² [meditative cultivation of non-self], but afterwards this too is eliminated. Because it is a false view relying on an object of perception³, is the sense.⁴ For so it is: Because of seeing non-self directly because of reaching the limit of excellence in the meditative cultivation of that, the false view of a real personality⁵ which is incompatible with that⁶ ceases. And when that ceases, because of the absence of seeing a continuing individual there is seeing of the bare moment devoid of a former and later nature. Therefore, because of the absence of the attribution of former and later one sees no means⁷ of accomplishing the future happiness of the self. Because of that, that [self] has no attachment arising for any object nor aversion towards [anything] opposing that for there simply isn't clinging. Nor does one see doing harm as an occasion for retaliation because of the non-existence of a later moment for both the one by whom the harm is done and the one to whom it is done. Nor is it appropriate for the discerning person to take revenge on one⁸ [person] when the harm was done by another. Nor does what is done belong to the one who did it. When in this way attachment etc. ceases, the other major and secondary defilements originating from those do not arise either. Alternatively,

¹ T. *bdag tu lta ba'i mi 'jug pa na* '[cessation of egoism] when there is not the activity of the view of self.' Perhaps reading *ātmadarśanāpravṛttau*.

² T. *re 'zig b'zag* (P. *g'zag*) *nas* 'having remained at first.'

³ *upalambhadṛṣṭivāt* T. *dños por dmigs pa yin pa'i phyir* 'because it is perception of an object.' According to LVP p. 492 fn 4, T. = *vastvālabhanatvāt*.

⁴ T. does not translate *iti bhāvaḥ* 'thus is the sense.'

⁵ *satkāyadrṣṭi*. The belief or view that there is a self or what belongs to self (*ātmīya*). AKBh V 7 p. 281 *ātmadrṣṭir ātmīyadrṣṭir vā satkāyadrṣṭiḥ*. It is the most serious of the four misapprehensions (*viparyāsas*). For references to *satkāyadrṣṭi* see May (1959) fn. 720.

⁶ Translated on the basis of T. *de dan 'gal ba'i 'jig tshogs la lta ba*. Vaidya *virodhi* in place of LVP *virodhinaḥ*.

⁷ T. *sgrub par byed pa g'zan* 'other means.'

⁸ T. *dgra g'zan 'joms par byed pa* '[the discerning person] harming one enemy.'

because one sees dependent origination - this having arisen that arises - neither, in reality, is there anyone doing harm to anyone.¹ For it is thus: When there is emptiness of the person and cessation of the view of a real personality defilements do not operate because they are cut off at the root.

493.12 As is said in the noble *Tathāgataguhyasūtra*²: "Just as, Śāntamati, every branch, leaf and petal³ of a tree cut off at the root dries up, so indeed, Śāntamati, do all defilements cease because of the cessation of the view of a real personality." Therefore **meditative cultivation of non-self is best.**

493.16 This secondary [matter of meditative cultivation of non-self] is completed. Now⁴, again he begins to examine⁵ the object of egoism. That may be so, but even if on investigation the self is not the object of egoism because it is like the a donkey's horn nevertheless the body possessing parts will be the object of that. To this he says, **the body is not ...**

79. **The body is not the feet, not the shank, not the thigh and not the hip; it is not the belly nor is it the back; neither is it the chest or the arms.**
80. **It is not the hands nor is it the sides; it is not the armpits; it is not characterised⁶ by the shoulders;**

¹ T. *dños po la gnod par bya ba dañ gnod par byed pa yod pa ma yin te* 'in reality, one harmed and one doing harm do not exist.'

² ŚS 242.7, MV 361.12 Identified LVP p. 493 fn. 3.

³ MV 361 *sarvaśākhāpattraphalāni śuṣyanti* 'all branches, leaves and fruit dry up.' ŚS -*palāsāḥ*. Cf. LVP p. 493 fn 3.

⁴ T. *de ni*. Read *da ni*.

⁵ T. *spyod pa*. More correctly *dpyod pa*.

⁶ T. *nañ khrol rnams* 'entrails' = *āntrikāṇi*. T. 80c *nañ khrol rnams kyañ de min la* (P. *lus min la*) 'the entrails are not that body.' Cf. *Bodhicāryāvatāra* 57d as found

neither the neck nor the head is the body. Then
which of these is the body?

494.5 He shows that, on investigation, no one body at all exists. For so it is: Finally¹, only² the parts such as hands, feet etc. are seen. But a single "body" is not evident.³ Nor is it tenable that any one of these is the body⁴ because **the body is not the feet.**⁵ **Not the shank.** And the shank is not the body. **Not the thigh.** Particular parts of the legs are not the body. **And not the hip.** And the loins not the body. **It is not the belly.** Nor is the abdomen the body. **Nor is it the back.** And this body is not the back. **Neither is it the chest.** Neither is the chest, the breast, the body. **Or the arms.** That body is also not the arms. **It is not the hands.** Also the hands are not the body. **Nor is it the sides.** This body is also not the sides. **It is not the armpits.** The roots of the arms are not the body. **It is not characterised by the shoulders.**⁶ Nor does the body have the nature of the shoulders.⁷ **Neither the neck.** The neck⁸ is not the body. **Nor the head is the body.** Nor is the head the body. The essential identity⁹ of the body is not in these individually because, by the investigation by way of atoms which is about to be declared feet etc. do not remain; and because of the absurd consequence of death by destruction of the body if any one of hands, feet etc. were cut off; and because of the

in the manuscripts from Tun-huang *de ni nan grol nams ma yin*. See Saito (1993) pp. 19-20.

¹ paraṃ. T. 'ba' zig 'only.'

² eva. Vaidya evaṃ not supported by T. or context.

³ T. *mthoñ ba ma yin* 'is not seen.'

⁴ T. *de nams las gzan pa'i lus po* 'that the body is other than these.'

⁵ The commentary glosses *pāda* 'feet' with *caraṇau* 'feet.'

⁶ T. *'phrag pa*. More usually *phrag pa*.

⁷ *skandha*. T. *phuñ po* 'aggregate.'

⁸ *kaṃdharā* 'head-bearer.'

⁹ *ātmatā*. T. *bdag* 'self.'

absence of acceptance [of that proposition] by others. When in this way these individually are not the essential nature of the body and the body is a mere collection of these, **then which of these is the body?** Of these, among these parts, the hands etc. before one, the grounds for conceptualisation of a body, which would be the body? That is to say, not one of these on examination is perceived to constitute of the body.

495.6 That may be so but hands etc. are not individually called "the body" in this way. Rather [the body] dwells in all parts of the whole¹ since it pervades all parts. To this he says, **if this body ...**

81ab If this body dwells partially in all

495.10 If this dwells in all parts², it either dwells partially [in each one], or completely [in all] simultaneously. Of those, **if this body, the whole³, dwells partially in all** the parts such as in the hands, feet etc - the meaning is, [if] it pervades a certain part with a certain portion, [but] not all completely - then one should not say this because the alternative is not settled as to whether it dwells partially, with other portions, in those portions by which it dwells in [each of] the parts or whether it dwells [in all the portions] completely. And, furthermore, in regard to those [alternatives], if there is the hypothesis of dwelling partially, an infinite regress would occur.⁴

¹ T. *yan lag can dai / yan lag thams cad la* 'in the whole and all the parts.'

² Translation based on T. which conveys the intent clearly *yan lag thams cad la 'di 'jug pa na*.

³ *avayavin* 'possessing parts.'

⁴ Cf. LVP *Introduction* p. 128 'car on demandera si le corps se trouve aussi partiellement dans chacune de ses parties, d'ou *regressus ad infinitum*.' Vaidya *anavasthānivṛttir na syāt* 'there would be no cessation of an infinite regress' is supported by T. *thug pa med par ldog par mi 'gyur*.

495.17 Moreover, because of the absence of space for that [body] there is not dwelling in the parts. Hence he says, **the parts dwell ...**

81cd. **The parts dwell in the parts and where does that itself abide?**

496.2 **The parts, the portions, dwell, are stationed, in the parts, in their own respective portions because every thing is stationed in its own portion. And where does that itself abide? But that body, the whole, itself, where pray is it stationed? We do not know. Now the second alternative. To this he says, if the body ...**

82. **If the body abides completely everywhere, in the hands etc., there would be as many bodies as there are hands etc.**

496.8 And in regard to the possibility of dwelling completely [everywhere] because there is not space in the parts, the consequence of the question, "And where does that itself abide?" is still not averted.¹ But if so the following is to be said.. **If, in the case that, the body, the whole, abides, inheres, completely with it whole being, not partially, everywhere in all the parts, in the hands etc. - by the word "etc." [he means] in the feet and the rest - then there would be this further fault.² Hence³ he says, there would.⁴ There would be as many⁵ bodies, wholes. They would be determined as the same number. How many? As [many as] **there are hands****

¹ T. *gegs med par 'jug* 'continues unimpeded.'

² T. *slar yan ñes pa gzan 'dir 'gyur ro,*

³ *bstan pa'i phyir* 'in order to show [the other fault].'

⁴ T. adds *la sogs pa = ādi* 'etc.'

⁵ T. *de rñed* (P. *bsñad*) *pa*. Read *de sñed pa*.

etc. As [many as] there are those parts, the hands feet etc. There would be the same number¹ of wholes as there are [parts] in which they inhere because insofar as [the whole] is without divisions it would be completely contained in [each of] those. It would not be otherwise single for it would be many because of its connection with those many [parts]. And this absurd consequence is to be construed also in regard to the postulate of dwelling partially in many, namely, [the body] could even be said to be, respectively, red, not red, concealed, not concealed, shaking² etc.

497.3 Thus the body is not clearly realisable by direct perception and the other means of valid knowledge. Moreover³, an impediment to this has been declared in the immediately preceding. Showing that this has been established⁴, he says, **the body is not ...**

83ab. The body is not inside nor outside. How is it in the hands etc?

497.7 **The body⁵ is not inside, internal, because of the previous negation*** through investigation of flesh, blood etc. of a person functioning internally. Moreover, now because of negating the whole **nor is it outside, external, the domain of direct perception etc.** Thus **how is the body determined as in the hands etc?** But [one might say] it will be separate from the hands etc. Hence he says, **it is not apart ...**

¹ Read, with Vaidya, *tāvanta eva* in place of LVP *tātanta eva*.

² T. adds *mi gyo ba* 'not shaking.'

³ T. does not translate *punar* 'moreover.'

⁴ T. *bsgrub pa'i don mjug bsdu ba* 'summing up in order to establish [this].'

⁵ T. *du sa*. Read *lus*.

83cd. It is not apart from the hands etc. How then does it exist?

497.13 It, the body, is not, does not appear, **apart**, different, **from** the hands etc., the parts, which possess perceptible characteristics, for only the hands etc. appear. That body, does not have the nature of the hands etc., nor is closely connected, i.e., comprehended by those¹, nor is it within, nor separate from those. **How then**, pray tell, **does it exist?**² By saying "how then," not perceiving a body in any way at all, considering its existence an impossibility³, he asks the question. **How then**, in what way - "then" [means] in the sense of deliberation - **does it exist**, is the existence of that determined?

498.3 When on investigation in this way the body is not able to be established, then not existing it is [only] conventionally expressible. Summing this up, he says,

84ab. Therefore the body does not exist. But through bewilderment there is the idea of a body in regard to the hands etc.

498.6 **Therefore the body does not exist.** Because it is not perceived on the said investigation, therefore, not being perceived possessing perceptible characteristics, **the body does not exist.** If it does not exist, how then is there the idea of a body in regard to the hands, feet, etc? To this he says, **but through bewilderment ...** But, however, **thorough bewilderment**, through ignorance, **there is the idea of a body in regard to the hands etc.** which are devoid of a single substance, but not absolutely. Or the word "but" (*tu*) in the sense of emphasis. For so it is: On

¹ T. *de la brten pa'i 'brel pa.*

² T. *yod min zes te.* Read *yod pa yin zes te?*

³ *tatsattvam asaṃbhāvaṇ.* T. *de yod pa ma (P. mi) srid pa ñid kyis (P. kyī).*

account of the latent impressions of mistaken practice accumulated over a series of births active in saṃsāra without beginning or end. Even when there is understanding of the reality of things as they are, a conceptual construction contrary to that arises. This conventional expression of "body" etc. connected to that is active in the world. But [the body] is not absolute.

498.15 Why does that [conceptual construction of a body] not occur in regard to something else? To this he says, because of particular configuration ...

84cd. On account of a particular configuration, like the idea of a person in regard to a post.

498.17 On account of, with that as a reason for erring, a particular, itself different from another, configuration, arrangement, of hands, feet, etc. [conceptual construction of a body] does not occur in regard to everything, only in regard to the hands feet etc. for errancy is held to have a definite object. How, for example? Like the idea of a person in regard to a post.¹ For example, a post is devoid of the nature of a person, yet someone perceiving a particular configuration which in height etc. is similar to a person has because of error the idea [that the post] is a person. This is because, due to its being far away, not having distinguished it from the other special features [which distinguish it from a person].² So too is it in regard to the point under discussion. Thus is the meaning.

¹ T. *mtho yor* = *tho yor* 'pile of stones.'

² T. *mtho yor la mi'i ran bzin med kyan skyes pa dan mtshun pa'i gyen du 'gren ba la sogs pa'o // dbyibs kyi khyad par dmigs pa dan ldan pa na rin po nas khyad par khoñ du ma chud pa gzan gyi khyad par 'ga zig gi* (P. *gis*) *khrul pas skyes bu'i blor 'gyur ro* 'Although a pile of stones does not have the nature of a man, in height etc. it is similar to a person. When perceiving a particular configuration, someone, not having recognised the particular configuration as different because of distance, has the idea of a man because of the mistake.' One would expect *rin po nas gzan gyi khyad par khoñ du ma chud pa 'ga' zig gi*.

499.5 This may be so but how is it determined that there is the idea of the body though bewilderment but not in reality? To this he says, **as long as ...**

85ab. As long as there is the assemblage of conditions for that long there is a body as a man.¹

499.8 **As long as, bounded by the limit of so much time, as there is the assemblage, aggregation, of conditions, consisting of the six elements of earth etc., the six bases of cognition of touch [etc.]², the eighteen spheres of mentation³, their activity⁴ dependent on action (*karma*), for that long, with only that limit of time, there is the body as a man.** Just as, although it is ultimately devoid of the nature of a person, insofar as its nature is thoroughly imagined it appears as a person. It is conventionally expressed [as such]. And this is an elliptical expression. It should be regarded as "as a woman" as well. [It does not appear as such] before in the early embryonic state etc. nor afterwards because of its dispersal in the state of ashes etc. because of the non-existence of an innate nature.⁵

499.15 And showing that this [absence of innate nature] is the same in this as well, he says, **likewise ...**

85cd. Likewise as long as there that in regard to hands etc. for that long body is seen in them.

¹ T. *snañ ba* 'appears [as a man].'

² T. includes *la sogs pa*.

³ *manopavicāra*. Pleasure, displeasure and indifference in regard to each of the six senses. See ŚS p. 244.18 ff. cited in BHSD p. 141.

⁴ T. does not translate *vṛtti*.

⁵ T. *thal ba la sogs pa'i gnas skabs na yañ ma yin te / gñug ma'i rañ b'zin med pa'i phyir* 'nor in the state of ashes etc. because of the non-existence of an innate nature.'

499.17 Just as when the assemblage of conditions really exists the body appears as if a man, and does not appear when that is absent¹, likewise, in the same way, as long as there is that assemblage in the hands etc. for that long the body is seen in them, in the hands etc. It appears² on account of conceptual construction but not absolutely. Therefore when the assemblage is complete the idea of a body occurs; when it is absent it does not occur. Hence it is ascertained that the idea of a body in regard to the hands etc. is only through bewilderment. This is the overall meaning here: When this and that assemblage of conditions exists, even without this and that substantial essential nature, on account of errancy that conceptual construction arises causing the unreal to appear as reality.³ On account of that, when there are particular configurations, the conventional expressions of a "body of a woman" or "[body of a] man," etc. takes place. For the same reason, when there is the state of ashes etc., because the assemblage is absent, [the conventional usage] ceases. Hence he will explain that the conventional usage of "body" etc. is not substantial. That is said:

That which endures⁴ apart from the states is to be called the essential nature of the body. If the body has an exemplary form⁵, that does not exist in the embryo or in the ashes; if it remains as a subtle entity there, having abandoned its gross form it has become unspecifiable in itself.

How can it be called a "body"?⁶

And it is said:

¹ Translated on the basis of T. *de med pa na mi snañ la = tadabhāve na pratibhāsate*. See LVP p. 499 fn. 3. Skt. 'appears as really existent.'

² Read, with Vaidya, *pratibhāsate* in place of LVP *pratibhāṣate*.

³ T. *rkyen gyi tshogs pa 'di dañ 'di yod pa na dños po de dañ de med par yañ 'gyur ro // de kho na ñid mthoñ ba po ni 'khrul pa'i dbañ gis rnam par rtog pa 'di skye bar 'gyur ro ??* T. appears to have read *bhavati* in place of *abhūtañ*.

⁴ T. does not translate '*sthitañ*' 'endures.'

⁵ T. does not translate *kāyaś cet pratimākārañ* 'if the body has an exemplary form.'

⁶ ŚS p. 358.14-17 with the reading *kāya ity ucyate na sañ*. LVP p. 500 fn. 1.

That which arises because of a cause and does not endure without conditions and disappears because the conditions are absent, how can it be understood to "exist."¹

Sometimes there is the [alternative] reading [of the verse]:

As long as there is an assemblage of convictions² for that long a piece of wood³ is⁴ like a man.

In regard to that [reading] this is to be explained: **As long as there is an assemblage of mistaken convictions⁵**, i.e., a post is recognised as a person, for that long a piece of wood with the nature of a post **is recognised as a man** but not when that [assemblage] is absent. **Likewise indeed as long as there that assemblage of convictions⁶ in regard to hands etc. for that long body is seen in them**, in the hands etc., not afterwards. Thus is the ascertainment that the idea of a body is only through bewilderment.

501.5 But even if the body does not exist, nevertheless the parts, the hands feet etc., cannot be negated because they are directly perceived. Supposing this, to show that hands etc. also have only a thoroughly imagined nature⁷, he says, **likewise ...**

86ab. Likewise, since there is a mass of toes, which would be the foot?

¹ *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* 39. Identified by LVP p. 500 fn. 1. Cf. CS I 4 (*Lokāṭīstava*) which is quoted p. 583.19.

² Reading in accordance with the explanation which follows. T. *rkyen* 'conditions.'

³ This reading of 85ab. has *kāṣṭaḥ* in place of *kāyaḥ*.

⁴ T. *snāṅ ba* 'appears.'

⁵ *viparyāsapratyaya* T. *phyin ci log gi śes pa*.

⁶ Translated in accordance with the previous explanation. T. *rkyen* 'conditions.'

⁷ T. *gzan gyis brtags pa*. T. has misread *para* for *pari*.

501.9 Just as, on investigation, the body does not exist, likewise hands, feet etc. also do not exist because there is a mass, a collection, of toes. "Of toes" is an elliptical expression. It should be regarded as "of the heel etc."¹ as well. There is that (*tattva*) [mass], [means] the existence of that.² Therefore, since it is the nature of that [foot to consist of a mass of toes etc.], is the meaning. Which would be the foot?³ Apart from that collection, on investigation, none [of them would be], is the sense. Even the mass of toes does not have a single nature. Hence he says, that too ...

86cd. That too because it is an aggregation of joints.
And the joint because of the division of its own parts.

501.16 That too⁴, the mass of toes, when investigated, is not existing as an entity. Why? Because it is an aggregation of joints. Because it is an aggregation, an association, of joints, of portions of the toe.⁵ Which of these would be the toe? is the connection with the point under discussion. Also the joints individually are not entities. Hence he says, and the joint is not an entity. For what reason? Because of the division of its own parts. Because of the division, subdivision, of its own, of its individual, parts, constituents. And the parts do not exist in reality. Hence he says:

87a. And the parts because of their division into atoms.

¹ T. does not translate *prabhṛtīnām*.

² i.e., the suffix *tva* in the sense of existence.

³ Skt. glosses *pāda* with *carāṇa*.

⁴ T. adds *śes pa la sogs pa ste = ityādi* 'etc.'

⁵ T. does not translate *aṅgulibhāgānām*.

502.3 And the parts, portions of the joint¹, because of their division into atoms, because of subdivision into minutest atoms, because they are divisible, are only conceptual.

502.5 And the atoms individually do not exist absolutely. Hence he says:

87b. And that atom because of the division of the directions.

502.7 Because of the division, multiplicity, on account of the relation² of the directions, whose nature is east, west, south, north, nadir and zenith. The divisible minutest atom³ would have six parts because of the differentiation of those divisions.⁴ Or⁵, the divisions in the directions are the atom's⁶ multiform parts situated in the multiple directions. Because of that⁷, on account of the differentiation, the essential nature of that [minutest atom] does not remain, in accord with the argument⁸: "The singleness of that which has different spatial portions is not tenable."⁹ For so it is: Is that nature of the centrally occurring minutest atom which faces the minutest atoms which are located in the eastern, western and other directions, only one or is it various?

502.13 If it is the thesis that it is only one then there is the absurd consequence that all the minutest atoms located surrounding [the central minutest atom] would be in one

¹ T. *tshogs*. Read *tshigs*.

² T. does not translate *saṃbandhena* 'on account of the relation.'

³ T. *rdul phra rab mams* 'atoms.'

⁴ T. *de ni nam par dbye bas* 'because that differentiates into parts (*nam par*).'

⁵ T. does not translate *vā* 'or.' Either the atom has parts because it is divisible into the directions; or the multiform parts it has constitute the directions.

⁶ T. *rdul phra mams* 'atoms.'

⁷ *tatas* is explaining the significance of the *tas* suffix of *digvibhāga-tas*.

⁸ T. does not translate *nyāyāt* 'in accord with the argument.'

⁹ *Viṃśatikā* 14ab.

place. For without the minutest atoms located in the eastern and other¹ directions being in the same² place the minutest atom located in the western direction and so on would not face the facing minutest atom located in the eastern place³ because of the consequence of different natures otherwise. And there is not being in the one place without inclusion in that intrinsic nature. And matter would be a the size of a minutest atom because of the inclusion [of all minutest atoms comprising matter] in the intrinsic nature of that [single minutest atom] on account of the connection completely of that minutest atom situated in the eastern direction with the other various minutest atoms.⁴ And if it were so, mountains⁵ etc. whose nature is a collection [of minutest atoms] would not exist.

503.1 Hence only the second thesis [that its nature is various], is to be accepted by one maintaining that earth etc. are a collection. And in that case the middle minutest atom would have six portions because of the simultaneous connection by the six with the nature of the various [minutest atoms]. Because of the differentiation of that [middle] minutest atom by its connection with the various atoms located in this and

¹ T. does not translate *ādi*. 'and other.'

² T. does not translate *samāna* 'the same.'

³ *deśa* is supported by T. *yul*.

⁴ T. *gžan du na rañ bžin tha dad par thal bar 'gyur bas yul gcig na gnas pa yañ yin no // de khoñs su 'dus pa med pa (P. om. pa) na śar phyogs na gnas pa ma yin no // rdul phra rab gžan dañ gžan dag dañ / rdul phra rab bdag ñid thams cad (D. insert dañ Read du?) 'brel pas de'i rañ bžin du 'dus pa'i phyir rdzas rdul phra rab tsam du 'gyur ro* 'Because of the absurd consequence otherwise of different natures there is also location in one place. Without inclusion in that there is not location in the eastern direction. Matter would be the size of a minutest atom because of inclusion in the nature of that [single minutest atom] on account of the connection entirely of the various minutest atoms and the minutest atom.'

⁵ T. *ño bo*. Read *ri bo*?

that place a single essential nature of a minutest atom is also not logical.¹ Which is said by the Venerable Teacher:

Because of its simultaneous conjunction with six a minutest atom would have six parts; or, because the six are in the same place the mass would be the size of an atom.²

And furthermore, those portions are more minute³ [than the minutest atom]; on investigation in this very way, [minutest atoms] acquire⁴ the essential nature of space insofar as they are without self. Hence he says,

87cd. And the directional division, because it is without parts⁵ is space. Therefore the atom does not exist.

503.13 **And the directional division, and the division of the minutest atom by the differentiation of the directions as before. Being divisible insofar as it has six parts which [of the six] would it be? There would be no entity at all. This should be construed in all the previous cases. Why? Because it is without parts. Because of this, being reducible [to nothing] insofar as it is without essential nature, [the directional division] is space, just empty. Therefore, for that reason, the atom does not exist, the minutest atom is not found.**

504.1 In the same way hands etc. should be seen to to without essential nature on investigation. Therefore neither does any body at all exist absolutely because of the

¹ Cf. *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* 18 in Lindtner (1982) p. 191. For other references see May (1959) p. 54 fn. 15; Lindtner (1982) p. 191 fn. 16-18; Murti (1960) pp. 200-1. EK I 120.

² *Vimśatikā* 12. For other occurrences see LVP p. 503 fn. 1. LVP adds: 'The first line refers to the Sautrāntika-system; the second line to the Vaibhāṣika.'

³ T. *de mams kyañ cha phra ba mams yin no* 'And those are minute portions.'

⁴ T. *rtogs par byed pas* mistranslates 'because he perceives them.'

⁵ The commentary and T. support the reading *digvibhāgo py anaṃśatvāt*. See LVP *Introduction* p. 129 fn. 3.

explanation that it is devoid of an essential nature that is one or many. In this way¹ there is no hair etc., no self, and no mind, and no body as the object of egoism in reality. Therefore insofar as its self-nature is set up by ignorance, acting even without the existence of self etc., the notion "I" arises quite without object. Therefore what [Śāntideva] has said:

If there is no "I" at all whose will be the fear?²

is confirmed. And by all this the application of mindfulness of the body has been shown. As is said in the *Dharmasaṃgītisūtra*³: "Moreover, O son of good family, a Bodhisattva applies mindfulness of the body in this way: This body is merely a collection feet, toes, calves, thighs, hip, abdomen, navel, backbone, heart, sides, ribs, hands, forearms, upper-arms, shoulders, neck, head, skull accumulated by birth producing acts (*karma*); dwelling place of hundreds of thousands of various major and minor defilements, ideas and dualistic conceptions. And in it many ingredients are brought together, for instance: hair of the head, hair of the body, nails, teeth, bones, skin, flesh⁴, fatty secretion⁵, sinews, fat, marrow {of flesh?}, lymph, liver, urine, excrement, stomach⁶, intestines⁷, blood, phlegm⁸, bile, pus, nasal mucus⁹, brain¹⁰ and membrane covering the brain. Thus it is a collection of many ingredients. Then what in this is the body?¹¹ The one thoroughly investigating thinks in this way: 'This body is like space.' He applies mindfulness to the body which is like space. He sees that all

¹ T. adds *yañ = api* 'also.'

² Verse 57cd.

³ ŚS p. 228.12. See LVP p. 504 fn. 1.

⁴ Read, with ŚS p. 229 and Vaidya, *piśita* in place of LVP *pisita*.

⁵ Read *vapā* in place of LVP *vapuḥ*. See LVP p. 504 fn. 4.

⁶ *āmāsaya* 'receptacle of undigested [food].' T. *pho ba*.

⁷ *pakvāsaya* 'receptacle for digested [food].' T. *loñ ka*. Not included in ŚS p. 229.

⁸ T. *snabs* 'nasal mucous.'

⁹ T. *mchil ma* 'spittle.'

¹⁰ ŚS p. 229 does not include *mastiṣka* 'brain.' T. *glad pa*.

¹¹ T. '*di la lus zēs ji skad du bya sñam du lus dran pa ñe bar 'jug go* 'he applies mindfulness of the body thinking, "What should be called 'the body' in this?"'

this is space¹. On account of his thorough knowledge of the body mindfulness does not proceed further anywhere; it does not become diverted; it does not retreat."²

505.7 Again it is said³: "This body has not come from the past, nor does it pass over into the future, nor does it endure in past and future, except as arisen from misapprehension of the non-existent⁴; it is devoid of agent and experiencer; not rooted in beginning, end or middle⁵; without owner; without 'mine;' without possession. It is conventionally expressed by adventitious conventional expressions as 'body,'⁶ 'shape,' 'enjoyment,' 'base,' 'physical frame,' 'corpse,'⁷ 'domain of cognition.' Without core is this body arisen from mother's blood and father's seed, its nature impure, putrid and foul-smelling.⁸ It is troubled by the thieves of [fear and] despondency on account of passion, hatred and delusion.⁹ It is always subject to ruin¹⁰, decay¹¹, separation, dispersion, and crumbling [to dust].¹² It is home¹³ to hundreds of thousands of various diseases."

¹ T. *nam mkha'* (P. *kha'*) *ltar* 'like space.'

² The three prefixes *pra*, *vi* and *prati* are used with the verb *sarati* indicating movement foreword, diverging, and back respectively. Mindfulness remains with its object.

³ ŚS p. 229.7.

⁴ *asadviparyāsa*. See May (1959) p. 166 fn. 519.

⁵ T. *thog ma dañ tha ma dañ dbus med / rtsa ba gnas pa med* 'without beginning, end or middle; without fixed root.' ŚS p. 229 supports Skt.

⁶ T. *tshigs*. Read *tshogs*?

⁷ *kunapa*. ŚS p. 229 and Vaidya *kunapa*.

⁸ T. *mi gtsañ ba rul pa / rañ bzin gyis* (P. *gyi*) *dri mi zim pa* 'impure [and] putrid, foul-smelling by nature.'

⁹ T. *'dod chags dañ / ze sdañ dañ / gti mug las 'jigs* (P. *'jig*) *pa dañ / sgyid lug pa'i rkun pos dkrugs pa*. ŚS p. 229 also includes *bhaya* 'fear.'

¹⁰ T. *'jigs pa*. Read *'jig pa*.

¹¹ T. *'drul ba*. D. *'brul ba* is incorrect.

¹² On the expression *śatapatanavikiraṇavidhvamsana* see BHSD p. 522.

¹³ T. *tshañ*. Read, with Vaidya, *nīḍa* in place of LVP *nīḍha*. ŚS *nīta*.

505.16 When being investigated in this way, the body is in every way like space insofar as its nature is empty in reality, then it is indeed mistakenly that the spiritually immature, having attributed substantial reality [to the body], generate passion etc., and promote saṃsāra. Therefore he says, thus ...

88ab. Thus what perspicacious person would be attached to a form which is similar to a dream?

506.4 Thus, in the way spoken of, what [perspicacious person] would be attached, would cling to, a form which represents happiness which is similar to a dream, like¹ what is perceived in a dream. And since this is an elliptical expression one should also understand: "Who would hate?" "Who would be deluded?" It is as follows: Having seen forms² with the eye³ which represent happiness passion attachment arises; having seen forms with the eye⁴ which represent unhappiness; having seen forms with the eye⁵ representing indifference delusion arises. ⁶The mind that, enamoured⁷, courses among not disagreeable forms⁸ has attachment arise thereby;

¹ T. *ñid* = *eva* in place of *iva*.

² T. *gzugs sna tshogs* 'various forms.'

³ T. *mig dag gis* 'with the eyes.'

⁴ T. *mig dag gis* 'with the eyes.'

⁵ T. *mig dag gis* 'with the eyes.'

⁶ The passage beginning here with *yadetat* and ending on line 14 with *pūrvavat* 'as before' is actually a quote from the *Pitṛpūtrasamāgama* found in ŚS p. 251. The passage there begins *yad etan mahāraja manopraticūleṣu*.

⁷ *anunīta* contrasted with *pratihata*. *Anunaya* and *pratigha* are virtually synonyms for *rāga* and *dveṣa* respectively. See BHSD pp. 28, 362. The commentary to VI 1 p. 167.10 glosses *pratigha* with *vidveṣa* and quotes (p. 168.1) the 'etymology' found in ŚS p. 149.5 *pratigha pratigha iti mañjusrīḥ kalpaśatopacitaṃ kuśalaṃ pratihanti tenocyate pratigha iti*.

⁸ T. *gañ de dag yid dañ rjes su mi mthun pa med pa'i gzugs dañ rjes su mthun par spyod de. de dag = mig dag* 'these [eyes]?' *yid dañ rjes su mi mthun pa med pa = manopraticūla* ? Cf. following *yid dañ rjes su mi mthun pa'i gzugs rnam la ni mi mthun par* (P. *pa'i*) *spyod de*. Therefore read *gañ de dag yid dañ rjes su mi mthun pa med pa'i gzugs rnam la rjes su mthun par spyod de* ?

[the mind that] , averse, courses among disagreeable forms has hatred arise thereby; [The mind that], bewildered, courses among forms which are neither agreeable nor disagreeable has delusion arise thereby. In the same way in regard to words etc. three types of object¹ are experienced as before. In regard to that, whoever belongs among the wise² does not perceive the eye organ³ which is completely empty of the essential nature of an eye organ as past⁴ nor do they perceive it as future nor as in between because it is devoid of essential nature. One should speak⁵ in the same way in regard to the other [sense organs], the ear etc. Likewise [he does not perceive] the visible form⁶ which is completely empty of the essential nature of an visible form. And so forth⁷, as before. One should talk in the same way in regard to sound etc.

507.3 Indeed it is thus: How can attachment etc. arise for one to whom the organs are like an illusion, the objects like a dream? Because of this he says, "perspicacious person." What perspicacious person, clear-sighted person, seeing perfectly with wisdom⁸ this thus as it is, **would be attached**, angry or deluded?

¹ i.e., agreeable, disagreeable, and neither agreeable nor disagreeable. CF ŚS p. 251 *cakṣu rūpeṣu trividhaṃ nīpatatīti anukūleṣu śubhasaṃjñāyā pratikūleṣu pratighasaṃjñāyā naivānukūleṣu na pratikūleṣūpekṣayā.*

² T. *gaṇ dpyod ldan su zig ces te / śin tu yaṅ = yaḥ kaś cid vicārayukta* (or *vicāraka*) *iti / atyantatayā* 'whoever is called perspicacious [does not perceive ...] completely' See LVP p. 506 fn. 5. *iti hy* in fact marks the beginning of another passage from the *Piṭṭpūtrasamāgama* found in ŚS p. 251 with some differences, ending with *svabhāvavirahitvāt* (LVP and Vaidya *svabhāvarahitvāt*) 'because it is devoid of essential nature.'

³ *cakṣurāyatana*. One of the six 'internal domains' (*ādhyātmikāyatana*) or 'sense organs.' There are six corresponding 'external domains' (*bāhyāyatana*) or 'sense objects.' T. does not translate *cakṣurāyatanaṃ* 'eye organ.'

⁴ Read, with Vaidya, *pūrvāntatas* in place of LVP *pūrvantatas*.

⁵ T. *rig par bya = veditavyaṃ* 'one should understand.'

⁶ *rūpāyatana*. The 'external domain' or 'object' corresponding to the eye organ (*cakṣurāyatana*).

⁷ T. does not translate *ādi* 'and so forth.'

⁸ T. *yaṅ dag pa'i śes rab kyis = samyakprajñāyā* 'with perfect wisdom.'

507.07 And here the beautiful woman of the country perceived in a dream etc. spoken of by the Blessed One should be presented as an example.¹ And if the body does not exist, attachment on account of conceptualisation of a woman etc. is not logical either. Hence he says **and when in this way ...**

88cd. And when in this way the body does not exist, then what is a woman and what a man?

507.7 The word "and" in the sense of accumulation of a reason. Because there is not attachment etc. on account of conceptualisation of a woman etc. **when in this way, in the way described, the body does not exist, is without essential nature, then, because of the non-existence of the body, what is a woman, an endearing woman, on account of whose desirability attachment would occur in a man? And what a man, a lover, on account of whose charm attachment would occur in a woman? For, a woman conceiving of herself as "a woman" generates attachment externally for a man thinking him "a man." And in the same way, a man, conceiving of himself as "a man" generates attachment externally for a woman thinking her "a woman." But if the body is non-existent, "a woman" does not exist in a woman; a man does not exist in a man.² "And what does not exist with an essential nature is neither a man nor a woman."³ Therefore, given that the body does not exist,**

¹ Several examples are given in ŚS pp. 252-258 from the *Piṭṛpūtrasamāgama* concerning the foolishness of being attached to agreeable forms, sounds etc. perceived in a dream and of being averse to disagreeable ones. Two examples concern a beautiful woman of the country (*janapadakalyāṇī*); one (p. 252) to do with her beautiful form, the other (p. 254) her beautiful voice. Cf. the commentary to verse 31 p. 412 where the example is given of a magician who foolishly becomes attached to the beautiful woman of the country he has created.

² The passage ending here and beginning *strī hi* 'for, a woman' closely resembles a passage in ŚS p. 245 from the *Piṭṛpūtrasamāgama* quoted below p. 503.13.

³ ŚS p. 251 from the *Piṭṛpūtrasamāgama*.

attachment created by conceptualisation of a woman etc. also is not logical. "What is the reason for that? Because all *dharma*s are free of vain imagining."¹ This exposition is in accordance with what is primary [i.e., the body]; in just the same way, garlands, sandalwood and other [objects of attachment] are also devoid of essential nature, it is to be understood. And likewise, the objects of hatred² and delusion.

508.7 And this is said by the Blessed One in the *Pitāpūtrasamāgama*³: "This man, O Great King, is six elements, six domains of contact, eighteen spheres of mentation. When it is said, 'This man, O Great King, is six elements,' in dependence on what is it said?⁴ Six are these elements, O Great King. What are the six? They are the earth element, the water element, fire element, wind element, space element, and consciousness element. These, O Great King, are the six elements. Up to, six are these domains of contact, O Great King. What are the six? The domain of eye contact to see forms, up to, the domain of mental contact for consciousness of objects of mind. These, O Great King, are the six domains of contact ... Eighteen are these spheres of mentation, O Great King. What are the eighteen? Here, a man, having seen forms with his eye, ranges over forms which represent happiness, unhappiness and indifference. In the same may one speak in regard to the ear etc. Through the division of the three beginning with happiness by each of the six sense organs, the spheres of mentation become eighteen. ... And what, O Great King, is the internal⁵ earth element?

¹ ŚS p. 251 from the *Pitpūtrasamāgama*. T. *chos thams cad ni mtshan ma dai bral ba'o* 'All dharmas are free of sign (*nimitta*)' ? But cf. p. 511.1 quoting the same passage where T. translates *manyānā* as *dpyad pa*. 'investigation.' T. does not here translate *iti*.

² Read, with Vaidya, *dveṣa* in place of LVP *dvaṣa*.

³ *Pitāpūtrasamāgama* = *Pitpūtrasamāgama*. See ŚS 244.11. Compare Majjhima III p. 240. LVP p. 508 fn. 3.

⁴ Translated on basis of T. *skyes bu 'di ni khams drug pa gañ smras pa de ci la brten te smras śe na*.

⁵ T. *gañ*. Read *nai*.

Whatever, O Great King, internal in this body is perceived as hard and solid¹ But what is that? It is hair of the head, hair of the body, nails, teeth etc. And what, O Great King, is the external earth element? Whatever external is are appropriated² as hard and solid and not appropriated, this is called the external earth element. In regard to that, O Great King, the internal earth element arising does not come from anywhere; ceasing it is not gathered anywhere. There occurs, O Great King, the circumstance³ that a woman thinks internally, 'I am a woman.' Having thought internally 'I am a woman,' she thinks of a man externally as 'a man.' Having thought of a man externally as 'a man,' she is enraptured and desire union with the external man. A man also thinks internally, 'I am a man,' as in the previous case.⁴ On their desire for union⁵, union occurs. On account of the union an embryo is conceived. Therein, O Great King, neither what is thought nor the thinker exists. The woman does not exist in the woman; the man does not exist in the man. Thus not existing, the unreal thought arises. And that thought does not exist with a real nature. Just as the thought neither does the union, nor the embryo exist with a real nature. And how will that which does not inherently exist produce⁶ hardness. Thus indeed, O Great King, having known the thought one should understand hardness. [One should understand] how⁷ hardness arising does not come from anywhere. There occurs, O Great King, the circumstance that this body has its termination in the cemetery. The hardness of that [body] putrefying, ceasing, does not go to the east, nor to the south, nor to the west, nor to the

¹ T. *lus 'di la nañ gi khoñ* (D. *khañ*) *na sra ba dañ mkhrañ ba'i nam pa dañ / ñe bar 'gyur ba dañ / ñe bar 'gyur ba dañ / zin pa'o* '[whatever] within this body is hard and solid and perceived' *mkhrañ ba'i nam pa dañ ñe bar 'gyur ba = kharagata* ?

² T. *sra ba dañ mkhrañ ba'i nam pa dañ / ñe bar ma gyur ba dañ / ma zin pa* ?

³ T. translates *bhavati samayo* 'yam 'there occurs the circumstance' at the end of description with *dus de yod do*.

⁴ T. repeats the whole formula.

⁵ T. *phrad par 'dod pas = saṃyogākāñkśayā* 'by [their] desire for union' is supported by ŚS p. 245.

⁶ T. *skye bar 'gyur = jāyate* '[how] does it arise.'

⁷ T. construes *yathā ... iti as ci nas ... śes bya ba'o*.

north, nor above, nor below, nor does it go to the semi-cardinal points. In the same way, O Great King, one should understand the internal earth element. ... Therein, O Great King, the arising of the earth element is empty, and its perishing is empty.¹ And having arisen the earth element is empty of essential nature. Thus indeed², O Great King, the earth element is not perceived as the earth element apart from conventional usage.³ And that conventional usage is not a man or a woman. Thus, O Great King, [this]⁴ is to be seen as is it is perfectly with wisdom."⁵ "Therefore what is vain imagining? Vain imagining is the domain of Māra. What is the reason for that? Because all *dharmas* are free of vain imagining."⁶

511.3 Thus having explained the application of mindfulness to the body, to show application of mindfulness to sensation, investigating sensation, he says, if the unpleasant exists ...

89. If the unpleasant exists in reality why does it not pain the delighted; if the pleasant [exists] consisting of delicacies etc. why does it not please the one afflicted by grief etc?

¹ T. construes *vyayo 'pi* with the next phrase *sa'i khams 'jig pa dan / 'byun ba yan no bo ñid kyis ston no* 'the perishing of the earth element and its arising are empty of essential nature.' LVP is supported by ŚS p. 246.

² T. does not translate *iti hi* 'thus indeed.'

³ T. *tha sñad tsam* 'mere conventional usage.'

⁴ T. includes *de*. ŚS p. 246 *etat*.

⁵ T. *yan dag pa ji lta ba bzin gyi ses rab kyis = yathābhūtaprajñayā* 'with wisdom as it is.' ŚS p. 246 *yathābhūtam samyakprajñayā* 'as it is with perfect wisdom.'

⁶ ŚS p. 251 from the *Pitṛpūtrasamāgama*. T. *des na ci zig la dpyad par bya ste / dpyad par bya ba'i yul ma yin no // de ci'i phyir ze na / chos thams cad ni dpyad pa dan bral ba'o zes so* ' "therefore in respect of what should one investigate; there is not an object to investigate. What is the reason for that? All dharmas are free of investigation." ' See LVP p. 511 fn. 1.

511.7 For sensation is of three kinds: pleasant sensation, unpleasant sensation, and [sensation that is] neither pleasant nor painful. In regard to that, sensation, like form, does not exist absolutely. In what way? **If the unpleasant**, the not pleasurable which is experienced, **exists in reality**, absolutely, then **why does it not pain the delighted**, why does it not cause pain to those endowed with satisfaction. Also **if the pleasant exists in reality consisting of delicacies etc.** tasty food, drinks, etc. - because of [the use of] the word "etc." [one understands] the pleasant consisting of garlands, sandalwood etc. since they are a cause of pleasure - **why does it not please the one afflicted by grief etc?** Because of [the use of] the word "etc." [one understands] one afflicted by desire, fear or insanity. For a thing with a real essential nature is never able to be removed. Therefore only established by conceptual construction are the pleasant and unpleasant able to be experienced.

512.1 Giving the reply of the opponent to the question which was asked: "Why does it not pain the delighted?" he says, **if that is not experienced ...**

**90ab. If that is not experienced because it is overpowered
by the stronger**

512.4 If¹ one says, the unpleasant is **not experienced**, is not felt, although it exists, because the unpleasant is not totally non-existent in the delighted state, rather [it is not experienced] because it is eclipsed by the pleasant whose activity is fully developed, i.e., **it is not experienced** despite existing **because it is overpowered**, because it is suppressed, **by the stronger**, by the pleasant possessing exceeding strength, then it is not tenable. Hence [Śāntideva] says, **how can that ...**

¹ *yadi. Verse cet.*

90cd. How can that which does not have the nature of a sensation be a sensation?

512.10 How can, in what way, can that non-evident¹ pleasure which does not have the nature of a sensation, which does not have an essential nature of experience, be a sensation? For it is called a sensation because it is felt, in accordance with the statement: "a sensation is an experience."² And if it were a sensation despite not being felt then there would be the extreme consequence that nothing would be a sensation. [Opponent] That may be so but it is not entirely not experienced. Rather, although it is experienced in a subtle way it is as if not experienced. Hence [Śāntideva] says, is it that pain ...

91. Is it that pain exists subtly, its grossness suppressed? If it is merest satisfaction that is [said to be] other than that [fully developed pleasure], that [merest satisfaction] too is a subtle form of this [pleasure].

512.19 Is it, "is it" in the sense of calling to the opponent, O [opponent] is your opinion that suffering exists, is found, subtly, imperceptibly? Then what is done to it by the stronger pleasure? Is it that its grossness is suppressed? Its, the unpleasant's, grossness, strength, is suppressed, overpowered, by the strong pleasure active in the delighted state? For at the time of pleasurable experience the so-called subtleness of the unpleasant is not perceived at all. How then can one speak of its subtleness? But if, in the case that it is meant, that that [subtle pain] is merest satisfaction other than that³, than that developed pleasure - [if you mean] were it

¹ T. *gsal ba*. Read *mi gsal ba*.

² AK I 14c.

³ T. *on te de ni de las gzan dga' tsaṃ // zes te*. Cf. LVP p. 512 fn. 2.

a different merest satisfaction, a second merest pleasure, a smallest particle of pleasure, it would be a subtle form of pain. **But that too is a subtle form of this. That too, the other merest pleasure, is a subtle form of this same pleasure, but not [a subtle form] of pain because satisfaction has pleasure as its class. Thus it is ascertained that a subtle form of pain its essential nature not felt does not exist at the time of experiencing pleasure.**

513.16 That may be so but pain is not occasional insofar as it is conceptually constructed but rather it is sometimes not perceived because of the absence of causes. To this he says, **if, on the arising of ...**

92ab. If, on the arising of contrary conditions, pain does not arise

513.16 If it is said, **on the arising**, given the presence of that contact which is a **condition**, a cause of pleasure which is **contrary** to suffering. Alternatively, **on the arising**, the birth, of a **contrary condition**, i.e., a cause of pleasure, or [on the arising] of that having a **contrary condition**.¹ It is an [admissible] compound because it is capable of conveying the sense despite an expectancy in the sense of "[contrary] to suffering."² [If it is said that] on the arising of that [contrary condition], because of an absence of causes in the delighted state, **pain does not arise**, pain does not originate, then:

¹ T. *'gal ba'i rkyen gan gi yin pa* 'whose condition is contrary.'

² T. does not translate this grammatical explanation

92cd. **Hasn't it come about that sensation is indeed an habitual misconception on account of conceptual construction?**

514.5 **Hasn't it come about, [haven't we] arrived at the very thing we said? What is that? That sensation, pleasure, pain, or other than those, is indeed - "indeed" (*hi*) in a restrictive sense - an habitual misconception on account of conceptual construction i.e., the very habitual conception which is created by conceptual construction [is sensation]. There is no other substantial pleasure etc. or cause of pleasure etc. For so it is: That which is imagined as a means of pleasure etc. though devoid of an intrinsic essential nature, arises felt as pleasure on account of habitual misconception. The opposite is the opposite to that. How otherwise can that which is a means of pain for one be a means of pleasure for another? Although there was pain from hearing the words of an individual, nevertheless at another time from seeing the same [individual] joy arises. Therefore pleasure etc. or the means of that are only conceptual, not substantial. And he says:**

A snake is born for the pleasure of a peacock; poison is elixir to one practised in poisons. And thorns which vex the mouth are cause of a particular joy for a camel.¹

514.20 **And sensation, since it has the nature of habitual misconception, can be made to cease by investigation. Hence he says, for this very reason ...**

¹ See Jacob (1907-11) p. 13 on the liking camels have for thorns. Noted by LVP p. 514 fn. 2.

93ab. For this very reason this investigation is cultivated as a counteragent to it.

515.2 For this very reason: because sensation has the nature of an habitual misconception, for this very reason this investigation, this examination, is cultivated, is reflected upon, as a counteragent, as opposition, because it is cause for removing it, the habitual misconception in the form of pleasure etc. For the habitual misconception of that is absent if the means for that are absent. Moreover, since in this way also habitual misconception is sensation¹, he says, for, yogins take ...

93cd. For, yogins take as sustenance meditation arising in the field of conceptualisation.

515.8 "For this very reason" occurs also in regard to this. Meditation devoid of sensual desires, devoid of unwholesome sinful qualities, with reasoning, with investigation, the joy, pleasure etc. born of meditative concentration², arising, born, in the field [of conceptualisation]. Conceptualisation itself is the field because it is the birthplace. Meditation etc. is meditative cultivation (*bhāvanā*) because meditative concentration and meditative absorption³ arise out of conceptualisation.⁴ That itself is to take sustenance because it is a cause of

¹ T. *zés bstan pa'i phyir* 'in order to show that.'

² *Dhyāna* 'meditation' is a term embracing the different facets of the meditative process. The first stage according to AKBh VIII 7b has five members: reasoning '*vitarka*,' investigation '*vicāra*,' joy '*prīti*,' pleasure '*sukha*,' and meditative concentration '*samādhi*.' For a discussion of the significance of these terms see Guenther (1976) pp. 120-4.

³ Taking *samādhi* and *samāpatti* as two closely related terms. See Tillemans (1990) I p. 232 en. 134.

⁴ T. ... *bde ba zés pa la sogs pa'i bsam gtan ni bsgom pa yin no // tiñ nie 'dzin ni sñoms par 'jug pa* (P. *pa'i*) *yin no // nram par rtog pa las byuñ ba yin pa'i phyir ro* 'Meditation consisting of ... pleasure is meditative cultivation; meditative

maintaining¹ the body.² For, because, yogins have a body supported by the sustenance of joy and pleasure created by conceptual construction. Therefore it is established that sensation is a habitual misconception from conceptual construction. Thus having accepted the cause in this way, it has been demonstrated that sensation is habitual misconception.

515.16 Now, since it is not tenable that sensation exists substantially because of the very impossibility of the cause, he says, **if sense organ and object ...**

94ab. If sense organ and object have an interval between them where is their conjunction?

516.2 This is the overall meaning here: Sensation has contact as its condition and contact is the coming together of three: sense object, sense organ and consciousness, in accordance with the statement: "six contacts are born of the coming together."³ But that very contact born of the three coming together does not logically hold. Where will the sensation be that has that as its condition? For so it is: Either sense organ and object have an interval between them or they do not have an interval. Of those, **if⁴ sense organ and object, organ of sense and sense object, have an interval between them, have a separation, then where, from what, is their, sense organ and object's, conjunction, coming together, gathering.** It⁵ is just not tenable. For contact is said to be touching. The sense is: If there is a separation how would that

concentration is meditative absorption, because they arise out of conceptualisation.'
Cf. LVP p. 515 fn. 2.

¹ T. *tshim par byed pa* 'satisfying.'

² The commentary here explains that *yoginaḥ* is qualified by the bahuvrīhi compound ending in *āhārāḥ*. Lit. 'Yogins whose taking sustenance ...'

³ AK III 30b

⁴ *yadi*. Verse *cet*.

⁵ T. adds *phrad pa* 'the conjunction.'

occur? But the second way is not tenable either. Hence he says, **if there is no interval ...**

94cd. **And if there is no interval they are one. What would come together with what?**

516.13 **And if there is no interval**, if separation is absent, **they are one**, sense organ and object are essentially identical. For thus, the two would be entirely without interval if there were not separation by even the minutest part and homogeneity.¹ If included in that there would be just identity. And thus **what would come together with what?** Because of the absence of difference if they are one what would have come together with what? For the coming together of self with self is not tenable. This may be so but there is conjunction in reality of minutest atoms which are indeed partless. In regard to that the conventional expression of part and part possessor² is not correct since that is possible only with gross forms. And if the fault is put of conjunction there, nothing is put at fault. To this he says, **there is no penetration ...**

95ab. **There is no penetration of an atom into an atom since that is without space and is uniform.**

517.2 The contact even of minutest atoms is not at all tenable because **there is no penetration of even one atom into another**. There is no being within. Why? **Since (ca)**, because, **that minutest atom, is without space**, without gaps, and that is is

¹ T. *bdag ñid thams cad kyis = sarvātmanā* 'entirely.' T. reads this with the next phrase: *bdag ñid thams cad kyis der 'dus pa yin na yañ de ñid yin no* 'if contained in that completely there is identity.'

² *cha śas dañ ldan pa'i phrad pa ma yin te* 'there is not the conjunction of the part possessor.'

uniform, is the same, because it is without depression or protrusion. Therefore how can there be coming together of what is without parts? That may be so but there need not be penetration of an atom into an atom, allow only mere coming together. By [allowing] that much what is to be established by us¹ is established. Hence he says, **if there is no penetration ...**

95cd. If there is no penetration there is no mixing; if there is no mixing there is no coming together.

517.9 For the coming together of an atom is its touching entirely, otherwise there is the consequence of its having parts. In this way that intrinsic nature pervades with its own being [and] there is coming together with that.² If there were absence of mixing of that intrinsic nature in this way there would not be coming together. And that mixing would not occur without penetration into that. In this way, **if there is no penetration**, if there is absence of penetration, **there is no mixing**, no having undifferentiated natures; **if there is no mixing**, if there is absence of mixing, **there is no coming together**, there is no adherence. Conjunction in any way at all is not possible for what is without parts. Hence he says, **and how pray ...**

96ab. And how pray is conjunction possible for what is without parts?

517.17 "And" in the sense of adding another fault. **How pray is conjunction, gathering, possible for an entity without parts, void of parts? "Pray"** in regard to possibility. How is conjunction possible? Even every minute thing must exist with one part. But only the non-existence of that incorporeal thing which does not have a part is found given the absence of parts for it. Thus is the sense. And this is nowhere

¹ T. *ma yin* 'not [established].' T. reads *na* in place of *naḥ*.

² T. does not translate *tena saṃgatīḥ* 'there is conjunction with that.'

perceived by a valid means of knowledge, even by you. Hence he says, **and if partlessness ...**

96cd. And if partlessness has been seen in conjunction please show it.

518.6 ... [he says], **besides ...**¹

97ab. Besides, for consciousness, which is formless, conjunction is indeed not tenable.

518.8 **Besides**, in the sense of expressing something extra, **for consciousness**, for mental representation of an object, furthermore, **conjunction is indeed not tenable**, is not logically consistent. Why? "**Which is formless**" states the reason. Which is empty of form. Because consciousness is without form, is the meaning. For **conjunction** is mutual contact and that only exists for what possesses form. But how would that which does not have form have conjunction? Thus having excluded conjunction of all three, now demonstrating that the very aggregate does not exist substantially, he says, **also because ...**

97cd. Also because the aggregate is not an entity as previously investigated.

518.16 **Also** in the sense of adding a fault. **Also because the aggregate**, the mass, **is not an entity**, is devoid of being an entity like a horse's horn - "**Conjunction is indeed not tenable**," is connected with the present case - because the very aggregate does not exist. But how is it **not an entity**? **As previously investigated**, as examined before with [the words] beginning: "Likewise, since there

¹ The commentary to verse 96cd is not available in Sanskrit or Tibetan.

is a mass of toes."¹ Summing up the non-occurrence of the cause, he says, **then, in this way ...**

98ab. Then, in this way, if contact does not exist, whence is the occurrence of sensation?

519.5 Therefore, **in this way**, in the manner demonstrated, **if contact does not exist**, if there is not the contact of the three, **whence is the occurrence of sensation? Whence is the occurrence**, the arising, **of sensation**, with the nature of pleasure etc. It is indeed not tenable because in the absence of a cause the occurrence of an effect is not possible.² Thus if sensation does not exist absolutely, because of the non-occurrence of a beneficial or non-beneficial object:

98c. To what purpose is this exertion?

519.10 **To what purpose is this exertion** which is made in order to meet with and avoid the means of bringing about pleasure and pain [respectively]?³ Like the aim of chewing the sky, it is not at all appropriate, is the sense. There may not be the means of bringing about happiness but since suffering cannot be tolerated there must be means of avoiding it. To this objection he says, **whose, and from where ...**

98d. Whose, and from where would be the pain?

519.15 Because on investigation sensation is without essential nature pain is only through want of investigation. The one who feels does not exist, for self etc. was negated previously. Also because the harming cause is imagined on account of

¹ Verse 86.

² T. *srid pa ma yin* 'does not occur.'

³ T. does not translate *sāadhanaprāpti* 'meet with the means of bringing about.'

conceptualisation there is not existence [of pain] absolutely. Thus, in this way, whose, because of the non-existence one who feels, and from where, because of the non-existence of a harming cause, would be the pain, the affliction? In absolute terms, it would not be of anyone or from anywhere. Therefore sensation is also not tenable because of the non-existence of own who feels. Now¹, to show that, because of the non-existence of sensation, the craving conditioned by it also is not able to arise absolutely since it is devoid of a cause, he says, **when there is no one who feels ...**

99. **When there is no one who feels and sensation does not exist, then having seen this situation, O craving why do you not disperse?²**

520.6 The one who feels sensation is the one who feels. When there is no self etc. and because of the non-existence of that and because of the immediately preceding examination **sensation does not exist, then having seen, having perceived, this situation as such devoid of your own birth, O craving why do you not disperse,** though pained by the suffering³ of that why do you not dissolve, since, even now bereft through separation from those, you are not yourself released. That may be so but if there were not one who feels and sensation does not exist, on account of what then does this conventional usage of the seen, etc. occur in regard to things insofar as they are means of bringing about happiness etc. To this he says, **and although seen and touched ...**

¹ T. *de. Read da.*

² The verse plays on the words *vedaka* 'one who feels', *vedanā* 'sensation', *vidyate* 'exists', *vidīryase* 'you disperse.'

³ T. adds *ltos (P. bltos) pa med ñid du ?*

100. And although seen and touched, it is by mind with a nature similar to a dream and an illusion; because it arises together [with mind] therefore sensation is not perceived.

520.16 It is seen by mind, cognition, born of the eye organ, touched [by mind] born of the organ of touch. So in that case mind alone is the substantially existing one who feels. To this objection he says, with a nature of a dream and an illusion, with a nature similar to a dream and with a nature similar to an illusion, i.e., by dependently arisen mind, but not by absolutely existing [mind]. How is what is separate from mind seen by mind?¹ Because it arises together, because it is arisen together with mind. There is seeing of that whose birth is together with mind because they are connected with a single complex and because dependent arising is inconceivable; but there is not seeing absolutely so that in this way there is conventional usage of seen, etc.. Therefore sensation is not perceived. Because even the conventional usage of the seen, means of bringing about pleasure etc. is from another, for this reason sensation is not perceived, nor really seen. [Opponent] That may be so but it is not seen born together, rather, cognition arising from that in the form of an object, at a later time is called the apprehender of that.² To put this aside he says, it is remembered ...

101ab. It is remembered by [cognition] born before and after. It is not experienced.

521.13 Certainly there is sensation of what is born together [with mind]. Put another way: it is remembered by cognition born, arisen, before, occurring

¹ T. *lan 'ga' yañ de las tha dad pa sems kyis mthoñ ba ni ma yin la* 'Mind never sees what is different from it.'

² T. does not translate *tasya* 'of that.'

before, and after, at a later time. **It is not experienced.** It is made an object with the nature of memory; it is not known directly because, at the time of cognising it, it has passed away, and knowing in its own nature what has passed away is not right because it does not exist. Also, experiencing is knowing own nature. Therefore this is mere memory. Knowing own nature is not tenable in regard to that. Since the very distinguishing characteristic that establishes the essential nature of sensation is not tenable¹, he says, **it does not experience ...**

101c. It does not experience its own self.

522.2 It does not experience, know, its own self, its own nature for self-awareness was refuted previously. Then, that sensation is experienced by another. He says, **and it is not ...**

101d. And it is not experienced by another.

522.5 And it is not, not at all, experienced, known, by another cognition occurring at the same time because a cognition² is not experienced by another cognition.

102ab. And there is no one who feels, hence there is no sensation in reality.

¹ T. *tshor ba ni ran gi no bo mam par 'jog par byed pa'i mtshan ñid du rigs pa ma yin no* 'Sensation is not tenable in terms of the very distinguishing characteristic that establishes its own nature.'

² T. *śes pa b'zin* 'like cognition [it, i.e., sensation, is not experienced by another cognition]. T. reads *jñānavat* in place of *jñānasya*.

522.8 **And there is no one who feels, who feels sensation, or another mind [that feels sensation].¹ Hence, for this reason, since it empty of the defining characteristic of sensation called "experience," there is no sensation in reality, absolutely, apart from habitual misconception² for nothing exists that would make known its own nature. This is said in the *Akṣayamatisūtra*³: "But, again, sensation is habitual misconception, sensation is grasping, sensation is appropriating, sensation is perceiving, sensation is misapprehension, sensation is conceptualisation ..."** Also in the *Dharmasaṃgītisūtra* it is said:

Sensation has been declared experience. By whom is that experienced?
One who feels does not exist separate apart from sensation.⁴ Thus the wise should apply mindfulness to sensation. For this is, like awakening, quiescent, pure, luminous.

523.1 Therefore this body appears empty of essential nature of one who feels⁵ and sensation, merely dependently arisen, without function, without owner, occurring as the object of perception like an illusory conceptual elaboration. Thus neither pleasure nor pain is proper to anyone. Thus he says, **in this bundle ...**

102cd. **In this bundle without self, who thus⁶ is pained by this?**

¹ T. *gañ la že na / tshor ba cuñ zad kyañ ma myoñ ba las te / sems sam gžan gyis myoñ ba tshor ba po 'ga' yañ yod pa ma yin no ?*

² See verse 92.

³ This quote and the following one from the *Dharmasaṃgīti* occur in ŚS p. 233. LVP p. 522 fn. 1.

⁴ Translated on the basis of ŚS p. 233 *vedako vedanād anyañ pṛthagbhūto na vidyate*; and T. *tshor ba po las tshor ba gžan // gud na yod pa ma yin no*.

⁵ Read *vedaka* in place of *vadaka*.

⁶ Read *evaṃ* in place of LVP *eva* on the basis of the commentary (p. 523.9) and T. *de ltar. Vaidya evaṃ*.

523.6 In this merely dependently arisen bundle, because of the absence of a continuing individual, without self, without owner, because of the absence of a self etc. which feels, occurring as the object of perception like an illusory conceptual elaboration. Seeing it thus like the net of Indra, with wonder aroused, he says, **who thus is pained by this?** Thus, in the way stated because of the absence of anyone who feels and of sensation, **who in terms of the absolute is pained, afflicted, by this sensation?** On investigation, no one at all. Therefore this attachment to bringing about pleasure etc. is simply false conceptualisation.¹ The application of mindfulness to sensation has been shown.

523.14 Now to show application of mindfulness to mind, he says, **mentation is not situated ...**

103. **Mentation is not situated in the sense organs, nor in forms etc., nor in between; nor is mind within, nor outside; nor is it found elsewhere.**

523.17 There, he considers the sixth placed mental consciousness. In this way: where then is this mental consciousness itself present? In regard to that, firstly, **mentation is not situated, has become stationed, in the sense organs, in eye etc., nor in forms etc., in the sense object, is mentation situated, nor in between, nor in between, in the middle of, sense organ and object, is mentation situated for its intrinsic nature is not ascertained in even one place. Nor is mind within, nor outside. Nor is mind within, in the middle of, the body, nor outside, nor is mind found in the external parts of the body. Nor is it found elsewhere. Nor is it found, reached on investigation, elsewhere, in some other place, than the spoken**

¹ T. *phyin ci log gi* (P. *gis*) *rnam par rtog pa ñid kyis* 'by false conceptualisation.'

of places. Nevertheless¹ somewhere, somehow it occurs. Therefore how is it negated? To this he says, **that which ...**

104. **That which is not in the body, nor elsewhere, not mixed, not somewhere separate is nothing. Hence beings are naturally in complete nirvāṇa.²**

524.9 **That mind which is not in the body, in the internal or external body, nor elsewhere, not apart from the body in an external entity. Not mixed - this is an adverb - nor is it situated mixed in both the internal and external. That mind which is not separate from the body. That mind which is not abiding somewhere, separately, independently. That in absolute terms nothing, is not substantially existent. That is only made to appear³ by conceptual construction. As long as saṃsāra lasts mind is an illusion like appearance because it is without essential nature. Hence, for this reason, beings, living creatures, are naturally, by their essential nature, in complete nirvāṇa, their essential natures completely released, because of the presence always of natural nirvāṇa with the distinguishing characteristic of absence of essential nature in the continua of all beings. They themselves, having attributed existence even to what does not exist by force of imagination of the unreal, the mental activity of their continua afflicted by latent impressions of the defilements, their independent activity prohibited by confinement in the prison of saṃsāra, are called "unreleased," but not in terms of the absolute. And having investigated mentation thus, investigating consciousness beginning of the eye etc., he says, if cognition is prior ...**

¹ Reading *tathāpi*.

² This is the only occasion in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* on which Śāntideva uses the expression *prakṛtyā parinirvṛtāḥ*. For a discussion of various commentaries on this term and verse see Williams (1992) pp. 530-3.

³ T. *brtags* 'conceived' in place of *upadarśita* 'made to appear.'

105. If cognition is prior to its object, what is its arising based on? If cognition is together with its object, what is its arising based on.

525.3 For so it is: Nowhere does cognition always remain with a real form¹, rather arising in dependence on the assemblage consisting of the eye etc. it is called the apprehender of a cognisable object such as form etc. Supposing the intention of the opponent to be thus he poses the alternatives. Either that would be **prior to its object** or at the same time as its object or after its object. Of those, if it is the first alternative, in regard to that he says, "If cognition is said to be arisen **prior to**, before, **its object**, the apprehensible object, when its object is yet unarisen, then **what is its arising based on?** Without a prior cognisable object, objective support, **what is its arising, origination, based on, founded on?** Adopting the second postulate, he says, **if**, if it is argued that, **cognition is together with**, at the same time as, **its object**, the apprehensible object, **what is its arising based on?** For its object [occurring] at the same time, not being a cause, is not an objective support, in accordance with the statement "what is not a cause is not an object."² Let then the third way be adopted. **But if ...**

106ab. **But if it were after its object then from what would there be cognition?**

525.16 **But if**, in the sense of a question, **it were**, cognition were to arise, **after its object**, immediately after the prior object when the object had ceased, **then from what would be the cognition** because the object has ceased at the time of cognition. **From what objective support would there be cognition?** Founded on what would it arise? Therefore also from the assemblage of object etc. cognition is not established absolutely.

¹ T. *yod pa dan med pa dños po = sadasadrūpaṃ* '[as a] real or unreal entity.'

² See verse 22.

526.3 This application of mindfulness has been conveyed in the noble *Ratnakūṭa* and other [sūtras]¹ "He searches thus for mind. Which mind is that? The one that is attached, or the one that hates, or the one that is deluded? Is it past, future or present? Of those, what is past is destroyed; what is future has not arisen; the present has no duration. For the mind, Kāśyapa, is not perceived within, nor outside, nor in between the two. For, Kāśyapa, mind is without form, is not pointed out, is without obstruction, not known by mental representation, not fixed, has no abode. For, Kāśyapa, mind was not seen, is not seen, and will not be seen by any buddhas. What kind of process could be seen of that which was not seen, is not seen, and will not be seen by any buddhas apart from *dharmas* that are active through false conception. For, Kāśyapa, mind which is similar to an illusion, takes manifold birth insofar as it is an unreal conceptual construction ... For, Kāśyapa, mind is like the flow of a river, not remaining, arising, breaking up, dissolving. For, Kāśyapa, mind is like a ray of a light, active on account of causes and conditions. For, Kāśyapa, mind is like lightning, breaking down in an instant, not remaining. For, Kāśyapa, mind is like space defiled by adventitious major and secondary defilements, up to, for, Kāśyapa, mind being searched for is not found. What is not found is not perceived. That is not past, future or present. That is beyond the three periods of time. That which is beyond the three periods of time does not exist nor does it not exist ..."

527.5 Having set forth in this way, the application of mindfulness to mind, to set forth application of mindfulness of *dharmas*, applying the declared way, he says, **and in this way ...**

106cd. **And in this way the arising of all *dharmas* is not ascertained.**

527.8 The word "and" with the sense of "very." In this very **way** in accordance with the method declared, **the arising, the origination, of all *dharmas***, of all things, **is not ascertained**, is not recognised. Also, of those, one may express the

¹ Quoted ŚS p. 233-4. LVP p. 526 fn. 2. Cf. MV p. 45.1.

same fault in regard to arising prior to their own cause, at the same time, or afterwards respectively. Because of the absence of arising, cessation also is not possible. For what is not arisen cannot cease. And for this very reason, all *dharmas* because they are beyond conceptual elaboration insofar as they are not arisen and not ceased are said to be turned towards liberation¹, issuing from the sphere of the real², encompassing the expanse of space, not nominal, apart from conventional expression, to not belong to the expressible, not able to be expressed." In this way, not apart from the application of mindfulness to *dharmas*, the cognition not attached to any *dharma* arises.³

527.16 And the cultivation of the application of mindfulness to *dharmas* has been conveyed in the noble *Akṣayamatisūtra*⁴: The bodhisattva who dwells, observing *dharma* in the *dharma* correctly observes that there is no *dharma* at all. Whence no buddha qualities, whence no awakening, whence no path⁵, whence no going forth. And having known all *dharmas* as going forth⁶ [the bodhisattva] attains meditative concentration of great compassion without obscuration⁷ and in regard to all *dharmas* and all defilements he acquires recognition that they are not genuine: these *dharmas* are without defilements; they do not have defilements. What is the reason for that? For so it is: They attain to the definitive meaning. There is no storing of defilements, no

¹ T. *mam parthar pa'i sgo* = *vimokṣamukha* 'access to liberation.'

² T. *chos kyi dbyiñs su ñes pa* 'definite in the sphere of the real.'

³ T. *de ltar chos dran pa ñe bar g'zag pa brjod pa chos thams cad la 'žen pa med par skye bar 'gyur ro* 'in this way the said application of mindfulness to dharmas arises without attachment to any dharmas.'

⁴ ŚS p. 236. LVP p. 527 fn. 3.

⁵ T. adds *gan la thar pa med pa dai* 'whence no liberation.'

⁶ Translated on the basis of T. *chos thams cad 'byuñ ba*.

⁷ T. adds *sems can rñams la* 'towards beings.' ŚS *anāvāraṇaṃ nāma* 'named "without obscuration."'

becoming a heap. No state of attachment, no state of hatred, no state of delusion. Because of understanding just these there is awakening. What is the nature of defilement that is the nature of awakening? And thus he establishes mindfulness."

And it is said.

That which has no arising, what cessation could that have? Since it is like an illusory elephant¹ it is primordially at peace without effort.²

You maintain that just that which is dependent arising is emptiness. Of that kind is the true Dharma and the tathāgata is like that.³

Also that is accepted as reality, the absolute⁴, suchness, the real.⁵ That is true without dispute. Because of understanding it one is called Buddha.⁶

528.15 By showing the application of mindfulness of *dharmas* in this way it has been explained that all *dharmas* are not arisen and not ceased.

529.1 It may be said that if it is so conventional truth is untenable. Raising the objection in order to eliminate the idea that the determination of the two truths does not logically hold, he says, if so...

107ab. If so there is no conventional then where are the two truths?

¹ T. 'gro ba 'world,' 'destiny.' On the illusory elephant see RA II 10-13. Noted by Lindtner (1982) p. 151 fn. 29.

² CS III (Acintyastava) 29. Identified by Aiyaswami Sastri (1950). Read, *ayatnatas* in place of LVP *yatnatas*. on the basis of T. 'bad med par and the context. Vaidya *ayatnatas*. The Tibetan translation in the Tanjur reads *arthatas* 'in reality.'

³ CS III (Acintyastava) 40. Identified by Aiyaswami Sastri (1950).

⁴ T. *don med* = *anartha*. ?

⁵ T. *de bzin ñid kyi rdzas* = *tathatādravya* 'the substance of suchness.'

⁶ CS III (Acintyastava) 41. Identified by Aiyaswami Sastri (1950).

529.5 If in absolute terms all *dharmas* have an essential nature that is not arisen and not ceased, [and] being so there is no conventional, i.e., [if] there is no conventional usage, [if] there is only the one absolute truth, then, because of the non-existence of the conventional, where are these two truths, conventional truth and absolute truth which have been declared:

Conventional and absolute: these are accepted as two truths.¹

They simply² would not exist. And because of their non-existence, there would not be accumulation etc. whose nature is the connection of the result of performing an action³ and going to another world, on account of the non-existence of all conventional usage. That may be so but even if it does not exist it is like this: the conventional is determined by an understanding, a conceptual construction of conventional nature like⁴ the conceptual construction of water in mirages. From that arises⁵ the two truths. Supposing this [the opponent] says, but is that also ..

107c. But is that also by another conventional?

529.17 "But" in the sense of a question. Is that conventional also, - "Not only conventional truth" is the significance of "also." - established by another conventional understanding that is a conceptual construction? Alternatively [the Sanskrit word "*api*" understood as] "even" in the sense of restriction and in a different order [in the text]. One should construe: "by just another conventional." Demonstrating [the truth of the maxim], "While accomplishing one thing another is lost,"⁶ he says, how would a being ...

¹ Verse 2.

² T. '*di Itar* 'in this way.' T. reads *evam* in place of *eva*.

³ T. *las dan bya ba* 'act and action.'

⁴ T. *ñid* reads *eva* in place of *iva*.

⁵ T. '*thad pa yin = upapadyate* 'is possible.'

⁶ See Jacob (1907-11) p. 14. LVP p. 530 fn. 2.

107ab. How would a being have passed into nirvāṇa?

530.4 If despite being empty of essential nature that is said to belong to the conventional because of forming an object of understanding which is a conceptual construction how then would that being also, who, having realised absolute truth characterised by the absence of essential nature of all *dharmas*, because of separation from all conceptual elaboration on account of non-perception, has attained to complete nirvāṇa, have passed into nirvāṇa¹, be liberated? He would not have. All understanding is conventional because it has the nature of conceptual construction in accordance with the statement "intellect is said to be concealing [conventional]."² Cessation [i.e., nirvāṇa] would also be conventional. To this he declares the counter: that is a conception ...

108a. That is a conception of another mind.

530.13 That is a conception of another mind, i.e., of a mind of a being other than the being passed into nirvāṇa who is the one who makes an object by the intellect even of the one passed into nirvāṇa. For it is not tenable³ that the conventional belonging to one is by the conception of another mind. Therefore despite being made an object by another intellect that one has indeed passed into nirvāṇa. Why? Because:

108b. But that one does not exist through his own conventional.

¹ *parinirvṛta*. Verse *nirvṛta*.

² Verse 2.

³ T. *brjod pa ni ma yin no* 'not said.' T. reads *uktā* in place of *yuktā*.

531.2 But conveys a distinction from the previous. "That one" passed into nirvāṇa does not exist, is not found, through is own conventional, through conventional of his own, i.e., through his own conceptual construction. "That one" has passed into nirvāṇa because he himself has ceased all conceptualisation. Then how would there be another conventional even elsewhere? To this he says,

108cd. That exists determined afterwards as that; if it does not it does not exist at all as conventional.

531.16 "This being that occurs; because of the arising of this that arises." Just the principal of conditionship is the conventional. Thus a *dharma* arising from *dharmas*, would come to be, occurring afterwards. Therefore if that *dharma* exists determined afterwards as that only the conventional exists. If it does not, that does not exist, then it does not exist at all as conventional because of the non-existence of the principle of conditionship in the case of a [totally non-existent] "sky-lotus" etc. This is said: Even if one passed into complete nirvāṇa is made an object of intellect the mere conceptualisation by the mind of another in the same measure does not at all [mean] that that one has not passed into complete nirvāṇa since he himself has ceased all elaborations of conceptualisation. Nor would one without object by way of an attached mind, who has himself dispelled the obscuration of all¹ defilements, whose passion is gone, become one whose passion has not gone. Therefore because he is free of all conceptual construction, although he is the object of another conventional, that one himself has indeed passed into complete nirvāṇa. For this very reason all *dharmas* because they are empty of all conceptual construction and because their essential nature is not arisen and not ceased are said to be naturally in complete nirvāṇa and primordially at peace. Nevertheless only from such [*dharmas*] do other such *dharmas* arise and cease like illusory natures. And again, being

¹ T. does not translate *sarva* 'all.'

perceived with that nature by force of imagination, they belong to the conventional. Because of the absence of substantial nature they are said to be unarisen and unceased, like a donkey's horn.

532.5 Which is said: "Empty *dharmas* arise from only empty *dharmas*."¹ Also it is said in the noble *Lalitavistara*²:

Formative forces are like the rays of a lamp their nature is to arise and cease quickly; like the wind not remaining; like clots of foam without essence and weak. The formative forces are without energy and empty; considered the same as a plantain trunk; the same as an illusion deluding the mind; like an empty fist coaxing a child ...

Just as a grass rope depending on muñja grass is turned, or the buckets of a well turn yet there is no turning in them individually so the turning of all the component members of existence is based on accumulation of one with another; in them turning is not perceived before, later or at the end.

The impression from the seal is seen yet the transference of the seal is not perceived; it is not in that yet it is not elsewhere. Likewise the formative forces are neither annihilated nor eternal. Just as the lower and upper kindling coming together as a triad with the extended hands and from this condition fire arise; once its task is done quickly it ceases. Now, some wise person enquires whence it has come and whither it goes. He searches the directions and the intermediate directions but does not perceive the coming or the going of it. The psycho-physical groups, the domains of cognition, elements, craving, ignorance: thus are the

¹ Nāgārjuna's *Pratītyasamutpādaḥṛdayakārikā* 4cd. Also quoted above p. 355.13 Identified by LVP Douze causes p. 123 fn. 1.

² LVP *āryalaḍitavistare*. Quoted ŚS p. 237, MV p. 551. See LVP p. 532 fn. 2. This quote is missing in T. On the significance of the *Lalitavistara* for Madhyamaka thought see Murti (1960) p. 79 fn. 2.

conditions of action, and the assemblage indicates the being¹ yet that is not perceived absolutely.

533.8 Also it is said in the *Catustava*²:

The sprout arises from neither a ceased seed nor a non-ceased seed.³ You say that every origination is like the origination of an illusion.

Hence you thoroughly know that this world has arisen due to imagination. It is unreal [and] unarisen it cannot be destroyed.

There is no being in saṃsāra (*saṃsṛti*) of a permanent [self], there is no being in saṃsāra of an impermanent self. You, the best of the knowers of reality, have declared being in saṃsāra to be like a dream.

533.15 Therefore although there is no arising or cessation absolutely, conventional truth is not contradicted. Thus everything is sound. [Opponent] But if all *dharmas* are unarisen and unceased absolutely, neither knowledge nor object of knowledge is possible in reality. Then what is investigated⁴ here by whom? There would be no investigation either. Hence [you] should just remain silent. Hence he says, **conceptual construction ...**

109. **Conceptual construction and the conceptualised, these two rely on one another. It is said every investigation is based on what [is ascertained] in accordance with what is generally admitted.**

¹ Translated on the basis of the common reading *sattvasūcanā*. See LVP p. 543 fn. 8. *Pañjikā* reads *kleśasūdanā* 'the destruction of the defilements.'

² CS I (*Lokāṭīstava*) 18-20. Identified by Aiyaswami Sastri (1950).

³ Negation has been added on basis of the sense and *Lokāṭīstava* 18 *na niruddhān nāniruddhād bījād aṅkurasambhavaḥ*. Cf. below p. 579.6-7.

⁴ T. '*gegs* (P. '*gog*) *par* '*gyur* 'would be refuted.'

534.6 **Conceptual construction is an attributing intellect; the conceptualised is what is attributed by that. "And" in the sense of conjunction of what has been said. These two, both, which are called thus rely on one another, are reciprocally based. The conceptualised with regard to conceptual construction; conceptual construction with regard to the conceptualised. It is said, it is stated, every investigation, examination, is based on, takes hold of, what is ascertained in accordance with what is generally admitted, according to conventional usage of the world. This is the meaning: Every, not just one, investigation proceeds based on the conventional, but not on absolute truth because that surpasses every conventional usage. [Opponent] Investigation also should be investigated because its nature is conventional like the external investigation. Having in view the impossibility of investigating investigation, he says, but when ...**

110. **But when it is investigated by investigation which has been investigated then there is an infinite regress because of investigation of that investigation as well.**

534.17 **But, however, when it is investigated, ascertained, by investigation which has investigated, examined, then there is, would be, an infinite regress, without resting place. Why? Because of investigation of that investigation as well. Because of, on account of, investigation of that investigation as well, i.e., the one which is undertaken in order to investigate investigation. Then when the object of investigation is being investigated how can there not be an infinite regress? To this he says, but when ...**

111. **But when the object of investigation is investigated there is no basis of investigation. Because it has no basis it does not arise. And that is called nirvāṇa.**

535.7 **But, however, when the object of investigation, when the object of examination, is investigated, is ascertained there is at a later time no basis of investigation, of ascertainment can be made based on which there would be an infinite regress in consequence of further investigation. [There is no basis] because of the absence of further desire insofar as one has attained one's object in regard to investigation of the object of investigation. For this very reason, because it has no basis it does not arise. Because no basis exists further analysis does not occur. Having effected the negation of all attribution, because of thoroughly knowing the reality of things, because what is to be done is done, because of the absence of activity and cessation, one is neither attached nor averse to anything. And that is called nirvāṇa because of the cessation of all conventional usage. The same is designated nirvāṇa because it is quiescent¹ insofar as it is without function anywhere. Certainly in all cases in regard to a conceptualised object there is investigation but not absolutely. Hence he says, but he for whom ...**

112ab. **But he for whom these two are real, just he is extremely badly situated.**

535.19 **But² he, the espouser of absolutely real existents, for whom these two, the investigation and the object of investigation, are real, are absolutely real, just he,**

¹ T. adds *rañ bzin gyis* 'naturally [quiescent].'

² *punar*. Verse *tu*.

the espouser of essential nature of things, is **extremely badly situated**, is extraordinarily miserably situated, because [for him] what is to be done is difficult to do.¹ Showing just this, he says, if **by force of...**

112cd. If by force of cognition the object [is established] what possibility then in regard to the existence of cognition?

536.5 If by force of cognition, by force, by the capacity, of cognition as a means of knowledge, the object, the object of knowledge, is established, then there must indeed be the determination of an object of knowledge through a means of knowledge. Who rejects it? This alone is to be ascertained here: **What possibility then in regard to the existence of cognition?** One must say how then the existence of cognition, the means of knowledge, is ascertained. Since self-awareness does not exist were one to seek another means of knowledge there would be an infinite regress. Thus **what possibility** is to be relied on? This may be so but there would only be an infinite regress if another means of knowledge were sought for the existence of cognition. Inasmuch as a means of knowledge is determined only through an object of knowledge why would there be an infinite regress? Supposing this he says, but if ...

113ab. But if by force of the cognisable, cognition [is established] what possibility then in regard to the existence of the cognisable?

¹ T. *dka' ba'i byed pa yin pa'i phyir* 'because of doing what is difficult.' Vaidya *duṣkaraṇīyatvāt* in place of LVP *duṣkarakaraṇīyatvāt*.

536.16 **But if** in the sense of illuminating the intent of the opponent. **But if by force of the cognisable**, the means of knowledge, **cognition** is determined, in that case **what possibility then in regard to the existence of the cognisable?** If by force of the cognisable, cognition is determined then the cognisable itself would be an adequate basis for determining the existence of cognition. "And through what means of knowledge is that established?" he asks. **What possibility then in regard to the existence of the cognisable?** One must say how, if one pursues another cognition in order to establish the object of knowledge, that other cognition also is established. If one says through that same cognisable, how is the cognisable established? But if one pursues another cognition in establishing that there would be an infinite regress and no termination.¹ [Opponent] This may be so but, this may be², if there were reliance on another cognition to establish cognition or cognisable but they establish each other mutually. Hence there is not the consequence of the declared fault.³ Revealing this intent of the opponent, he says, **but if existence ...**

113cd. **But if existence [is ascertained] by reciprocal force, there would be non-existence of both.**

537.8 **But if** said in the same way again. [But if] **existence**, reality of cognition and the cognisable, is ascertained, **by reciprocal force**, by mutual capacity of cognition and the cognisable, that is, [existence] of the cognisable by force of cognition and of cognition by force of the cognisable, that being so, **there would be non-existence of both**, there would be non-existence of both cognition and the cognisable. The existence of even one would not be established. Given the non-

¹ Read, with Vaidya, *paravasāna* in place of LVP *paravasthāna*. T. *mthar thug pa med pa*.

² T. does not translate *bhaved etat* 'this may be.'

³ T. *ji ltar 'gyur* 'how does it occur.'

establishment of one, because each is based on the other, there would be non-establishment of the second also. Here he gives an example suitable for the present case, saying, **if without the son ...**

114ac If without the son there is no father, from what will the son arise? In the absence of the son there is no father.

537.17 If without the son, apart from the son, there is no father, no producer, since his designation presupposes the generation of a son, then **through what will the son arise? From what, because of what, because of the non-existence of the father, will the son, the one to be produced, arise, be born?** If one asks why, in the absence of the son there is no father, states the reason. Because in the absence, given the non-existence, of the son there is no father, the father does not exist, for the son is to be produced by the father. And to the extent that he does not produce the son, the father himself does not exist. And to the extent the father does not exist the son does not arise, from him. Hence, because they are based on each other, through the non-existence of one the other would be non-existent. Therefore both those two are non-existent, is the overall meaning. Applying this meaning to what is explained through the example, he says, **in this way ...**

114d. In this way both of these are non-existent.

538.8 Just as in the instance of father and son in the same way both of these, cognition and the cognisable, are non-existent, are in the same way non-existent. For so it is: One speaks of cognition because of production by the cognisable and insofar as it is defined by cognition, [one speaks] of the cognisable. Therefore to the extent that cognition is not established, to that extent thorough knowledge is not established, and to that extent, insofar as it is to be defined by that,

the cognisable is not established. Both would be non-existent because they rely on each other. Thus is the sense. [Opponent] That may be so but we do not say these two are established by mutual force, but that cognition is the result of the cognisable. Through that cognition, like a seed because of a sprout¹, the cognisable object will be established. Making apparent² the intent of the opponent thus, he says, **the sprout arises ...**

115. **The sprout arises from the seed; the seed is revealed by the same. Why then isn't the existence of that [the cognisable] known through cognition arisen from the cognisable?**

538.18 **The sprout arises, originates, from the seed contained in a granary or hole; just as the seed is revealed, understood, by the same, by the sprout arisen from the seed. Why then, in the same way in this case is the existence, the real existence of that cognisable object, not known, not perceived, through the cognition arisen, originated, from the cognisable, from the object of knowledge, since in this case also, like the seed and the sprout, causality (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*) exists. Since this is not a fitting example he says,**

116. **Because cognition is other than the sprout the seed is known to exist. How is the existence of cognition known so that the cognisable is known by it.**

¹ T. *myu gu dan sa bon bzin du* 'like sprout and seed.'

² Read, with Vaidya, *udbhāvayan* in place of LVP *udbhāyan*. T. *dgod pa'i ched du*.

539.7 When it is known that the seed exists because the sprout is a result, that is not the power of this same [sprout] by itself. Rather **because cognition is other, separate from the sprout**, that [seed] is known to exist. For so it is: Not by its mere fittingness does the result make known the cause. Even one who does not realise that only a seed generates a sprout would be made to know. And [the seed] is not [known] by mere perception of the thing itself [i.e., the sprout] because of the absurd consequence of the perception of that [seed] even by one who does not understand causality. Rather it is ascertained by necessary concomitance. Hence there arises an inference from a seed consisting of the mental conviction in a certain instance [on the part of a person] who formerly has understood causality [and] who afterwards has perceived a sprout which is necessarily concomitant with a seed.¹ From that it is ascertained that a seed exists. Hence only² a sprout which has been made the object of cognition is the cause for discerning a seed.

540.1 **How, through what, is the existence of cognition**, is the real existence of cognition, **known**, discerned, since self-cognition does not exist, and since another cognition is not pursued through fear of an infinite regress? **So that the cognisable is known by it. So that, in order that, the cognisable is known, ascertained, by it**, by the cognition resulting from the cognisable object. For it is not possible for an invariable mark that is itself uncertain to make known the thing to be established. It is this [invariable mark] that makes known the cognisable because it is an indicating sign. Therefore in regard to the case of the substantial, investigation cannot be made because of not establishing cognition and cognisable object, however in the case of the conceptual relying on conventional expression as it is generally admitted it can be made. This is certain.

¹ T. *sa bon las byun ba ba'i myu gu* 'a sprout which arises from a seed.'

² T. *'di ltar* 'in this way.' T. reads *evam* in place of *eva*.

No things whatsoever exist anywhere, at any time, originated from themselves, from another, from both, or without a cause.¹

540.10 In order to justify the meaning [of this verse], to establish the fourth extreme "nor without a cause," first, to eliminate the opinion of naturalists (*svabhāvavādin*) he says:

117.ab. The world perceives, first, through direct perception every [kind of] cause

540.13 For so it is: They proclaim that the diversity of the multitude of things arose quite independent of any cause whose nature is self or other. Their opinion is this: Since water, mud etc. which are unconscious are not able to produce the manifold variety of lotuses etc, divided in many different ways such as stem, leaf, shoot, filament etc; nor is anything conscious, skilled in creation, perceived as such other than action, nor revered, because there is no termination of that action and because functioning simultaneously is not possible in regard to unlimited distinctive characteristics. Therefore all this, the variety of the world, arises simply without any cause. Thus is their doctrine. This is said:

The birth of things is described as independent of all causes by the naturalists and they do not say that it is even its own cause. For who makes the diversity of the filament of the blue lotus etc. or by whom is created the many coloured eye of a peacock feather etc? Just as the sharpness etc. of thorns etc. is without cause insofar as they occur at some times, so suffering etc. is without cause.²

541.10 [Śāntideva] shows then³ the invalidation of one who speaks thus because of the capacity of causes which is even recognised by the world. **The world [is] all people. Through direct perception,** through cognition based on the sense organs.

¹ MMK I 1. MV p. 12.13. Quoted above p. 357.11.

² TS 110-12. Identified by Aiyaswami Sastri (1950) p. 108.

³ T. *de la* 'in that.'

Because **through direct perception** is an elliptical expression, "through inference"¹ is also understood there. That is to say, through direct perception and inference. **Every**, of many kinds, **cause**, cause of the diversity of the world. [The world] **perceives**, sees [the cause] generating a result conforming to positive and negative concomitance to that. [The world] understands that if [that which is] its result really exists it exists and that does not exist it does not exist. It is ascertained that that is the cause of that. Therefore because of the function of the cause, which is even recognised by the world, the thesis that this is without cause is refuted. Showing just that he says:

117cd. For the diversity of stem etc. is produced by the diversity of causes.

542.2 **For**, because, **the diversity**, the manifoldness **of stem etc of the lotus**, the blue lotus flower, of those described as having leaf, shoot, filament etc. **is produced**, originates, **by the diversity of**, by the distinction, **of causes**. Not otherwise, because of the consequence of real existence everywhere without limitation. Hence whatever is recognised as creating conformity of positive and negative concomitance with something that should be admitted as the result of that thing alone, not another. Wherefore for this reason the arising of definite distinction is only from a definite cause. Because the difference of those [characteristics] is on account of the difference in those [causes], [that arising] is not without a cause. [Opponent] But if there were this distinction, that distinction would itself be established only from a cause. But one should say of that same [cause] whence is [the distinction]. And a distinction does not arise from what is without distinction because of the consequence of there not being a cause again. Removing this supposition of the opponent [Śāntideva] says, if one asks ...

119cd. If [one asks] by what is created the diversity of causes, it is through the diversity of previous causes.

¹ *anumāna*. As another form of valid knowledge.

542.12 If one asks **by what is created**, by what is created, from whence has come, **the diversity of causes**, the distinction, the difference of cause, **it is through the diversity of previous causes**, because of the diversity, the difference of, **the previous**, the former, **cause**, which is the producer of that. If one asks whence is the distinction of that cause also which is prior to that one would again have to say in regard to that also [that it is] from the distinction of a previous cause. In regard to the supposition of the distinction of the successive one would have to say because of the distinction of the preceding in turn. In this way no undesired regress occurs because of the admission that no prior limit arises of saṃsāra which without first or last. For this very reason even the contrary result is not from self. Hence he says, **from what ...**

118cd. From what does the cause give a result? From the power of the previous cause.

543.4 **From what cause does the cause give a result**, have the capacity to produce a particular result? **From the power of the previous cause**, from the capacity of the previous cause which produces that. A nature such as that of that is produced by its own cause¹ because achieving transformation of a series of particulars suitable for producing a result produced by a particular cooperating cause it produces a result of that kind if there is no occurrence of an obstacle and lack [of conditions].² Hence the giving of an unmistaken result also is produced by the capacity of its own cause. Therefore a result of temporal happiness or ultimate good arises respectively

¹ T. does not translate *svahetunā sa tādrśas tasya svabhāvo 'jani*.

² T. *gañ gis na lhan cig byed pa'i khyad par gyis skyed (Read skyes?) pa 'bras bu skyes (Read skyed?) pa'i yon tan gyi khyad par phan tshun yon su gyur pa'i lhag par gyur pa ni gags dañ ma tshañ ba mi srid na / de lta bu'i rnam par ñid kyis 'bras bu skyed par byed do* 'because achieving transformation of a series of special qualities producing a result produced by a particular cooperating cause it produces a result of that kind if there is no occurrence of an obstacle and lack [of conditions].' Skt. read *-pādagaṇaviśeṣa?*

from a cause that is a means of bringing about temporal happiness or ultimate good. Since the opposite is the opposite of that it is in no way a mistake.¹

543.12 And this certainly is to be accepted by the naturalist (*svabhāvavādin*) though he does not accept possession of a cause. How otherwise without a reason will the proposed thesis that existents do not have a cause be established since no one holds that merely by its proposal. Moreover, one proving that by function of the reason would be refuted by his own statement in regard to the thesis, because of his own acceptance of it having a reason. It would be like him saying, "A barren woman is my mother." Alas, this miserable one has met with a constriction like a rope with a knot on both sides. That is stated:

Wouldn't one saying, with a reason, that there is not a cause himself destroy the thesis? But were there tardiness in setting forth the reason what would be the use of the thesis alone for him?²

Therefore this is simply the manifestation of bad views because it is refuted by valid argument .

544.8 Thus having refuted what is said by the naturalist, mentioning that to reject God as the cause of the world in order to make known the fourth way³, he says, God ...

119a. God is the cause of the world.

¹ This may relate to *Nyāya Sūtra* 1.1.37 which defines a negative example: *tadviparyayād vā viparītam*.

² Quoted TSP p. 66.

³ T. *mam pa gñis pa* 'the second way.' This appears more appropriate since the first way has just been refuted and the second way concerns origination from another. Cf. 540.8.

544.10 Those who adhere to the doctrine that God is the cause of the world, having heard the refutation of the doctrine of the naturalist, thinking half of the burden to state the distinction is settled, declare: "In this way¹ you've exactly rendered assistance, for the diversity of the world does not arise without a cause, because of the absurd consequence of the uncertainty of place etc. Moreover, what this one has said is correct: alone, water, mud and other unconscious things, are without the capacity for diversity. For that there is the Lord skilled in the creation of the diversity of all, the sole architect of the world. God is first being of the whole world; possessor of the might of unimpeded power at all times insofar as his Self is eternal; knower of the reality of the causality etc. of all existents; God's majesty is beyond the range of all vision on this side. For this reason what sensible one is able to say otherwise than that all this world, moving and unmoving, has a cause."

544.20 Having conveyed the household story of the Nyāyas etc, he rejects it. God is the cause of the world. God is called Śaṅkara.² He alone is the cause, the efficient cause of the creation, abiding, and dissolution, of the world, of all. Only because of Him does all this without remainder arise. Otherwise, since the material cause is unconscious how could mountains, rivers, soil, sea etc. partake in arising? However, these are able to arise because of the sustaining power of what possesses consciousness because they are brought about by the very function of that. That is stated:

Others declare God the cause of everything that has arising. What is unconscious, it is said, does not by itself produce its own effects.³ There would not be this Mount Meru, nor this soil, nor this ocean, nor that sun

1 T. does not translate *evam*. 'in this way.'

2 'The Beneficent One,' Śiva.

3 TS 46. The rest of the quotation is incorrectly identified by Vaidya as TS 47.

and moon the two eyes of the world beautiful in arrangement¹ if God were not like a potter effecting the creation of all. Because of existence assuredly one says that this world has God as its creator.

545.11 [Commentator] Therefore, you yourself say that the world itself is unconscious and God is the cause of the state of all.² To this it is said: What is the use of this literary production of what is to be proved prepared and grasped by yourself³ consisting of a prolix succession of eloquent words? Although saying this gives delight to the dull-minded who are attached to their own doctrines, being devoid of valid argument, it does not generate satisfaction for the intelligent. For so it is: If that one is compassionate then why does he make these living creatures afflicted by the suffering of hell etc? And if it so, his being compassionate would only be realisable by faith. [Opponent] But, because [people] experience the result of bad actions done by themselves, how possibly can the activity of him who gets rid of and takes away that [fruit of bad actions] be not compassionate? [Commentator] No. Why does a compassionate one cause him to do that action so that an undesired result is experienced?⁴ [Opponent] Because of his activity in that case also because everything that arises has an efficient cause. [Commentator] However, if he is not functioning is the result of that action experienced or not? If it is the first postulate [that the result of

¹ T. *ñi zla gza' skar ldan 'dir dgod pa mig yul 'di dag* 'the sun and the moon endowed with planets and stars, the two eyes set in place here.'

² Translated on the basis of T. *de lta bas na 'gro ba ñid sems pa med pa ñid dan / sna tshogs pa'i dños po'i rgyu dbaṅ phyug yin no.* Skt. You say that the world in this way has a universal nature which is unconscious [and] that the self has God for his cause. ? Read *ātmanā* in place of *ātmanash?*

³ T. adds *raṅ gi khyim du* 'in your own household.'

⁴ T. reads Skt. *na* with the following phrase: *gaṅ gis mi 'dod pa'i 'bras bu myoṅ ba 'di'i las sñin rje dan ldan pas mi byed par 'gyur ba ji ltaṅ mi byed do* 'How will the Compassionate One not cause that action of him by whom the undesired result is experienced not to be done?'

the action is experienced without him functioning] then how is this [passage from your own scriptures accounted for]?

This unknowing being, powerless over his own happiness and suffering, impelled by God may go to heaven or to the abyss.¹

For there would be the absurd consequence that admitting his function in every effect would be inconclusive on account of this [claim that the result of the action is experienced without him functioning]. But if the second [postulate that the result of that action is not experienced if he is not functioning] then why is it that the Compassionate One does not consent to² indifference to that one [who will experience the undesired result] whereas he strenuously³ imparts assistance to that one? [Opponent] But because of the non-destruction of the action that has been done certainly that one must experience the result of it. So [God] does function for the experiencing of that. [Commentator] But how, when he [God] is not functioning, because of the absence of the complex [of conditions] is it to be certainly experienced by him? [Opponent] But what is the fault if it is destroyed in this way? By effort indeed it is appropriate for the compassionate one to avoid⁴ that. For so it is: Because of the non-maturation of that insofar as he acts as he wishes it would be for him to show his own sovereignty there. [Commentator] In this case even that one possessing pity is unable to remain, impelled by those actions of beings. Alas, by this, his own sovereignty in this way would be manifested elsewhere. And drawn by the action of that other⁵ he would not attain mastery over himself. Through God the great capacity of action would be displayed in this way! That most excellent action is to be attended upon drawn by the power of which even the Sovereign God is unable to remain. Therefore this is quite unimpeded:

¹ *Mahābhārata* III.30.28. Quoted TSP v. 46 p. 41. See LVP p. 546 fn. 1 and Jha (1937) p. 69 for references to other occurrences.

² T. *sgom par mi byed* 'not cultivate.'

³ T. *gal te 'bas pas = yadi yatnena*.

⁴ T. *'grub par = nirvartitum* 'to accomplish.'

⁵ T. *'ga' 'zig las kyis* 'by action [of] someone.'

Homage to true actions over which even the creator has no power.¹

547.4 But if not compassionate then is he free of passion or with passion? If it is the first alternative then one must ask why, even if he does not bring about happiness because of lack of compassion, does he produce the suffering of mankind? For suffering is brought about for someone by force of passions etc. This one does not have them. How, without a cause, does he cause mankind to suffer? [Opponent] He makes them suffer for the sake of play. [Commentator] Certainly that one is free of passion because the activity of one free of passion is for the sake of play.² When even the activity of those endowed with passion etc. who have conquered their senses is not seen to be for the sake of play how much less will [the activity] of those free of passion be so? Except for a Rakṣas, a cruel flesh-eating demon etc., the play of one is not brought about by the suffering of another.

547.13 But if it is the postulate that he is not free of passion then how is this one, being like other people, able to be God³ since the activity dependent on the snare of passion and the other defilements is not appropriate to sovereignty over the world. Otherwise⁴ there would be the consequence of that [world sovereignty] even for one like that who is other than him. Nor is skilfulness to produce the diversity of everything possible for one like that other than him; for one whose independence is obstructed in the prison of saṃsāra.⁵ To the extent that you accept the sovereignty of what is so its very existence as such deceives you.

¹ Bhartṛhari *Vairāgya* 92. See LVP p. 547 fn 1 for other references.

² Cf. Vaidya *krīḍārthaṃ vītarāgasya pravṛttir iti cet, niścitam asau na vītarāgaḥ*. 'If you object that the activity of the one is free of passion, certainly that one is not free of passion.' This reading is not supported by T. but seems to fit better with the line of argument that follows.

³ T. *ji ltaṅ dbaṅ phyug ma yin par mi rigs te* 'how is it not possible not to be God?'

⁴ T. adds *de' i tshe* 'then, in that case.'

⁵ T. *'khor ba'i btson rar bcinṣ pa daṅ raṅ dbaṅ can ma yin pa la* 'for one bound in the prison of saṃsāra and without independence.'

547.18 Or even if it is granted that such a one is the creator, nevertheless, is he of sound nature or not of sound nature? If of sound nature then why does he make people suffer without cause? For one of sound nature is not seen afflicting people without transgression on their part. But if it is objected that he afflicts only those going on an evil course, who have committed an offence, the reply is that only he causes them to even go on an evil course and having made them to be such he moreover afflicts them. Consequently he surpasses the activity of even worldly lords in being vile since they only punish the transgressor who has himself committed the offence, but this one [does so] having caused it himself. Great is his difference [from worldly rulers].

548.7 But if he is not of sound nature then the engagement in worship of him by the discerning aiming for heaven or emancipation is a good thing.¹ It is not possible for other than the intoxicated to worship the intoxicated.² For so it is: The discerning engage in the worship of him³ with the desire to gain heaven etc. but, insofar as his nature is not certain, that [result] is not brought about through that [worship]. Or even the opposite of the result⁴ of worshipping him is possible. But those engaged in the worship of him, looking to that intoxicated one by force of more intense faith, would only show themselves as intoxicated. How else would they engage in worship of that one? Or is there then a transgression by other intoxicated ones so that they are not attending upon [him]? [Opponent] It is because they are deficient in an abundance of power. [Commentator] And in regard to the point under discussion, assuredly we do not behold any abundance of power. Who other than an

1 Vaidya *asādhu* 'not good' seems more appropriate. The Tibetan supports LVP.

2 'The intoxicated' is one of the names of Śiva.

3 T. does not translate *tadārādhane* 'the worship of him.'

4 T. does not translate *-phalasya* 'of the result'.

intoxicated one¹ is able to say that the intoxicated one has a power surpassing the entire world. Therefore investigating this does not reach settlement anywhere, so enough attention to those unsteady with bad opinions. Therefore what has been said is a wise saying:

There is no giver of happiness and suffering. It is a deficient intellect that thinks another gives for the world is extended on the thread of its own actions. To think "I am the agent" is pointless conceit.

549.4 Therefore this entire world is without creator.² Consequently neither is there an independent conscious creator of that apart from the observed cause.³ To explain just this in detail the follower of the definitive system declares:

119b. Tell us now who is God?

549.8 He asks the one who adheres to the doctrine of God as the cause: Tell us, speak, who is this God accepted by you? He conveys it with the word "now". Which of earth etc., of which the result has been perceived conforming to positive and negative concomitance, do you call God? Nor is it right to imagine that of which the function of negative and positive concomitance has not been perceived as a cause because of the extreme consequence. Therefore by accepting that as a cause⁴ one must accept only that of which the function of negative and positive concomitance is seen. Nor is a result of another [cause] separate from earth, seed etc. seen effecting conformity of negative and positive concomitance. Then how is the appropriateness of that as an effect determined? That is stated:

¹ i.e., What sane or rational person?

² T. does not translate this sentence.

³ T. *rgyu gzan mthoñ ba las gzan pa'i* '[no] other cause apart from the observed.' Perhaps T. reads *nāparo dṛṣṭakāraṇād anyo* in place of *na paridṛṣṭakāraṇād anyo*?

⁴ T. does not translate *tatkāraṇatām* 'that as a cause.'

When they exist that indeed arises. If another [cause] is conceived apart from those¹ as a cause of that, [there is] an endless series of causes everywhere.²

549.18 But the elements themselves, earth etc., are God. Supposing this intent of the opponent he says, if it is the elements ...

119cd. If it is the elements let it be so. Why labour over only a mere name?

550.2 If God is said to be the elements, earth etc., then it is simply accepted. Let it be so, it is granted. We do not contradict this because we observe an effect possessing conformity to the negative and positive concomitance³ of earth etc. Only why labour over only a mere name? It is only a name, nothing but a name devoid of a separate meaning. Only [means] in a restrictive sense. Why labour, toil, here over a mere name with a great enterprise to establish that? I talk of earth

¹ D. reads *de dag las gzan rtog pa na* 'If another [cause] is conceived apart from those'. This is omitted in P. and unclear in the manuscript. Cf. LVP footnote p. 549. See next fn.

² The verse is a quote from *Pramāṇavārttika, Pramāṇasiddhi Pariccheda*, verse 26 p. 10: *yeṣu satsu bhavaty eva yat tebhyo 'nyasya kalpane / tadhetutvena sarvatra hetūnām anavasthitih //* Manorathanandin's *Vṛtti* on this verse reads: *yeṣu kāraṇeṣu satsu yat kāryaṃ bhavaty eva tebhyo 'nyasya padārthasya tatkāryahetutvena kalpane sarvatra kāryahetūnām anavasthitih prāpnoti aparāparakalpanayā / tasmād dṛṣṭasamārthyā eva kṣitibijādayaḥ kāraṇam aṅkurasya neśvarādir adṛṣṭasāmarthyā //* 'When those causes exist that result indeed arises. If another thing is conceived apart from those as a cause of that, there is an endless series of causes and effects everywhere because of their conceptualisation one after another. Therefore only earth, seed etc. whose capacity is seen are the cause of the sprout; not God etc. whose capacity is not seen.' Cf. TS v. 90.

³ T. does not translate *vyatireka* 'negative concomitance.'

etc. while you call these same elements¹ God. As to the meaning there is no difference. Nor is any consequence perceived in this disagreement which is devoid of meaning. But if there is a difference in meaning then it is not correct that these are God. Hence he says **but ...**

120. But earth etc. are multiple, impermanent, immobile and not divinities, traversable, and impure: that God is not.

550.14 With the word "but" he says more. ²It is not correct for you to imagine earth and the rest of these as God because they do not have his distinguishing characteristics. With what understanding? **Earth etc., earth**, is the first of earth, water, fire and wind which are declared by **etc.**³ **Are multiple**, with many natures, **impermanent**, with perishable natures, **immobile**, devoid of function insofar as they are without volition⁴, **and not divinities**, nor with natures worthy of worship, **traversable**, to be passed over because they are not unassailable, **and impure**, unclean, also in the senses of unholy etc.⁵ because of their actual existence as dirt etc. **That God is not**, that God does not have a nature like that since that is opposed in six ways. If earth etc. are not God then ether will be. To this he says, **ether is not ...**

121a. Ether⁶ is not God because it is inactive.

¹ T. *'byuñ ba chen po = mahābhūtāni* 'gross elements.'

² T. starts *blo gros chen po can = mahāmate* 'O, great minded one.'

³ The commentary indicates that *ksmādayaḥ* is a bahuvrīhi compound.

⁴ T. *śes pa ñid kyis* 'by being conscious' in place of *acetanatayā* 'insofar as they are without volition.'

⁵ T. does not translate *amedhyādiṣv api* 'also in the senses of unholy etc.'

551.6 **Ether also is not God. Why? Because it is inactive, because it is without function insofar as it is devoid of essential nature. Because even in the opinion of the opponent it is without activity. Then the self must be [God]:**

121b. Not the self because of its previous negation.

551.10 **Because the self was negated previously in detail.¹ Without essential nature that is like the horn of a rabbit. [Opponent] That may be so, but since his majesty is beyond conception his intrinsic nature is not able to be discerned by those seeing this side; [it cannot be indicated by] saying, "it is like this." To this he says, and why is ...**

121cd. And why is the creatorship of the inconceivable also described as inconceivable?

551.15 **Why, if there is this majesty which surpasses thought, then is the creatorship, the simultaneous causality, of the inconceivable, of God who surpasses the path of thought, also described² as inconceivable, as beyond reasoning? Why is it talked about? This is the meaning³: It is also not right to speak of his creatorship since it is inconceivable. [Opponent] This may be so. That is not able to be conceived insofar as its nature is extremely difficult to characterise but the result of it is conceivable because the perception of it is common to all people. To the one speaking thus he replies:**

122a. And what has he sought to produce?

¹ Verse 57 ff.

² T. *brjod pas ci zig bya ste* 'what is the use of describing.'

³ T. does not translate *ity arthaḥ* 'this is the meaning.'

552.2 Granted that the result of that is conceivable, nevertheless **what has he sought to produce? What result has he, God whose majesty is inconceivable, sought, intended, to produce, to create?** Supposing the answer of the opponent¹ he says,

122b. **If the self ...**

552.6 [In the Sanskrit text] the euphonic conjunction (*saṃdhi*) with the letter 'a' of the previous quarter verse has not been made because of compliance with the metre.² If it is held that **the self** is accepted as made by that one ... He disallows this:

122b. ... **Isn't that permanent?**

552.9 Listen, **isn't that self** accepted by you as **permanent**, as eternal? Then how is that created? Otherwise that would not be eternal at all³ because of the absurd consequence of absence of the distinguishing characteristic of the eternal, since the eternal [is characterised] as existing without a cause. Nor is his function of production perceived elsewhere. So he says, **the essential nature ...**

122cd **The essential nature of earth etc. and God [are**

¹ T. *g'zan gyi dogs pa dgod pa'i tshul gyis* 'by way of setting out the supposition of the opponent.'

² Skt. verse reads *tena kiṃ sraṣṭum iṣṭam ca ātmā cet*. If *saṃdhi* were applied *ca ātmā* would become *cātmā*. This sentence is not included in the Tibetan translation.

³ T. *de rtag pa ñid ñams par 'gyur ro* 'That would be vitiated as eternal.'

-123a. permanent], and cognition is from cognisable objects without beginning, and happiness and suffering are from action.

552.15 By the word etc. water, fire, air, ether, time, direction and mind are understood.¹ The essential nature of those is permanent. Nor is that created by that one because the atoms of earth etc. are accepted as eternal. And because of the repudiation of his function that will be made in regard to gross matter. Also because ether etc. are eternal. Also because the constituents etc. are about to be examined.² And God, God also is permanent, consequently he does not create himself. And cognition is from cognisable objects without beginning, and cognition also goes on arising from cognisable objects without beginning because as long as saṃsāra lasts it continues, having taken the cognisable object as its support. That [cognition] also is not created by him. And happiness and suffering are from that³ action, from wholesome and unwholesome action respectively happiness and suffering comes about arising as a desired or undesired maturation [of that action]. With regard to that also he does not have a function. This being so:

123b. Tell us what is created by him?

553.6 Say what now is created, produced, by him, by God. Thus his capacity is not perceived anywhere. Then how is he spoken of as the creator of the world? Now he declares the means of refutation common to all cases:

123cd. If there is not a beginning to the cause how can there be a beginning to the result?

¹ These, along with earth, are the eight substances (*dravya*) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

² In verse 128.

³ T. does not translate *tat*.

553.10 For so it is: That cause of the world may be eternal or impermanent. That is imagined as eternal by those who profess that [God]. In regard to that, if it is permanent, if there is not a beginning to the cause, the instrumental cause¹, then how can there be a beginning to the result? How could there be a beginning to the result, to the effect produced from that, since it would always occur.² The meaning is: There simply would not be one. If the cause, whose nature is efficacy, is permanently present [then] the result which is produced from that would also arise uninterruptedly. Consequently, the result, bound to the capacity of that [cause], would be always found.³ That [cause]⁴

124a. Why is it not always creating?

553.18 Why, because of what, is it not always, at all times, creating? Since it is not generating every result how, at any time, does the creation of any result stop?

554.1 Or put another way: And if God were not the creator of the world, how in the beginning, immediately after dissolution, would [God] become involved in creation? To this he says, [if there is not a beginning] to the cause ... For the cycle of births is without beginning or end. If there is not a beginning, a starting point, to that, the cause characterised by defilement and action, how could there be a beginning, an original commencement, to the result characterised by

¹ T. *de la gal te rtag pa yin na rgyu ste byed pa po la thog ma yod pa ma yin no* 'in regard to that, if it is permanent, the cause, the creator, does not have a beginning.'

² T. *de'i bras bu'i bskyed par bya ba rtag tu 'jug pa'i phyir* 'since what is produced, a result of that, would always occur.'

³ T. *de'i phyir de'i nus pa thogs pa med pa'i 'bras bu rtag tu skye bar 'gyur ro* 'Consequently, the result which is the unobstructed capacity of that would always arise.' Perhaps Skt. *tatsāmarthyāpratibaddham* ?

⁴ Cf. TS verse 87.

the development of the world of beings and the container-like world. The meaning is: There simply isn't one. For in beginningless *samsāra* the enduring, destruction and development¹ of beings continues by the power of action. And just this has been stated by him saying, "and happiness and suffering are from action."

554.9 Alternatively, here also having in mind only God, he says, [if there is not a beginning] to the cause. If there is not a beginning to the cause, to God, [then], because of accepting his majesty even at the time of dissolution insofar as he² is unimpeded, how could there be a beginning to the result which is caused by him and characterised by creation etc.? Creation etc. would also be eternal because the cause of that always has the capacity insofar as it is eternal. Hence, in that case, if there were one with eternal capacity, there would not be a beginning to creation etc. Therefore how would he be active in the beginning of creation. Moreover if he is the creator then, since [he] is eternal why is he not always creating? 'Creation etc.' remains to be supplied. For so it is: If at a certain time³ he causes creation then, insofar as he has the nature of causing that, he would always cause just that. One must say the same about enduring and destruction as well or he would effect creation etc. simultaneously. And for the same reason, because of absence of cessation of the cause there would be no cessation of the result either. The rest is [to be explained] as before.

555.1 That may be so but, even if that one always has the nature of efficacy, nevertheless at a certain time because of a absence of cooperating causes he does not create. To this he says:

¹ T. *gnas śin chags pa dañ 'jig pa'i bdag ñid* '[beings] having the nature of enduring, development and destruction.'

² T. *de'i nus pa* 'his capacity.'

³ T. does not translate *kadā cit* 'at a certain time.'

124b. For he does not depend on another.

555.4 God is a cause with the nature of efficacy. For, because, he does not depend on another, on a cooperating cause, because it is not tenable for an eternal existent with the nature of efficacy to rely on that. For surely there isn't any dependence for that to which, being eternal, nothing extra is to be added. Either, if there was an arising of a particular [cooperating cause] there would be the absurd consequence of that also arising with an essential nature not different to that [God]. Or, if there were a difference [there would be] the arising of the effect only from the particular¹: That [God] would not be the cause.² That is stated:

Some other is depended on if it does something; why would a thing that does nothing be depended on by anything?³

555.12 Or, let that [God] have cooperating causes. Nevertheless they would be either eternal or impermanent. First, it is not possible for those atoms etc. which are

¹ T. *khyad par gzan 'byun ba ni de la tha dad pa'i ran bzin gzan de las skyes par thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro // khyad par las tha dad pa nīd kyis 'bras bu skyes pas de rgyu nīd ma yin par 'gyur ro* 'If there were an arising of a particular, there would be the absurd consequence that from it would arise another nature different from it. Because an effect would arise from a particular while being different, it [the particular] would not be a cause.'

² T. adds *'di de'i khyad par yin no zes pa 'brel par sems pa na ni thug pa med pa nīd dan 'brel pa ma grub par 'gyur ro* 'If one imagines the relation as 'this is a particular possessed by that' an infinite regress and non-establishment of the relation occurs.'

³ Aiyaswami Sastri (1950) p.103 identifies this as a quote of *Catuḥstava* (*Acintyastava*) III.12 as does Vaidya. The readings are different. *Catuḥstava:: yadā nāpekṣate kiṃ cit kutaḥ kiṃ cit tadā bhavet / yadā nāpekṣate dīrghaṃ kuto hrasvādikaṃ tadā //* Tibetan supports the manuscript (LVP p. 555 fn. 2) and agrees with *Pramānavārttika*, *Svārthhānumāna Pariccheda* vv. 280b-281a. T. *BCAP gal te bya ba cuñ zad cig // yod na gzan la ltos 'gyur na // dños gañ cuñ zad mi byed la // ci phyir 'ga' žig gis ltos 'gyur //* 'If another is depended on when there is a trifling result why does anything depend on a thing which does nothing?' *Pramānavārttika: apekṣyeta paraḥ kāryaṃ yadi vidyeta kiṃcana // yad akimcītkaraṃ vastu kena cid apekṣyate.*

eternal to lack real existence. Nor for those whose presence is dependent on him to lack presence. Also why would there be an absence of the impermanent ones whose presence arises dependent on him such that [God] would not create through an absence of cooperating causes? This [may be] said. Therefore this [having cooperating causes] is not a counter to this [i.e., God creating always]. Because of just this, he says:

**124cd. There is simply not another not created by him.
Therefore on what would he depend?**

556.2 **There is simply not another not created by him, another does not exist in the world which is produced without being created by that God. Therefore, for that reason, since the cooperating causes whose occurrence depends on that [God] are always present, on what would he, the eternal creator, depend? Depending on what would [God] at some time not create an effect? In this way that one has no dependence at all. Therefore he would always be creating a result.**

556.5 That may be so but a result arises from a triad of causes, namely, inherent cause, non-inherent cause, and efficient cause. Therefore, since this one is the efficient cause, there is not the consequence of the fault [you] spoke of concerning [God] depending on the complex of conditions creating¹ an effect. Supposing the intent of the opponent thus, he says, **if he relies ...**

125a. If he relies on the whole assemblage

556.12 **Even if there is that capacity to always create all effects nevertheless he relies on the whole assemblage. For without the whole assemblage, although**

¹ T. does not translate *kurvatas*.

there is the capacity as a creator, the result is not produced. Just as, although there is somewhere the cause capable to produce a piece of cloth, without shuttle, yarn and loom etc., a piece of cloth is not produced, so it is in regard to the point under discussion. If this is supposed, he says:

125b. However God is not the cause

556.18 If it is accepted that [God] creates when the whole assemblage exists and does not create when that is absent, in that case, **however God is not**, would not be, **the cause**, because production would be only from the whole assemblage and because there would not be production from him. For one would see the existence or non-existence of the result from the existence or non-existence of that [whole assemblage] but not however from the existence or non-existence of God. And not even at the time of the whole assemblage is he the creator via the nature of another (*pararūpeṇa*), but even prior to this he has that very capacity as his intrinsic nature (*svarūpa*).¹ So how would there be a stopping of creating any time?² Even that which is said, 'Like a weaver etc. [God] sometimes creates' is not correct because formerly the weavers etc. simply did not have the capacity but afterwards because of attaining the capability which was not there before through acquiring the assemblage of the shuttle³ etc., they create the cloth etc. as the result. Otherwise, the consequence of them creating that if the capability existed previously is not be averted. Thus the example is deficient in the point to be established. Moreover, even in producing the

¹ T. *tshogs pa'i dus na yañ de g'zan gyi ño bos byed pa po'i ño bo yañ 'di'i sñar ñid du nus pa yin no* 'And although that, even at the time of the whole assemblage, is a nature as a creator through the nature of another, it is a capacity prior to this.'

² T. *tshogs pa'i dus na yañ de g'zan gyi ño bos byed pa po'i ño bo yañ 'di'i sñar ñid du nus pa yin no* 'And although he, even at the time of the whole assemblage, has a nature as a creator through the nature of another, it is a capacity [that exists] prior to this.'

³ T. *thag bzaris* 'loom.'

whole assemblage he alone is the cause. And, since he has an essential nature that is always present, how at any time could there be the absence of the whole assemblage for him. For this very reason, showing this, he says:

125c. He is not able not to create the whole assemblage¹

557.13 He is not able not to create, not capable of not creating, the whole assemblage, [locative case] with reference to the whole assemblage. Because he is capable of creating every effect he is not able to remain indifferent to the birth of the whole assemblage either. To the objection that he may then generate the whole assemblage, he says;

125d. Nor to create because of the non-existence of that.

557.17 Nor is he able to create the whole assemblage. Why? Because of the non-existence of that, because of that whole assemblage not existing. And if its essential nature is not existing, like the child of a barren woman, nothing is able to be produced because it is lacking a nature. Which will be said²:

Even after hundreds of millions of world-ages³ there is not change for the non-existent.

558.1 Let that one be a creator when the whole assemblage exists, nevertheless drawn by the force of the whole assemblage, does he create not desiring it himself or desiring it? These are the two alternatives. Supposing the first alternative of those, he says:

¹ Cf. LVP translation: 'Il n'est pas maître de ne pas agir quand ce complexe des conditions est réalisé.'

² Verse 147.

³ Verse 147 reads *hetukoṭīśatair* in place of *kalpakoṭīśatair*. T. supports this reading.

126ab. If God creates not desiring it, it follows that he is dependent.

558.6 If it is considered that God, the Supreme Being, creates, produces a result, not desiring it, not wishing it, it follows that he is dependent. It follows, it results [as an unwanted consequence], that he is dependent, dependent on others, because there is the consequence for one creating by force of the whole assemblage although not desiring it, of it occurring by force of that [assemblage]. Nor is it right that one experiencing dependence on others is God because of the extreme consequence.¹ Regarding the second alternative, he says:

126c. And desiring it, he would be dependent on desire.

558.12 But if one accepts the second proposition that he creates desiring it, nevertheless he would be dependent on desire. This is because of acting for the result when the desire exists and not acting when that [desire] is absent² there would be dependence on that [desire]. Hence:

126d. How can one creating be God?

¹ T. *g'zan gyi dbaṅ du myoṅ ba yaṅ mi yin te / dbaṅ phyug ṅid dor ba thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro* 'And he does not experience dependence on others because of the consequence of abandoning being God.'

² T. does not translate *tadabhāve cāvyāpārāt* 'because of not acting when that [desire] is absent.'

558.16 **How can one creating, producing a result in this way, be God?** Whence is his Supremacy? This is what has been said by someone¹: Because he is intelligent God does not have this fault. For one devoid of intelligence would create an effect at once² produced merely by his own presence, but one possessed of intelligence although able to create does not create without desiring to do so. So, what is the objection to this?³ [Commentator] That too is negated. For so it is: Even that desire has its basis merely in his own presence. Why does he not create [it]? So there is the same objection to this. Moreover, if those [desires] are not cooperating causes, why does he not create even when there is an absence of those? And if there is not an absence of cooperating causes when creating an effect⁴ he is always dependent on those.⁵ And if [you say] they are cooperating causes then when they are present why does he not create every result since he is capable when the cooperating causes are complete? [Opponent] What is incapable alone is not the creator. [Commentator] Then is he the creator through another's nature? If one replies that he is such, then he is simply not the creator, for one who is not a creator by his intrinsic nature is not called "creator." [Opponent] Also his intrinsic nature is describable by the words "innate power." It is suitable for an effect. [Commentator] Enough now of

⁶ The word *ākāśa* is best translated as 'ether' in the context of Nyāya and related systems of thought since it is the substratum of sound; *diś* more closely corresponds to 'space'.

¹ A similar argument has been put by Uddyotakara in the *Nyāyavārtika*, paraphrased by Kamalaśīla TSP commentary on verse 87, p. 55. See fn. in Jha's translation, p. 95.

² *akrameṇa* 'not consecutively.'

³ T. adds *rtaḡ par byed ces pa* 'That he [would] always create'.

⁴ Read *kāryakāraṇe in place of kāryākāraṇe*. T. '*bras bu byed pa la*.'

⁵ T. construes this phrase as an answer to the previous question and reads *sahakāriyaikalye* in place of *asahakāriyaikalye*. T. *lhan cig byed pa'i rgyu dañ bral na yañ 'bras bu byed pa la thams cad du de dbañ du gyur pa'i phyir ro* 'Because of dependence on those at all times when creating an effect even if there is a lack of cooperating causes.'

consideration of adventitious powers. [Opponent] Even though capable by nature he not a creator without the presence of cooperating causes. [Commentator] In that case one beloved of the gods [i.e., a fool]¹ would even say this: "despite being a mother, by nature she is a barren woman." So, now let it be. But [God being] impermanent is not accepted by those claiming that [God]. And that being so, how is one whose nature is common to others God? Therefore it is established that the diversity of the world is not a result of God.

559.17 If the world does not have an intelligent creator, then earth, trees, mountains etc. consisting of a mass of permanent atoms arise gradually through a combination of two atoms and so on. Hence he says, **those who ...**

127ab. Those who declare eternal atoms have already been refuted.²

559.21 Those Mīmāṃsakas and followers of other [systems] **who declare eternal atoms**, who speak of smallest atomic particles as the cause of the diversity of the world, **have already been refuted**, been repudiated, because of negating them with the words "the parts because of their division into atoms,"³ at the time of investigating smallest atomic particles. Hence this world also does not consist of eternal smallest atomic particles.

560.4 He has thus disposed of God as cause and, in the space of half a verse, of smallest atomic particles as being the essential nature of the world. Explaining the doctrine of the Sāṃkhyas, to refute [the doctrine that the world] is comprised by the transformation of primary matter in order to justify that same fourth way⁴, he says, **the Sāṃkhyas ...**

¹ On the significance of *devānām priya* and its degeneration from use as a royal title to meaning a fool or blockhead, see Hara (1969) pp. 13-26.

² Verse 87.

³ Verse 87.

⁴ i.e., *ahetutas*. Cf. 540.8, 540.10.

127cd. The Sāṃkhyas hold that Primary Matter is the eternal cause of the world.

560.9 The Sāṃkhyas, followers of Kapila, hold that, think that, Primary Matter, another name for which is "Primary Nature," is the eternal cause of the world. And they believe that that [Primary Matter] is the eternal, with imperishable nature, cause, cause in the form of evolution, of the world, of the whole moving and unmoving universe. To the question, "What is this which is called 'Primary Matter'?", he says, *sattva* ...

128. "*Sattva, rajas and tamas*"¹, the constituents, remaining in equilibrium are called "Primary Matter"; because of [their] disequilibrium one speaks of the world.

560.15 "*Sattva, rajas and tamas*", these three constituents, remaining in equilibrium, that have attained a state of equipoise, are called "Primary Matter", one speaks of "Primary Matter", the natural state of these. Because of [their] disequilibrium one speaks of the world; however, because these same constituents have attained a state of disequilibrium one speaks of the world. One speaks of the evolution of the diversity of the universe. For thus is their process²: At the time when longing in the form of enjoyment of objects arises for the Spirit (*puruṣa*), Primary Nature, which recognises the longing of the Spirit, is joined with the Spirit. And then it brings about evolution in the form of the creation of sound etc. This then is the order:

¹ 'Purity, activity, darkness.'

² P. *lo rgyus* 'account'. D. *rgyu*.

From Primary Nature the Great; from that Egoism; and from that the group of sixteen; and from five of the sixteen the five elements.¹

561.6 This is the meaning of this: *From Primary Nature the Great*, from Primary Matter the Great - "the Great" is a name of the Intellect.² *From that*, from the Great, *Egoism* - the notion "I". *And from that*, from Egoism, *the group of sixteen* - the eleven capacities³ and the five subtle elements. Therein there are five action capacities characterised by speaking, grasping, moving, excreting, and generating; and five sense capacities: hearing, feeling, seeing, tasting and smelling; while mind has the nature of both. Thus it comes to eleven. Further, the five subtle elements are sound, touch, form, taste and smell. *From five the five elements*, from the five, sound etc., the five elements come into being. The five elements are named space, wind, fire, water and earth. However the first, Primary Nature, is only a cause, not an effect; the Great and Egoism, and the five beginning with sound are an effect and a cause; the eleven capacities and the five beginning with space are only an effect, not a cause. The Spirit, however, is excluded from both natures. Hence what he says:

Root Primary Nature is not derivative; the seven beginning with the Great are primary⁴ and derivative. The sixteen however are derivative; the Spirit is neither primary nor derivative.⁵

562.1 And that Primary Matter, which is capable of every effect and simply consists of the three constituents, produces an effect. How else would what is not existing there be produced as an effect in a diversity of forms? And thus it is said:

¹ *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 22.

² P. *glo bur du brjod pa yin no* ? D. is illegible.

³ Ten plus *manas*.

⁴ T. *rgyu* 'cause' (as opposed to effect).

⁵ *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 3.

Only from Primary Matter where every power is gathered do the different results proceed. In reality their nature is just that. But if the effect did not exist potentially in the nature of the cause that would simply not be able to be effected¹ because it would be non-existent² like a sky-lotus.³

562.8 In this way, assuredly, from Primary Matter does the transformation of the world proceed in the form of effects, say the followers of Kapila. Thinking, in this way, all that appears is like a picture composed in the sky, the follower of the definitive system says in order to refute it, for one ...

129ab. For one to have three natures is illogical.
Therefore that is not.

562.12 For one existent Primary Matter to have three natures, to be three-natured through the division of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, is illogical, is inconsistent. Therefore, for that reason, that is not; that Primary Matter which consists of the three constituents does not exist. To say it is one [and] has many natures is contradictory. Hence, if that is disposed of, everything that is an effect of that may be eliminated. [Opponent] Granted that that single nature does not consist of three constituents, still the constituents intrinsically exist.⁴ To this he says, likewise ...

129cd. Likewise the constituents do not exist for they too are each tripartite.

¹ T. *de ñid byed par nus yin te* 'would be able to be effected.'

² T. *med pa'i phyir* TSP p. 18 understands it as 'because it would be without essential nature:' *nairūpyād iti / niḥsvabhāvatvāt*.

³ TS 7-8 with minor differences.

⁴ T. reads *tat* in place of *tāvat* : *de'i rañ b'zin gyi yod pa yin no* Skt. *tatsvarūpatas santi* 'exist with that [tripartite] intrinsic nature.'

562.19 Likewise, like Primary Matter, the constituents in the form of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* do not exist for they too are tripartite. For (*hi*) in the sense of "because." They too, the constituents, are each, individually, tripartite, have three aspects. For so it is: By them saying that everything is constituted by the three constituents the constituents also each turn out to be in themselves constituted by three constituents. In this way, the constituents of that [Primary Matter] also, insofar as they are constituted by three constituents, do not exist having one nature. And when, if one investigates in this way, the constituents do not exist, then sound and other forms of the transformations of that also are not logical. Therefore he says, and if the constituents do not exist ...

130ab. And if the constituents do not exist the existence of sound etc. is extremely far off.

563.8 And - the word "and" in the sense of accumulating another refutation - if the constituents, *sattva* etc., do not exist, are not real, the existence, real existence, of sound etc. - through the use of the word "etc." touch and the rest are comprehended - is extremely far off, is not logical in any way at all, because the existence of an effect is untenable if the cause is non-existent. And what has been said:

For this manifest (*vyakta*) is manifestly seen as endowed with happiness etc. because it is perceived as one with the nature of serenity, torment and depression.¹

that too is not logical. In order to justify *sattva* and the rest [of the primary constituents] having the nature of happiness etc. one speaks of the manifest - the forms etc. which are the transformations of those [primary constituents] - as concomitant

¹ Cf. TS 14. The second line of the verse in the TS reads: *prasādatāpadainyādikāryasyehopalbdhitas* 'because of the perception here of the result of serenity, torment and depression etc.'

with happiness etc. as the reason. That [concomitance] does not exist.¹ Therefore he says, and in ...

130cd. And in unconscious cloth etc. there is not the occurrence of happiness etc.

563.18 **And** - the word "and" as above - in **unconscious, inanimate, cloth etc.**, in woven cloth etc. whose nature is unconscious, **there is not the occurrence**, not the existence with the same nature, **of happiness etc.** whose nature is conscious. This is because *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* themselves are spoken of as happiness, suffering and delusion and those constituents do not exist. Then how would there be happiness etc. there?

564.3 That may be so but woven cloth etc. are not said to have the nature of happiness etc. insofar as they are constituted by happiness etc. but rather because the arising of happiness etc. is from those. Supposing this, he says, **if existents ...**

131ab. If existents have as their nature the cause of those, haven't existents been investigated?

564.7 If it is thought that external **existents**, woven cloth etc., **have as their nature the cause**, have essential natures which are the cause², **of those**, of happiness etc., **haven't existents been investigated?** These woven cloths etc. do not have natures which are substances possessing parts, nor natures which are atoms, nor are they constituted by three constituents. In this way existents have been **investigated**, examined with reasoning. And since appearances are without essential

¹ T. does not translate this sentence. It is written in the margin of the original manuscript. See fn. LVP p. 563.

² T. *byed pa po* 'creator.'

nature like an illusion¹, which of these existents then will have a nature which is the cause of happiness etc? Moreover, if the manifest has the nature of happiness etc., the cloths etc. would be produced by happiness etc. Hence he says, **and for you ...**

131c. And for you it is happiness etc. which are the cause.

564.15 **And for you Sāṃkhyas it is happiness etc. which are, would be, the cause of cloth since the manifest is constituted by happiness etc. And so:**

131d. And therefore cloths etc. are not [the cause].

564.17 From the word **etc.** sandalwood rosaries etc. [are understood]. But here the opposite is perceived. Hence he says, **but happiness etc. ...**

132ab. But happiness etc. would be from cloth etc; in the absence of those, happiness etc. would be non-existent.

565.2 **But, however, happiness etc. - from the word 'etc.' suffering etc. [are understood] - would be, would come to be, from cloth etc. - from the word "etc." rosaries etc. [are understood]. In the absence of those, in the absence of those cloths etc., happiness etc. would be non-existent; because they are a result of cloth etc. happiness etc. also would not be. Happiness etc. are a result of those in conformity with negative and positive concomitance of those. And that**

¹ T. *'di ltar dños po nmam par dpyad ciñ brtags pa na rigs pas dños po snañ ba rnams kyañ sgyu ma lta bu yin te / rañ bñin med pa'i phyir ro* 'If in this way existents are examined, investigated, logically, even apparent existents are like an illusion because they are without essential nature.'

eternity of happiness etc. which is claimed insofar as they are constituted by *sattva* and the other constituents is not accurate. Hence he says, **and the eternity ...**

132cd. **And the eternity of happiness etc. is never perceived.**

565.10 **And** - the word "and" in the sense of the intention to declare an additional fault - **the eternity**, having a permanent nature, **of happiness** suffering and delusion¹ **is never perceived**, is not seen, because, since the constituents themselves do not exist, the eternity etc. of those is not tenable. And if happiness etc. were eternal they would be perceived eternally. Hence he says, **if happiness ...**

133ab. **If happiness exists in the manifest state why is it not experienced.**

565.15 If happiness etc. have natures that abide truly, they would always be so. Therefore there would always be the experience of those.² Because of not relinquishing that nature, is the overall meaning. **If happiness exists in the manifest state**, if at one time happiness is present in the manifest state, if happiness is eternal, **why is it not experienced**, why would there not be the experience of happiness at all times. But there is not the experience at all times. Therefore, sometimes it is not being experienced and at that time that does not exist. Since that has been ascertained, how is it eternal?³ [Opponent] It may be that there would be

¹ T. *btañ sñoms* 'indifference.'

² T. *gal te bde ba la sogs pa rtag pa'i rañ bzin du gnas pa yin na / de'i tshe ji ltar nam zig bde ba'i rañ bzin yin pa de bzin du nam yañ zes pa ni rtag tu de rigs par 'gyur te* 'If happiness etc. abide as an eternal nature then just as at a certain time there is the nature of happiness so at any time there would be. Therefore, they always would be experienced.'

³ T. *ji ltar rtag pa ñid du nies pa yin* 'how is it ascertained as eternal?'

this fault if its nature were manifest always, however when the same [happiness], insofar as its nature is potential, disappears there is not the fault. Hence he says, the same ...

133cd. The same goes to a subtle state. How can that be gross and subtle?

566.5 The same having completed abiding in the manifest state through recourse to a [gross] existent, afterward, at the time of non-perception, goes to a subtle state as stars by day have recourse to their unperceived essential nature. [Commentator] This is inconsistent. Why? Because how can that which is gross, existing with manifest nature, be subtle? How can that happiness etc. have an unmanifest nature? Insofar as it is eternal it is not logical for what is single to have many natures, is the sense.¹ [Opponent] It is not tenable for two mutually incompatible [properties] to be at one time in what is single, however, because of the arising of the latter property on the cessation of the former property, there is not a fault. To this he says, if, having abandoned ...

134ab. If, having abandoned the gross state, it becomes subtle, the gross and subtle states are impermanent.

566.14 If, having abandoned, having relinquished, the gross state, the state of visible nature, it becomes subtle, its nature were hidden - if it is accepted as so - [then] the gross and subtle states are impermanent. Because they are consumed by² arising and perishing the gross and subtle states would be transient.³

¹ T. *de ltar mi gsal ba'i rañ b'zin bde ba la sogs pa de rtag pa yin pas gcig pu ni du ma'i rañ b'zin ñid du gcig pu mi rigs so zes bsams pa yin no* ? Perhaps delete *gcig pu*.

² T. *dbañ du gyur pa* 'subject to.'

[Opponent] Let it be so. If they are eternal what damage is there [to our case]? To this he says, why isn't ...

134cd. Why isn't the impermanence of every thing accepted as like that?

566.19 Why isn't the impermanence, why isn't perishing without continuance, of every thing characterised by the twenty five principles (*tattva*) accepted, assented to, as like that, as like the gross and subtle state. This is the intent: It is not tenable for both the gross and subtle state to be visible and hidden existents without perishing without continuance and arising of the [previously] non-existent.¹ Otherwise because of continuing to exist somehow in some form there would be the consequence of perceptibility again as previously. Happiness etc. are also like that.² Therefore, certainly, perishing without continuance and arising of the [previously] non-existent are to be assented to.³ And just as these two [perishing and arising] are for those two [gross and subtle state] so it would be for the others as well because there is no difference. Moreover, if perishing and arising are accepted of the gross and subtle state then there would be the consequence of the impermanence of happiness etc. For so it is: That gross state may be different from or the same as happiness. In that case, if it were different then even when that [gross state] ceases happiness would be experienced as previously. For even if a piece of cloth ceases [to be] the non-perception of a jar is not logical because there would be the consequence of an infinite

³ T. does not translate *adhruve sthauyasūkṣmate syātām* 'the gross and subtle states would be transient.'

¹ T. *rjes su 'gro bar med pa'i 'jig pa skye ba med par* 'without perishing without continuance [and] arising.'

² T. does not translate this sentence.

³ T. *de lta bas na ñes par de dag rjes su 'gro ba med par 'jigs pa yañ dag par skye ba ñid du khas blañ bar bya'o* 'Therefore, certainly, perishing without continuance [in a subtle state] and real arising [of something new] are to be assented to.' T. reads Skt. *sadutpāda* or *saṃyagutpāda* in place of *asadutpāda*.

regress if there were conceptualisation of the relation as 'that of that'. And even if there is a relation, on the cessation of what is not a cause, the cessation of the other is not logical, just as when a cow ceases to be [the cessation] of its owner [is not logical]. Nor is that [gross state] the cause of happiness because there would be the arising of happiness simply from a piece of cloth etc. And also that is not a cause because of its being at the same time as happiness etc. But as to the proposition that it is the same, to this it is said:

135a. If the gross state is not other than happiness

567.17 If the gross state is not other, not different, than happiness¹ then that would be just happiness. Then:

135b. Clearly, happiness is impermanent.

568.2 Insofar as it has the nature of that, happiness ceases on the cessation of the gross state. Because of that clearly, certainly, **happiness is impermanent**, is perishable. [Opponent] That may be so but if there were destruction totally then there would be no further arising of happiness because of the impossibility of the completely non-existent, like a sky-lotus, arising. Showing the opinion of the opponent to be thus he says, **if it is thought ...**

135cd. If it is thought that something non-existent does not arise because it does not exist

¹ T. *gal te rags pa bde ba las gzan te tha dad pa yin na* 'if the gross state is other, different, than happiness.'

568.8 That which is not existing in any way in the nature of the cause¹ does not arise, like a sky-lotus. And likewise, even if it were other [than the cause] it would not arise. Hence, if it is thought, if it is assented to, that **something non-existent does not arise**, something with a completely non-existent essential nature does not arise - why? - because it does not exist, because of its non-being, then one should not say this. Hence, he says, **the arising ...**

136ab. **The arising of the non-existent manifest, is settled for you though you do not like it.**

568.14 **The arising, the origination afterwards, of the non-existent manifest, of the manifest not existing previously in the potential state, [though you do not like it]², though unwished for, is settled for you, has befallen³ you who follow the doctrine of arising of the [pre-]existent. Otherwise, given the real existence of that previously as afterwards, there would be the consequence of the perception of that previously as well. Just as the arising of the non-existent manifest so, if there were [the arising] of something else, then nothing would be contradicted.**

568.19 Furthermore, because this too is supposed as another means of refuting the follower of the doctrine of the [pre-]existent effect (*satkāryavādin*) on account of the real existence of the effect in the state of the cause, he says, **one who eats ...**

136c. **One who eats food would be eating excrement**

¹ T. *rgyu med pa'i bdag ñid la* 'in the nature of what is not the cause.'

² T. includes *mi 'dod kyañ*.

³ T. *de yod pa* 'that exists [for you].'

569.2 **One who eats food (*annāda*) is one who eats food¹ (*annam attīti*), i.e., an eater of food, would be eating excrement, would be one who eats filth. How?**

136d. **If the result is present in the cause.**

569.5 **If the effect had its essential nature existing in the cause. For so it is: The effect of the food is excrement. And that, for the follower of the doctrine of the [pre-]existent effect, exists in the food state. Therefore, one supposes that for you because of eating food one eats that. Moreover, drawing out this too as another consequence for the follower of the doctrine [pre-]existent effect, he says, having bought ...**

137ab. **Having bought cotton seed for half the price of woven cloth one should be clothed in it.**

569.10 **The connection is: if the result is present in the cause: because of the real existence of the woven cloth - the effect that will come to be - in the cotton seed - the cause - having bought, having acquired, cotton seed for half the price, the cost, of woven cloth one should be clothed in it, it should be put on. [Opponent] That may be so but even if the effect exists absolutely in the cause, nevertheless people belonging to the conventional world, their eyes afflicted by the darkness of conventional ignorance, do not see it. Supposing this, he says, if the world ...**

137c. **If the world does not see it because of delusion**

¹ T. *bza' bar bya'i don gyis na zas yin la* "because of the meaning 'to be eaten' it is food"

569.17 If, in the case that, **the world does not see it**, does not perceive the reality of things though it exists, **because of delusion**, because of unknowing, then there is not the consequence of the fault spoken of. But surely ...¹

137d. **Even for the knower of reality that is the practice.**

570.2 Even if the world not seeing does not make the conventional to be thus, it nonetheless applies² to the knower of reality. Because it is not so³, **even for the knower of reality**, even for the adherent of Sāṃkhya doctrine who knows the absolute, [who knows] that the effect is in the cause, **that is the practice**; that is the rule⁴ common to all conventional people. They too are seen⁵ engaged in eating food etc. and rejecting seed of cotton when seeking woven cloth. Nor is this counter fitting here. Hence, he says, and the world ...

138ab. **And the world also has that knowledge. Why does it not see?**

570.9 **And the world**, conventional people, **also**, not just the knower of reality, **has that knowledge** by which it understands that the effect is in the cause. For so it is: Having seen the effect, the ascertainment that it exists in the cause is common to both the knower of reality and the world. Hence, **why**, for what reason, **does it**, the world, **not see?** To that [the opponent] must say that the world has a

¹ T. *gal te brjod do že na / de kho na ñid śes pa yañ gnas pa ma yin nam* 'If you say that, isn't it the situation even for knowers of reality?'

² T. *rigs pa ma yin te = na yujyate* 'it is not correct.'

³ T. does not translate *evam*.

⁴ T. does not translate *vyavasthitih*.

⁵ T. *ma mthoni* 'not seen.'

reason not to see. To the response that the seeing of the world is not authoritative¹ he [Śāntideva] says, **if the world ...**

138c. If the world is not authoritative

570.16 **If the world, conventional people², is not authoritative - if the knowledge of those does not have sufficient authority:**

138d. Vision of the manifest also is not true.

570.18 **Viewing of the manifest, the specific nature of which is to be visible, also is not true, would be not authoritative. Therefore the correct determination of the reality of things does not obtain. And this is exactly what we maintain because all conventional means of knowledge are, in absolute terms, without authority. And thus you are put on our side. And in this way the accomplished follower of Kapila³, [in turn] drawing out a means of refutation common even to the follower of the definitive system⁴ says, if a means of knowledge ...**

139ab. If a means of knowledge is not a means of knowledge isn't what is known by that false?

571.5 [Opponent] **If your thesis is that even a means of knowledge, in absolute terms, is not a means of knowledge, [then] isn't what is known by that false? If the means of knowledge does not have sufficient authority what is**

¹ T. *tshad ma yin* 'is authoritative.'

² T. does not translate *lokasya sāmvyavahārikajanasya* 'the world, conventional people.'

³ i.e., follower of the Sāṃkhya system.

⁴ i.e., a Mādhyamika.

known by that, what is determined by that means of knowledge, is false, turns out to be untrue. What else would be [a consequence]?

139cd. The emptiness in reality of things¹ through that is not possible.

571.9 If the means of knowledge does not have sufficient authority and what is known by that is false then the emptiness, the absence of essential nature of all *dharma*s, in reality, in absolute terms, of things, of *dharma*s, which is ascertained through that means of knowledge, also is not possible, is not logically consistent, because what is shown by all the means of knowledge would be wrong. The same logic dictates that the absence of essential nature² of all *dharma*s which is demonstrated by the valid argument of the one investigating would also [be wrong]. [Śāntideva] states the counter to this: not having contacted ...

140ab. Not having contacted the conceptualised thing one does not apprehend the non-existence of that.

571.16 Not having contacted, not having apprehended with the conceptualising intellect, the conceptualised by conceptualisation, the attributed, thing, *dharma*, one does not apprehend, perceive, the non-existence of that.³ For so it is: Having thoroughly conceived a pitcher in its attributed nature the world understands the non-existence of a pitcher insofar as [non-existence] is related to that [existence]. When, by investigation which is generally admitted by the world no real nature at all

¹ T. of the root text reads *sgom pa* (= *bhāvanā*) in place of *bhāva*. The verse in Tibetan thus suggests that meditative development (*bhāvanā*) of emptiness is not possible. However, the commentary in Tibetan, in keeping with the Sanskrit verse reads: *de'i phyir de ñid du dños rnams ston pa ñid ni 'thad pa yin*.

² T. *med pa* 'non-existence.'

³ T. *de'i dños po* in place of *de'i dños med* of the verse.

remains of the pitcher, then even less is there any non-existence of it, i.e., of the nature of which is opposite to that [existence]. Showing just this¹, he says, **therefore the non-existence ...**

140cd. Therefore the non-existence of that thing which is false is clearly false.

572.2 Because the non-existence is apprehended² by the discernment of the conceptualised thing **therefore the non-existence, the absence, of that thing, thing without essential nature, which is false, which has a non-existent essential nature, is clearly, certainly, false, is untrue, because the nature of that too is thoroughly conceptual. And thus, given the thoroughly conceptual nature of existence and non-existence, only the absence of essential nature of all *dharmas* remains. Again clarifying this by the device of a conclusion³, he says, **therefore when ...****

141ab. Therefore when in a dream a child has perished the notion "he is not" ...

572.9 Because existence and non-existence are false significations since they are applied by conceptualisation, **therefore when in a dream, in the state when mind is overpowered by sleep, a child, a son, who has perished as soon as arisen, the notion "he," the son, "is not," the notion of his non-existence ... What does it do?**

141cd. Obstructs the arising of the notion of his existence

¹ T. *de ñid brtags pa* 'just this conceptualised [non-existence].'

² T. *'dzin pa ma yin* 'is not apprehended.'

³ *upasaṃhāra*. One would expect a word meaning 'example.' Perhaps equivalent to *drṣṭāntopasaṃhāra* 'presenting an example.' See BHSD *upasaṃhāra* p. 142.

572.13 It obstructs, it prevents, the arising, the emergence, of the notion, the attribution of existence, of his, the son's, existence. [Opponent] In that case that [i.e., the notion of non-existence] is exactly so [i.e., true]. [Commentator] No [that is not so]¹:

141d. And that is false.

572.17 [That] notion², although it obstructs the notion of his existence, is false, is not true³, because the son in the dream has not arisen or ceased. Alternatively, all this [world] could be applied to [the example] of the child, accepted as real, which has perished in a dream.⁴ In this way, one would see that the arising and cessation of all *dharmas* has been made to appear⁵ by conceptualisation.

573.3 This has been said: The existence and non-existence of an object perceived in a dream, even though the object has neither arisen nor ceased, [are] made to appear by conceptual construction [and] are not ultimately real. But, because of conceptual construction, they enter the domain of everyday transactional reality and appear to the mind. And that conceptual construction insofar as it has an unreal object⁶ is not authoritative because its object is ultimately without essential nature. [Not authoritative] in just the same way, is the determination of existence and non-existence [of an object] even though perceived in the waking state, i.e., of [existence and non-existence] which, established by conceptual construction, have entered into

¹ T. *brdzun pa yin te* 'it is false.'

² T. *de brtags pa yin no* 'that is conceptualised.' Vaidya *sā kalpanā*.

³ Following T. *brdzun yin la / bden pa ma yin te*. Skt.: 'is false because the untrue son in the dream ...'

⁴ Cf. CS III 25 (*Acintyastava*): *utpannaś ca sthito naṣṭaḥ svapne yadvat sutas tathā / na cotpannaḥ sthito naṣṭa ukto loko 'rthatas tvayā*. This verse is quoted in part on p. 573.11.

⁵ T. *brtag pa* (P. *brtags pa*) 'conceptualised.'

⁶ T. *med pa'i yul can yin pas*.

the course of everyday transactional reality. Therefore even if that [determination] is not authoritative the absence of essential nature of all *dharmas* is not undermined.

What [Nāgārjuna] says:

The world is said to arise, endure and perish in fact¹; therefore, you have declared that all *dharmas* are merely conceptual construction.² Even the conceptual constructions by which emptiness is conceived is said to be not existent [absolutely].

is all appropriate. In this way, having refuted that the world has as creator its own nature (*svabhāva*), God, and Primary Matter which are not its cause; and having established the meaning of "nor without a cause,"³ summing up, he says, therefore

...

142ab. Therefore on examination in this way nothing exists without a cause.

573.18 Because no effect at all is logical⁴ as arisen from itself etc. therefore on examination, by the immediately preceding investigation, in this way nothing exists without a cause. Nothing, no result at all, exists, is found, without a cause, arisen without a cause through its own nature etc. And this is an implication: There is also not being created by Spirit, time etc. because they too are not causes. Therefore "nor without a cause" is established. [Opponent] But even if nothing exists without a cause, through its own nature, [caused by] God, Primary Matter etc.,

¹ T. *skye dan gnas dan 'jig pa yan 'jig rten bsam pas* 'because the world is thought to arise, endure and also perish.'

² This quote is incorrectly identified by Sastri (1950) and Vaidya as *Acintyastava* 34. The first line (with minor differences) is from CS III 25 (*Acintyastava*), *pādas* c and d; the rest of the quote is CS III 36. According to Lindtner (1982) p. 149 fn. 25, CS III 25 is inspired by *Samādhirāja* IX 17. Regarding CS III 36 see *ibid.* p. 153 fn. 36.

³ MK 1.3 quoted p. 540.8, p. 357.13.

⁴ T. *skye ba = utpadyate* 'arises.'

nevertheless it will arise absolutely from the observed cause itself. Then how will the absence of essential nature of all *dharma*s be established? Supposing this intent of his opponent, justifying the three lemmas:

not from self, nor from another, nor from both¹

he says, and not present ...

142cd. And not present in individual or collected conditions.

574.10 And not, not at all, present, located, in individual or collected² [conditions]. And nothing in those individual, singly "from self or other," or collected, from both self and other, conditions, causes, is [present] with an arising nature.

574.14 In regard to that, first, existents do not arise from self, that is, from their essential nature (*svabhāva*), because that essential nature does not exist prior to the arising [of the existents]. From what could they arise? And if that [essential nature] had arisen [previously] why would they arise³ since that would exist in its intrinsic nature? Moreover, if there were birth from self there would be further birth of what has already arisen and that is not right because the doing of what has been done is not tenable. If there were further birth of what has arisen there would be the activity simply of the seed etc. as long as *saṃsāra* lasts; the sprout etc. would never find the opportunity to arise. And though one accepts this, experiencing its contradiction in the mundane world, one does not arrive at a way of proof, because one sees the arising of sprout etc. from seed etc. Nor are seed and sprout identical for the form, flavour,

¹ MK 1.3 quoted p. 540.8, p. 357.13.

² The commentary indicates that *vyastasamasteṣu* 'individual or collected' is a *dvandva* compound.

³ MS. *kim utpadyatām* 'Why would that arise?' See LVP p. 574. fn. 2.

energy and digestibility are different for both. And if [things] were producible from their own essential nature there would not be the arising of anything because of their dependence on each other. For so it is: Until essential nature occurs there would not be arising and until arising occurs there would not be essential nature. They are dependent on each other.¹ Therefore nothing arises from itself.

575.8 Nor from another. For if birth from another is maintained there would be the consequence of the arising of a millet sprout even from a rice² grain. And rice and millet would not be distinguished as different with regard to a millet sprout. Or there would be the birth of everything from everything because there would be no distinction of all things as different to one another. [Opponent] But even if not distinguished as different, nevertheless, because effect and cause are necessary as the reciprocally existing produced and producer, there would not be the arising of everything. [Commentator] No. For, of whose potential³ may one speak when the effect has not arisen? And when the effect has arisen⁴ of whose potential may one speak since the cause does not exist? Nor is there any strict necessity of effect and cause as existing as produced and producer insofar as they do not occur at the same time. For this very reason the strict necessity of them as one continuum is also not right because without effect and cause the continuum does not exist. And since that does not persist for one moment⁵, what is it that is called "continuum?" And because a stream of earlier and later moments is an attribution by conceptual construction a substantial continuum does not exist. And because of this the necessary likeness is

¹ T. *de'i phyir gcig la gcig brten pa yin no* 'therefore they are dependent on each other.'

² T. does not translate *śāli* 'rice.'

³ T. *gañ gis* (read *gi*) *nus pa = kasya punar śaktir*. Read *kasya* in place of *kasmin*. Cf. LVP p. 575 fn. 2

⁴ T. *skyes pa la yañ rgyu dañ 'bras bu med pa'i phyir = utpanne ca kāryakāraṇasyābhāvāt*.

⁵ T. *de skad cig ma gcig tu gnas pa yin pa'i phyir* 'since it persists for one moment.'

negated in this case. Thus neither is something that has occurred in one¹ continuum alike to something nor is there the necessary existence [of them] as produced and producer. And since the very existence of produced and producer are conceivable² [only] in regard to this [attributed continuum] how can there be a counter by way of that [continuum]. Therefore there is also no occurrence of anything from another.

576.4 Nor from both because of the consequence of all the faults³ spoken of for each position. And because the two, powerless individually, also do not have the capacity when combined. For a path unable to be seen by one blind person also cannot be seen by many. Or, grains of sand which are incapable of yielding sesame oil individually are also unable to do that when combined.⁴ Therefore because of the consequence of the faults explained for both positions there is also no occurrence of the arising of anything from both.

576.9 Thus, in reality, nothing exists produced from self, other or both, or produced from a non-cause. Therefore, in terms of the absolute, everything⁵, the totality, appears with an essential nature that is neither arisen nor ceased, like an illusion, a mirage, a reflection and an echo⁶, dependently arisen, quite empty of essential nature. However the mere principle of conditionship is not negated here conventionally. Which has been said by the Blessed One in regard to this in the *Śālistambasūtra*: "Therein how does one see dependent arising? Here the Blessed One has said as an introduction ⁷: 'Whoever sees this conditioned origination as incessant, impersonal, as it is, non-erroneous, without individuality, unborn, unarisen,

1 T. does not translate *eka* 'one.'

2 T. *dpyad par bya* 'are to be examined.'

3 T. *ñes* (read *ñes*) *par thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir*. T. does not translate *sarva* 'all.'

4 Reading negation with T.: *tshogs pa la yan de'i nus pa yod par mi 'gyur ro*.

5 Read, with Vaidya, *sarvaṃ* in place of LVP *sava*.

6 T. does not translate *pratibimbapratiśrutkā* 'a reflection and an echo.'

7 *upanayena* ?

unmade, unconditioned, unobstructed, without support, quiescent, fearless, immoveable, undecaying¹, of unceasing nature², he sees the Dharma. And whoever sees [the Dharma]³ thus as incessant, impersonal etc., as before up until, of unceasing nature, he sees the Buddha, highest Dharma-body when he realises the Noble Dharma through perfect knowledge⁴ Why is it called conditioned origination? It has causes and conditions and is not without causes and conditions, [therefore] it is called [conditioned origination]⁵ ... Furthermore, this conditioned origination arises from two causes.⁶ From which two causes does it arise? From a causal relation and from a conditional relation. And that should be seen as twofold: external and internal. Of those, what is the causal relation of external dependent origination? It is this: From a seed a sprout, from the sprout a leaf, from the leaf a shoot, from the shoot a stalk, from the stalk a swelling, from the swelling⁷ a bud, from the bud a calyx, from the calyx⁸ a flower, from the flower a fruit. If there is not a seed the sprout does not come to be, up until, if there is not a flower the fruit does not come to be. But if there is a seed the development of the sprout occurs, in the same way up until, if there is a flower the development of the fruit occurs. In that, it does not occur to the seed, 'I cause the sprout to develop,' nor does it occur to the sprout, 'I am developed by the seed.' In the same way up until, it does not occur to the flower, 'I cause the fruit to

¹ T. does not translate *avyayam* 'undecaying.'

² T. *mam par 'gyur ba ma yin pa* 'unchanging.'

³ Cf. p. 387.12.

⁴ T. *de 'phags pa'i chos ñe bar rtogs te / yañ dag pa'i ye śes dan ldan pa'i bla na med pa chos kyi sku sañs rgyas mthoñ no źes gsuñs so* ' "...he realises the Noble Dharma and sees the Buddha as the highest Dharma-body endowed with perfect knowledge" ' Cf. Stein's fragment: *sa āryadharmābhisamaye samyagjñānāprāpter anuttaradharmāśarīraṃ buddhaṃ paśyaṭīti*. Cited LVP, *Douze causes* p. 72 fn. 8; the Tibetan of Stein's fragment is given in Reat (1993) p. 33.

⁵ The Tibetan translation of the *Śālistambasūtra* in the Kanjur reads: *de'i phyir rten cin 'brel bar 'byuñ ba źes bya'o* See LVP, *Douze causes* p. 93, Sastri (1950) p. 47, Reat (1993) p. 33.

⁶ T. *gñis kyis phyir* 'on account of two.'

⁷ T. does not translate *gañḍaḥ / gañḍāt* 'a swelling, from the swelling.'

⁸ T. does not translate *śūkaḥ / śūkāt* 'a calyx, from the calyx.'

develop,' nor does it occur to the fruit, 'I am developed by the flower.'¹ Nevertheless, if there is a seed the development of the sprout occurs, it becomes manifest. In the same way up until, if there is a flower the development of the fruit occurs, it becomes manifest. In this way, the causal relation of external dependent origination is to be seen.

578.01 How is the conditional relation of the external dependent origination to be seen? Through the coming together of six elements. Through the coming together of what six elements? Namely, through the coming together of the earth, water, fire, wind, space and season [elements]² the conditional relation of external dependent origination is to be seen. Of those, the earth element performs the function of supporting the seed. The water elements moistens the seed. The fire element matures the seed, The wind element develops the seed.³ The space element performs the function of not obstructing the seed and the season performs the function of transforming the seed. If there are not these conditions the development of the seed from the sprout does not occur. But when the external earth element is not wanting, and likewise water, fire, wind, space and season are not wanting, then, from the coming together of all these, when the seed is ceasing, the development of the sprout occurs. Therein, it does not occur to the earth element, 'I perform the function of supporting the seed.' In the same way up until⁴, nor does it occur to the season, 'I perform the function of transforming the seed.' Nor does it occur to the sprout, 'I am produced by these conditions.' Nevertheless if there are these [conditions]⁵, when the

¹ Read, with Vaidya, *puṣpeṇa* in place of LVP *bījena*.

² T. includes *khamś mams* 'elements.' Traditionally the six *dhātus* are earth, water, fire, air, space and consciousness (*vijñāna*). The *Śālistambasūtra* gives this list: See LVP, *Douze causes* p. 77, Sastri (1950) p. 8, Reat (1993) p. 45. For the various meanings of *dhātu* see BHSD p. 282. In this passage, 'season' substitutes for 'consciousness.' See Reat (1993) p. 36.

³ Read, with Vaidya, *bījam* in place of LVP *vījam*.

⁴ T. gives the complete series.

⁵ T. includes *rkyen* 'conditions.'

seed is ceasing the development of the sprout occurs.¹ And this seed² is not made by itself, not made by another, not made by both, not created by God, not transformed by time, not born of Primary Nature, not dependent on a unique cause³, nor arisen without a cause. ⁴Through the coming together of earth, water, fire, space and season, when the seed is ceasing, the development of the sprout occurs. In this way, the conditional relation of external dependent origination is to be seen.

578.22 Therein⁵, external dependent origination is to be seen under five aspects.⁶ Which five? Not as eternity, not as annihilation, not as passing over⁷, as the development of an extensive result from a limited cause and as a series similar to that [cause]. How not as eternity? Because the seed is one and the sprout is another. That which is the seed is not the sprout. Rather, the seed ceases and the sprout arises.⁸ Hence not as eternity. How not as annihilation? The sprout is not brought about through the previously ceased seed nor from the non-ceased; but the seed ceases and at that very time the sprout arises, like the arm of a balance rising and falling.⁹ Hence not as annihilation. How not as passing over? Seed and sprout are dissimilar.¹⁰ Hence

¹ T. adds *de bzin du me tog yod na 'bras bu'i bar du yan mñon par 'grub par 'gyur te* 'and in the same up until, if there is the flower the development of the fruit occurs.'

² Read *ayam añkuro* in place of LVP *ayañkuro*.

³ T. does not translate *ekakārañādhīnaḥ* 'dependent on a unique cause.'

⁴ T. begins *'on kyañ* 'but.'

⁵ T. *de ltar* 'thus.'

⁶ Read *ākārañair* in place of *kārañair* 'causes.' T. *mam pa lñar* supports this reading. See LVP, *Douze causes* p. 75 fn 5.

⁷ i.e., from one state to another.

⁸ T. *sa bon 'gags pas myu gu 'byuñ ba ma yin / ma 'gags pas kyañ ma yin te / sa bon yañ 'gags la / de ñid kyi tshē myu gu 'byuñ ste* 'the sprout does not arise from the the seed that has ceased nor from the non-ceased. The seed ceases and at that very time the sprout arises.' Cf. the next point concerning annihilation.

⁹ Cf. MA VI 19. The passage of the *Śālistamba* containing the example of a balance is quoted MABh. p. 97. See also AKBh III 15ab and AKV.

¹⁰ T. *gañ gi phyir myu gu yañ gzan sa bon yañ gzan la myu gu gañ yin pa de ñid sa bon ma yin te* 'because the sprout is one and the seed is another. That which is the sprout is not the seed.' Cf. the case above concerning not as eternity.

not as passing over. How as the development of an extensive result from a limited cause?¹ A limited seed is sown; it causes extensive fruits to develop. Hence as the development of an extensive result from a limited cause. How as a series similar to that [cause]? As is the seed sown so is the fruit it develops. Hence as a series similar to that [cause].² In this way, external dependent origination is to be seen under five aspects.

579.16 Internal dependent arising has been explained in detail previously³ and this should be supplied here.

579.18 In this way, on investigation absolutely, the conventional is indeed not negated.

579.19 [Opponent] Surely existents are not totally non-occurring but rather by force of causes and conditions they come⁴ from the future time to the present time; from the present again by force of impermanence they go to⁵ the past time. Thus is the representation of arising, duration and destruction. And dependent arising duly fits⁶ in this way. Thus supposing the opinion of the adherent of the three times⁷, he says, and ~~neither has it~~ ...

143ab. And neither has it come from elsewhere, nor does it remain, nor does it go.

1 T. does not translate this sentence.

2 T. does not translate this sentence.

3 See p. 386, pp. 482-3.

4 T. *su 'gyur la* 'arrive at [the present time].'

5 T. *su 'gyur la* 'arrive at [the past time].'

6 T. *'gyur ro* 'occurs.'

7 i.e., the Sarvāstivādins-Vaibhāṣikas. See AKBh V 25-7.

580.5 Neither has anything come, arrived, from elsewhere, from [another] time or place, nor does it, that has arrived¹ from a real² present time, go anywhere, nor does it remain anywhere with that single essential nature. For so it is: If the present were to arrive³ from a future time or the past from the present then even the conditioned would be permanent because of always being present. It would not be called "impermanent." And how will one establish that that *dharma* is not permanent?

580.11 [Opponent] But insofar as it devoid of operation at a former and later time there is a difference in the *dharma* in the [three] times. For so it is: When it has not obtained the operation, it does not do an action. Then it is designated "future." When it is acting it is present; but when it has ceased acting it is past.⁴ Thus is the difference. [Commentator] But this is nothing. Even then that [*dharma*] would have real existence by way of the same self and therefore one would have to say how there would not be the operation [of that]. And dependence on other conditions is not possible for a nature that persists permanently. And if what is devoid of operation is an entity there would be the consequence of the reality of even horse's horns etc. Or, how is the operation described as past, future and present? Is [the operation] from the existence of an operation other than that or from itself? If the former there is an infinite regress⁵; if the latter, nothing at all is destroyed⁶ when there is the determination that the *dharma* itself is past etc. And if it exists as past and future in the same way that it exists substantially as present then it is not so.⁷ How can a *dharma* existing with an

1 T. does not translate *āgatam* 'arrived.'

2 T. does not translate *sat* 'real.'

3 T. *ma 'oṅs pa'i dus na da ltar byuñ bar 'gyur* 'if it were to become present in the future.'

4 T. *'das pa ma yin* 'not past.'

5 T. *žugs pa med pa*. Read *thug pa med pa*.

6 T. *ñams pa*. Read, with Vaidya, *kṣīyate* in place of LVP *kṣūyate*.

7 T. does not translate *na* 'not' and construes *tadā evaṃ* with the next sentence: *de'i tshe 'di ltar* 'then, in this way.' Perhaps we should read *tadā tenaiva svabhāvena*

essential nature have an essential nature that is not arisen and is destroyed? What [part] of this did not exist formerly¹ which because of its non-existence [the *dharmā*] is described as "unborn?"² And what does not exist afterwards which because of its non-existence it is described as "destroyed?"³ If it continued to exist⁴ with that same nature at an earlier and later time there would be the consequence of perceiving it etc. as during the present. Therefore in no way is possession of the three times feasible through a *dharmā* that does not occur because it has not come into being.⁵ For one accepting reality there is not the real existence of past etc. Concerning that, there is this summarising verse:

Essential nature always exists⁶; a permanent existent is not maintained;
there is no existent apart from essential nature. Clearly the activity of
God!⁷

⁸One may say that since the sūtra says, "past karma exists; the future result exists," the past etc. existent exists. However the Blessed One said, "past exists, future exists," in

'then [how can a *dharmā* existing] with that same nature ...?' Cf. AKBh V 27bc p. 298 *tenaiva svabhāvena sato dharmasya* and below p. 581.7 *tenaiva cātmanā ... avasthāne*.

- 1 T. '*di ltar* 'in this way.' Perhaps reading *evaṃ* in place of *pūrvam*.. Skt. agrees with AKBh V 27bc p. 298.
- 2 T. *skyes pa* 'born.'
- 3 Cf. AKBh V 27bc p. 298 which the author must have had in mind when composing this passage.
- 4 T. *rtag tu yod pa na* 'if it always existed.'
- 5 T. *de lta bas na ma byuñ ba'i phyir med pa'i chos 'gro ba ma yin te ji ltar yañ dus gsum dañ ldan pa'i de kho na ñid khas len pa na 'das pa la sogs pa yod pa ma yin no* 'Therefore, because it has not come into being, a non-existent *dharmā* is not feasible and, for one accepting the reality of possession of the three times, in no way is past etc. existent.'
- 6 Vaidya *sarvadā nāsti* is not supported by T. or AKBh V 27 where the verse is quoted.
- 7 Read, with Vaidya, *īśvaraceṣṭitaṃ* in place of LVP *īśvaraveṣṭitaṃ*. T. *dbañ phyug spyod pa* and AKBh V 27bc where the verse is quoted. AKV comments on *vyaktam īśvaraceṣṭitaṃ: nātra yuktir asti* 'there is no logic in it.'
- 8 See AKBh V 27bc p. 299 which the author clearly had in mind for the following argument. See also LVP *Kośa* vol. 4 p. 58 fns. 1, 3.

order to negate that view in regard to the denial of cause and result. But past is what, previously non-existent, has arisen and perished; the future is what will come to be when the cause exists. Thus [the Blessed One] said, "the cause etc. exists." Because the word "exists" serves a grammatical function it occurs in relation to the three times. Thus, in this way, the Blessed One said this in the *Paramārthaśūnyatā*: "The eye, O monks, arising does not come from anywhere, nor ceasing is gathered anywhere. For thus, O monks, the eye, not having been, comes to be, and having been, vanishes." And if the future eye existed [the Blessed One] would not have said, "not having been, it comes to be."¹ Therefore there is not passage over time. And if in this way one knows not coming from anywhere or going anywhere, on investigation, no nature at all remains of what has arisen like an appearance. Then:

143cd. What difference from an illusion does this, which the foolish take as true, have?

582.9 What difference² from an illusion in the form³ of an elephant etc. created by a magician does this appearing entity produced by causes and conditions have insofar as it is without essential nature? None at all. In what way is it not different? Again making this evident, he says, that what is created ...

144. That which is created by illusion and that which is created by causes - from where does that come⁴ and to where does it go? This should be investigated.

¹ Quoted AKBh V 27bc p. 299.

² Following T. *khyad par ci yod de = ko viśeṣaḥ*, which better reflects the structure of the verse.

³ T. adds *mig yor dan mtshun pa* 'like an appearance.'

⁴ Read, with Vaidya, *āyāti* in place of LVP *ayāti*.

582.15 Here, by the word "illusion" the special kind of consciousness etc. which is the cause creating the illusion¹ is conveyed because of the metaphoric use of effect in the sense of cause, and in order to teach the illusory essential nature of the cause.² **That which is created by that³, that is to say, that entity⁴ which is fashioned by an illusory cause⁵ with an illusory essential nature; and that other⁶ entity which is created by causes, produced by causes generally admitted by the world. The word and in the sense of mutual conjunction.⁷ From where, whence, does that⁸ entity created by illusion or created by causes come and to where does it go, and when it is destroyed where does it go? This⁹ in this way should be investigated, should be examined with a keen eye. One observes whether that comes from anywhere or goes anywhere. [Opponent] But if the entity is produced by the capacity of causes and conditions then how possibly could it be false? [Commentator] For this very reason it is false. Therefore he says, what is seen ...**

145. **What is seen with the presence of another [and] not [seen] because of the absence of that; in that artificial [entity] which is similar to a reflection, how can there be reality?**

¹ T. *sgyu mas sprul pa'i sgyu mar śes pa la sogs pa* 'consciousness etc. of the illusion created by the illusion.'

² T. D. *rgyu dañ*. Read P. *rgyu yañ*.

³ T. *don dañ* (read *gañ*?) *des sprul pa yañ rtogs par bya ba'i ched du* 'and in order to teach that object which is created by that.'

⁴ T. does not translate *vasturūpaṃ* 'entity.'

⁵ Read, with Vaidya, *māyāhetunā*.

⁶ T. Does not translate *anya* 'other.'

⁷ The word 'ca ('and') is used twice in the Sanskrit to emphasise the close connection between the two.

⁸ T. *de lta bas ni* (read *na*?) agrees with MS *tasmāt*. See LVP p. 583 fn. 1.

⁹ T. *de'i phyir* 'therefore' for *iti*.

583.10 **What is seen, the entity observed, with the presence of another, [with the presence] of causes and conditions, [and] not [seen] because of the absence of that, not seen because of the absence of that other, because its occurrence depends on that other. Similar to a reflection, like a likeness of a face etc. appearing as a reflection on the disk of a mirror. Just as the reflection appears with the presence of the disk of the mirror with the image of the face etc. and does not appear if that is absent, so also does the entity [appear or not appear] on the presence or absence of causes and conditions. In such an artificial entity which is without essential nature insofar as its presence is dependent on another how¹ can there be reality, non-falsity? It is simply not tenable because the non-artificiality of essential natures which are in the trust² of another is not tenable. That has been said:**

Those whose arising is from causes and which do not occur in their absence; how pray can they not be clearly considered the same as a reflection?³

584.1 Therefore nothing produced by causes and conditions exists absolutely. Nor does the capacity of causes and conditions occur anywhere absolutely.⁴ For so it is: An existing thing, or one not existing, or one whose nature is both would be made by causes that were its own, another's or both. Of those an existing [thing] would not be made. Therefore he says, **what use ...**

146ab. **What use is a cause for a thing that is existing?**

¹ *kutas*. Verse *katham*.

² T. *khyad par* 'attribute.'

³ CS I 4 (*Lokātīstava*). This is identified as *Lokātīstava* 4 by Sastri (1950) and as from the *Yuktiśaṣṭikā* by Vaidya. It may be compared to *Yuktiśaṣṭikā* 39 which is quoted above p. 500.14. CS I 4 is quoted MV p. 413.6.

⁴ T. does not translate *paramārthataḥ*.

584.7 **What use is a cause, efficient cause, for a [thing] with a real essential nature that is existing prior to the functioning of the cause.¹ Since there is an absence of an essential nature that is to be brought about insofar as the effect is complete, the functioning of a cause is useless. Regarding the second alternative, he says, but if ...**

146cd. **But if that is not existing what use is a cause?**

584.12 **But if - in the sense of illuminating another way - that is not existing, does not have a real essential nature, then what use is a cause? Even then there is no use whatsoever. Because of the absence of the functioning of a cause because of the non-existent essential nature in that case as well. [Opponent] That may be so but, even if, because of the absence of [anything] to be done² because the existing is complete, there is no use whatsoever of a cause, nevertheless why isn't there [a need for a cause] for the non-existing? To this he says, for a non-existent ...**

147ab. **For a non-existent there is no modification even by hundreds of millions of causes.**

584.19 **For a non-existent with a non-existing essential nature there is no modification, being otherwise, i.e, having the essential nature of an existent³,**

¹ T. *rgyu'i byed pa med pa'i phyir snar ma ñid du* 'because of the cause not functioning prior [to the existing thing].'

² T. *rgyu'i byed pa med pas* 'because of the absence of the functioning of the cause.'

³ *Anyathā* explains *vikāra* and I have translated accordingly. The modification, or being otherwise, consists in a non-existent having the nature of an existent. This does not happen. Cf. T. *dnos po'i* (read *med pa'i?*)*rañ bzin ñid la gzan ñid yod pa ma yin la = anyathātvam abhāvasvabhāvatāyāḥ* (or *-bhāvatāyām*) *nāsti*. T. on this reading has repeated the negation found at the beginning of the verse and the commentary on the verse.

because for that [non-existent] too¹, when investigated, there is an absence of [anything] to be done² even by hundreds of millions of causes. It must remain [without modification] by hundreds of causes, by thousands of causes, even by hundreds of millions of causes because, insofar as it is without essential nature, it is unable to be changed by anything at all.³ [Opponent] Granted there is not a change; by itself it has the essential nature of an existent. To this he says, with that state ...

147c. With that state how can it be an existent?

585.7 With that state, with its essential nature of a non-existent not abandoned, it would indeed not be an existent. A non-existent does not become an existent. Only⁴ on the cessation of the essential nature of a non-existent does the essential nature of an existent come to be. Here he says, and what else ...

147d. And what else can become existent?

585.11 If an antecedent non-existent does not assume the essential nature of an existent then what else apart from a non-existent, having abandoned its essential nature of a non-existent, can become existent, go to the state of an existent. That nothing else [can] is understood because the cause having the nature of the effect has previously been negated.⁵ [Opponent] It may be that nothing else becomes an existent, but an existent does not come to be at that time because of the existence of an

1 i.e., as well as the already existing.

2 T. *bya rgyu*. Concerning *rgyu* attached to verbal stems see Das (1902) *rgyu* 2. p. 316 and Beyer (1992) p. 296.

3 T. *bye ba brgya'i rgyu yis kyañ* 'even by hundreds of millions of causes.'

4 T. *'on kyañ* 'but.'

5 Verses 136-137.

antecedent non-existent hindering an existent.¹ Rather, it only comes to be afterwards when that [antecedent non-existent] is gone . [Śāntideva] says:

**148ab. If the existent is not at the time of the non-existent
when will the existent come to be?**

585.19 If, in the case that, the existent does not come to be at the time of the non-existent, when there is the presence² of the non-existent, when will the existent come to be? If the arising of the existent is not at the time of the non-existent there would never be the emergence of the existent because of its being always held back³ by the hindering non-existent. [Opponent] There will be the destruction of the non-existent by that same arising existent.⁴ In reply, he says,

**148cd. For with the existent not arisen that non-existent
will not go away.**

586.5 As long as that existent does not arise there is simply not the destruction of the non-existent.⁵ For (*hi*) in the sense of "because." Therefore⁶ with the existent not arisen, not produced, that non-existent, with the nature of the antecedent non-existent, will not go away, will not be removed. [Opponent] That may be so but no matter if the non-existent does not go away, when that has yet to go away the existent arises. And afterwards, when the existent has arisen, the non-existent quite by itself⁷

¹ T. 'on kyañ dños po med pa (P. yod pa)dañ 'gal ba yod pa las snar yod pa'i dños por 'gyur ba ni ma yin la ??

² T. rgyun 'continuity.'

³ T. rtag tu gegs byed pa' i phyir 'because of obstruction always.'

⁴ T. de ñid kyis bskyed pas na dños pos 'by the existent because of generation by that.'

⁵ T. does not translate this sentence.

⁶ T. does not translate *tasmāt* 'therefore.'

⁷ T. dños po med pa ñid 'the non-existent itself.'

will go away because existence and non-existence are mutually exclusive. In reply, he says, and if ...

149ab And there is not, if the non-existent has not gone away, a possibility of an occasion for the existent.

586.12 There is this order if the existent itself were to come to be before [the non-existent has gone]. **And there is not this. And in the sense of "because." And there is not, if the non-existent has not gone away, not ceased, an occasion, an opportunity, for the existent because of the presence of the non-existent hindering the arising of the existent. [There is not] a possibility of that. [Opponent] What if the cause itself removes that non-existent? [Commentator] No, because the functioning of the cause is only in the arising of the effect.¹ [Opponent] Simply producing the effect it also removes that non-existent. [Commentator] It only produces the effect if it is able to produce because of the absence of what hinders that [production]² and it is not able to produce that effect when the capacity of that [hindrance] is unimpeded. And there is not hindrance of that non-existent by the cause because of the continued presence³ of that antecedent non-existent on account of its existence even at the time of the cause. Therefore the function of the cause is not logical in regard to the effect whether its nature is existent or non-existent.⁴ And one should see that the negation has been made of the function of the cause in both [existent and non-existent], and neither [existent nor non-existent], cases simply because of the negation in each case. Nor is it possible for both because the**

¹ T. *rgyu de ni 'bras bu ñid la byed pa'i phyir* 'that cause functions only in regard to the effect.'

² T. *gal te de dañ 'gal ba'i med pa bzlog pa bskyed par gyur na* 'if the removal of the non-existent which hinders it is produced.'

³ T. *lhan cig gnas pa'i phyir* 'because of coexistence.'

⁴ T. *yod pa'i bdag gam med pa'i bdag ñid kyis* 'insofar as its nature is existent or non-existent.'

occurrence of affirmation and negation, which are contradictory, in one place at one time is not tenable. That has been said:

And existent thing does not arise, nor a non-existent, nor one that is existent and non-existent, not from itself, nor from another, nor from both. How would it arise?¹

In this way, to begin with, the arising of an existent is in no way at all possible in absolute terms; nor in any way is the cessation of an existing² essential nature which has arisen tenable. Hence he says, **and an existent ...**

149cd. **And an existent does not become a non-existent because of the consequence of having two essential natures.**

587.13 The word "and" with reference to the preceding. A non-existent does not become an existent and likewise **an existent does not become a non-existent**, [does not] go [to a state of non-existence]. Why? **Because of the consequence of having two essential natures.** When an existing thing acquires the nature of a non-existent then there would be the consequence of a single entity having two essential natures because of what is only one having the nature of an existent and a non-existent. Nor is it correct to say that having abandoned the state of an existent it assumes the nature of a non-existent. And since the existent itself is absent³ in that case, what assumes the nature of a non-existent? We do not know.⁴ Nor, given the absoluteness of an existing essential nature, is cessation logical because of the consequence of the non-existence of what is absolute. In this way, having established

¹ *Catuhstava* I 13 (*Lokātīstava*). Identified by Sastri (1950).

² T. does not translate *sat* 'existing.'

³ T. *dnos po yin pa* 'is an existent.'

⁴ T. *rīgs pa ma yin te* 'it is not logical [to ask].'

the non-existence of the arising and destruction of a thing in absolute terms, summing up, he says, **and thus ...**

150ab. And thus there is never annihilation nor existence.

588.2 **Thus, in the way described, because arising and destruction are not tenable. And in the sense of a reason. Because there is never, at any time, annihilation, destruction, nor existence, nor substantial reality. Nor¹ in the sense of conjunction. In accordance with the words: "Whether the Tathāgata arises or the Tathāgata does not arise this nature of *dharmas* indeed remains: the sameness of *dharmas*, the stability of *dharmas*, the definiteness of *dharmas*, the sphere of Dharma, suchness, non-mistakeness etc."² Because it is thus:**

150cd. Therefore this whole world is unborn and unceased.

588.9 **Therefore, because of the absence of arising and destruction spoken of previously, this, whose common substratum is absence of essential nature³, whole, entire, world, universe, termed "beings and the container-like world," or the moving and unmoving, is unborn, unarisen, and unceased, undestroyed, absolutely. Like the arising and cessation of an illusion on account of conventional usage however there is arising and cessation.⁴ Conventional truth is not negated by this it is said.**

¹ *ca* (with negation).

² Cf. *Śālistambasūtra* Sastri (1950) p. 4, LVP *Douze Causes* p. 73, Reat (1993) p. 34. For sources of this quote see LVP *Douze causes* p. 111. Unlisted is *Daśabhūmikasūtra* VIII p. 65, cited by Murti, (1960)p. 276 fn 2. See also MV p. 40 and LVP's notes on it. Pāli parallel is *Sam. N. II* p. 25.

³ T. *rañ bzin med pa dañ gzi mthun pa*. Read *rañ bzin med pa gzi mthun pa*.

⁴ T. *skye ba dañ 'gag pa gñi ga yin no* agrees with second hand *nirodhāv ubhau*. See LVP p. 588 fn. 2 . Vaidya *utpādanirodhau staḥ*.

And this has been stated in the *Dharmasaṃgīti*:¹ "Suchness², called 'suchness,' O son of good family, is an expression for emptiness. And that emptiness neither arises nor ceases. He says: 'If all *dharmas* are thus spoken of by the Blessed One as empty, then all *dharmas* will neither arise nor cease.'³ Nirārambha Bodhisattva says: 'As you fully realise, O son of good family, so it is: all *dharmas* neither arise nor cease.' He says: 'When the Blessed One said: 'conditioned *dharmas* arise and cease,' what is the intent of this which the Tathāgata spoke?' He says: 'The disposition⁴ of the world is conceptually attached⁵ to arising and cessation. The Tathāgata in his great compassion in order to remove the fear of the world said there, according to conventional usage, that they arise and cease but not that there is in this the arising and cessation of any *dharma*.' "

589.09 Therefore all *dharmas* insofar as their essential nature is not arisen and not ceased, are primordially quiescent, naturally in nirvāṇa. Thus given the absence of essential nature of the world, the states of existence of hell etc. included in that also are quite without essential nature. Showing this, he says, **but like a dream ...**

151ab. But like a dream are the states of existence; on investigation the same as a plantain.

¹ ŚS p. 263.1. LVP.p. 588 fn. 3.

² T. does not translate *tathatā*.

³ T. *gañ 'di* (P. om. 'di) *bcom ldan 'das kyiś 'di skad du chos thams cad ni stoñ pa'o źes gsuñś te / de bas na chos thams cad ni mi skye mi 'gag go* 'What the Blessed One has said is this: "all *dharmas* are empty.'" Therefore all *dharmas* neither arise nor cease.'

⁴ T. *gnas pa*.

⁵ T. *mñon par chags pa*. Read, with Vaidya, *-abhiniviṣṭaḥ* in place of LVP - *abhiniśiṣṭaḥ*.

589.14 But in a restrictive sense. Like, comparable to, a dream¹ are the states of existence with essential natures perceived in a dream, distinguished by the groups belonging to hells, hungry ghosts, animals, humans and gods. Just as going and coming to another country etc. in a dream and experiencing happiness and suffering so one should understand the [going and coming] into hell etc. of one who has not realised absolute reality. But not in reality [is it thus]. How? On investigation the same as a plantain - this states the reason. Because on investigation, when there is examination, insofar as all *dharmas* are without essential nature [the states of existence are] the same as a plantain; therefore² states of existence are without core like a plantain. Thus is the meaning. As he [Śāntideva] said above:

This is only an illusion³, therefore O heart⁴ cast off fear ...⁵

That too showed what is to be established. Because all *dharmas* are unarisen and unceased, he says, between the released and ...

151cd. Between the released and the unreleased there is no difference in reality.

590.8 Between the released who are released from all bonds because of removing the obscuration of all *dharmas* and the unreleased within the prison of saṃsāra whose mental continuum is subject to the snare of passion and the other defilements there is no difference. No differentiation is possible between both of those. How? In reality, absolutely, because insofar as all *dharmas* are without essential nature they are naturally in final nirvāṇa. However, conventionally there is

1 The commentary indicates that *svapnopamās* is a bahuvrīhi compound.

2 T. does not translate *tasmāt* 'therefore.'

3 T. *sgyu 'dra* 'like an illusion' = *māyeva* in place of *māyaiva*.

4 T. *sñin la* 'in the heart.'

5 IV 47. T. adds *śes phyir brtson pa bsten* = *bhajasvodyamaṃ prajñārthaṃ* 'make effort for wisdom.'

indeed a difference. This has been taught in many ways. For this very reason [Nāgārjuna] says:

Because there is no difference between the realm of beings and buddhas in reality, therefore¹ the equality of self and others is believed by you.²

Thus spiritually immature people trouble themselves with their self having fashioned the multiplicity of the attributed world through false³ conceptual attachment because of not thoroughly knowing absolute reality. Showing this, he says, when in this way

...

152. When in this way *dharmas* are empty what would be gained, what would be lost? Who by whom would be honoured or reviled?

153. Whence is happiness or suffering?⁴ What is agreeable or disagreeable? What craving would there be? For what would there be that craving⁵ when searched for by way of its essential nature?

154. On investigation what is the world of living beings? Who, pray, will die here? Who will be? Who has been? Who is a relative? Who is a friend of whom?

591. 5 When in this way, in the manner set forth, *dharmas* are empty, without essential nature, what would be gained? What from anywhere would be

1 T. does not translate *yena* 'because' and *tena* 'therefore.' CS III 42 *tena ... tena*.

2 CS III 42 (*Acintyastava*). Identified as *Acintyastava* 40 by Sastri (1950).

3 T. does not translate *mithyā* 'false.'

4 Vaidya *duḥkhaṃ* in place of LVP *dukhaṃ*.

5 Read, with Vaidya, *ṛṣṇā* in place of LVP *ṛṣṇa*.

received about which they will delight at the gains?¹ **What would be lost?** What would be removed from anyone by anyone such that they would be angry about what they possess being removed? **Who by whom would be honoured, revered, or reviled, offended against?** In the absence of a substantial essential nature no one [would be] by anyone, is the meaning.

591.10 **Whence, because there is no cause of happiness², is happiness?** Or whence, because there is no cause of suffering, is suffering? The word "or" in both cases³ in the sense of mutual conjunction. **What is agreeable, what is dear to one, such that for the sake of its receipt or removal an effort would be made since what has an agreeable form has a conceptualised nature?⁴** Or what is disagreeable, what is undesirable? Nor does anything disagreeable exist absolutely. Therefore to what end is an effort made to meet with what is desirable and be apart from what is undesirable. With what craving do people⁵ crave for the sake of profit etc?⁶ For what would there be that craving? For what thing, which is an opportunity for attachment, would there be craving when searched for by way of its essential nature, when investigated by way of its intrinsic nature? Insofar as [the craving] has no object since its object does not exist there is also the absence of that [craving] through whose power this and that action (*karma*) is accumulated.

592.3 **On investigation, when there is examination of intrinsic nature absolutely, what is the world of living beings, the world of beings?** Nothing at all because

¹ T. adds *cui zad gañ las kyañ thob pa ma yin no* 'nothing would be gained from anywhere.'

² T. does not translate *sukhahetor abhāvāt* 'because there is no cause of happiness.'

³ Verse *sukhaṃ vā duḥkhaṃ vā*.

⁴ T. *de dga' ba'i rañ bzin ñid kyī spoñs pa* (P. *phañs pa*) *ci žig yod de / brtags pa'i no bo yin pa'i phyir* 'what is that loss of agreeable nature since its nature is conceptualised?'

⁵ T. *skye bo gañ žig* 'do what people?'

⁶ T. does not translate *ādi* 'etc.'

of the non-existence of that. **Who, pray, will die here** for, when investigated, the world of beings is without real essential nature?¹ **Who, pray, will die here** in the world of beings? [Whose] vital power will have ceased? **Who will be?** Who will arise? **Who has been?** [Who has] previously arisen? In this way conventional usage of "passed away" etc. is simply conceptual construction. **Who is a relative?** Who is kindred? **Who is a friend of whom?** Who is a companion of whom? In every case "here" is to be supplied. Because of intense attachment to whom one also takes no account of unwholesomeness. Thus is the reality which is only attributed by conceptual construction for it is devoid of essential nature. Hence he says, **may they** ...

155. **May they, who are like me, comprehend that all is like space; they who become angry and delight on account of quarrels and festivities [respectively].**

592.14 **May they, who are like me** having attributed intrinsic nature which is simply not existing, **comprehend that all this spoken about and the other is like space.** It resembles space because of the emptiness of the attributed reality. Saying "**like me**" the author makes himself an example. Spiritually immature people like me, who have not thoroughly known² absolute reality, their minds confused by wrong reasoning, **become angry**, get angry because of mistaken conceptual attachment; **they delight**, become overjoyed at possession of a false gain. With what [do they delight and become angry]? **On account of quarrels and festivities. On account of quarrels, on account of disputes, and on account of festivities, on account of enjoyments, respectively.** Therefore those who have not realised absolute

¹ T. *gson pa'i 'jig rten la dpyad pas sems can gyi 'jig rten med pa'i phyir* 'because when the world of living beings is investigated the world of beings does not exist' = *sattvalokābhāvāt* in place of *asatsvabhāvatvāt*.

² T. *yoñs su śes pa'i* 'who thoroughly know'.

reality, conceptually attached to what is only conventionally a substantial entity as real, believe all this, but not those who know the absolute. That has been said [in the *Pitāputrasamāgama*]: "The extent of the knowable is, namely, the conventional and the absolute and that is thoroughly seen, thoroughly known, thoroughly realised by the Blessed One as empty. For this reason he is called 'omniscient'. And in regard to this, the Tathāgata sees the conventional in terms of conventional usage. Furthermore, that same absolute is inexpressible, incomprehensible, unknowable, not taught, not explained, up to without action, without instrumentality, up to not gain, not non-gain, not happiness, not suffering, not fame, not disgrace, not form, not without form," etc.¹

There for the benefit of the world the Victorious One taught the conventional for the sake of² creatures³ whereby [creatures] might generate faith in the Sugata for happiness. The Lion of a Man, declaring the relative⁴, told the six states of existence of the hosts of beings⁵, namely, hells, animals⁶ and likewise hungry ghosts, the collection of demi-gods, men and gods⁷; also low families and high families, rich families and poor families.⁸

And so forth. And this is the result of not realising reality.⁹ Hence he says,

¹ See above p. 367.3.

² T. *dbañ du byas nas* 'having subdued.'

³ *jaga* T. '*gro ba*. Vaidya *jana* but ŚS p. 256.30 supports LVP. Concerning *jaga* see BHSg p. 94.

⁴ T. *kun rdzob bcas pa yi* (P. *yin*). Reading *saṃvṛti prajñāpayī* found in ŚS p. 137.4 and in Vaidya in place of LVP *saṃvṛti prajñāyayī*. Cf. LVP p. 593 fn. 5.

⁵ *sattvagaṇānām* LVP follows ŚS p. 177.2. T. *sems can gyur pa* agrees with MS. *sattvagatānām*. See LVP fn. 7 p. 593.

⁶ Following T. *dmyal ba dud 'gro*. This agrees with *narakatiraśca* ŚS p. 137.3. Cf. LVP fn. 8 p. 593.

⁷ *maru* is the equivalent of *deva*. See BHSD p. 420. T. *lha*.

⁸ ŚS p.256, MA p. 175. LVP p. 593 fn. 3.

⁹ T. *de kho na ñid śes pa'i* 'of knowing reality.'

156. Those desiring their own happiness through evil deeds spend their lives with great trouble in grief and effort, in despondency and in mutilating and cutting each other.

594.7 Grief created at the separation from a son or wife etc.; effort, exertion on account of obtaining happiness and avoiding suffering. In this grief and effort¹, those who are like me spend their lives with great trouble, is the connection. And in despondency: and in despondency, and in anguish, at the loss of profit, honour etc.; in cutting and mutilating each other: cutting hands, feet, heads, noses, ears etc. [and] mutilating forearms², shank, chest, side, belly³ etc. of each other, mutually. The word "and" continues to apply: and in this cutting and mutilating each other they spend their lives - in the process of time they exhaust⁴ the conditionings of long-life - with great trouble, with great hardship, their food, drink and clothing⁵ obtained with difficulty. Of what type are they?⁶ Those desiring their own happiness through evil deeds. Those desiring, disposed towards wishing for their own self's happiness through evil deeds, through unwholesome actions. And by different conduct⁷ of such a sort⁸:

157ab. After death they fall into evil states, the pains of which are long and intense.

1 T. D. *bral ba*, P. *bal ba*. Read *ñal ba*.

2 *bāhu*. T. *pha rol gyi* = *bāhya* 'external.'

3 T. *dpuñ pa* 'upper arm.'

4 *kṣapayanti*. T. '*phan pa* (P. '*phen pa*) 'to throw away, cast.' Perhaps reading *kṣepayanti*.

5 T. *zas dañ gos la sogs pa* 'food, clothing etc.'

6 T. *ji ltar gyur pa'i rgyud kyis ze na* 'with what sort of continuum?'

7 T. *yañ dag par dpyad pa*. Read *yañ dag par spyad pa*.

8 Reading *tathāvidhaiś ca samācāra viśeṣaiḥ*.

595.2 After death¹, the vital power relinquished, they fall into, go to, evil states of hells, hungry ghosts and animals. Of what kind [are the evil states]? The pains of which are long and intense. The pains of which, the pains in the evil states², are long, occur for a long time, and intense because the maturation [of one's deeds] that one must experience is unbearable. The word "and" in the sense of the conjunction of what has been said or [to be construed] in a different order [in the text]. In what way? To this he says, having come ...

157cd. Having come again³ and again to good states of existence and having become again and again accustomed to happiness.

595.8 [Having become again and again accustomed to happiness]⁴, having again and again⁵ fostered happiness. How? Having come again and again to good states of existence, having obtained again and again a propitious state of existence as a god or man. And again⁶ showing the successive submersion and emergence in the ocean of suffering for such as those, he says, and in existence ...

¹ T. adds *gañ gañ mams su 'chi ba* 'whosoever has died.'

² The commentary indicates *dīrghatīvravyatheṣu* is a bahuvrīhi compound.

³ Read, with Vaidya, *āgatya*. in place of LVP *agatya*.

⁴ T. *bde ba mañ po spyad spyad nas* 'having enjoyed again and again much happiness.'

⁵ T. does not translate *bhūtvā bhūtvā* 'again and again.'

⁶ T. construes *punar api* (T. *slar yañ*) with the previous phrase: *slar yañ dañ yañ thob nas* 'having obtained again and again.'

158. And in existence there are numerous abysses and therein unreality¹ is such. But therein there is mutual contradiction; there would not be² reality which is such.

595.13 And in existence, in saṃsāra whose nature is the desire, form, and formless [realms] there are numerous abysses, very numerous injuries. And therein unreality is such.³ Therein, in existence or in the abysses, unreality is such, unreality is such as appears because of delusion; the kind common⁴ to all people, such as has been set forth or is observed. But therein there is mutual contradiction.⁵ Therein where there is such unreality there is mutual contradiction⁶ there is incompatibility of one with the other.⁷ In what way? There would not be reality which is such.⁸ Therefore an entity is such because of the attribution of many aspects.

159ab. And therein are horrible endless oceans of suffering without compare.

596.2 And therein, even so, are horrible, extremely terrible to experience, endless insofar their maturation is over unlimited time or limitless insofar as the

¹ *asattva*. Vaidya reads *atattva* which is in keeping with T. *de ñid min*. The Skt. commentary has readings of both *asattva* and *atattva*; T. commentary reads *de kho na ñid* (= *tattva*) or equivalent throughout.

² *bhavet*. T. *srid na = bhavet* 'in existence.'

³ T. *der ni 'di ñid mi 'dra źes pa la*. Read *der ni de ñid min 'di 'dra ?* But compare below p. 595.18 *na tattvaṃ idṛśam* translated '*di ñid 'dra ba med*.'

⁴ T. *thun moñ ma yin pa* 'not common.'

⁵ T. *phan tshun 'gal bas na* 'because there is mutual contradiction.'

⁶ See previous fn.

⁷ T. *log par rtogs pa* 'disagreement.'

⁸ T. *srid na* (D. *pa*) '*di ñid 'dra ba med* 'in existence there is not reality ('*di ñid*?) which is such.'

sufferings are extremely extensive, oceans because of the impossibility of crossing them without having realised the Great Way, without compare, unable to be compared because of the non-existence of suffering like that apart from that. Nevertheless, [one might argue], somehow with great energy, having attained a good state of existence¹ after a long time because of the accumulation of wholesome factors, the [oceans of suffering] may be made an end of.² Hence³ he says,

159cd- There, in the same way, strength is little, and there
161ab. life is short; also there, with actions for life and health, with hunger, weariness and fatigue, with sleep and with misfortunes, likewise with fruitless meetings with the spiritually immature, life quickly passes in vain. Discernment however is very difficult to obtain.⁴

596.13 There, in an entry of such a form, in the same way its observed strength is little, that is to say, energy is low. And there, and when it is so, life is short, the conditionings of life are slight. Also there, with actions⁵ for life and health, with actions to prolong life for a long time by bathing and anointing the body etc. and with actions of health, or for health, for the alleviation of disease

¹ *sugati*, a good state of existence as a man or god from whence awakening is possible. T. *bde gśeḡs*, has interpreted the passage to mean having attained the state of a Sugata, i.e., a fully awakened one. The commentator may well have had both meanings in mind.

² T. *bde gśeḡs thob nas gnas par nus pa yin no* 'having obtained [the state of] a Sugata it is possible to remain.'

³ T. *dogs pas* 'having supposed [this of the opponent, in reply].'

⁴ Read *vṛthaiṅvāyur vahaty āśu vivekas tu sudurlabhaḡ* Cf. commentary p. 597.4 (*vṛthaiṅvāyur vahaty āśu*) and 597.7 (*vivekas tu sudurlabhaḡ*). *Vaidya vivekas tatra durlabhaḡ* is implausible.

⁵ Read, with *Vaidya*, *-vyāpāraiḡ* in place of LVP *vyārāraiḡ*.

especially by hot and bitter medicines and astringent drinks etc.¹ - this is connected with what is about to be said - and life quickly passes in vain, without the accumulation of the wholesome.² Likewise with hunger, the desire to eat, weariness, exhaustion³, and fatigue, lassitude on account of the path etc. With sleep and with misfortunes. With sleep, with sleeping, [and] with misfortunes created by being laughed at, derision, injury etc.; [misfortunes] created by snakes, wild beasts⁴; gad-flies and gnats etc.; [misfortunes] characterised by killing, bondage, beating etc.⁵ Likewise⁶ with fruitless meetings with the spiritually immature. Likewise with meetings, by contact, with the spiritually immature, with ordinary people.⁷ [Meetings] of what sort? Fruitless [ones] replete with self-conceit etc., with idle talk etc. "Likewise" [means] not only in the way spoken of previously but also in this way life quickly passes in vain. Life quickly, speedily passes, goes, because it is rapidly exhausted through indulgence in wrong activity, in vain, quite fruitlessly, because it is devoid of the accumulation of wholesome factors. And for those existing⁸ in this way discernment however is very difficult to obtain. Discernment however,

¹ T. *dge ba'i rtsa ba bsags pa med par tsha ba dan kha ba dan bska ba la sogs pa'i sman mams kyis so* 'without the accumulation of the root of the wholesome, by hot and bitter and astringent medicines.'

² See previous footnote.

³ T. *na ba ni nad pa'o* 'ailment is debility.' T. has understood *klama (na ba)* as 'ailment.'

⁴ *vyādamrga* See BHSD p. 517. T. *stag dan ri dags* 'tigers and hoofed animals.'

⁵ T. reads *vadhābandhanatāḍanādīlakṣaṇaiḥ* as qualified by *sarīṣpavādamrgadaṃśakādīkṛtaiḥ*: *sbrul dan stag dan ri dags dan sbran bu dan śa sbran la sogs pa mams kyis byas pa'i bsad pa dan / bciñs pa dan / brdegs (P. bgreg) pa la sogs pa'i mtshan ñid kyis* 'characterised by killing, bondage, beating etc. done by snakes, tigers, hoofed animals, gad-flies, gnats etc. ??

⁶ T. reads *tathā* 'likewise' with the previous sentence: ... *mtshan ñid kyis de bzin du yin no*.

⁷ Following Vaidya p. 278.19-20: *tathā bālasaṃsargair niṣphalaiḥ, tathā bālānāṃ pṛthagjanānāṃ saṃsargaiḥ saṃparkaiḥ*.

⁸ T. *da ltar byuñ ba'i dus su* 'at the present time.'

knowledge of what is to be abandoned and what is to be accepted¹, or, the relinquishing of mental distraction², is very difficult to obtain, is not obtained in any way even with great pain. Granted that it is so, nevertheless, [one may argue] if somehow mental application arises then there would be virtue. Because that too is not [the case] he says,

161cd- And there, whence is there a way to avert habitual
162ab. distraction? And there Māra strives for our fall
into great evil states.

597.14 And there, and when one has gone to such as state, whence is there a way, an access, to avert, to stop, habitual distraction, regularly practised mental indolence³? There is none. And there, having perceived⁴ somehow the wholesome factors of those abiding in a profitless succession like that⁵, Māra strives for our fall into great evil states, the Māra of the defilements or Māra son of the gods⁶, strives, endeavours, for our fall into great evil states, for the sake of our fall, that is to say, for the purpose of casting us into the *avīci*⁷ and other hells. [One might argue] even so sometime on account of complete confidence in the truths, the [three] jewels etc. somehow virtue arises, hence he says, and there, on account of ...

¹ Cf. *Catuḥśatakavṛtti* on verse XII 277, Tillemans (1990) Vol. II p. 4: *blañ bar bya dañ dor ba bya ba'i 'bras bu dañ bcas pa dag ñe bar bstan pa'i phyir ro.* 'For [the Blessed One] taught what is to be abandoned and what is to be accepted along with the result [of those].'

² *vyāsaṅga*, T. *nam par gyeñis pa.*

³ *auddhatya*, T. *rgod pa.*

⁴ T. adds *skyed par byed pa ni* (P. *na*) 'the producer' ??

⁵ T. does not translate *evam* 'like that.'

⁶ The other two Māras or Evil Ones are *skandhamāra*, the Māra of the psycho-physical constituents, and *mṛtyumāra*., the Māra of Death. For references see BHSD p. 430.

⁷ The lowest of the hot hells situated below Jambudvīpa, our world. See AKBh III 58.

162cd- And there, on account of the multitude of wrong
 163. paths, doubt is difficult to conquer. Moreover,
 birth under favourable conditions is difficult to
 obtain, the arising of a buddha is extremely
 difficult to meet with and the flood of defilements
 is difficult to stem. So, alas, a succession of
 suffering.

598.6 And there, [when] one attains such a state, on account of the
 multitude, preponderance¹, of wrong paths which are adverse to correct view and
 are expounded by Cārvakas, Mīmāṃsakas etc., doubt, uncertainty about the right
 path, is difficult to conquer. In no way can doubt be abandoned. And although
 somehow a good state of existence is obtained² moreover, birth under
 favourable conditions is difficult to obtain. Birth under favourable
 conditions completely free of birth under the eight unfavourable conditions³ is
 difficult to obtain, is exceedingly difficult to obtain:

Like a turtle inserting its neck into a yoke hole [adrift] on the great ocean.⁴

598.12 If somehow⁵ there is the occurrence of another birth under favourable
 conditions the arising of a buddha is extremely difficult to meet with.

¹ T. *mi che ba*. Read *che ba*.

² T. *brgya la bde 'gro thob kyañ brgya la yañ the tshom dor bar nus pa ma yin no*
 'although somehow a good state of existence is obtained, in no way can doubt be
 abandoned.'

³ See I 4 and commentary pp. 9-10. For further elaboration and references see
 BHSD pp. 2, 198.

⁴ IV 20. This simile is common in Buddhist texts. See LVP *Introduction* p. 25 fn.
 5 and Lindtner (1982) p. 223.

⁵ T. *brgya la ma žig na* 'if somehow one has not perished.'

The arising, the appearance, of the buddhas, the Blessed Ones¹, who produce light for the whole world, who remove the torment of the defilements which are the determining factor for all suffering, is extremely difficult to meet with in any way at any time. Like the Udumbara flower², the one who is the means of coming out of the ocean of saṃsāra [is extremely difficult to meet with].³ Even if somehow the arising of a buddha occurs the flood of defilements, the flood, the uninterrupted stream, [of passion etc.]⁴ is difficult to stem, even with suffering impossible to ward off. So, alas, a succession of suffering. So, in this way, "alas," in the sense of distress.⁵ A succession of suffering, of pain, because of falling into another suffering even when departing the first suffering.

599. 4 Now, having perceived beings who are greatly pained, his heart distressed⁶ with compassion, pained by the suffering of others, the author of the treatise, grieving at the suffering of beings, says, oh alas, greatly to be lamented ...

164ab. Oh alas, greatly to be lamented are those abiding in
the flood of suffering

599. 8 The combination of words⁷ ["oh" and "alas"] in the sense of distress. Greatly to be lamented, to be lamented abundantly, are those beings deficient in the thorough knowledge of what is beneficial and what is not beneficial, their minds troubled by immersion in and emergence from⁸ the succession of waves in the ocean⁹

¹ T. supplies missing word: *bcom ldan 'das*.

² T. *udu mba ra'i me tog b'zin du*.

³ T. includes this phrase *rñed par dka' ba yin no*.

⁴ T. supplies '*dod chags la sogs pa yin la* 'of passion etc.'

⁵ T. *kye ma zes skye ba* '[the exclamation] "alas" is produced.'

⁶ T. *gduñs pa*.

⁷ *nipātasamudāya* lit. 'combination of particles' referring to *aho bata*.

⁸ T. *skye ba dan 'jig pa* 'birth and destruction.'

⁹ T. *rgya mtsho de* (P. '*di*') 'that ocean.'

of suffering. And who are those beings who are to be lamented? He says, **who do not perceive ...**

164cd. **Who do not perceive their own wretched situation although in this way they are extremely unhappy.**

599.12 Those beings **who**, their eye of knowing blinded by ignorance, **do not perceive**, do not see, **their own wretched situation**, their own, selves', state of suffering **although in this way**, in the way described, **they are extremely unhappy**, remain excessively in suffering, that is to say, are involved in suffering. Clarifying with an example conformable with this, he says, **just like ...**

165. **Just like someone having repeatedly bathed might enter a fire again and again, they think their own situation to be good although in this way they are extremely unhappy.**

600.3 **Just like someone with an impaired mind having repeatedly bathed**, having repeatedly immersed themselves in water, suffering from the cold and desiring happiness, **might enter**, might go into, **a fire, flames, again and again**, continually or repeatedly. So too do these¹ beings **think their own situation to be good**, perceive their own [supposed] excellent state as happiness. **And in this way**, in the way set forth, **they are extremely unhappy**, they are devoured by the flames of the fire of suffering. Oh alas, the darkness of unknowing that overpowers them is so exceedingly dense that they do not see their own heedlessness. Hence, he says, **for those who are living ...**

¹ T. *de ltar zés pa ni*. Perhaps reading *tatheti* in place of *tathaite*.

166. For those who are living like that, their activity [as if] they are ageless and deathless, terrible calamities¹ will come placing death at the front.

600.13 Those for whom old age, the state of being old, does not exist are ageless; those who do not die are deathless. Their activity, their behaviour, [as if] they are ageless and deathless.² For those who are living with activity like that, certainly for those who are acting [like that] terrible, extremely fearsome³, calamities without interruption⁴ will come, will approach. All those are causes of suffering, misfortunes of old age, disease [etc.].⁵ How will they come? Placing death at the front. Placing death which is without remedy or exclusion at the front, causing death to precede.

601.1 And this has been said by the Blessed One in the *Rājāvavādakasūtra*:⁶ "Just as if, great King, from the four directions four mountains⁷ were to come, firm, strong, not fragmentary, without fissures, not hollow, well compacted⁸, one mass, touching the sky and rending the earth, grinding down all grass, timber, branches, leaves, foliage etc.⁹ and all sentient beings and breathing creatures. It would not be easy to protect oneself¹⁰ from those with speed or strength¹¹, or to ward them off with

¹ T. *nian son ltuñ ba* 'falling into evil states of existence.'

² The commentary indicates that *ajarāmaralīlānām* is a bahuvrīhi compound.

³ T. does not translate *ghorā atīva bhayaṃkārah* 'terrible, extremely fearsome.'

⁴ T. does not translate *nirantaram* 'without interruption.'

⁵ T. *rgud pa* (P. *par*) *ni de mams thams cad kyi sdug bsñal gyi* (P. *gyis*) *rgyu dag pa* (read *rga pa*) *dañ nad la sogs pas rgud par byas pa'o* 'As to calamity, all those causes of suffering, old age, disease etc. create misfortune.'

⁶ ŚS p. 206. LVP p. 206 fn. 1.

⁷ Read, with Vaidya and ŚS p. 206 *parvatā* in place of LVP. *parvavā*.

⁸ *susamvṛtta*, T. *śin tu mkhregs*.

⁹ T. does not translate *ādi* 'etc.'

¹⁰ T. *'bros pa* 'run away.'

¹¹ T. D. adds *nor gyis bzlog pa 'am* 'or to ward off with wealth.'

drugs, mantras or medicine. Just so, great King, these four great terrors come from which it is not easy to protect oneself with speed or strength¹, or to ward off with drugs, mantras or medicines. What are the four? Old age, disease, death and misfortune. Old age comes, great King, laying waste to youth; disease comes, great King, laying waste to health; death comes, great King, laying waste to life; misfortune comes, great King, laying waste to all good fortune. Why is that?² Just as, great King, the lion, king of beasts, endowed with beauty, endowed with speed, terrible with superb claws and teeth, enters the herd of beasts and having caught a beast does as he desires to do, and that beast³, encountering the extremely strong jaws of the beast of prey⁴ is helpless; just so, great King, for one pierced by death's arrow⁵, pride gone, without protection, without resort, without refuge, being cut to the quick⁶, flesh and blood drying up⁷, mouth thirsty⁸ and trembling, with hands and feet shaking, not able to act, incapable, smeared with spittle, snot, stinking urine and excrement⁹, with

¹ T. adds *nor gyis bzlog pa 'am* 'or to ward off with wealth.'

² T. does not translate *tatkasmād dhetoḥ* 'Why is that?' but repeats the formula: *de dag las mgyogs pas 'bros pa 'am / stobs kyis bzlog pa 'am / nor gyis bzlog pa 'am / rdzas dañ snags dañ sman mams kyis źi bar bya bar sla ba ma yin no* 'It is not easy to run away from these with speed or ...'

³ Translated on the basis of T. *ri dags de ni* and ŚŚ p. 207. Skt. reads *sa ca mṛgarājah* 'and that king of beasts.'

⁴ T. *kha mi bzad pa* 'terrible jaws' is supported by ŚŚ p. 207 *vyālamukhaṃ*.

⁵ T. *'chi bdag gi gsal śiñ gis thug ste* 'struck by the arrow of the lord of death.'

⁶ Or 'the vital parts.' According to AKBh 44b p. 156 the 'vital parts' (*marmāṇi*) are certain parts of the body the injury of which leads to death. T. P. (D. is illegible) *gśis ni 'jig* 'body being destroyed.' T. adds *tshigs ni 'bye źiñ bral* 'joints being divided and separated.' This corresponds with *mucyamāneṣu saṃdhiṣu* included in ŚŚ p. 207.

⁷ T. adds *lus ni nad kyis gduñ* (P. *gduñs*) 'body tormented by disease.'

⁸ *paritṛṣita*, T. *skom*. ŚŚ p. 207 *paritaptatṛṣita* 'burnt and thirsty.'

⁹ T. *gcin dañ / ñan skyugs kyis* 'with urine and foul vomit.' T. adds *mig dañ / rna ba / sna dañ / lce dañ / lus dañ / yid kyī dbañ po ni 'gags / skyigs bu ni 'byuñ / sgra ñar ñar po ni 'don / sman pas ni bor / snam dañ / (P. om. snam dañ /) kha zas dañ bza' ba dañ / thug pa thams cad kyis ni gles (P. sles) la bor te / 'gro ba mtha' dag tu ni 'gro / mal gyi tha ma la ni ñal / thog ma med pa'i skye ba dañ / rga ba dañ / na ba dañ / 'chi ba dañ / 'khor ba'i rgyun du ni nub / 'the eye, ear, nose, tongue, touch and*

only a little life remaining, taking up a new birth from this birth (produced by) acts (*karma*), panic-stricken by Yama's servants, overcome by the dark night¹, one's final breaths being obstructed², alone by oneself without a companion, leaving this world, approaching the other world, travelling the great path, entering the great wilderness, plunging into the great abyss, entering into the great darkness³, swept away by the great flood, led away by the wind of karma, going a direction without signs⁴, [for that

mind senses ceases, sobs arise, loud cries erupt, the doctor gives up, blankets, and food and drink, and broth forsaken, people completely go away, one sleeps in one's bed for the last time, one sinks into the stream of birth, old age, disease, death and becoming which is without beginning.

- 1 T. *byur* 'trouble.'
- 2 T. adds *kha dañ sna ni 'gags / so ni gcigs (read gtsigs?)/ sbyin pa sbyin no zes de skad gsol ba ni 'debs* 'mouth and nose blocked, teeth bared, one is entreated to give gifts.'
- 3 Following T. *mun pa chen por ni žugs* and ŚS p. 207 *mahāndhakāraṃ pratipadyamānasya* 'entering the great darkness.' Skt. *mahākāntāraṃ prapadyamānasya* 'entering the great wilderness' is merely repetitive.' T. adds *khrod sdug por ni 'jug* 'entering the evil throng.'
- 4 Following ŚS p. 207 *animittīkṛta* in place of *nimittīkṛta*. T. *sa tshugs med pa* 'without stations.' T. to the end of the quoted passage reads: *gyul ño chen por ni 'jug / gdon chen pos ni zin / nam mka' la ni 'chel / pha ma dañ / phu nu dañ / sriñ mo dañ / bu dañ / bu mos ni bskor / dbugs ni chad / nor bgo bśa bya zes ni zer / kyi hud ma / kyi hud pha / kyi hud bu zes zer te / skra ni bśig ste / sbyin pa dañ / dka' thub dañ / chos 'ba' žig grogs su gyur pa na / chos ma gtogs par skyabs gžan med / mgon gžan med / gnas gžan med / dpuñ gñen gžan med do // rgyal po chen po de'i tshe de'i dus na chos ni gliñ dañ / gnas dañ / mgon dañ / bžon pa dañ / ñal pa la mal 'jam po dañ / skom pa la chu grañ mo dañ / śin tu bkres pa la kha zas bzañ po dañ / mya ñan gyis gnod pa la dpugs 'byin pa dañ / gduis pa la tshim pa dañ / dgon par lam stor ba la lam ston pa dañ / nad kyis btab pa la sman dañ / sman pa dañ nad gyog byed pa dañ / chus khyer ba la gziñs dañ / 'dam du (D. bu)byiñ ba la 'jus dañ / brgal dka' ba'i zam pa dañ / ñam ña ba la 'bab stegs dañ / mun khuñ la sgron ma (P. me) dañ / rgya mtsho chen po la gru dañ / lhags pas ñen pa la rluñ med pa'i gnas dañ / yul gžan du 'gro ba la lam rgyags dañ / dbul po la nor dañ / byed par 'dod pa la grogs dañ / gcad (P. bcad) par 'dod pa la lag cha dañ / gžig par 'dod pa la rdo rje dañ / gyul ñor žugs pa la go cha dañ / 'jigs pa la stobs dañ / ldan pa'i grogs dañ / (P. om. dañ /) 'thab pa la dpuñ gñen dañ / dogs pa la go 'byed pa dañ / mu ge la nor dañ ldan pa dag mgon dañ / skyabs dañ / gnas dañ / rten du gyur pa de bžin du 'entering the great battle, seized by the great evil spirit, (*nam mkha' la ni 'chel* intent on the sky ?), surrounded by parents, brothers, sisters, sons and daughters one stops*

one] there is no other defence, no other refuge, no other resort except the Dharma. For the Dharma, great King, at that time is defence, resting-place and resort. As for one suffering from cold, the warmth of fire; for one having entered fire, extinction [of the fire]; for one suffering from the heat, coolness; for one on the road a very cool and shady grove; for the thirsty, very cool water; for the hungry, fine¹ food; for the sick, doctors, herbs and attendants; for the frightened, powerful companions; [all] are effective refuges." Thus at length. Therefore for the sake of doing away with this fear one should make an effort only in regard to the wholesome factors which are completely purified by wisdom.

602.18 Now, to remove the suffering of those pained by the suffering of birth etc. supposing² his own intention, he says, **when may I ...**

**167. When may I bring peace to those tormented by the
fires of sufferings in this way, through my own**

breathing, is asked to apportion one's wealth, calling out, 'O father, O mother, O children,' hair dishevelled. Generosity, austerity and the Dharma alone are one's companion: Apart from Dharma there is no other refuge, defence, resting place, or resort. Then, at this time, great King, the Dharma is an island, a resting place, a protection and a vehicle, as, for a one sleeping, a soft bed; for the thirsty, cool water; for the hungry, good food; for one oppressed by misery, encouragement; for the afflicted, consolation; for one lost in the wilderness, a guide; for one struck by illness, medicine, a doctor and nurse; for one carried away by water, a ship; for one sunk in a swamp, a hand; for the difficult to cross, a bridge; for the anxious, stairs; for a dark hole, a lamp; for the great ocean, a boat; for one pained by wind, a windless place; for one going to another country, provisions for the journey; for the poor, wealth; for one wanting to act, an assistant; for one wanting to cut, tools; for one wanting to destroy, a diamond; for one entering battle, armour; for the fearful, a strong friend; for a dispute, a final resort; for the apprehensive, space; for a famine, a good protector endowed with wealth; a refuge, a resting place, and a support.

¹ *praṇītam*. See BHSD p. 360. T. *bzai po*.

² T. *smon pas* 'aspiring for.'

means¹ of happiness arising from [my] clouds of merit.

603.3 When, at what time, may I bring, may I grant, peace, pacification, to those tormented, those beings afflicted, by the fires of sufferings, the flames of the sufferings of birth etc - the sufferings themselves are the fires - in this way, in the manner described immediately preceding this. How through my own means² of happiness, means of bringing about happiness, such as clothes, ornaments, unguents, beds and seats etc? Is it through what they have accumulated? No, he says, through my own³, through what belongs to my own self. Through what I have acquired myself, is the meaning. Is it through what is shown by a magical creation? No, he says⁴, through [the means] arising from [my] clouds of merits. The merits themselves are the clouds. Because they are the determining factor in giving the cooling rain of the means of happiness which pacify the pain of every torment of suffering.⁵ Through those, [the means] arising, issuing from, those [clouds of merits]. In this way having directed the mind towards the fulfilment of the temporal happiness of others, showing the fulfilment of ultimate happiness, he says, when ...

168. When will I teach emptiness to those who hold the false view of perception, by the conventional, and

¹ T. *tshogs* 'accumulation.'

² T. *yo byad* 'necessaries [of life].'

³ T. *ji lta* (P. *lta*) *bu zig ñe bar bsags pas yin la gzan gyis ma yin ze na / ran gis te* 'Through what kind of accumulation? Is it not through the other? Through my own.'

⁴ T. *nam / gzan gyis yin ze na* 'or by another?' in place of *nety āha* 'No, he says.'

⁵ T. *sdug bsñal gyis gduñ ba thams cad kyis ñen pa*.

the accumulation of merit respectfully with non-perception [of gift, giver and receiver]?¹

603.16 **When**, at what time, **will I teach**, will I explain, **emptiness**, the absence of essential nature of all *dharma*s, **to those who hold the false view of perception**, to those conceptually attached to apprehending existents. How? **By the conventional**, by conventional usage, because otherwise it is not possible for the emptiness of the ultimately empty to be taught insofar as it is not a conceptual object.² In this way it is taught with the aim of the accumulation of knowledge which is the cause of ultimate happiness. Showing the cause of that, the determining factor which is the accumulation of merits, he says, **the accumulation ... The accumulation³ of giving and the other⁴ merits**. When will I show them to those who hold the false view of perception, is the connection. **Respectfully**, with great reverence, having paid honour, not haphazardly. In what way? **With non-perception**, on account of non-perception⁵ of the triad of gift, giver and receiver etc., that is to say, with purity regarding the three points⁶ In this way, the collected accumulation of merits arises for the attainment of buddhahood. Thus then⁷ by all this it has been shown that wisdom arises as the means of pacifying all sufferings because it is the means of dispelling all obscuration insofar as it is the counteragent to the conceptualisation⁸ of all false

¹ The Tibetan translation of this verse is problematical insofar as it corresponds fully neither with the Sanskrit verse nor with the Tibetan translation of the commentary. See Saito (1993) pp. 27-8.

² T. *nam par rtog pa'i yul du gyur pas* 'insofar as it has become a conceptual object.'

³ T. *tshogs pa ni phui po yin no* 'the accumulation, the mass.'

⁴ Vaidya *jñānādeḥ* supported by neither T. nor context.

⁵ T. *adds la sogs pa* 'etc.'

⁶ T. '*khor gsum* 'the three spheres' = *trimaṇḍala* Cf. ŚS 183.11 *dadato datvā ca trimaṇḍalapariśodhitam dānaprāmodyam*, cited BHSD p. 258.

⁷ T. *de nīd ni*. Perhaps reading *tad eva* in place of *tad evam*.

⁸ T. does not translate *vikalpa* 'conceptualisation.'

attributions which are the cause of every defilement, and because it is the cause of the entire attainment of the state of tathāgata.

Those sages¹, elevated on account of their stainless knowledge conducive to purifying defilements, whose erring has been removed by skilful wisdom through immersion² in deep methods, are wise; and though they should take the best part entirely without stain³ from this mixture of good qualities and faults, if it is incorrectly expressed, they should reject it⁴ as if it were poison.

Nothing which I have said here is correct; ultimately, it is only blundering I have brought forth. Will the sages accept from me the understanding here by way of this [treatise] made now⁵ by me?⁶

Moreover⁷,

Whose understanding which is like mine does not stumble for the sake of such as that which, by the conventional, somehow becomes an object of the mind? Thus, may those participants in the middlemost method who discern⁸ the meaning of wise speech, having seen some fragment of good qualities here, accept it in their mind.⁹

¹ T. *dpa' bo* 'hero' = *śūra*. This supports MS. See LVP fn. 3 p. 604.

² T. *rtogs* 'understanding.'

³ See next fn.

⁴ T. *dri ma thams cad* '[they should reject] everything impure.'

⁵ T. *de ltar*. Read *da ltar*?

⁶ T. *rañ gir byas te* 'made my own.'

⁷ T. does not translate *api ca* 'moreover.'

⁸ T. *ñes pa dañ ldan pa* 'endowed with certainty.'

⁹ T. *glo bur 'gyur?* *Buddhi* on p. 561.7 is also translated as *glo bur*. T. read *blañ bya yid?*

By whatever benefit-producing merit I, having effected the conventional¹ exposition of wisdom with clear words of detailed explanation, have acquired on account of pacifying the thick delusion of views adverse to correct knowledge, [by that merit] may all people quickly be born as a source of wisdom, like Mañjuśrī, the unique dwelling-place of true virtues.

The commentary on the perfection of wisdom section in the *Bodhicāryāvatāra* is completed. This is the work of the scholar-monk Prajñākaramati.

¹ T. does not translate *sāṃvṛtām* 'conventional.'

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